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This paper investigates if multinationals in.uence the political process through lobbying more effectively than national firms. First, I introduce a model which contrasts a multinational's incentives for lobbying with those of a national firm. Then the effect of lobbying on the political decision is analyzed. I conclude that multinationals have smaller incentives to lobby because they have smaller stakes in national markets. But the effectiveness of lobbying by multinationals might be higher if the government cares much about production in the home country. The resulting regulation depends on the relative strength of these effects.

Mestrado APNOR ; Lobbying is itself not a very new topic. However, the current practices of the lobbying in the European Union (EU) and the relationship between lobbying firms' expenditures and their main performance indicators, like firms' annual turnover, their annual productivity growth, annual value-added, annual patents, annual profit margins and firms' annual regulation intensity are still a new topic and has not been drown enough attention in the literature. The literature mostly focuses on the lobbying tactics, successfailure of the lobbyists and generally provides theoretical and qualitative analyses. This research aims to shed light on the current practices of lobbying in the EU and the correlation between lobbying expenditures and firms' key performance indicators by using qualitative and quantitative analysis. The purpose of the current study was to investigate the evolution and current practices of lobbying in the EU, examine the particular case of Portuguese Businesses and determine if there is any relationship between lobbying firms' expenditures and their annual turnover, annual productivity growth, annual value-added, annual patents, annual profit margins and annual regulation intensity. The study undergoes exploratory research in which both qualitative and quantitative data is gathered and analysed. The research used the online quantitative data set available regarding the lobbying activities of European countries and their firms between 2016-2020. One of the main data sources used provides information about the last five years. The other source of information used provides information since 2008. The study findings show that lobbying activities and registration in the transparency register increased in the last ten years, and the volume of lobbying expenditures also increased significantly. The digital, banking, energy, technology, and car manufacturing sectors were found to be spending the most. It is also found that there is a positive relationship between a firm's expenditures and the firm's annual turnover, its value-added yearly, and its yearly regulation intensity in the EU. ; O lobbying em si não é um tópico muito novo. No entanto, as práticas atuais de lobby na União Europeia (UE) e a relação entre os gastos das empresas de lobbying e seus principais indicadores de desempenho, como a faturação anual das empresas, o crescimento anual de produtividade, valor anual acrescentado, as patentes, as margens de lucro anuais e a intensidade da regulamentação anual das empresas ainda são um tópico novo e não têm atraído atenção suficiente na literatura. A literatura concentra-se principalmente nas estratégis de lobbying ou no sucesso/fracasso dos lobista e, geralmente, fornece apenas análises teóricos e qualitativas. Assim, este trabalho de investigação visa lançar uma luz sobre as práticas atuais de lobby na UE e a correlação entre as despesas de lobbying e os principais indicadores de desempenho das empresas, usando uma análise qualitativa e quantitativa. O presente estudo teve como objetivo investigar a evolução e as práticas atuais de lobbying na União Europeia, examinar o caso particular das empresas portuguesas e determinar se existe alguma relação entre as despesas das empresas em lobbying e o seu volume de negócios anual, produtividade anual crescimento, valor acrescentado anual, patentes anuais, margens de lucro anuais e intensidade de regulamentação anual. O estudo constitui-se como um trabalho de investigação exploratório em que dados qualitativos e quantitativos são recolhidos e analisados. A investigação utilizou um conjunto de dados quantitativos disponíveis online sobre as atividades de lobbying dos países europeus e suas empresas entre 2016-2020. Uma das fontes de dados utilizadas fornece informações sobre os últimos cinco anos. A outra fonte de informação utilizada fornece informações desde 2008. Os resultados do estudo mostram que as atividades de lobbying e o seu registro aumentaram nos últimos dez anos assim como o volume das despesas. Os setores digital, bancário, de energia, tecnologia e produção de automóveis foram os que mais gastaram. Também se constatou que há uma relação positiva entre os gastos de uma empresa e a sua faturação anual, o seu valor acrescentado anual e sua intensidade de regulamentação anual na UE.

The paper is concerned with effects of lobbying activities by political pressure groups that wish to affect environmental legislation. Two interest groups are considered, environmentalists on the one hand and a polluters' lobby on the other. These two groups can influence the environmental policy in two ways. First, they support those political parties that promise to implement their favoured kind of environmental regulation. This support has an impact on election probabilities and, therefore, on the environmental policy measures implemented by the new government. The second way of influencing political decisions is to exert pressure on an existing government. These two approaches are used in the paper to address the questions of how environmental quality is affected by lobbying activities and how large the resource waste due to lobbying is.

pt. 1. The role of lobbying in representative self-government March 27, 28 and 30, 1950 -- pt. 2. Housing lobby April 19-21, 25-28, May 3, 5, and 17, 1950 -- pt. 3. Contingent fee lobbying May 18, 1950 -- pt. 4. Lobbying, direct and indirect, National Economic Council, Inc. June 6,20,21, and 28, 1950 -- pt. 5. Lobbying, direct and indirect, Committee for Constitutional Government June 27-29 and August 25, 1950 -- pt. 6. Lobbying, direct and indirect, Americans for Democratic Action July 11-12, 1950 -- Lobbying, direct and indirect, Public Affairs Institute July 14, 1950 -- pt. 8. Lobbying, direct and indirect, Foundation for Economic Education July 18, 1950 -- pt. 9. Lobbying, direct and indirect, Civil Rights Congress August 3-4, 1950 -- pt. 10. Legislative activities of executive agencies, Bureau of the Budget, General Accounting Office, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Department of Agriculture, Federal Security Administration, Department of State March 30, May 5, July 26 and 28, 1950. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Techniques of modern lobbying provide organized interests & a variety of tactical options. How does the mix of tactics employed by groups vary across different lobbying campaigns? When, & why, will groups use some tactics & not others? Prior research points to organizational structure & resources, features of the issue, & institutional forces as crucial determinants of lobbying. We analyze patterns of advocacy using data from a survey of interest groups about their activities on 15 federal nominations for judicial & related offices considered by the US Senate from 1984 through 1991. We find that the overall amount of advocacy varies across nominations according to the importance of the office, as do the types of organizations involved -- but lobbying tactics do not. We also find that organizational resources have some effects on the use of some tactics, but, overall, these effects are quite limited. Organizations of all types engage in multiple, often disparate, tactics. The absence of strong organizational constraints helps to account for the regularities we observe across lobbying campaigns. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article offers a systematic exploration of why interest groups sign up to the European Union Transparency Register, a non‐binding lobby regulation system. We distinguish between instrumental and normative perspectives to explain voluntary compliance, and find that concern for one's reputation represents the most important motivational driver. Based on this, we suggest that the Transparency Register can be understood as a "voluntary club" sponsored by European institutions. This theoretical perspective captures the appeal of the instrument among lobbyists, but also a number of inconsistencies in its current design, which make it unviable in the long term. We outline implications for the ongoing reform of the Transparency Register, and more generally for the regulation of lobbying activities. The analysis draws on semi‐structured interviews with various types of lobbyists active in Brussels, and on data from public consultations organized by the European Commission.

AbstractThis article offers a systematic exploration of why interest groups sign up to the European Union Transparency Register, a non‐binding lobby regulation system. We distinguish between instrumental and normative perspectives to explain voluntary compliance, and find that concern for one's reputation represents the most important motivational driver. Based on this, we suggest that the Transparency Register can be understood as a "voluntary club" sponsored by European institutions. This theoretical perspective captures the appeal of the instrument among lobbyists, but also a number of inconsistencies in its current design, which make it unviable in the long term. We outline implications for the ongoing reform of the Transparency Register, and more generally for the regulation of lobbying activities. The analysis draws on semi‐structured interviews with various types of lobbyists active in Brussels, and on data from public consultations organized by the European Commission.