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The interest rate plays an important role in the economies. It's like a self-regulator of capital allocation. Interest rate changes is a complex mechanism: 1) the economic downturn in the demand for credit decreases and this reduces the cost of credit, 2) economic recession increases credit risk, which is the rate-increasing factor, 3) improving the country's economic situation, growth of gross domestic product and positive direction of change of other macroeconomic variables, interest rates may rise. Factors affecting the rate can be divided into three categories: economic (inflation and the country's economic activity, the degree of foreign influence on financial markets, government securities supply and demand changes), political (control of the money supply, changes in the tax area, the reserve rate) and social (in the age structure of the population employment rate). The financial crisis is a challenge for everyone. In order to reduce stress in the financial sector, to increase the liquidity of the financial system and the implementation of monetary policy incentives measures, the ECB's key interest rate was reduced to a minimum low limit. Negative central bank policy interest rates in history have few examples: Switzerland (foreign currency deposits), Sweden, and Denmark (certificates of deposit), Switzerland, Denmark and Germany (negative short-term bond yields). ECB's cheap and readily available monetary policy can be a deciding factor in lending, businesses moving out of recession in the development phase. Requires detailed studies assessing the risk of interest rate theory implications for financial stability. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15544/ssaf.2012.21

A new theory of interest rates, the Neo-Fisherian theory, predicts a low inflation rate due to a central bank's low interest rate. After several years of near-zero interest rate policies and low and even negative infl ation rates in the eurozone and in the US, this theory gained momentum in academic circles. Indeed, central banks have had a hard time reaching their infl ation targets. This paper argues that it is not the low central bank policy rate which causes low inflation but rather the low equilibrium real interest rate, the economy's real interest rate under full employment and stable prices, in combination with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, which restricts the effectiveness of monetary policy and causes low infl ation. In order to stabilise infl ation in the medium term, higher equilibrium real interest rates are necessary. Since monetary policy cannot move the equilibrium real interest rate, structural policies are needed.

The interest rates have remained low in recent years, after long decline over the past thirty-five years in OECD countries. This evolution is associated to a slowdown of output growth, while inflation stabilized around its two percent target. In trying to provide a better understanding on how we got there, we review the macroeconomic developments during almost sixty years. Conventional analysis of the role of macroeconomic policy does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the observed long-term trends. In particular, large fiscal deficits and growing debt ratios did not lead to higher interest rates, except in a few countries, whose governments were facing serious fiscal troubles. Conservative monetary policy can explain the low level of inflation that have prevailed since the middle of the eighties, but not the continuous decline of the real interest rate. Based on a few stylized facts we suggest a direction for a plausible characterization of a low growth / low interest rate regime

The interest rates have remained low in recent years, after long decline over the past thirty-five years in OECD countries. This evolution is associated to a slowdown of output growth, while inflation stabilized around its two percent target. In trying to provide a better understanding on how we got there, we review the macroeconomic developments during almost sixty years. Conventional analysis of the role of macroeconomic policy does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the observed long-term trends. In particular, large fiscal deficits and growing debt ratios did not lead to higher interest rates, except in a few countries, whose governments were facing serious fiscal troubles. Conservative monetary policy can explain the low level of inflation that have prevailed since the middle of the eighties, but not the continuous decline of the real interest rate. Based on a few stylized facts we suggest a direction for a plausible characterization of a low growth / low interest rate regime

This lecture focuses on the costs of public debt when safe interest rates are low. I develop four main arguments. First, I show that the current US situation, in which safe interest rates are expected to remain below growth rates for a long time, is more the historical norm than the exception. If the future is like the past, this implies that debt rollovers, that is the issuance of debt without a later increase in taxes, may well be feasible. Put bluntly, public debt may have no fiscal cost. Second, even in the absence of fiscal costs, public debt reduces capital accumulation, and may therefore have welfare costs. I show that welfare costs may be smaller than typically assumed. The reason is that the safe rate is the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital. If it is lower than the growth rate, it indicates that the risk-adjusted rate of return to capital is in fact low. The average risky rate however also plays a role. I show how both the average risky rate and the average safe rate determine welfare outcomes. Third, I look at the evidence on the average risky rate, i.e., the average marginal product of capital. While the measured rate of earnings has been and is still quite high, the evidence from asset markets suggests that the marginal product of capital may be lower, with the difference reflecting either mismeasurement of capital or rents. This matters for debt: the lower the marginal product, the lower the welfare cost of debt. Fourth, I discuss a number of arguments against high public debt, and in particular the existence of multiple equilibria where investors believe debt to be risky and, by requiring a risk premium, increase the fiscal burden and make debt effectively more risky. This is a very relevant argument, but it does not have straightforward implications for the appropriate level of debt. My purpose in the lecture is not to argue for more public debt, especially in the current political environment. It is to have a richer discussion of the costs of debt and of fiscal policy than is currently the case. (JEL E22, E23, E43, E62, H63)