This article provides an overview of some of the most prevalent topics in post-Yugoslav memory politics as well as on some of the scholars working on these issues, focusing on the commemorative practices of the Second World War and the wars of the 1990s. Thirty years after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the discourse of post-war memory politics continues to dominate nearly all of the successor states, even though two of them have seemingly left the past behind to join the European Union. While the wars of the 1990s created an entirely new memoryscape in the region, they also radically transformed the way in which each country commemorated the Second World War. Although the article examines in-depth the collective remembrance of sites of memory, such as Jasenovac, Bleiburg, and Knin, trends across the broader region are also addressed. The work of young scholars, as well as experienced researchers, who have introduced innovative approaches in memory studies in the former Yugoslavia, is highlighted to show how new studies focus on the cultural reproduction of dominant narratives in addition to top-down political discourse.
Petar II Petrović Njegoš is probably the most famous figure in Montenegro's history and a particular symbol of this place. Despite his short life, he achieved fame not only as a politician but also as an artist. The article aims to analyze how the memory of Petar II Petrović Njegoš – a symbolic figure in the history and culture of Montenegro – has been constructed. The analysis will focus on the public debate on this figure in relation to the motion to establish a new national holiday – Njegoš's day, i.e., the day of Montenegrin culture. The study uses both the discourse method and content analysis, including legislative projects, newspaper articles, television broadcasts, public speeches, and other messages from individual politicians and intellectuals. The public debate on Njegoš revealed how the inconsistency of memory, primarily the Montenegrin, Serbian and Bosniak memory, generates conflicts and at the same time deepens the prevailing social divisions.
30 years after the tragic events in Vukovar, the Serb and Croatian communities live side by side, each cultivating their memory of their own tragedy and their own victims. The peaceful reintegration, that Croats are proud of, did not go hand in hand with building an atmosphere of reconciliation. No wonder then, that Vukovar is a model example of a divided city, where the mental divisions and psychological barriers affect its politics and everyday life. It seems that such a situation is favourable to politicians in Belgrade and Zagreb. One gets the impression that, as in 1991, Vukovar is becoming a victim of great politics and the clash of Serbian and Croatian nationalism.
The book analyses issues associated with the contemporary and memory in the Polish-German borderlands a complex, multidimensional cultural and geographic area. The first section of the book, which focuses on contemporary issues, is divided into three parts: namely, a theoretical body, records of conversations with the inhabitants of the borderlands who are engaged in social activities, and records of workshops and conversations that brought together teenage inhabitants of the borderlands. Close cooperation with the inhabitants of two borderland towns resulted in several interesting perspectives on the borderlands, which are seen as a physical space, as well as a mental, intimate, close, and sometimes frustrating space subject to micro- and macro-scale transformations. In this book, the borderlands are viewed from these two perspectives. The micro-scale, is marked out by the individual experience of the inhabitants of the borderlands, and the macro-scale by the institutional framework established for the purpose of constructing an integrated community on the border.--
In: Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej; The Impact of the Russian Federation upon the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Volume 18, Issue 3, p. 195-223
The Conference on "Recovering Forgotten History" is one of the oldest attempts undertaken in the III Republic to defend Poland's (and East- Central Europe's) image abroad, especially in the US. From 2006, the Conference has organized its seminars, originally bi-annually and now annually, to provide a forum for discussions between the authors of English-language history textbooks and monographs, and Polish historians who review those publications. Arguments are scholarly, grounded in evidence of primary sources and historiography, therefore, they are convincing in combatting Western prejudices and clichés about Poland and East-Central Europe. Additionally, the Conference provides opportunities for sightseeing of Poland's historical places. As a result, the work of the Conference leads not only to the removal of countless mistakes and misinterpretations in the reviewed books but also to a change of guests' attitudes toward this part of Europe. For the most part, they are academic teachers, who can also influence students through their classes. The Conference achieves all of this while having very modest means at its disposal.
The aim of the paper is to scrutinize activities related to the commemoration of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. There were three main goals of the research. The first one was to identify the most important actors of the commemorative activities. The second goal was to reconstruct the strategies applied by these agents. Thirdly, this research aimed to consider current processes in the Ukrainian political system. In particular, the question was what we can know about the evolution of these commemorative activities after the Euromaidan based on relations between different agents in the mnemonic field. Special emphasis was placed on Sheptytsky's attitude during the Holocaust and on the impact of this topic on the commemorative activities. As a theoretical framework of the research, Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard's theory of the politics of memory was applied. The research enabled verification of some elements of Kubik and Bernhard's concept. Inter alia it was an issue of a set of presumptions regarding interrelations between strategies applied by mnemonic actors, the structure of mnemonic regime, and prospects for democratization of a political system.
The article aims to analyse the impact of historical memory on foreign and security policy using the example of the Serbia – Kosovo relations in the period of 2014-2019. Historical memory is a burden, challenge and opportunity for foreign and security policy, and has a considerable impact on bilateral relations between countries which used to be in conflict. Historical memory generates numerous research questions – who is the architect of memory? what are the actors? what are the mechanisms, tools and instruments of its creation? how is it used to maintain power and what are its effects? – to name but a few. In the example analysed, leaders use historical memory to create separate identities and gain power, whereas NGOs do it to commemorate victims. Historical memory is present in celebrating important dates, historical places, monuments and events, and creating national heroes. It also draws attention to the stereotypes in school textbooks and to transitional justice. The most important space for historical memory in the analysis is Kosovo and the role of an international organisation – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Historical memory has an important function in the process of regional reconciliation, which is an essential condition for cooperation and security in the Western Balkans.
The Treaty of Trianon (hereinafter Trianon), the enormous losses of territory and co-ethnics, and the shaking of Hungary's status as a dominant power in the Carpathian Basin imputed a tragic understanding of contemporary Hungarian history on the Hungarian society, invoking the idea of a trauma lasting even today. Trianon's understanding became a divisive issue for political parties after 1989, highlighting the ever-deeper divisions between right and left-liberals, since 2010. Its "overcoming" is a flagship project of the government's politics of identity, with modest success so far. Thus, the 100th anniversary was a crucial moment as a test case for a self-professed nationalist, traditionalist, conservative political force for manifesting a comprehensive politics of memory. In the light of the newly built monument at the heart of Budapest, with the Hungarian names of all localities on the territory of pre-1918 Hungary inscribed on its wall, a cautious shifting back to territorial revisionism was expected. In this article, I will argue that even with such tendencies being, obviously, present, the official commemorations were crafted with a surprising message, that attempts to turn the canonical understanding of Trianon upside down and reframe it into a common catastrophe of Central Europe. Doing so places the consequences in the context of the decolonization of history, the present decline of empires, and the emergence of nation-states while combining it with important tropes of the traditional, anti-liberal and revisionist Trianon discourse. Nevertheless, the result is a transparently political message that is not only driven by easily visible actual political goals (V4 and Central European), but one that detaches the politics of memory from historical references and legacies and creates a set of shallow symbols for utter instrumentalization, to recombine at will, in a vulgarised sense of post-modernism.
The transformation of the political system in Poland after the negotiations of the'Round Table' resulted in an increased interest in modern history, accompanied by a desire to reckon with the past, in particular with the period of communist rule after 1944. Since the 1990s, government authorities and political parties have made a natural move to legitimize the democratic political system in the area of social memory and historical policy. This process has been initiated by constitutional changes, coupled with a truly spontaneous social movement to change national symbols, names of streets and squares, patrons of schools and universities, institutions and manufacturing plants rooted in the overthrown system of communist Poland. The humanities, in particular historiography, have taken steps to reassess attitudes to Polish and global history. The issues of social memory, national identity and historical policy have been reflected in the ideologies and platforms of various political parties. The issue of social (national) memory has become entangled in political disputes and a struggle for 'control of the past', of interpretations of history, the value of patriotism and, by extension, of the electorate, has been waged mainly by the Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parties. This paper analyzes and describes the most influential political movements in Poland in the early 21st century as regards their attitude to collective memory and the concept of historical policy. These attitudes are presented in terms of the conservative, liberal, critical and totalitarian 'models of historical policy'. The study implies that the conservative and liberal models predominate, clearly influenced by the ideology of Christian democracy and national tendencies. The attitude of conservative parties in particular is characterized by disrespect for academic findings and interpretations of history, a frequently ad hoc approach to facts and assessments of the past, which follows from a desire to find the in-depth historical legitimization of the status of a given party in society and to dominate the electorate. ; The transformation of the political system in Poland after the negotiations of the'Round Table' resulted in an increased interest in modern history, accompanied by a desire to reckon with the past, in particular with the period of communist rule after 1944. Since the 1990s, government authorities and political parties have made a natural move to legitimize the democratic political system in the area of social memory and historical policy. This process has been initiated by constitutional changes, coupled with a truly spontaneous social movement to change national symbols, names of streets and squares, patrons of schools and universities, institutions and manufacturing plants rooted in the overthrown system of communist Poland. The humanities, in particular historiography, have taken steps to reassess attitudes to Polish and global history. The issues of social memory, national identity and historical policy have been reflected in the ideologies and platforms of various political parties. The issue of social (national) memory has become entangled in political disputes and a struggle for 'control of the past', of interpretations of history, the value of patriotism and, by extension, of the electorate, has been waged mainly by the Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parties. This paper analyzes and describes the most influential political movements in Poland in the early 21st century as regards their attitude to collective memory and the concept of historical policy. These attitudes are presented in terms of the conservative, liberal, critical and totalitarian 'models of historical policy'. The study implies that the conservative and liberal models predominate, clearly influenced by the ideology of Christian democracy and national tendencies. The attitude of conservative parties in particular is characterized by disrespect for academic findings and interpretations of history, a frequently ad hoc approach to facts and assessments of the past, which follows from a desire to find the in-depth historical legitimization of the status of a given party in society and to dominate the electorate.
The transformation of the political system in Poland after the negotiations of the 'Round Table' resulted in an increased interest in modern history, accompanied by a desire to reckon with the past, in particular with the period of communist rule after 1944. Since the 1990s, government authorities and political parties have made a natural move to legitimize the democratic political system in the area of social memory and historical policy. This process has been initiated by constitutional changes, coupled with a truly spontaneous social movement to change national symbols, names of streets and squares, patrons of schools and universities, institutions and manufacturing plants rooted in the overthrown system of communist Poland. The humanities, in particular historiography, have taken steps to reassess attitudes to Polish and global history. The issues of social memory, national identity and historical policy have been reflected in the ideologies and platforms of various political parties. The issue of social (national) memory has become entangled in political disputes and a struggle for 'control of the past', of interpretations of history, the value of patriotism and, by extension, of the electorate, has been waged mainly by the Law and Justice (PiS), Civic Platform (PO), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) parties. This paper analyzes and describes the most influential political movements in Poland in the early 21st century as regards their attitude to collective memory and the concept of historical policy. These attitudes are presented in terms of the conservative, liberal, critical and totalitarian 'models of historical policy'. The study implies that the conservative and liberal models predominate, clearly influenced by the ideology of Christian democracy and national tendencies. The attitude of conservative parties in particular is characterized by disrespect for academic findings and inter- pretations of history, a frequently ad hoc approach to facts and assessments of the past, which follows from a desire to find the in-depth historical legitimization of the status of a given party in society and to dominate the electorate.
The multicultural and multiethnic character of Śląsk Opolski frequently leads to emotionally heated disputes over such symbols of the past as historical monuments, anniversaries of historical events, cemeteries, signs with topographic names and so on, which is reflected in regional policy. History and collective memory are obviously used by the politicians of Śląsk Opolski (both by political parties and minority organizations) for their current political purposes, in order to achieve certain political interests (such as winning or retaining voters) by means of exerting an influence on the regional community or selected groups and by shaping certain attitudes and behaviors. The author refers to concrete examples of debates held in the region to explain the phenomenon of the politicization of history. She ponders the role of researchers, including political scientists, in preventing the politicization of the past and emphasizes the necessity for their taking a stand in the process of forming regional historical policy. ; The multicultural and multiethnic character of Śląsk Opolski frequently leads to emotionally heated disputes over such symbols of the past as historical monuments, anniversaries of historical events, cemeteries, signs with topographic names and so on, which is reflected in regional policy. History and collective memory are obviously used by the politicians of Śląsk Opolski (both by political parties and minority organizations) for their current political purposes, in order to achieve certain political interests (such as winning or retaining voters) by means of exerting an influence on the regional community or selected groups and by shaping certain attitudes and behaviors. The author refers to concrete examples of debates held in the region to explain the phenomenon of the politicization of history. She ponders the role of researchers, including political scientists, in preventing the politicization of the past and emphasizes the necessity for their taking a stand in the process of forming regional historical policy.
The increasing popularity of programs promoting aktywność (activity) in old age in contemporary Poland is part of regional and global attempts to encourage health and economic productivity in old age. In order to understand this interest in aktywność in old age, such practices must be seen within broader sociocultural and political-economic contexts. This drive for aktywność cannot be fully explained without understanding its status as an unquestioned moral good in opposition to illness, disability, and frailty in old age. Seeking commonalities across such seemingly opposite experiences can reduce marginalization in old age. Side-stepping binary constructions of health and illness in old age creates a more holistic perspective that demonstrates how older Poles in a range of contexts create moral lives. ; Rosnąca w Polsce popularność i szerzenie się programów promujących aktywną starość stanowi część lokalnych i globalnych działań na rzecz utrzymania zdrowia i produktywności ekonomicznej starszych osób. Aby lepiej zrozumieć zainteresowanie aktywnością w starszym wieku, należy rozpatrywać te praktyki w szerszym społeczno-kulturowym i polityczno-ekonomicznym kontekście. Wzmożonego dążenia do aktywności nie sposób dogłębnie pojąć, jeśli nie uwzględni się tego, że aktywność stała się niekwestionowanym dobrem moralnym stanowiącym przeciwieństwo choroby, niepełnosprawności i zniedołężnienia. Wskazując, że te pozornie przeciwne doświadczenia łączy faktycznie wiele podobieństw, można przeciwdziałać marginalizacji starszych osób, a odrzucając binarne konstrukcje zdrowia i choroby w odniesieniu do osób w starszym wieku – zastosować bardziej holistyczną perspektywę umożliwiającą zrozumienie, jak starsi ludzie w Polsce kreują sobie w różnorodnych kontekstach moralne życie.
The establishment of the Lithuanian state and the consolidation of independence in the Republic of Lithuania (1918–1940) was accompanied by the construction of an appropriate collective memory and the accompanying historical narrative. The Catholic Church in Lithuania at that time was an authoritative institution that influenced various spheres of domestic life in the country; therefore, it could also influence the collective memory. This article attempts to answer whether the Catholic Church in Interwar Lithuania sought to form a collective memory. It is stated that the Lithuanian Episcopate did not demonstrate a purposeful desire to form a collective memory because it did not have a clear and unified approach to the culture of memory. There were other reasons: at first it was hindered by the worries of creating an independent ecclesiastical province of Lithuania, and from the end of the 1930s the Church's relations with the government became strained, as the latter hindered the social activity of Catholic society. The Church did not specifically shape its own story about the creation of a modern Lithuanian state and the history of modern Lithuania. However, the Church turned to this past when, in defending the freedom of action of the Catholic Church, it wanted to emphasise the role of the Church in the creation of an independent state of Lithuania.
