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59 pages, maps, charts, The Herald of Asia library of contemporary history ; no. 5 ; https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/moore/1086/thumbnail.jpg

"ATO-130." ; "ZAT-761(ALL)." ; "November 3, 1998." ; Shipping list no.: 98-0377-P. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Lettered on cover: Official history of the war. ; One folded map in pocket of v. 1 and of v. 2. ; Maps on front lining papers. ; Atlas in portfolio. ; "List of books consulted": v. 1, p. xv-xvi; v. 2, p. xv-xvi. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Modern military forces experience a wide variety of accidents, including explosions, collisions, fratricide, and "friendly fire." These accidents are examined as a problem of organizational structure by applying Perrow's theory of normal accidents to modern military operations. Modern combat operations score so highly on complexity and interdependence that they can be expected to trigger structurally induced normal accidents. As military operations become more tightly coupled and more complicated, system accidents may become more frequent. Some military technologies are sufficiently complex and tightly coupled for system accidents to be "normal," that is, inevitable.

Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- 1 Information Sharing in Military and Security Operations -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Information Sharing with Whom? -- Why Is Information Sharing Among Partners Beneficial, Even Though It May Be Hard to Do? -- Acting like an Oyster: Why is Information Sharing Among Partners Problematic? -- The Dynamics of Non-sharing and Non-receiving -- Conclusions and Organization of this Volume -- References -- 2 Information Fusion: Intelligence Centers and Intelligence Analysis -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Defining Information Fusion -- Origins of the Concept -- Civilian Policing and Security -- Civilian Fusion Centers -- Criticisms of Civilian Fusion Centers -- Models of Information Fusion -- The Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) Process Model -- Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop -- C-OODA -- Military Information Fusion Centers -- The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre -- The U.S. Joint Analysis Center (JAC) -- Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) -- Air Force Joint Battlespace Info-Sphere -- Criticism of U.S. Military's Fusion Centers -- Conclusion -- References -- 3 Oh, Didn't Anyone Tell You? The Importance of Intra-Organizational Information Sharing -- Abstract -- Organizational Justice and the Role of Informational Justice -- Informational Justice -- This Study -- Procedure -- Sample -- Measures -- Descriptive Results -- Descriptive Analyses of Demographic Variables -- Correlational Analyses -- Mediational Analyses -- Discussion -- References -- 4 Information Sharing in Contemporary Operations: The Strength of SOF Ties -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Organizational Effectiveness in Multinational HQs -- Special Forces and Conventional Forces in Operations -- Case Study: SOF HQs in Kabul -- Main Barriers to Information Sharing -- Conclusion: A Delicate Chemistry -- References

It is almost six months since the launch of operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan.1 The operation has been further extended to Khyber agency named as Khyber-12 with the aim to root out terrorism from Pakistan. An endeavor has been made in this study to focus on the main objectives of the operation Zarb-e-Azb and its conduct and the success story so far narrated as well as the local, regional and international narratives and perspectives attached to its modus-operandi and ultimate goals. The paper also addresses the preparation for and circumstances under which the operation has been launched and significance of timings and the element of surprise and the scope in the time and space dimensions. There is a need to analyze the fallout effects of the operation in the internal and external perspectives and highlight the significance of its outcome. The importance of integrated strategy to achieve sustainable peace and the need for revisiting policies in terms of long-term implications and reorientation has been recommended for a sustainable solution.
The article, prepared by an IPS Task Force, is primarily based on a roundtable held at IPS on October 20, 2014. It covers the developments with regard to the ongoing military operation and its outcomes up to the first week of December 2014. The scenario continues to be changing and a shift happened when a brutal attack took place on a school in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The argument presented here, however, remains relevant in spite of somewhat changing situation in the post December 16 scenario. The task force headed by DG IPS Khalid Rahman included Senior IPS Associate Brig. (r) Said Nazir and Assistant Research Coordinator Ms. Fehmeedah Khalid.

Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for al-Queda terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and no CB or nuclear weapons stockpiles or production facilities have been found.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.