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How fragile is our knowledge of morality, compared to other kinds of knowledge? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds? Sarah McGrath offers new answers to these questions as she explores the possibilities, sources and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge.

Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable because they do not express genuine propositions.' The second half of the twentieth century brought a revival of interest among philosophers in moral and political questions. Whether or not ethics can be founded upon a rational basis continues to preoccupy the philosophical community even now

In the area of moral epistemology, there is an interesting problem facing the person in my area, ancient philosophy, who hopes to write a historical paper which will engage with our current philosophical concerns. Not only are ancient ethical theories very different in structure and concerns from modern ones (though with the rapid growth of virtue ethics this is becoming less true), but the concerns and emphases of ancient epistemology are very different from those of modern theories of knowledge. Some may think that they are so different that they are useful to our own discussions only by way of contrast. I am more sanguine, but I am quite aware that this essay's contribution to modern debates does not fall within the established modern traditions of discussing moral epistemology.

"Based on an unfinished manuscript by the late philosopher Dallas Willard, this book makes the case that the 20th century saw a massive shift in Western beliefs and attitudes concerning the possibility of moral knowledge, such that knowledge of the moral life and of its conduct is no longer routinely available from the social institutions long thought to be responsible for it. In this sense, moral knowledgeas a publicly available resource for livinghas disappeared. Via a detailed survey of main developments in ethical theory from the late 19th through the late 20th centuries, Willard explains philosophys role in this shift. In pointing out the shortcomings of these developments, he shows that the shift was not the result of rational argument or discovery, but largely of arational social forcesin other words, there was no good reason for moral knowledge to have disappeared. The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge is a unique contribution to the literature on the history of ethics and social morality. Its review of historical work on moral knowledge covers a wide range of thinkers including T.H Green, G.E Moore, Charles L. Stevenson, John Rawls, and Alasdair MacIntyre. But, most importantly, it concludes with a novel proposal for how we might reclaim moral knowledge that is inspired by the phenomenological approach of Knud Logstrup and Emmanuel Levinas. Edited and eventually completed by three of Willards former graduate students, this book marks the culmination of Willards project to find a secure basis in knowledge for the moral life."--Provided by publisher.

chapter 1 Moral Knowledge Disappears -- chapter 2 A "Science of Ethics"? -- chapter 3 G. E. Moore: From Science of Ethics to Nihilism -- chapter 4 Emotivism: The Erasure of Moral Knowledge -- chapter 5 A Rational Form of Noncognitivism? "Rational Necessity" Relocated -- chapter 6 A Consensus of Rational People: Social Constructionism in Rawls -- chapter 7 Practices, Traditions and Narratives: Social Constructionism in MacIntyre -- chapter 8 Prospects for a Return of Moral Knowledge.

Moral knowledge disappears -- A "science of ethics"? -- G.E. Moore: from science of ethics to nihilism -- Emotivism: the erasure of moral knowledge -- A rational form of noncognitivism? "Rational necessity relocated" -- A consensus of rational people: social constructionism in Rawls -- Practices, traditions, and narratives: social constructionism in MacIntyre -- Prospects for a return of moral knowledge