Two studies investigated the effects of the perception of the opponent's motives and incentives to defect on cooperation in a mixed-motive game. Study I varied the perceived goal of the other (by instructions) and the incentive of the other to defect (by payoff values). Study II varied the other's incentive as well as the subject's incentive to defect, both by payoff values. The results indicated that the perceived goal of the other strongly influenced the subject's cooperation. The incentive of the other also affected cooperation, except when the other was assumed to be pursuing a benevolent goal. Finally the subject's incentive did not affect his cooperation nearly as much as did his opponent's incentive.
Abstract:This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of cooperation in productive ventures, conceived of as collective action endeavours that require cooperation rather than mere coordination. It is argued that cooperative behaviour is grounded on three kinds of 'common goods', defined as goods that are shared and recognized as beneficial by the workers. These comprise common goals, relational satisfaction, and moral norms and values. The commonly held goods are associated with motives and behavioural rules which constitute both the reasons for cooperating and the means through which the dilemmatic nature of cooperation is overcome. It is further argued that the binding character of these rules is closely linked to humans' ability and opportunity to communicate. Normative guidelines relative to management practices and directions for future research are also derived.
The emergence of new models of socially oriented cooperatives in the agrarian sector of the economy is a necessary condition for the realization of successful economic policy of the state, implemented in conditions of institutional tension. The cooperative movement in Russia has a unique multifaceted and at the same time complex character of functioning. With the powerful development of agricultural holdings, which act as the main drivers of agricultural production and export, small farmers face signifi cant problems in building a successful cooperative system. The purpose of the research, the results of which are presented in this article, is to develop a comprehensive approach to the study of social motives for the development of agricultural cooperation in the modern market environment in the context of its special role in the development of the agricultural industry, rural communities and rural areas. In the framework of this study, the factors constraining the development of cooperative associations were identifi ed, the model of values of new-type cooperatives was proposed, including the key role of leadership as the main driving force for the powerful development of agricultural cooperation. The factors of cooperative trust formation are identifi ed in order to increase motivation and encouragement to join these associations. The conclusions formulate the most signifi cant parameters of the new model of cooperative knowledge management, contributing to the sustainable development of the Russian cooperation in modern conditions, acceptable for its realization with the following parameters.
This experiment systematically varied the degree of friendship of S's in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. A pre-exp'al sociometric questionaire provided the basis for selecting exp'al groups of M Coll S's who were (a) best friends, (b) acquaintances, (c) nonacquaintances, & (d) disliked individuals. 62 S's were assigned by pairs into 1 of the 4 conditions. Results differed sharply for the 2 Coll's involved. In one the overall level of cooperation was quite high, & the predicted signif positive relationship between degree of friendship & amount of cooperation emerged, with best friends & acquaintances being more cooperative than the other 2 groups. In the other Coll cooperation was lower, & the best friends were markedly least cooperative. The results show that the level of cooperation in a mixed-motive game is a complex phenomenon & sensitive to a number of situational influences. AA.
PurposeThis paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the motives, structure and performance attributes of horizontal cooperations between logistics service providers (LSPs). Based on an analytical classification model, distinctive types of logistics cooperation that characterize the logistics landscape are identified.Design/methodology/approachEmpirical data were collected on horizontal LSP cooperations from managers of German LSPs. Different uni‐ and multi‐variate statistical methods including ANOVA and cluster analysis were applied to the dataset of 226 cooperations for a total of 6,081 involved parties.FindingsHorizontal cooperations with other LSPs are an organizational form used by 57 percent of LSPs. Cooperation decisions are substantially driven by external market objectives. Six distinctive types of cooperation are identified. They reveal the dominance of multi‐lateral and international networks that are mainly based on contractual agreements. There is a clear preference for partners with similar market competencies and for strong functional integration. Despite its inherent complexity, performance of these cooperations is high – its less than 19 percent failure rate makes these cooperations substantially more stable than cooperations within manufacturing industries.Research limitations/implicationsThis study is limited to an exploratory, descriptive approach in providing a sound understanding of the cooperation landscape.Practical implicationsThe findings contribute transparency to horizontal LSP cooperations and a common understanding of their idiosyncrasies. The conclusions help logistics managers to position themselves better within the cooperation landscape. Further, the analyses offer managers a conceptual classification of horizontal LSP cooperations and some guidance on how to structure their individual LSP cooperations more successfully.Originality/valueThis paper is the first empirical study that defines the types of cooperation that comprise the logistics cooperation landscape. The analysis integrates a holistic perspective of their contractual, organizational, functional, geographical, service and resource scope and matches them with underlying motives and performance attributes.
The relative effectiveness of pacifistic and retaliatory strategies in eliciting cooperating in a mixed-motive game is unclear due to confounded manipulations of these strategies and inadequate experimental designs in earlier research. In an attempt at clarification, subjects in the present studies were exposed to opponents programmed with one of three strategies: nonretaliatory (pacifist), low retaliatory, or high retaliatory. A multivariate analysis of repeated measures in experiment 1 revealed an effect of strategies and an interaction of strategies by trial blocks. The low retaliatory strategy elicited the most cooperative behavior, the high retaliatory next, and the nonretaliatory least, these differences increasing over trials.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
The Thesis explores the motives and conditions under which the US, China, and Russia are likely to cooperate on arms control in cyberspace in order to improve both their national and international security. It is stated that hostile states will be in favor of negotiating a limitation of cyber capabilities to reduce escalation and avoid the damage caused by a potential conflict. The analysis is based on defensive realism theory, which explains the conditions leading to "negative cooperation" among potential adversaries. Three variables are identified which help to analyze the potential of cooperation in cyberspace: a) motives; b) the distinction between defensive and offensive cyber capabilities; c) information. The research shows that the risk of a cyberspace conflict escalating between the US, China and Russia encouraged them to seek cooperation. However, only few cooperation precedents could be described as successful. The same principles and conditions are valid for both cyber and military disarmament regimes. Two types of conditions necessary for effective cyber disarmament are identified. The first refers to external conditions such as the increased confrontation, the use of offensive cyber capabilities and applying of exhaustion strategy. The second refers to internal condition – this is a lack of trust between states which deepens the security dilemma in cyberspace. While evaluating the potential of cyber disarmament regime, worth mentioning that conditions which lead to "negative cooperation" create the ground for the disarmament regime in cyberspace.
