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Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

At its founding in 1957, the European Union (EU) had no environmental policy, no environmental bureaucracy, and no environmental laws. When, in 1973, the EU began systematically to address environmental concerns there was little expectation that the environment would develop into one of the largest areas of common activity. Twenty-five years on, the EU has some of the most progressive environmental policies of any state in the world although it is not itself a state. At the same time, the preexisting environmental policies of the member states have undergone a progressive change through their involvement in EU environmental policymaking. In other words, the member states have created an institutional entity to perform certain tasks which has in turn deeply affected the way they themselves perceive and act against environmental problems. This theme issue of Government and Policy offers a retrospective analysis of these developments. The purpose of this introductory essay is to describe the historical evolution of EU environmental policy and to identify the most salient themes.

Presents an analytical framework for comparing patterns of devolution to subnational governments & autonomous social insurance institutions in social security systems. The framework has two components: (1) analysis of financial structures along the dimensions of financial autonomy (indicated by the extent to which the administering institution raises its own revenue or depends on central grants) & financial responsibility (indicated by whether marginal costs are borne by the administering institution) & (2) the assignment of policy-making power; in particular, the effects of competitive & cooperative modes of devolution are contrasted. The discussion uses examples from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, & the US. While looking for "principal-agent" relationships between central governments & administering institutions, it was found that more complex multilevel governance structures prevailed in most cases. 1 Diagram, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

Presenting a fresh alternative to traditional state-centred analyses of the process of European integration, 'Governance in the European Union' clearly shows the interaction of subnational, national, and supranational actors in the emerging European polity. This 'multilevel politics' approach offers a powerful lens for viewing the future course of European integration. The authors' empirical exploration of areas such as regional governance, social policy, and social movements underpins their broad conceptual and theoretical framework, providing significant new insight into European politics

Presenting a fresh alternative to traditional state-centred analyses of the process of European integration, 'Governance in the European Union' clearly shows the interaction of subnational, national, and supranational actors in the emerging European polity. This 'multilevel politics' approach offers a powerful lens for viewing the future course of European integration. The authors' empirical exploration of areas such as regional governance, social policy, and social movements underpins their broad conceptual and theoretical framework, providing significant new insight into European politics.

Over the past 5 years, a new and unexpected form of interest representation has developed in the European Union: subnational governments that mobilize directly in Brussels. The authors propose explanations for this phenomenon, drawing on theories of public choice, resource mobilization, and multilevel governance. The first set of hypotheses is concerned with the material and cultural resources that may induce a subnational government to organize in the European arena. The second set of hypotheses explains regional representation as an outcome of overlapping competencies, tensions, and conflicts in a system of multilevel governance. Logistic analysis of the probability of regional representation provides support for the second set of hypotheses. The authors find that subnational representation is positively associated with the degree of overlap between the competencies of subnational and supranational governments and with the political distinctiveness of a region and the relative strength of citizens' regional identity.

Recent studies of the role of lobby groups in European Union (EU) policymaking have drawn attention to the concept of 'multilevel governance' as a powerful explanatory tool in analysing how these organisations exert political influence on EU institutions. One of the longest standing of these groups is the Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles (COPA). Until the mid-1980s, COPA was regarded as being remarkably successful in influencing the content and direction of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), More recently, however, commentators have noted a marked decline in COPA's influence, citing as evidence the organisation's abortive attempts to blunt the radical edge of the 1992 reform package of the Common Agricultural Policy. In this paper the authors use Grande's conception of multilevel governance to provide a thorough examination of why COPA carried little influence with the European Commission's Agriculture Directorate, Directorate-General VI (DGVI) during the 1992 reforms. An illustrative case study is presented of a minor though notable element of these reforms, the so-called 'agri-environment' regulation, EU 2078/92. In explaining COPA's slight effect on the final text of the regulation, Grande's notion of multilevel governance emphasises the eclectic positions adopted by COPA's constituent farming unions towards the regulation, and the complexities of a negotiating process transacted simultaneously with different EU institutions, each requiring the tailoring of specific lobbying strategies by COPA's secretariat. The authors conclude that the negative outcome of COPA's lobbying resulted not only from disarray among this organisation's national policy constituencies, but also from skillful counterlobbying mounted by DGVI to prevent COPA from derailing the delicate CAP reform process.

Canada has experienced two formal federal ministries dedicated to addressing urban issues. The first, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, encountered resistance from provincial governments and its fellow departments. Both worked to undermine it. The second, the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities, was created with a more conciliatory tone towards the provincial governments and its ministerial colleagues. This paper examines the establishment of both ministries and tracks their efforts using a policy learning and lesson-drawing framework, concluding that common institutional actors, such as the Privy Council, were responsible for the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities' change in tone and approach to multilevel governance. General lessons are drawn about inter-governmental relations and multi-level policy formation in federal systems.