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We develop a theoretical model in which ?rms are either private or state-owned. When ?rms become insolvent, the government can intervene with general measures, like subsidies, or by nationalizing ?rms. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a ?rm entails social costs. In a stylized model, we analyze how government interventions a?ect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalization of private ?rms in case unpro?table investments were made, leads to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers working for ?rms is also affected by government intervention with an impact on productive efficiency.

We develop a theoretical model in which there are public and private firms and a government. When firms become insolvent, the government can intervene with bailouts or nationalizations. The government only intervenes when the bankruptcy of a firm entails social costs. In this setting, we analyze how government interventions affect allocative and productive efficiency. Nationalizations of private firms after unprofitable investments lead to increased allocative efficiency despite private ownership. The effort level chosen by the managers and employees working for a firm is also affected by the possibility of government interventions, reducing the productive efficiency advantage of private firms.

Victorian Telegraphy before Nationalization offers an analysis of the technological and entrepreneurial features of the Victorian telegraph service, together with the companies which ran it until nationalization in 1869. Based on original research and extensive study in a variety of archives, the book presents a comprehensive overview of the service. It analyzes both the business and technological history of the Victorian telegraph, showing how they were interdependent. Using a methodological approach, it tracks the ownership of the business, uncovers boardroom-level power games, and examines the financial results. The book examines in detail the technological evolution of the telegraph sector, its innovations and user needs, and its continuous interaction with developments in other fields.

"This paper studies the cycles of nationalization and privatization in resource-rich economies. We discuss available evidence on the drivers and consequences of privatization and nationalization, review the existing literature, and present illustrative case studies. Our main contribution is then to develop a static and dynamic model of the choice between private and national regimes for the ownership of natural resources. In the model, this choice is driven by a basic equality-efficiency tradeoff: national ownership results in more redistribution of income and more equality, but undermines incentives for effort. The resolution of the tradeoff depends on external and domestic conditions that affect the value of social welfare under each regime. This allows us to characterize how external variables - such as the commodity price - and domestic ones - such as the tax system - affect the choice of private vs. national regimes. The analysis therefore identifies the determinants of the observed cycles of privatization and nationalization, and is consistent with a variety of observed phenomena"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

This thesis is focused on the nationalization of party systems in Western Europe and combines four different approaches. Despite the literature claiming that political decentralization reduces party system nationalization, the first paper shows that this effect depends on the level of personalism that the electoral system allows. The second article shows a new effect of the nationalization of party systems. This variable is shown to be a crucial element to explain turnout differences across districts within a country. The third article of this thesis is centered on the impact of the electoral system on party system nationalization through a crucial-experimental approach based on electoral reforms in Western Europe. Finally, the last part of the thesis focuses on describing and analyzing the nationalization of political parties in Spain, paying particular attention to differences among national and subnational parties. ; Esta tesis doctoral está centrada en la nacionalización de los sistemas de partidos en Europa Occidental desde cuatro perspectivas diferentes. Una hipótesis clásica de la literatura es que la descentralización política reduce la nacionalización. En el primer artículo se muestra que el efecto de esta variable depende de que haya un grado suficiente de personalismo en el sistema electoral. En el segundo artículo se demuestra un nuevo efecto de la nacionalización de los sistemas de partidos; esta variable determina las diferencias en la participación electoral entre distritos dentro de un mismo país. El tercer artículo se aproxima al fenómeno mediante experimentos cruciales centrados en las reformas del sistema electoral en Europa Occidental a fin de estimar su efecto sobre la nacionalización. Finalmente, el último artículo analiza la nacionalización de los partidos en España y sus principales determinantes, distinguiendo particularmente entre partidos de ámbito nacional y subnacional.

Includes abstract. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 51-55). ; Within a context of political posturing and intimidation it can become difficult for fruitful discussion to emerge and real debate can be stifled. The nationalisation of mines in South Africa is a discussion that has been debated in such an environment. The aim of this dissertation is to cut through the political posturing and get to the fundamental question surrounding nationalisation of mines in South Africa. Would nationalising the South African mining industry enhance its contribution to the achievement of poverty and inequality reducing economic growth? This is the central question to the debate because the twin objectives of the South African government are to eradicate poverty and substantially reduce inequality.

This dissertation is about the institutional choices governments make to manage their petroleum wealth. It is about the determinants of these choices, but more importantly, their consequences for effective governance and how they explain variations in political outcomes in oil-producing countries. I begin by describing several different institutional pathways -- involving national oil companies (NOCs) and their varying characteristics -- that governments can take in extracting petroleum and regulating its production. My goal, then, is to show how these seemingly technical institutional choices can have profound impacts on governance, ranging from effects on state revenue collection to incentives for corruption to ultimately the survival of the regime itself. To this aim, I collected original longitudinal data on the formation of NOCs in 62 countries since 1900; data from U.S. Department of Justice transcripts on the prosecution of corrupt practices in the energy sectors of 80 countries in the 2006-12 period; and existing cross-national data on government revenue capture from the sale of oil and natural resources. I analyze the determinants of NOC formation in the first empirical chapter, where I use Bayesian analysis informed with interview-based data from oil consultants to test and confirm leading theories of state revenue-maximization as the primary determinant of expropriation. In the following chapter, I analyze the process of extortion in the oil sector where I show cross-nationally how NOC institutional design influences bribery to high-level government officials. In the penultimate chapter, I expand on the governance consequences of NOCs by showing that nationalization ultimately increases state resource revenues, creating pathways for regime stability and duration. In the last chapter, I discuss the theoretical implications of my argument and findings. I make two broad claims in this dissertation. First, while there is much agreement that oil is not always and everywhere a curse for political development, there is little consensus about the specific conditions or institutions that do and do not matter. I help turn the ``institutions matter'' phrase from a vague stylized fact into a well-measured, clearly-specified phenomenon. Second, when it comes to the production of natural resources, classical economics theories would suggest that state intervention will lead to inefficiency, lower outputs and therefore lower revenues. In contrast, I argue and show evidence that some forms of state intervention -- that is, certain types of NOCs -- actually increase both production levels and revenues when compared to periods of no state intervention. Taken together, my dissertation applies novel ways to measure and test theories about oil's conditional effects on politics that are widely circulated but often assumed rather than tested.

This article uses a representative sample of elections held in 80 countries (1992–2012) for a statistical analysis of societal and institutional factors of party system nationalization. The analysis demonstrates that high degrees of political decentralization, such as in federations and devolved states, exert a strong negative effect on party system nationalization. However, in the long-term federalism can accommodate highly nationalized party systems. Another factor that strongly contributes to party system nationalization is a high quality of democracy. The degrees to which different varieties of electoral rules support party system nationalization are associated with a lack of incentives for cultivating the personal vote. Countries with large populations and societies divided along linguistic and/or religious lines tend to have party systems that are less nationalized, but these factors are not as important as institutional determinants. The impact of some of the factors is mitigated by party system fragmentation.