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Examined are equilibria in multi- & two-party political systems. Drawing on the work of Anthony Downs (An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row, 1957), a rational-choice model of governmental decision making is presented that has a one-dimensional policy space for the positions of parties & voters, & assumes an arbitrary continuous density of voters, voters for the nearest party, & parties that try to maximize the number of votes. Sufficient & necessary conditions for equilibria are given, from which it is deduced that for systems with a large number of parties, equilibria are rare unless the density of voters is uniform. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

An examination of the multi-party system in Israel and to a large extent also in France during the last two decades reveals the emergence of three distinct types of party clusters. These approximate to a limited extent to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, but reveal motives and conditions other than those he postulated. The party clusters are distinguished as Conglomerate Blocs, Proportionally Amalgamated Parties and Unitary Amalgamated Parties. An analysis of the party systems in at least these two countries show the conditions likely to foster the formation of such party configurations, their modes of operation, and the internal stresses they generate.

Changes in West European party systems can be related to a four-fold typology: imbalance, balance, diffusion, & fragmentation. The extremes of imbalanced & fragmented party systems are no longer represented: West European countries all now tend towards balanced or diffused forms. The balanced type is well represented, & it accords with the pattern of majority government & cohesive opposition. However, several systems show growth in diffusion: seen in the lack of clear polarization & by the rise in the number of parties represented in assemblies. A diffused system imposes quite different conditions for the successful operation of parliamentary government. Thus the occurrence of minority government, as a relatively stable form of rule, implies a high degree of consensus in the political system & requires an amount of overt or disguised interparty cooperation. AA.

THIS ARTICLE PROPOSES A NONLINEAR MODEL FOR THE CAREERS OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. THIS MODEL IS EASILY INTERPRETABLE, IN SPITE OF ITS NONLINEARITY, AND YIELDS A MEASURE, HERE CALLED THE "CAREER COEFFICIENT," THAT SUMMARIZES THE CAREER PATTERNS OF ANY FRESHMAN CLASS. FOR DATA FROM THE 1ST THROUGH THE 93RD CONGRESSES, THE MODEL FITS EXTREMELY WELL. COMPARING THE CAREER COEFFICIENTS OF THE 93 FRESHMAN CLASSES, WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE PATTERN OF CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS FOLLOWS THE PATTERN OF THE PARTY-SYSTEM ERAS IN AMERICAN POLITICS. THESE PATTERNS CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE LEVELS OF INTERPARTY COMPETITION CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PARTY SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS BY THE GENERAL DESIRABILITY OF A HOUSE SEAT DURING THESE HISTORICAL PERIODS.