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In this article, we reinterpret the current political turn in animal rights theory in terms of republican as opposed to liberal political theory. By appealing to the values of liberty and fraternity as well as equality, we argue for a conception of animal liberation from human domination and not from humanity per se. This establishes a basis of liberty and fraternity in our cooperative relationships with animals in a "zoopolis," or interspecies political community. We contend that such a basis for interspecies political cooperation is not available on the more traditional model of animal liberation, where rights are derived from weak equality of the species.

This article points out that Henrik Enroth often seeks to reveal things that are not obvious. An invitation to manifest good political science is in that sense an invitation not only to hold anybody to things they want to stand up for, but also to implicitly discern what is especially important to say in political science right now. We may manifest walls around the points of contention, but these texts are actually surprisingly consistent: The main thread associates the good political science with life. Adapted from the source document.

In Karl Popper's famous book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, appears the formulation social engineering. That is an unfortunate wording. There is nothing mechanical in Popper's political strategy. The keywords are rather piece-meal & trial & error. It is even possible to characterize Popper as -- up to a point -- anti-rationalistic. His warning that we should not think too much of our knowledge of the functioning of the social world & of our ability to make forecasts, reminds one of what a critic of the French Revolution like Edmund Burke had to say. We should start with the delivered institutions, diagnose what is working badly &, aware of possible error, try to improve it. That said, one is not surprised of meeting a strain of antipolitics in Popper's philosophy. Although Popper welcomes measures to clear away suffering & distress, it is uncertain how he would balance his negative utilitarianism against individual freedom. He is distrustful of political power. The idea that democracy gives the people the instrument of governing is an illusion. Democracy's point is to make it possible to dismiss a government (notice the parallel with his methodology, a government is a kind of hypothesis, the election an opportunity for falsification.) However, it is not Popper's political philosophy in a substantial meaning that makes him worth studying, but his theory of the critical discourse, a theory that is very relevant for a reformistic political strategy. The idea of the Popperian discourse is not to get the parties closer emotionally, not to reach a compromise, not even to convince, but for me to listen to & learn from the criticism of my hypotheses. People with divergent standpoints should not be kept out of the discourse, they should be welcomed. Popper admires Greek culture up to Socrates & he emphasizes its openness to influences from other cultures along the shores of the Mediterranean. That is in keeping with Popper's antinationalism. Nationalism fattens stupidity & is often the cause of devastating violence. In his later works Popper regularly uses an evolutionary model & his theory of language is no exception. He sets forth how the development of describing, language's third function besides expressing & warning, created the possibility of storytelling. Now, stories can be true & false, & that makes language's fourth function necessary, the function of argumentation, of proving or disproving of what has been said. Lying, however, is a wonderful invention. To lie, to say what is not, but could be true, is a nursery for fantasy & creativeness. 33 References. Adapted from the source document.

Policymakers in Sweden, as in most of the rest of the world, believe that we are responsible for the crimes we commit but not for our ill health. One reason for why we are excused for the latter, even in cases where our actions is the cause of our ill health, is because these actions are in turn ultimately caused by factors outside our control. If this is true for these actions, however, it seems that the same thing could be said with regard to our criminal behavior. In this paper I argue that this disparate position can be explained with reference to data from the field of experimental philosophy. In cases where individuals have done something we believe is morally wrong, then we tend to disregard from the fact that their behavior is ultimately caused by factors outside their control. In cases where individuals instead have done something morally neutral, then we instead tend heed to the fact that their actions is ultimately caused by factors outside their control. Since most of us believe that being sick is morally neutral & committing a crime is morally wrong, this can explain why policymakers tend to think that we are responsible for the one but not the other. Adapted from the source document.

A reading of David Hume with the intent to highlight components of a reformistic approach to social change. The well-known formulation about "reason as the slave of passions" poses the first problem. In spite of this, it is maintained that reason plays a decisive role in Hume's theory of knowledge as in his practice as a political philosopher. Connected with this problem is Hume's skepticism, which is based on the discovery of the logical impossibility of inductive inference. However, this theoretical skepticism does not lead to defeatism regarding the possibility of improving knowledge & society; it just leads to modesty &, paradoxically, to an even more important role for reason. A parallel to Hume's criticism of induction is his demonstration of the impossibility of deducing values from facts. Again, it is necessary to notice the difference between his theoretical position & his recommendations for politics. The task of the historian is to give a causal explanation of social institutions &, on the basis of this, point out values inherent in the institutions. This gives the instrument for a rational discussion of maintaining or reforming the institutions. Obviously, Hume is a relativist, but not in the usual & careless meaning of individual or collective subjectivism. Values are produced by men in a historical process, but as they stand before the historian & the politician, they are as objective as facts. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Hume with his view of the importance of an informed & critical discussion of social problems comes close to critical-rationalism. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.