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In this article, we reinterpret the current political turn in animal rights theory in terms of republican as opposed to liberal political theory. By appealing to the values of liberty and fraternity as well as equality, we argue for a conception of animal liberation from human domination and not from humanity per se. This establishes a basis of liberty and fraternity in our cooperative relationships with animals in a "zoopolis," or interspecies political community. We contend that such a basis for interspecies political cooperation is not available on the more traditional model of animal liberation, where rights are derived from weak equality of the species.

This article points out that Henrik Enroth often seeks to reveal things that are not obvious. An invitation to manifest good political science is in that sense an invitation not only to hold anybody to things they want to stand up for, but also to implicitly discern what is especially important to say in political science right now. We may manifest walls around the points of contention, but these texts are actually surprisingly consistent: The main thread associates the good political science with life. Adapted from the source document.

"Theodore Metochites, a distinguished figure in the intellectual and political landscape of the early Palaiologan period (1261-1341), was born in Constantinople in 1270. The On Morals or Concerning Education is an extensive disquisition about the significance and status of cultural education (paideia) in the context of Palaiologan society. The oration might also be seen at least partly as an autobiographical narrative exposing Metochites's inner reflections and anxieties. The On Morals belongs to the genre of the protreptikos, a hortatory speech designed to encourage its readers to study philosophy and attain virtue. With the On Morals Metochites sought to establish himself as a continuator of ancient moral philosophy in late Byzantium"--

Policymakers in Sweden, as in most of the rest of the world, believe that we are responsible for the crimes we commit but not for our ill health. One reason for why we are excused for the latter, even in cases where our actions is the cause of our ill health, is because these actions are in turn ultimately caused by factors outside our control. If this is true for these actions, however, it seems that the same thing could be said with regard to our criminal behavior. In this paper I argue that this disparate position can be explained with reference to data from the field of experimental philosophy. In cases where individuals have done something we believe is morally wrong, then we tend to disregard from the fact that their behavior is ultimately caused by factors outside their control. In cases where individuals instead have done something morally neutral, then we instead tend heed to the fact that their actions is ultimately caused by factors outside their control. Since most of us believe that being sick is morally neutral & committing a crime is morally wrong, this can explain why policymakers tend to think that we are responsible for the one but not the other. Adapted from the source document.