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Due to a lack of time and expertise, policy makers often rely on others, such as bureaucrats, experts, or advisers, when policy decisions have to be made. A nontrivial problem is that those who possess information have a vested interest in the policy outcome; this gives them an incentive to manipulate or conceal information. In this book, we examine a penalty for lying and the power to replace an advisor as a means of restraining information providers from information manipulation. We argue that these two institutional arrangements may not always help a policy maker to attain a better decision (Chapters 2 and 3). Inasmuch as consequences of policies are complicated and difficult to foresee, small groups like committees often assist policy makers to collect information, deliberate over policies, and devise policy recommendations. As information is not for free, committee members must be motivated to collect it. We shed some light on how deliberation affects committee members' incentives to gather the costly information, and thus the quality of collective decision-making (Chapter 4). Outside the political arena, agency problems between politicians and voters also exist. In Chapter 5, we examine how elections play their role of disciplining and selecting politicians and how policy choices are made when politicians differ in their motivations in running for political office.

Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theory's central finding is that individuals' attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting. Where do these preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not. © 2011 The Author. Political Studies Review © 2011 Political Studies Association.

Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theory's central finding is that individuals' attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting. Where do these preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not.

Little attention has been paid so far, in the current discussion re the use of PO polls in pol, to consideration of the limits placed on the polls by the nature of pol'al decision-making What polls can tell politicians, & what politicians want & need to know, are considered. It appears that the shortcomings, like the strength of polls, are probably no greater, though definitely diff from, those of other sources of pol'al intelligence. It is all the more tempting to reject the validity & utility of polls if the method produces findings which the individual dislikes on pol'al grounds. IPSA.

Economic rights can be instantiated in a variety of ways. This article investigates the problem associated with making economic rights into policy through one source: the political policymaker. By considering the policymaker's decision problem, we can identify particular decision flaws and possible corrective measures that might prompt economic rights instantiation through "enlightened self-interest." A complementary approach involves constitutionalizing economic rights as directive principles and enforceable law, which could work somewhat independently of the policymaker's preferences and/or beliefs. The final part of the article examines a sample of actual constitutions to determine whether government effort toward fulfilling economic rights is related with constitutionalization. The evidence considered here suggests a positive relationship: countries with better economic rights provisions in their constitutions demonstrate greater economic rights effort.

"This encyclopedia traces the development and future of research on political decision making through an exploration of its central theoretical approaches, methodologies, and substantive topics of perennial interest. The focus is on political decision making as a question of individual psychology: individual preferences, information search, evaluation, and choice. Through peer-reviewed contributions by leading researchers, the encyclopedia provides a general framework for studying political decision making that applies to both everyday citizens and political elites"--

Sound political decision making requires input from various sources. Science represents one important source. Among the scientific disciplines systems analysis particularly provides the means for knowledge transfer between science and political decision making because systems analysis incorporates a multidisciplinary approach covering the spectrum from engineering and the natural sciences to economics and the political sciences. For instance, the development of an efficient, environmentally friendly and safe energy supply system may be regarded as one of the great challenges a country continuously has to face. In industrialized countries like Germany, the results from systems analysis have been used very fruitfully for this task since the early 70s. For this purpose energy models have been developed to provide the analyst with an appropriate tool. Over the years the number of energy models has increased significantly and the models have become more sophisticated. However, one can identify a few lighthouse projects representing the state of art. The IKARUS Project on behalf of the German Government may serve as such an example where a large number of institutions from science and industry have been involved to establish a solid platform for the debate on the future German energy system under the boundary conditions of climate protection. This effort led to a large database containing the relevant data and a family of models covering the various aspects of the energy system. After successful completion of these tools they have served to formulate the official German strategy to achieve reductions in the emissions of energy related greenhouse gases according to the Kyoto process. But even such a big effort cannot cover all aspects of technology evaluation and as political decision making proceeds to new or modified targets the tools of energy systems analysis have to be updated. This volume provides an overview of methods and corresponding results in the field of energy systems analysis at Forschungszentrum Jülich. ...