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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS DO NOT HAVE A GOOD THEORY OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING. THE AUTHOR, IN THIS ESSAY-REVIEW OF FOUR WORKS STUDYING STATESMANSHIP, FOREIGN RELATIONS, DIPLOMACY, AND AGGRESSION AND HISTORY, INVESTIGATES THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING DECISION MAKING. HE DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE QUESTION: ARE BELIEFS, VALUES, AND CALCULATIONS AUTONOMOUS? HE SAYS CONCLUSIONS ARE EXPLAINED MOST BY BELIEFS.

Risk is a central feature of political decision making. Prospect theory, an empirically correct theory of choice under risk that deals precisely with this condition, therefore seems to have much to offer political science. Prospect theory's central finding is that individuals' attitude toward risk depends on whether they face losses or gains. Confronting gains, individuals are risk averse in their decision making; confronting losses, they are risk accepting. Where do these preferences come from? Do they also hold for collective decision making? How can prospect theory help us to solve puzzles in political science? This article addresses these questions by discussing some advances in evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, psychology, neuro-economics and political science. The article shows that there is increasing evidence that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin and that these preferences extend to collective decision making. Moreover, it demonstrates that political science can indeed gain from applying prospect theory, as insights from prospect theory help to solve puzzles such as why some governments pursue electorally risky welfare state reform but others do not.

Little attention has been paid so far, in the current discussion re the use of PO polls in pol, to consideration of the limits placed on the polls by the nature of pol'al decision-making What polls can tell politicians, & what politicians want & need to know, are considered. It appears that the shortcomings, like the strength of polls, are probably no greater, though definitely diff from, those of other sources of pol'al intelligence. It is all the more tempting to reject the validity & utility of polls if the method produces findings which the individual dislikes on pol'al grounds. IPSA.

Economic rights can be instantiated in a variety of ways. This article investigates the problem associated with making economic rights into policy through one source: the political policymaker. By considering the policymaker's decision problem, we can identify particular decision flaws and possible corrective measures that might prompt economic rights instantiation through "enlightened self-interest." A complementary approach involves constitutionalizing economic rights as directive principles and enforceable law, which could work somewhat independently of the policymaker's preferences and/or beliefs. The final part of the article examines a sample of actual constitutions to determine whether government effort toward fulfilling economic rights is related with constitutionalization. The evidence considered here suggests a positive relationship: countries with better economic rights provisions in their constitutions demonstrate greater economic rights effort.