Kant, Hegel, Heller i ambivalentni "ustav slobode"
In: Politicka misao, Volume 30, Issue 4, p. 130-139
The author shows that it is not possible to formulate a consistent theory of freedom, tying together the internal perspective of action & the external perspective of rational description & explanation of action. In the history of philosophical discussion about freedom as a fundamental concept of liberalism, Kant & Hegel represent two extremes. Each tried to formulate consistently a concept of freedom & its moral & political consequences, but both paid the price of one-sidedness. Kant postulates the primacy of the internal perspective of the moral subject, which is ideally expressed by his categorical imperative. However, the concept of freedom defined from the stance of autonomous morals loses contact with the historical world of traditional values, with the consequence of moralizing politics & unrealistically disregarding the nation as a characteristic framework of politics. Hegel points out the priority of the external perspective, which gives him an analytical advantage relative to liberal theories of natural law & Kant's moralist position. However, as warned by the German political theorist Hermann Heller, Hegel's position results in defining the sphere of collective morality as superior to individual action, disregarding the protection of individual liberties against the state & accepting national politics of power as the only criterion for international politics. The author concludes that liberal constitutions, unlike totalitarianism, must then be inconsistent. Adapted from the source document.