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NATO's political and - above all - military participation in secession-motivated conflicts in former Yugoslavia (1990-1995), will be remembered as a clear example of demonstration of power, intentions and (in)capability of the Victor in a decades-long global "cold war" between the "freedom-loving" West and "totalitarian East". Regardless of the expectations of liberal theoreticians and the majority of public opinion, it was soon revealed that the victory was no "triumph of freedom" and even less "the end of history". On the contrary, as historically typical, it was only an unstable resultant of relations between major actors in the modern global theater, who strive to legitimize their need for domination with varying success and vocabulary. Hence the lessons to be learned from the final act of destruction of Yugoslavia (several months of NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999) have the expected tone of banality: absolute might strives for absolute power (which remains unattainable in principle); "the mighty oppress" is true always and in any place (but with a time limit); and, finally, what everyone knows but does not (or is unable or refuses) to say aloud: the only true alternative to military threat and/or aggression of a single political actor is an equally valid (military) threat/aggression by another one. We are tempted to conclude that, despite the ideological ardor of NGO activists, the political correctness of theoreticians and the rhetorical figures of speech of politicians, the "banalities" remain valid as the only certainties, i.e., regularities in the unpredictable currents of relations between states.

Са политичким преокретом 2000. године у Србији отпочео је истовемено и процес идеолошког преобликовања јавних простора. Међу најпроминентнијим видовима оваквог деловања је именовање или преименовање урбаног простора, првенствено улица и тргова, те бављење постојећим споменицима и меморијалима, као и градња и планирање нових. Овакви су случајеви посебно били уочљиви у Београду. Њима су се у неколико наврата супротставиле одређене политичке партије, те неполитичке групе које су организовале уличне акције 'против-именовања' београдских улица, те кампање против новопланираних јавних споменика. Односи моћи и идентитетске политике у овим случајевима биће коментарисани у овом раду. Пропратиће се праксе неколико уметничких и политичких скупина које су спровеле акције и перформансе незваничног преименовања улица, или су пак дискутовале и противиле се подизању новопредложених споменика. (Пре)именовањем одређених градских простора, хегемонске политичке коалиције покушавају да конституишу сигнификантна симболичка места, док, са друге стране, опозиционе противакције покушавају да преузму та иста места и да их реинтерпретирају. У овом ће се раду покушати да прикажу и анализирају поједине идеолошке политике и званични дискурси сећања, те поједине уметничке и политичке контраполитике и опозиционе праксе алтернативне комеморације ; With the onset of political overturn in Serbia in 2000, the process of the ideological reconfiguration of public places was simultaneously being put in motion. One of the most promi- nent means of this endeavor was naming and renaming of urban space, primarily of streets and squares, but also treatment of existing memorial sites and monuments and commissioning and erection of new ones. These undertakings were especially prominent in Serbia's capital Belgrade. Such processes were opposed several times by certain political parties and groups which organized street-actions of counter-naming of Belgrade's thoroughfares and campaigns against newly designated public monuments, and power-play and identity politics of such proceedings will be commented on here. This paper will discuss practices of several artistic and political groups which carried out unofficial street-renaming actions and performances, or discussed and opposed proposed new memorials. By (re)naming certain urban spaces, hegemonic political coalitions are trying to construct significant symbolic places, while oppositional counter-actions are seeking to overtake those same places and reinterpret them. This paper will attempt to sum up and inquire into the ideological politics of official memory discourses and artistic and political counter-politics and actions of opposition or alternative commemoration.

Demokratski optimizam devedestih godina prošlog veka zamenjuje osobita forma javnog razočarenja u demokratiju. Kriza demokratije praćena institucionalnim deficitima, konfuzijom, niskim stepenom upravljačke sposobnosti da se rešavaju pitanja siromaštva, nezaposlenosti, imigracije, korupcije, simptomi su ovoga stanja. Globalni val populizma najizoštreniji je izraz ove političke patologije. Početak novoga veka rađa uzlet otvorenog neprijateljstva prema demokratiji. Deskriptivni pristupi oslonjeni na proceduralnu dimenziju režima moći ("hibridni režimi", "ograničena demokratija" "iliberalna demokratija", "kompetitivni autoritarizam" ) pokazuju se nedostatnim. U ovome radu autor se vraća klasičnom konceptu "despotizma" i pokazuje normative i teorisjke prednosti ovoga koncepta ("novi despotizam") u analizi novoga režima moći koji izrasta na pretpostvkama sve šireg nepoverenja u demokratske instituciije. ; The democratic optimism of the 1990s has been replaced by a particular form of public disillusionment with democracy. The crisis of democracy, accompanied by institutional deficits, confusion, low levels of management capacity to tackle poverty, unemployment, immigration, corruption, are symptoms of this condition. The global wave of populism is the sharpest expression of this political pathology. The beginning of the new century has given birth to an open hostility to democracy. Descriptive approaches based on the procedural dimension of the regime of power ("hybrid regimes", "limited democracy", "liberal democracy", "competitive authoritarianism") are proving insufficient to capture the new political system. In this paper, the author returns to the classical concept of "despotism" and shows the normative and theoretical advantages of this concept ("new despotism") in the analysis of a new regime of power that grows on the premise of growing distrust of democratic institutions.

The term politics, from its origin until nowadays, has been closely related to coercion and effects of coercion. The first rulers were finding support in a belief in the divine nature of power, but since, in time, this belief faded, the solution was found in physical superiority of rulers. The development of politics as an activity by which a community can be governed instrumentally, conditioned its closer linkage to force. Politics was sometimes identified with force, and sometimes politics was using force as an instrument for taming the bullying by others. Undoubtedly, the man is a rational and instinctive being. Monopolization of bullying within political activity made it possible to place the force, depending on the circumstances, into the service of one or the other attribute of human nature. Integration processes in political, economic, military and other areas, significantly contributed to changing the role of a national state in its formerly inviolable spheres, even in those elements that are considered classic attributes of the state as an institution (sovereignty, independence, monetary policy, defense, state power legitimacy, etc). Does this power, which is 'taken away' from the national state, go away, through integrative processes with other international subjects, to some distant power and alienated centers, or does it, on the contrary, enter the corpus of political activity that strengthens its overall position? Without immersing into more profound analysis about what is closer to the truth, it is a fact that through integrative processes a number of 'state' activities is transferred to joint institutions. In the spirit of this paper, the most important institutions are those which decide about organization, preparing, functioning, and using of the state (interstate) power. Strategic solutions concerning these matters, are a part of domestic and intergovernmental policy. They are products of a great number of internal and external factors, starting from economic and institutional, to social and cultural-traditional, and to international.

In this text the author elaborates on two central assumptions. The first assumption (based on the comparative survey results from ten postcommunist countries) is that there is a marked positive correlation between the residue of "communist legacy" in people's minds and the electoral success of leftist parties. Since that legacy in Croatia (and Czech Republic) has been weakest, this is going to be an aggravating circumstance for SDP in their struggle for power. The second assumption is that the politics of leftist parties which could come to power is to shuttle between two extremes: the restoration of real socialism in a modified form and the social-democratic model of Sweden or at least Germany. According to the author, the key agents of such politics are "neotraditionalism" and "political capitalism" both inherited from the former system. (SOI : PM: S. 46)

Thucydides is considered to be the founder of political realism. Even in those times he determined the basic premises of realism - security and survival. He made an impact on subsequent development of realism embodied in the works of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau, Car, Niebuhr, Aaron, Waltz etc. They will call the system of international relations as anarchical one since there is no supreme arbitrator which will force states to adequate behaviour. His views of realism were given in the volume 'The Peloponnesian War' where he had determined the anarchy of the relationships among states. Such system did not rely on justice and morale, but force and power were the predominant facts. He also introduces the category of just wars by claiming that Sparta led a just war against the increased power of Athens, and observed morale principles. Nevertheless, Thucydides faces contradictory, since Sparta itself as the largest land force of that time had to use force in order to beat Athens. He went ahead since he considered force and power as a necessary condition to achieve other objectives, which was later on adopted by Raymond Aaron. Following the example of the war between Athens and Sparta, he successfully analysed bipolar system of balance of power in which the conflict between the leading members of the two opposite blocks was possible in the end, while beforehand there should have been conflicts among weaker members of both blocks. Thucydides explained the manifestation of force and power using example of the Melian dialogue between the envoys of Athens and Melos. It was about the pure politics of force of Athens regardless of the fact that Melos had its independence.

Comparative politics is a political science discipline which has in its evolution continuously reflected the developments in the field of international politics. The author outlines the genesis of this discipline, which boomed in the 1950s with the framework of American politology. He first defines this discipline and the goes on to give an account of the evolution of the fundamental research principle, the expansion of the subject matter and the importance of the key concepts that delineate this academic discipline (political power, political system, politic regime). The author analyses the role of comparative politics in the context of other disciplines of political sciences as well as its applicative potentials. As analysis of the history of this discipline he points to the connection between shift of the interest and the focus in practical politics and the thematically specialized subdisciplines within comparative politological research. In the conclusion, the author points out the importance and the applicatory value of discipline for Croatia (as a country in the process of democratic transition) regarding the comparative analysis of the experiences of developed democracies and countries in transition. (SOI : PM: S. 148)

The author analyses Schmitt's and Luhmann's theory of democracy and the constitutional state. By comparing them, he concludes that Schmitt's critique of the democratic pluralistic state has ended in the theory of direct or plebiscitary democracy in which the constitution is subject to an unpredictable will of political majority which can change it wilfully in line with the power relations. Luhmann, on the other hand, starts from the assumption of the separation between law and politics and builds his concept of the constitutional state on the bipolar differentiation and the mutual checks between law and politics. The author concludes that Luhmann does not give up on Hobbes' pessimistic conviction that human nature is bestial; he only offers a different strategy for the coexistence of cultured savages. (SOI : PM: S. 67)

After twenty five years since the introduction of the semi-presidential system in Serbia and in the region, this text attempt to reassess its performance, achievements and limits. It analyses the factors which the power of the directly elected president depends on (constitutional competences, manner of election, whether he is a party president, whether his party has majority in the parliament). The text explains the origin of the concept and institution, reasons for introduction, criteria for maximalist and minimalist understandings of semi-presidentialism. In new democracies the semi-presidential system faces additional challenges and temptations: 'the third mandate', absence of reelection-related incentives in the second mandate, manner of inclusion in/exclusion from the creation of politics and whether the directly elected president is in the same time the party president. Possible redesign of this political institution would require taking care that the manner of election is only one of the dimensions important for functioning of this system. The issue of the level of competences is of no less importance. The key is in the careful balance of power among the three branches of power, but above else between the president of the state and the prime minister.

In this article Dr Pribicevic analyses the impact of Kosovo crises on Serbian EU integrations and shaping of political scene of Serbia. Dr Pribicevic pointed out how crises started in spring 2011 when idea of split of Kosovo appeared again in Serbia and then continued with the clashes between KFOR and Serbs from north of Kosovo in order to get the control of administrative crossing Jarinje and Brnjak. During the summer 2011 German chancellor Merkel visited Serbia and asked government in Belgrade to normalize its relations with Kosovo and dissolve "parallel institutions" of Serbs in the north of Kosovo. Following this visit Serbian government continue its negotiations with Pristina and find out solutions for administrative crossings. On the other side, Belgrade and Pristina didn't find solution for the problem of presentation of Kosovo on the regional gatherings after what European council, under the German influence, decided to postpone the decision to give Serbia the status of candidate for the EU. Therefore, Serbia remains without EU candidaturein December 2011 in spite of the fact that government in Belgrade handedover general Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic to Hague Tribunal as well as conducted a number of successful reforms which got very high marks from EU commission. In this article Dr Pribicevic is trying to answer several questions. Why Washington and Berlin imposed such a strong pressure on Serbia in this moment? Is split of Kosovo possible solution? Could Serbian government continue with current politics of EU and Kosovo or it should take one of these politics as a priority? How Kosovo crises influenced Serbian political scene? At the end, Kosovo crises opened the crucial question: could Serbia enter EU without "recognition of territorial integrity of Kosovo"as described by German foreign minister Westervele. Having in mind forthcoming elections in spring time 2012 author thinks that ruling Democratic Party as well as leading opposition party Sebian Progresive Party will continue with current politics "both EU and Kosovo". Such politics will be in accordance with the public mood in Serbia which shows that support for EU integrations is declining with the growing pressure of US and Germany on Serbian Kosovo's politics. On the other side, Serbian politics "both EU and Kosovo" is not sustainable on the long run and Serbia has to face difficult decisions in future. Also, according to the author opinion Kosovo crises showed weakness of Serbian international position. It is without important allies among key Western powers which has dominant influence in this part of Europe. Serbia has support of Russia but key influence on Kosovo has US, GB, France and Germany. These powers connected Serbia's further progress towards EU with normalization its relations with Kosovo, knowing in advance that the time when Serbia is seeking for the EU candidature is the best time to ask Belgrade to make concessions in its Kosovo's politics. Western powers do not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo but they expect Serbia to accept " territorial integrity of Kosovo", including its north part. Why Kosovo become so important for leading Western powers? Author thinks that several reasons influenced such tough behavior of Western power towards Serbia. First, after helping them to create an independent state, US perceived Albanians as the most reliable ally in this part of Europe. Second, Germany and other big powers in Europe wants to prevent creation of new frozen conflict in Europe similar to Cyprus one, Third, all big Western powers has reserves towards Serbian foreign policy and its orientation on EU but as well as on Russia, nonalignment world, China which quite often is described in the West as sitting on the two chairs, Last but not the least, Germany as well as France is not very eager of politics of enlargement of EU in the eve of forthcoming elections in these countries scheduled for 2012 and 2013. Therefore its hesitation in this moment towards further enlargement with US pro Albanian politics creates tough dillemas for Serbian politics in foreseeable future.

Finer investigated the phenomenon of politics within its spatial and temporal framework, trying to look into as many forms of government as possible and to fmd uniformity in their variety. He paid particular attention to a study of institutions of government which he considered the core of politics. His investigations focused on the state. By condensing the consequences of the emergence of the state on the forms of government, Finer came up with two variables: the extent in which rulers establish a standardized central administration and the extent in which homogeneous culture, religion and laws have been achieved. The second topic which held an important place in Finer's research is military organization. He wanted to demonstrate how the survival of a state, international order, social distribution of power, governing, the degree of bureaucratization, and a regime's nature, are intertwined with the structure of the state's military institutions. His opinion was that the military organization is necessary for the establishment and preservation of political communities, regimes and governments. According to Finer, the state's key function are preparing for wars, waging wars and reconstructing the country after them, and expecting the next one. Finer's third topic is the relationship between political and religious systems of belief. He stressed their dualistic nature, with two more or less independent hierarchies which have been a source of serious tensions. Furthermore, Finer links the existing system of beliefs, social stratification, and political institutions. Where these factors are balanced, the political community achieves permanent stability. (SOI : PM: S. 182)

The article is based on a critical review of existing literature in the field of political participation and representation of women in democratic institutions and procedures in contemporary society. Then, on the basis of relevant statistical indicators, it provides a state-of-the-art review of the participation of women in executive, legislative and judicial government in the European Union countries. The paper especially highlights the obstacles women face in the candidature for political office and when entering the political arena. It takes into account only the political factors, such as the type and structure of the electoral system, the number of parties in the parliament and their ideological differences, the number of candidates at polling stations, and the candidates' nominations for political offices, which have a crucial influence on the possibility for women to enter the political arena. Gender equality policy in the European Union in recent years has achieved significant success in the direction of larger and more equitable representation of women in all spheres of public life. However, women still do not participate in a sufficient number of institutions of governance and decision-making in economics and politics. The mere numerical, descriptive presence of women in political institutions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the increase of their political power.

The aim of this article, through an analysis of Veljko Vujacic's text and other pamphlets and manifestos by the Serbian political elite, was to show that the Serbian elite and the Serbian society have not got rid of their nationalist bias in explaining the events which led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. They claim that the main culprit for this failure was the communist national policy and the failure to use adequate means (meaning Rankovic's technology of violence) in order to preserve the unity of the state. The second part of the article serves to demonstrate how Weber's view on the politics of power does not suffice to explain away the bolshevist and the communist form of the populist Serbian nationalism. The moment when the former Yugoslav political elite split into the anticommunist and anticentralist on the one hand, and the bolshevist and the centralist on the other, there was no possibility for a compromise. The third part suggests that Vujacic (and not only he) thinks that a way of overcoming the Serbian "dominant" nationalism is the catharsis of Serbian intellectuals and the Serbian society. However, as the latest events and proclamations of the Serbian elite show, his is a solitary case. (SOI : PM: S. 37)