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Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is inherently risky. This is problematic when studying time preferences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present-biased behavior. We systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment. Discounted expected utility performs well with risk, but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply. The data cannot be explained by prospect theory, hyperbolic discounting, or preferences for resolution of uncertainty, but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty. The data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences. (JEL C91 D81 D91)

Can the well-known experimental phenomenon of present-bias in intertemporal choice be confounded with the risks associated with receiving payment? Can measurements of risk preferences be used to represent desires for smoothness in intertemporal payments? In our two 2012 papers in this journal we explored these two questions and found the answer to the first to be yes and the second to be no. We feel the three papers inspired by our work and published here underscore these arguments and point to interesting new possibilities for modeling and measuring risk over time. (JEL C91, D81, D91)

Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a,b) observe that utility functions are distinct for risk and time preferences, and show that their findings are consistent with a preference for certainty. We revisit this question in an enriched experimental setting in which subjects make intertemporal decisions under different risk conditions. The observed choice behavior supports a separation between risk attitude and intertemporal substitution rather than a preference for certainty. We further show that several models, including Epstein and Zin (1989); Chew and Epstein (1990); and Halevy (2008) exhibit such a separation and can account for the overall experimental findings. (JEL C91, D81, D91)

Theorists of justice have to steer between two rocks. On the one hand, there is the intuition that an individual's morally permitted preferences should be respected: it is not justifiable to intervene with them. On the other hand, such preferences are the result of formation processes, which are notoriously vulnerable to manipulation. Does justice demand respect for preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices, suffered either by the individual herself or by others? In this paper, I will investigate this problem in the context of the ambiguous tenet of neutrality. The field of gender justice has extended Rawlsian theories of justice in order to account for structural factors, such as socialisation. Some theorists have argued that the justice-inhibiting character of some preferences implies that the first intuition should be rejected in favour of the second in some cases, which leads to the conclusion that some preferences are like obstacles standing in the way of justice and should thus be reformed. I will call this the 'Normative Hierarchy View' and argue that it is problematic. It presupposes a certain attitude with respect to those who hold the preferences, which forecloses a politically salient kind of respect. Furthermore, at the

This review concerns political preferences—what they are and where they come from. We begin by documenting the close relationship between processes of preference formation and change. Rather than suddenly appearing, most preferences emerge from interactions between individuals and their environment. This aspect of preference formation poses a concrete challenge: to uncover the mechanics of these interactions in important social contexts. We then describe political science research that meets this challenge. We find an expansive literature that clarifies how phenomena such as parties, campaigns, and the need to act strategically affect preferences. This work provides many widely applicable insights.

This note is devoted to the question: How restrictive is the assumption that preferences be Euclidean in d dimensions. In particular it is proven that a preference profile with I individuals and A alternatives can be represented by Euclidean utilities with d dimensions if and only if d=min(I,A-1). The paper also describes the systems of A points which allow for the representation of any profile over A alternatives, and provides some results when only strict preferences are considered. ; Cette note est consacrée à la question:Quelle restriction impose-t-on en faisant l'hypothèse qu'un profil de préférences est euclidien en dimension d ? En particulier on démontre qu'un profil de préférences sur I individus et A alternatives peut être représenté par des utilités euclidiennes en dimension d si et seulement si d est supérieur ou égal à min(I,A-1). On décrit aussi les systèmes de points qui permettent de représenter tout profil sur A alternatives, et on donne quelques résultats quand seules les préférences strictes sont considérées.