Search results

We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in a committee with members of both common and conflicting interests. We show that the set of preferences that allow for the existence of an informative voting equilibrium can be heavily restricted by the presence of a public signal, regardless of the size of the committee and the choice of the voting threshold value. What's worse, the presence of the public information introduces an inefficient equilibrium which robustly exists across different voting rules. To mitigate the harmful effect of the public information, we propose to use a class of more flexible voting rules, whose threshold values depend on both the precision and the realization of the public signal, that may restore the informative voting equilibrium. In particular, in a standard setting with common interest agents, the contingent voting rule that we construct not only always restores the informative voting equilibrium but also achieves full informational efficiency.

The free flow of information and ideas is essential for democracy and respect of human rights. Censorship has the potential to allow human rights violations to occur in secret, hinder investigations into corrupt and inefficient governments, and many other things. Based on this background, this research is a legal study that takes a statutory, conceptional, and case approach to examine the following issues: 1) the philosophical basis of public bodies as public institutions providing information in the era of public information openness; 2) the existence of an information commission as an administrator and law enforcer in public information disclosure; and 3) public entities' liability against disputes based on public information from the aspects of administrative, civil, and criminal law. We conclude that freedom of information is in the spirit of democratisation that ensures freedom, based on which the state can function effectively and efficiently without neglecting democratic principles. The enactment of the UU KIP in Indonesia on 30 April 2010 opened a new era of public information disclosure in the country. This law is part of the desire to implement a spirit of transparency to fulfil citizens' human right to access public information (right to know) guaranteed by Art. 28F of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

How does salient public information affect voters&rsquo ; behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses &ndash ; subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information&rsquo ; s accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent &ndash ; subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.

How does salient public information affect voters' behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses - subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information's accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent - subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.

This study examines public information as a profession by surveying professionals at the management level in state government. Respondents provided data which was analyzed using content analysis, paired correlation, univariate statistics, and phenomenology. Results reveal a general theme involving journalism. Respondents indicated a background (educational and occupational) in journalism is the most important aspect in a public information career. This study provides average ages, dominant gender, salary figures, specific educational preparation advice, and advice for getting into and achieving in the public information field.

What are the welfare effects of enhanced disclosures of public information - Is it always the case, that frequent and timely publication of economic statistics by government agencies and the central bank are desirable - This question has become one of several interlinked strands of debate on the desirability of transparency in hte conduct of monetary policy. Here we put to the test the presumption that greater disclosures of public information is always welfare enhancing. We examine the impact of public information in a setting where a principal provides public information to private sector agents. The principal's interest is in inducing the agents to take actions that are appropriate to the fundamentals. The agents, too, are motivated to take actions appropriate to the underlying state, but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When there is perfect information concerning the underlying state, there is no conflict of interest between the principal and the agents. However, when there is imperfect information, the welfare effects of increased public disclosures is more equivocal. ; Welche Wohlfahrtseffekte hat eine größere Publizität öffentlicher Informationen? Ist die häufige und zeitnahe Veröffentlichung von Wirtschaftsstatistiken durch Regierungsstellen und die Zentralbank immer wünschenswert? Diese Frage zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die Diskussion über das Thema, inwieweit Transparenz bei der Durchführung der Geldpolitik wünschenswert ist. Wir prüfen die These, dass eine verbesserte Publizität öffentlicher Informationen stets wohlfahrtssteigernd ist. Wir wollen im Rahmen eines Modells, bei dem der Prinzipal (Zentralbank) Informationen an die Akteure im privaten Sektor gibt herausfinden, wie öffentliche Informationen wirken. Der Informationsgeber möchte bewirken, dass die Akteure den wirtschaftlichen Grunddaten entsprechend handeln. Die Akteure sind ihrerseits auch daran interessiert, ihr Handeln an den grundlegenden Bedingungen zu orientieren, aber sie sind auch auf Koordination bedacht, da sich ihre Handlungen aus strategischen Gründen gegenseitig ergänzen müssen. Bei vollkommener Information über die Grundbedingungen besteht kein Interessenkonflikt zwischen Informationsgeber und Akteuren. Bei unvollkommener Information hingegen sind die Wohlfahrtseffekte einer größeren Publizität öffentlicher Informationen weniger eindeutig.