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Norges relasjon til Kina har siden anerkjennelsen av Folkerepublikken i januar 1950 blitt utøvd i et spenn mellom småstatsrealisme og småstatsidealisme. Norges handlingsrom og politikk overfor stormakten Kina utformes i et samspill mellom nasjonale og internasjonale faktorer, men i tråd med teoriretningen ny-klassisk realisme har strukturene i det internasjonale systemet størst forklaringskraft. Som en liten stat må Norge manøvrere i forhold til stormaktenes maktbalanse og rivalisering for å sikre sin egen velferd og sikkerhet. Norge valgte i 1949 å inngå i en allianse med USA gjennom NATO, og dette har siden vært bærebjelken i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk. Norges handlingsrom vis-a-vis Kina er dermed til enhver tid påvirket av USAs forhold til Kina. Denne artikkelen trekker de lange linjer i norsk Kina-politikk over syv tiår, fra 1950 til 2020. Med en ambisjon om global orden som et ekstra sikkerhetsnett var Norge tidlig ute med å anerkjenne Kina og støttet landets inntreden i FN-systemet, men den kalde krigen begrenset relasjonene. USAs engasjement av Kina på begynnelsen av 1970-tallet var et vendepunkt i norsk Kina-politikk. Den tiltakende rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina de siste år gjør at norsk Kina-politikk nå igjen står overfor et vendepunkt, i retning av redusert handlingsrom og engasjement.
Abstract in English: Norway's relationship with China over the Past 70 Years: A Small State's Idealism and Realism with Respect to a Great PowerFrom recognizing the People's Republic of China in 1950 until today, both realism and idealism as well as domestic and international level factors have informed Norway's relationship with China. Nonetheless, this article finds that in accordance with neo-classical realism, international system variables have the strongest explanatory value on Norway's China policy. Since joining NATO in 1949, Norway's alliance with the United States has been the pillar in Norway's defence and security policy. Norway's room for maneuver crafting and implementing its China policy is consequently strongly affected by the ups and downs in Sino-U.S. relations. Unlike the United States, Norway recognized the PRC in 1950 and supported China's entry into the UN system, but the Cold War restricted Norway from further developing its relations with China. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the early 1970s enabled Norway to engage China, and the end of the Cold War in 1989 enabled Norway to widen its engagement to include issues such as environment and climate change, human rights and welfare policies. Nevertheless, after five decades of engagement, Norway's approach to China is currently once again changing as the result of an intensified Sino-U.S. rivalry and a changing threat perception of China across Europe.

Artikkelen ser på den teknologiske og strategiske rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina hva gjelder implementeringen av 5G-nettverk, og spør hva som er med å påvirke hvordan andre stater posisjonerer seg mellom de to supermaktene. Ved å bygge på tre grener av politisk realisme – balance-of-threat-teoriens tanke om at trusseloppfatning driver staters valg av allianser, patron–klient-teoriens tro på at USA kan forvente at deres klientstater innretter seg etter amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og teorien om at handelsrelasjoner kan brukes som maktverktøy – utleder jeg et sett med hypoteser og potensielt relevante forklaringsvariabler. Som avhengig variabel samler jeg 70 staters holdninger til Kinas omstridte telekommunikasjonsgigant Huaweis rolle i 5G. Bivariat analyse avslører tre hovedmønstre: (1) Stater som er små og maktesløse i forhold til Kina, samt statene i Kinas geografiske region, ser ut til å være mer aksepterende til Huaweis 5G. (2) Stater som ser på USA som sin patron og som er avhengige av Washingtons sikkerhetsgaranti ser ut til å være betydelig mer avvisende til selskapets 5G. (3) Handelsrelasjoner til både USA og Kina ser ut til å ha liten eller ingen effekt på staters holdninger. Av de tre realisme-grenene er det altså patron–klient-teorien som veier tyngst når det gjelder å forklare staters holdninger til Huaweis 5G.
Abstract in English:The US way or the Huawei: An analysis of how small and medium states stand on the Chinese giant's role in 5GThis article examines the technological and strategic rivalry between the US and China on the implementation of 5G networks, asking what influences how other states position themselves between the two superpowers. By building on three branches of political realism – balance-of-threat theory's notion that perception of threat drives states' alliance choices, patron-client theory's belief that the US can expect its client states to adhere to American foreign policy, and the theory that trade relations can be used as power tools – I derive a set of hypotheses and potentially relevant explanatory variables. As dependent variable, I measure 70 states' stances on China's controversial telecom giant Huawei's role in 5G. Bivariate analysis reveals three primary patterns: (1) States who are dwarfed by China's power, as well as states in China's immediate geographic region, appear to be more acceptive of Huawei's 5G. (2) States who see the US as their patron and who rely on Washington's security guarantee appear to be much more rejective of the company's 5G. (3) Trade relations to both the US and China appear to have little or no effect on states' stances. Of the three branches of realism, it is the patron-client theory that offers the most weight in explaining states' stances on Huawei's 5G.

Siden Gulfkrigen i 1991 har skandinaviske land deltatt i nesten 30 år med sammenhengende krig, på blant annet Balkan, i Afghanistan, i Irak, Libya, Mali og Syria. Hvordan kan vi forstå denne formen for militæraktivisme? Tradisjonelle teorier fra realismen, institusjonalismen og konstruktivismen gir ingen gode svar. Innenfor organisasjonsteorien derimot, finnes det forklaringer knyttet til begrepet «strategisk kultur». Ved å utforske den strategiske kulturen i USAs militære styrker under krigene i Afghanistan, Irak og Libya trer det frem et tydelig mønster: det bombes for mye på militær side, og det snakkes for lite på diplomatisk side. I USAs doktriner levnes det lite til overs for dialog, forhandling og kompromiss. Dermed blir den strategiske kulturen innad i de militære styrkene et outrert uttrykk for en krigføringsform der operasjonene ses på som et null-sum spill. Resultatet blir oftest systemkollaps i statene som angripes. Denne kulturen har store konsekvenser for små skandinaviske allianseavhengige land: knappe forsvarsressurser trekkes inn i hengemyrerer det er vanskelig å komme ut av, ikke minst fordi koalisjonslederen selv, USA, forårsaker dem.
Abstract in English:How Should Scandinavian Military Activism Be Understand?Since the 1991 Gulf War, Scandinavian states have continuously been engaged in various international operations, i.e. on the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, Libya, Mali and Syria. How can we comprehend this peculiar form of Scandinavian military activism? Traditional theories derived from realism, institutionalism and constructivism provides few convincing explanations. Within organisational theory however, plausible explanations may be found though the concept of 'strategic culture'. By exploring the military culture prevailing inside US forces operating in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, a consistent pattern arises: too much bombing from the military side, coupled with insufficient diplomatic talks. Little effort is paid to dialogue, negotiations and compromises. US warfighting thereby becomes a one-dimensional expression of a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all. The result is a collapse inside the states that are attacked. This culture has grave consequences for small Scandinavian allies: scarce military resources are trapped into a quagmire made by the coalition leader itself, the United States.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

A note on the text and translation -- The role of correspondences -- The search for accord -- Leibniz and the Jesuits : China and the universal church -- Jansenism -- The metaphysics of substance -- The union of soul and body -- Composition and the unity of corporeal substance -- The problem of transubstantiation -- Leibniz on transubstantiation and the vinculum substantiale -- Leibniz's final metaphysics : idealism or realism? -- The Leibnizdes- Bosses correspondence -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 January 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 February 1706 -- Des Dosses to Leibniz, 12 February 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 14 February 1706 -- Des Dosses to Leibniz, 2 March 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 March 1706 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 21 May 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 July 1706 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 August 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 1 September 1706 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 17 September 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 20 September 1706 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 29 September 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 4 October 1706 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 October 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 October 1706 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 5 February 1707 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 June 1707 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 21 July 1707 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 3 September 1708 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 12 September 1708 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 5 October 1708 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, mid-October 1708 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 February 1709 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 March 1709 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz 22 April 1709 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 April 1709 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 30 July 1709 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 31 July 1709 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 September 1709 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 September 1709 -- Des Dosses to Leibniz, 18 January 1710 -- Des Dosses to Leibniz, 25 March 1710 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 May 1710 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 14 June 1710 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 2 July 1710 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 18 July 1710 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 4 August 1710 -- Des Dosses to Leibniz, 11 October 1710 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 7 November 1710 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 January 1711 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 February 1711 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 25 April 1711 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 8 July 1711 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 18 August 1711 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 7 September 1711 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 28 January 1712 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 February 1712 -- Des Dosses to Leibniz, 20 May 1712 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 26 May 1712 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 12 June 1712 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 June 1712 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 28 August 1712 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 20 September 1712 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 10 October 1712 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 12 December 1712 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 24 January 1713 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 8 August 1713 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 23 August 1713 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 10 January 1714 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 22 March 1714 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 21 April 1714 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 September 1714 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 15 March 1715 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 6 April 1715 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 April 1715 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 30 June 1715 -- Des Bosses to Leibniz, 20 July 1715 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 19 August 1715 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 13 January 1716 -- Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716.