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This special issue about the practice of local referendums in the Netherlands and Flanders, Belgium, focuses in particular on the relationship between referendums and the consensus model of democracy. On the one hand, referendums are widely conceived of as a typical majoritarian device. On the other hand, the legal possibility of referendums forces political elites to reach broad agreement, in order to prevent a popular vote in which decisions would be recalled. The three contributions to this issue demonstrate that consensus democracy influences the debate about referendums in the legislative, as well as how the practicalities are organised, in more varied ways. Studies of independent referendum bodies in the Netherlands and question wording in referendums in Flanders show that the nature of consensus democracy enables both countries to find solutions to potential problems, but also brings new problems. Guidelines for how these may be prevented in future referendums are provided. Adapted from the source document.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

Politics of the EU frequently use referendums to legitimise fundamental decisions. Naturally, attention is usually focused on those that end in a NO vote. Historically, governments have always had ways to circumvent such decisions by calling another referendum on a slightly reworded question, e.g. the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark or the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. The qualitative comparative analysis showed that these pairs of referendums are distinct and comparable to study the result inversion phenomenon. Hence, the research aim was widened: employing the theoretical approaches of rational choice and new institutionalism, to explore the behaviour of actors participating in campaigns of European pairs of referendums within a changing structural environment. Paired referendums pose new challenges to actors of the institutional level (governments, parties and stakeholder groups). It was observed that governments tend to manipulate formal rules of referendums and aim to influence the process of second referendums. Next to the rational choice aided by the new institutionalism, the change in positions of YES and NO camps was registered by reconstructing constantly changing political discourses for each specific moment. This revealed that during second referendums and despite the participation of same actors, the voting is no longer on the same issue but on a differently presented and perceived treaty, i.e. the structural environment is essentially changed.

In recent years the growth of direct democratic procedures in the world has become far more noticeable. Never before such a large number of people could vote for the actual issues since over the past decade. More frequently applied initiative law, general voting with a view to resolving essential problems and using mechanism of cancelation of the elected officials has fundamentally changed the political dynamics. Around the world representative democracy is being transformed and modernized. Thus the topic of the Master's thesis was chosen not randomly but to the more extensive context of the analysis of the referendum institute and aims to approach the experience of the referenda and assessing their prospects in Lithuania, Switzerland and California. The objective has been achieved by analyzing legal doctrine and legislation in terms of Lithuania and the experience of the selected states (Switzerland and California) organizing the referendums as well as their effects on representative democracy. The first part disputes the referendum in detail referring to it as the institute of direct democracy, concept and classification since the researchers' opinion concerning the terminology is different. The second part deals with the practice of referendum law in Lithuania and its assessment is presented. The third part analyzes the institutions of direct democracy in Switzerland and their assessment. The direct democracy in California is assessed in the fourth part while and arguments disapproving sceptics' opinion are presented in the fifth part.

In recent years the growth of direct democratic procedures in the world has become far more noticeable. Never before such a large number of people could vote for the actual issues since over the past decade. More frequently applied initiative law, general voting with a view to resolving essential problems and using mechanism of cancelation of the elected officials has fundamentally changed the political dynamics. Around the world representative democracy is being transformed and modernized. Thus the topic of the Master's thesis was chosen not randomly but to the more extensive context of the analysis of the referendum institute and aims to approach the experience of the referenda and assessing their prospects in Lithuania, Switzerland and California. The objective has been achieved by analyzing legal doctrine and legislation in terms of Lithuania and the experience of the selected states (Switzerland and California) organizing the referendums as well as their effects on representative democracy. The first part disputes the referendum in detail referring to it as the institute of direct democracy, concept and classification since the researchers' opinion concerning the terminology is different. The second part deals with the practice of referendum law in Lithuania and its assessment is presented. The third part analyzes the institutions of direct democracy in Switzerland and their assessment. The direct democracy in California is assessed in the fourth part while and arguments disapproving sceptics' opinion are presented in the fifth part.