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The logic of civil religion consists of minimizing community in order to maximize pluralism. Every modern society needs pluralism on the one hand, and securing of its foundations on the other. Still, civil religion may raise suspicion with regard to use of religion for political purposes. And instrumentalization is contradictory to the character of religion, although the latter always has political consequences as well. Civil religion serves politics with the aim of educating citizens. Perhaps, however, it can also be perceived as preparation of totalitarian beliefs and liturgies, such as are known to us from the first half of the 20th century. Civil religion can go hand in hand with excessive nationalism, proselytism, and Satanization of enemies. Such undesirable consequences of civil religion are discussed in this article on the basis of examples from the time of the French Revolution. The Revolution was largely marked by civil religion, the former even legitimized the latter. Four examples from the history of the French Revolution are analyzed: human rights as civil religion; cult of reason and of the supreme being; worship of the Revolution's "martyr" Jean-Paul Marat, and, finally, Satanization of enemies. Following his expose, the author confronts these questions: Is the confusing element of civil religion the fact that it wants to utilize religion per se for political purposes? What is it that protects civil religion from degenerating into nationalism and proselytism? Or else civil religion can be both: the basis of a tolerant pluralist democracy as well as the preparatory stage of totalitarianism? Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the relation between politics, state and religion from the political-science perspective, as part of an analysis and evaluation of tasks, achievements and failures of polity, policy or politics from the standpoint of normative-constructive philosophy of equity. At present the central task of policy is to stimulate and strengthen the Western political culture based on the fundamental distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" pluralism. "Reasonable" pluralism rests on the assumption that the state is a just power, the sovereignty of which can be recognized in distinguishing the "public" and the "private", the just and the good, and, in connection therewith, it is almost self-understandable that such a liberal guaranteed private sphere must be the primary arena of religious practice and religious freedoms. The crucial trait of the relation between state and religion is manifest in the fact that only the legal state and the liberal constitution are competent to state what the freedom of individuals consists of within the framework of norms of what is just. The author defines "religion" in the comprehensive sense as central to the processes of forming cultural identity, and he deems that cultural policy (which, in principle, has to do with relations between state and religion), as policy of equitable integration of multi-culturally shaped political unities, must be oriented toward stimulation of those attitudes and values which make possible the reasonable pluralism defined according to Rawls. Since the political encompasses also the possibility to make enemies, the author advocates the cultural policy of "weakening the feelings of enmity" (N. Elias). In this way, a systematic concept of policy would be created, one which would reflect and preserve the conditions of reasonable pluralism. On the policy level and, in particular, on the politics level, cultural policy is a very demanding project. Perhaps it is precisely Switzerland, with its special prospects of civil democracy, that offers promising cultural-policy opportunities for activity, which are as yet still insufficiently researched. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy of religion is inseparably linked with his onto-gnoseological & ethic concepts. The author explains his concept of religion within the limits of practical reason as well as his theoretical agnosticism. We can only have certain ideas & beliefs about the transcedental, God, & immorality of the soul -- they are solely the notions of practical reason -- but we cannot have any theoretical knowledge. The author shows how the absence of critical awareness about the possibility of rational cognition leads to various kinds of dogmatism. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy of religion is inseparably linked with his onto-gnoseological & ethic concepts. The author explains his concept of religion within the limits of practical reason as well as his theoretical agnosticism. We can only have certain ideas & beliefs about the transcedental, God, & immorality of the soul -- they are solely the notions of practical reason -- but we cannot have any theoretical knowledge. The author shows how the absence of critical awareness about the possibility of rational cognition leads to various kinds of dogmatism. Adapted from the source document.

The paper starts from hypothesis that current religious change may be best approached within the categorical framework not of a sociology of religion, conceived of & practiced as a sociology of religion of individuals & values, but a political sociology of religion (Guizzardi), focused on political exchange aimed at generating legitimacy &, therefore, creating consensus. Two current complementary trends of religious change, described as politicization of religion & religionization of politics (Robertson), are interpreted in such a way. First, some aspects of the current politicization of religion have been identified & described. Second, the crucial aspects of the religionization of politics, projected primarily on the background of transitional processes in former Yugoslavia, have been identified & analyzed. Finally, an interpretation of such trends has been elaborated, basically by taking into consideration two crucial discrepancies & their precariousness. The first one is the discrepancy & precariousness of legitimacy of dominant political strategies to be obtained by a politics coherently situated in the relative, dissociated from any kind of absolute & sacred. The second is the discrepancy & precariousness of a possible religious revival to be achieved strictly on religious bases. 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

The paper starts from hypothesis that current religious change may be best approached within the categorical framework not of a sociology of religion, conceived of & practiced as a sociology of religion of individuals & values, but a political sociology of religion (Guizzardi), focused on political exchange aimed at generating legitimacy &, therefore, creating consensus. Two current complementary trends of religious change, described as politicization of religion & religionization of politics (Robertson), are interpreted in such a way. First, some aspects of the current politicization of religion have been identified & described. Second, the crucial aspects of the religionization of politics, projected primarily on the background of transitional processes in former Yugoslavia, have been identified & analyzed. Finally, an interpretation of such trends has been elaborated, basically by taking into consideration two crucial discrepancies & their precariousness. The first one is the discrepancy & precariousness of legitimacy of dominant political strategies to be obtained by a politics coherently situated in the relative, dissociated from any kind of absolute & sacred. The second is the discrepancy & precariousness of a possible religious revival to be achieved strictly on religious bases. 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

According to Luhmann, religion transforms the indefinable/un-defined into the definable/defined complexity, thus outlining the problems of the whole society. Due to this function, religion remains bound to the level of the entirety of a social system. Nevertheless, in time, in the course of the functional differentiation of society, different sub-systems have been created for different tasks (economy, science, politics, education, etc) & religion has been accorded the status of one such system. Besides distinguishing among various subsystems, this process implies the separation of diverse task-areas within the religious system itself. By & by, within the Christian religion, three functionally differentiated spheres have emerged which Luhmann labels as a) the church, ie, the entirety of spiritual communication in which the function of the system of religion is fulfilled for the whole social system; b) Diaconate (Diakonie), which performs the system's tasks towards other social sub-systems (these tasks, in line with the theory of systems, may be termed services Leistungen) as well as towards personal systems (in line with the theory of systems they may be termed pastoral -- Seelsorge); & c) theology (Theologie) whose role within the religious system may be described as reflexion (Reflexion) ie, the task of the reflexive contact of one's own identity. 1 Table, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

The article proposes to improve using of the concepts "freedom of religion" or "freedom of faith" and "legal religious tolerance". Such categories as "freedom of religion" or "freedom of faith" are more popular now in the state and international legal acts.

The application of hermeneutic, comparative, historical, formal legal and dialectical methods of scientific research allows concluding that the term "legal religious tolerance" is better suited to the realities of the legal system than the concept of "freedom of religion" or "freedom of faith". The content of the concept of "freedom of religion" as one of the main categories of human rights and freedoms enshrined in international acts and in the legislation of the most states of the Western Legal Tradition is based on the philosophical ideas of the early modern period. Despite the humanity and the enlightening liberality of those ideas, they remain too idealized and complicated in their practical legal application. The legal content of the concept of "religious tolerance", with all the disadvantages of its vagueness, due to its hermeneutic flexibility leaves much more space for the practical law enforcement.

The categories of "state religion" and "religion of the majority population" are supposed to exist. It does not require absolute detachment of public authorities from regulating religious relationships. Moreover, it mitigates collisions between the application of this right and other civil rights. The author states that using of the legal category of "religious tolerance" is much more suitable. Since its content is in line with the canons of the religious laws of the different religions, natural law, and the historical legal tradition of the long development of society, the concept of "religious tolerance" should be used for the regulation of the religious legal relations in the states with different religious communities.

The paper reports partial findings of a research project into Croatian ethnonationalism (Croatian: narodnjastvo) as a religion (in the sense of a human invention of the sacred). The practical problems are as follows: ethnonationalism as a religion, which implies inter alia that an ethnic community (Croatian: narod) has the potential and/or capability to develop into, and ought to become, the substratum of a (nation-)state; consequences of ethnonationalism, which include the unattainability of ethnic democracy, ethnic economy and ethnic maturity; conditions of Croatian ethnonationalism, primarily the Catholic Church as a condition in 1961-71, and also before and after the period, especially since 1990. Theoretical problems, i.e. inadequacies in scholarly knowledge of the practical problems, include the following: firstly, Croatian Constitutional Court jurisprudence on ethnic and religious communities; secondly, systematic history of law and state in Croatia and Yugoslavia 1945-90; thirdly, transformation of both communism and catholicism into ethnonationalism; fourthly and fifthly, social structure and representation/agency. To attain the general goal of the research project, which is the use of reason in public affairs, the research is carried out within the theoretical and methodological framework of an integral theory of law and state which includes a modified Lasswell and McDougal's policy analysis expanded by historical institutionalism and critical theory. The subject-matter are the following features of Catholicism as an institutionalized religion, especially in Croatia 1961-71: (1) law, i.e. (1.1) sources of law; (1.2) internal law (organs, members, means); (1.3) external law (relations with the state and non-Catholics); (2) the Church and economy; (3) the Church and nation; (4) Catholicism on theory and practice. The hypotheses (which are ideal-types and as such cannot be either verified or falsified conclusively) are that ethnonationalism in Croatia is a consequence of, inter alia, the following beliefs maintained by the Catholic Church in Croatia in the 1960s and to a significant degree later on: 1. the only acceptable relationship between the Church and the state is the partnership of two legally equal public orders over the same subjects within which the Church has the exclusive power to regulate matrimonial and other family relations, and the power to control education in public schools; 2. peasant family is the basic organic human community; 3. the subjects to the ecclesiastical -- originally feudal -- power tied in fact to land make the ethnic community (Croatian: narod), which is united with the clergy into the Christian community (Croatian: krscanski narod); 4. since fundamental truths are accessible by theology only, and practice is an application of theory, practical knowledge, especially on the appropriate relationship between the Church and the state, is valid only if in accord with Church teaching. The evidence presented in the paper supports to a significant degree the hypotheses. The research findings contribute to the solution of all the theoretical problems, providing major contributions to the second and the third: the most probable reason why the Catholic Church in Croatia was rather silent in the Yugoslav and Croatian Spring 1961-71 and quite vocal since the 1990 is the Croatian Church's allegiance in matters of Church and state more to the First than to the Second Vatican council (which abandoned the Church's "divine" right to be co-sovereign with the state, exposing the "right" as a human invention of the sacred); the Church's ethnonationalism, which facilitates the political partnership of the Church and the state and ensures the dominant position of the clergy within the Church, has coincided with the interest of Yugoslav communists to retain their might and power by a metamorphosis, with the Church's assistance honoured by a concordat, into Croatian ethnonationalists, who, as newly born capitalists, have appropriated the greater part of the former socialist property and continue appropriating the greater part of present public goods. Adapted from the source document.

From an extensive comparative study conducted in 27 European countries about the attitudes of young people toward history, the winnowed variables show not only attitudes toward history & the causes of historical changes, but also attitudes toward nation & religion. The results (obtained from a sample including 1,025 Croatian first-year high school students) show that the attitudes of young people toward history do not significantly differ from those in other European countries. However, the interest of young people in national problems, national communities, & religions has increased. Their attitudes toward history are shaped by the factors that homogenize the living space of young people. 5 Tables, 7 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

From an extensive comparative study conducted in 27 European countries about the attitudes of young people toward history, the winnowed variables show not only attitudes toward history & the causes of historical changes, but also attitudes toward nation & religion. The results (obtained from a sample including 1,025 Croatian first-year high school students) show that the attitudes of young people toward history do not significantly differ from those in other European countries. However, the interest of young people in national problems, national communities, & religions has increased. Their attitudes toward history are shaped by the factors that homogenize the living space of young people. 5 Tables, 7 Figures. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocks of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modem (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modem social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modem social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part) law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action-guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within the limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.

How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocs of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modern (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modern social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modern social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part), law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach, which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.