Search results

In many of its areas, the writing of music history in Germany is characterised by the Romantic music outlook and its "Two-World-Model": the real world is seen as opposing the ideal world of music as a higher existence of ideas and ideals. Art music in the emphatic sense, commonly designated as serious music, pretends to represent that ideal world and makes claims to truthfulness. The science of music actually believes it is able to prove the universality of these claims. A large part of musicological publications are characterised by this assumption. However, a public discussion among musicologists as to whether such writings should belong to the field of theology rather than to historico-critical historiography (as a science in the strict sense) is non-existent. As a result, our field has not only disappeared from a public sphere that wishes to leave those claims to small elitist circles, but has also encountered a growing lack of understanding among other disciplines, even to the point of mockery. It would suffice here to refer to the lawyer Bernhard Weck, who wrote with regard to Beethoven's Opus 112: "Only musicology could prove that 'political ideas of freedom can be expressed through gestures of sound.'" ; У многим својим сегментима, писање историја музике у Немачкој карактерише романтичарска визура и њен "модел два света": реални свет се посматра као супротстављен идеалном свету музике као вишем ступњу постојања идеја и идеала. Уметничка музика у изворном смислу, обично означена термином "озбиљна музика", претвара се да представља тај идеалан свет и претендује на истинитост. Наука о музици заиста верује да може да докаже универзалност ових тврдњи. Знатан број музиколошких публикација карактерише ова претпоставка. Међутим, јавна дискусија међу музиколозима о томе да ли такви списи треба да припадају области теологије, а не историјско-критичкој историографији (као науци у строгом смислу) не постоји. Као резултат тога, наше поље није само нестало из јавне сфере, која жели да те тврдње остави малим елитистичким круговима, већ је наишло и на све већи недостатак разумевања међу другим дисциплинама, чак и до тачке ругања. Довољно је да се позовемо на речи адвоката Бернарда Века (Bernhard Weck), који је у вези са Бетовеновим опусом 112 написао: "Само музикологија може доказати да се 'политичке идеје слободе могу изразити звучним гестовима'." ; Часопис је индексиран на http://doiserbia.nb.rs/, http://dais.sanu.ac.rs/handle/123456789/914 и у међународној бази ProQuest. / The journal is indexed in http://doiserbia.nb.rs/, http://dais.sanu.ac.rs/handle/123456789/914 and in the international database ProQuest. Издавање ове публикације подржали су Министарство културе и информисања Републике Србије, Министарство просвете, науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије и СОКОЈ - Организација музичких аутора Србије / The publication of this volume was supported by the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia and SOKOJ - Serbian Music Authors' Organization

Hegelove riječi iz Enciklopedije filozofskih znanosti, da revolucija nije moguća bez reformacije, mogu se shvatiti kao načelno upozorenje da svakoj korjenitoj političkoj promjeni mora prethoditi promjena u unutrašnjem svijetu uvjerenja pojedinca i zajednice. Te riječi povijesno preciznije upućuju na reformirano kršćanstvo kao na inherentni poticaj modernim revolucionarnim previranjima. Religiozno oslobođenje savjesti prethodilo je političkom oslobođenju i u tom smislu Hegel izdvaja protestantizam kao najviši lik religioznosti koji je u modernoj običajnosti moguć. Hegel favorizira protestantizam ne samo zato što je uvjeren da je religijska reformacija prethodila i da uvijek mora prethoditi revoluciji nego i zbog toga što smatra da s protestantizmom postaje očito da i reformiranje religije ostaje nedovršeno i apstraktno ne preraste li u politički prevrat. Razmatranje načina na koji Hegel problematizira odnos države i religije autora vodi k zaključku: revolucije ne može biti bez reformacije, ali ni istinske reformacije bez revolucije. ; Hegel's words from the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, that a revolution is not possible without a reformation, can be understood as the general warning that the change within the inner world of beliefs of individual and community must precede every radical political change. Historically more precise, these words point to the Reformed Christianity as the inherent impetus to the modern revolutionary movements. The religious liberation of conscience preceded the political liberation, and Hegel, therefore, points out Protestantism as the highest form of religiosity which is possible in the modern ethical life. On the other hand, Hegel favours Protestantism not only because he is convinced that the religious reformation preceded and must precede the revolution, but also because he considers that with Protestantism becomes evident that the reformation of religion remains incomplete and abstract if it does not grow into the political upheaval. Considering the way Hegel is problematizing the nature of the relationship between state and religion, the author concludes: there can be no revolution without a reformation, but neither a true reformation without a revolution.

The logic of civil religion consists of minimizing community in order to maximize pluralism. Every modern society needs pluralism on the one hand, and securing of its foundations on the other. Still, civil religion may raise suspicion with regard to use of religion for political purposes. And instrumentalization is contradictory to the character of religion, although the latter always has political consequences as well. Civil religion serves politics with the aim of educating citizens. Perhaps, however, it can also be perceived as preparation of totalitarian beliefs and liturgies, such as are known to us from the first half of the 20th century. Civil religion can go hand in hand with excessive nationalism, proselytism, and Satanization of enemies. Such undesirable consequences of civil religion are discussed in this article on the basis of examples from the time of the French Revolution. The Revolution was largely marked by civil religion, the former even legitimized the latter. Four examples from the history of the French Revolution are analyzed: human rights as civil religion; cult of reason and of the supreme being; worship of the Revolution's "martyr" Jean-Paul Marat, and, finally, Satanization of enemies. Following his expose, the author confronts these questions: Is the confusing element of civil religion the fact that it wants to utilize religion per se for political purposes? What is it that protects civil religion from degenerating into nationalism and proselytism? Or else civil religion can be both: the basis of a tolerant pluralist democracy as well as the preparatory stage of totalitarianism? Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the relation between politics, state and religion from the political-science perspective, as part of an analysis and evaluation of tasks, achievements and failures of polity, policy or politics from the standpoint of normative-constructive philosophy of equity. At present the central task of policy is to stimulate and strengthen the Western political culture based on the fundamental distinction between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" pluralism. "Reasonable" pluralism rests on the assumption that the state is a just power, the sovereignty of which can be recognized in distinguishing the "public" and the "private", the just and the good, and, in connection therewith, it is almost self-understandable that such a liberal guaranteed private sphere must be the primary arena of religious practice and religious freedoms. The crucial trait of the relation between state and religion is manifest in the fact that only the legal state and the liberal constitution are competent to state what the freedom of individuals consists of within the framework of norms of what is just. The author defines "religion" in the comprehensive sense as central to the processes of forming cultural identity, and he deems that cultural policy (which, in principle, has to do with relations between state and religion), as policy of equitable integration of multi-culturally shaped political unities, must be oriented toward stimulation of those attitudes and values which make possible the reasonable pluralism defined according to Rawls. Since the political encompasses also the possibility to make enemies, the author advocates the cultural policy of "weakening the feelings of enmity" (N. Elias). In this way, a systematic concept of policy would be created, one which would reflect and preserve the conditions of reasonable pluralism. On the policy level and, in particular, on the politics level, cultural policy is a very demanding project. Perhaps it is precisely Switzerland, with its special prospects of civil democracy, that offers promising cultural-policy opportunities for activity, which are as yet still insufficiently researched. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy of religion is inseparably linked with his onto-gnoseological & ethic concepts. The author explains his concept of religion within the limits of practical reason as well as his theoretical agnosticism. We can only have certain ideas & beliefs about the transcedental, God, & immorality of the soul -- they are solely the notions of practical reason -- but we cannot have any theoretical knowledge. The author shows how the absence of critical awareness about the possibility of rational cognition leads to various kinds of dogmatism. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy of religion is inseparably linked with his onto-gnoseological & ethic concepts. The author explains his concept of religion within the limits of practical reason as well as his theoretical agnosticism. We can only have certain ideas & beliefs about the transcedental, God, & immorality of the soul -- they are solely the notions of practical reason -- but we cannot have any theoretical knowledge. The author shows how the absence of critical awareness about the possibility of rational cognition leads to various kinds of dogmatism. Adapted from the source document.