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Using multivariate regression analysis, this study compares the relative effects of traditional aggregate rational choice electoral behavior with a more recent perspective focusing on the preservation of group norms and group morality in the context of county economic classification and the presence or absence of same‐sex marriage referenda in the 2004 presidential election in Appalachian counties. Our findings suggest that economic factors, in the aggregate, retain the explanatory value commonly afforded them, but the presence of same‐sex marriage referenda fails to conform with the expectations of the group norm/morality perspective of rational choice behavior. We discuss how this study fits with other analyses of same‐sex marriage referenda in the 2004 election. Our findings suggest that the region can no longer, if it ever was, be considered politically and socially cohesive.

In this Essay, I demonstrate that, with the extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples in Iowa, the District of Columbia, and New Hampshire (all states that recognize common law marriage), there now exists the possibility that—for the first time in the United States—a same-sex couple may enter into a legally recognized common law marriage. In the Essay, I first show, as a doctrinal matter, that same-sex couples have the right to enter into common law marriages in these three jurisdictions, and I explain and compare the criteria for entering into common law marriages in each of them. I then address the question whether it makes sense—as a policy matter—to expand the concept of common law marriage to include same-sex couples, including an analysis of whether being a closeted same-sex couple is consistent with being in a common law marriage. I conclude that the lack of consistent access to religious and public officials willing to perform same-sex marriages coupled with the libertarian spirit underlying both same-sex marriage and common law marriage militate in favor of recognizing common law same-sex marriages. I also demonstrate the advantages that common law marriage—with its lack of a paper trail—provides to same-sex couples who need to keep their relationships closeted, such as those in the military or foreign nationals with temporary visas. Finally, on the assumption that the U.S. Supreme Court may eventually hold that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, I examine the criteria for entering into common law marriages in the remaining nine states that recognize common law marriage. With respect to these remaining states—nearly all of which have bans on same-sex marriage enshrined into their state constitutions and that thus will allow same-sex marriage only if ordered to do so by a federal court—I conclude that the policy arguments in favor of recognizing same-sex common law marriage are even more compelling than they are in jurisdictions that currently recognize same-sex common law ...

AbstractIn the majority opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court over same-sex marriage, a claim by Confucius was quoted, which led to an uproar among Confucian scholars in mainland China. In this article, I will first explain the background of the debate over same-sex marriage in the United States, and why Confucius's claim was quoted. I will then show how a contemporary Confucian philosopher Zhang Xianglong addressed the issue of same-sex marriage from a Confucian perspective. In my view, compared with other mainland Confucians' responses, Zhang's are one of the most scholarly and moderate responses that nevertheless follow Confucian values. But he eventually rejected same-sex marriage on the Confucian ground. I will argue that, based on some Confucian values and principles which are shared by Zhang, we can answer Zhang's concerns with same-sex marriage, thus offering an even more moderate Confucian stance that accepts same-sex marriage. But this stance is still different from the typical liberal one. We will also see that, in order to accept same-sex marriage, it is the liberals, not the Confucians, who will have to deal with an issue—the acceptance of polygamy—that poses a serious challenge to the principle of equality, which is fundamental to some liberals.

This Chapter gives a brief analysis of the status of same-sex marriage in the United States prior to the US Supreme Court decisions of 2013 and the current status of litigation and political reforms triggered, in part by the court decisions. It shows that marriage is a central institution in the country's rationale of family law in ways that separate it from other Western countries that have allowed same-sex marriage. ; https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_bk_contributions/1165/thumbnail.jpg