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Stephen Blank. L 'après-Primakov. Évolution dans la politique de sécurité nationale en Russie. L'article traite des dangers qui menacent la sécurité nationale russe depuis la deuxième moitié de 1999. À cette époque, la Russie connut de graves crises internes dues au limogeage du premier ministre, Evgenij Primakov, et aux tentatives de la Douma de destituer Boris El'cin. L'auteur maintient que la menace principale sur la sécurité de la Russie, contrairement à ce que portent à penser les réactions courroucées à la campagne du Kosovo, sont d'ordre interne et proviennent de l'incapacité à construire un État efficace, à contrôler l'armée, à résoudre la question du projet fédéral de façon adéquate, ou à ranimer l'économie. Tous ces facteurs favorisent un processus de privatisation de l'État dans lequel des individus ne voient dans celui-ci qu'un moyen de servir leurs intérêts personnels au détriment de tout intérêt national. En fait, la Russie éprouve des difficultés à définir un intérêt national cohérent et ne peut faire face ni aux menaces classiques ni aux nouvelles menaces transnationales. Bien que la Russie, ou plutôt l'armée et l'élite politique, se sentent menacées par la campagne de l'OTAN au Kosovo, elles sont en fait menacées de l'intérieur, et leur obsession de la deržavnosť et du statut naturel de la Russie comme grande puissance ne peut qu'entraver tout effort de gestion des dangers effectifs et exacerber ses crises interminables.

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

International audience ; La tension entre politique de sécurité et réduction des inégalités en Colombie amène à interroger la place du crime organisé dans le rapport énoncé par les autorités entre paix et développement, alors que l'impératif sécuritaire justifie la stratégie gouvernementale de contrôle territorial et replace le processus de paix dans le temps géopolitique plus long d'une entreprise d'ajustement des conditions d'investissement. La mobilisation de la force publique dans le cadre d'une politique sécuritaire visant à garantir un régime capitaliste et libéral montre que le traitement de la menace criminelle est un instrument stratégique de consolidation des rapports de force entre groupes sociaux.

International audience ; La tension entre politique de sécurité et réduction des inégalités en Colombie amène à interroger la place du crime organisé dans le rapport énoncé par les autorités entre paix et développement, alors que l'impératif sécuritaire justifie la stratégie gouvernementale de contrôle territorial et replace le processus de paix dans le temps géopolitique plus long d'une entreprise d'ajustement des conditions d'investissement. La mobilisation de la force publique dans le cadre d'une politique sécuritaire visant à garantir un régime capitaliste et libéral montre que le traitement de la menace criminelle est un instrument stratégique de consolidation des rapports de force entre groupes sociaux.

International audience ; La tension entre politique de sécurité et réduction des inégalités en Colombie amène à interroger la place du crime organisé dans le rapport énoncé par les autorités entre paix et développement, alors que l'impératif sécuritaire justifie la stratégie gouvernementale de contrôle territorial et replace le processus de paix dans le temps géopolitique plus long d'une entreprise d'ajustement des conditions d'investissement. La mobilisation de la force publique dans le cadre d'une politique sécuritaire visant à garantir un régime capitaliste et libéral montre que le traitement de la menace criminelle est un instrument stratégique de consolidation des rapports de force entre groupes sociaux.