The following links lead to the full text from the respective local libraries:
Alternatively, you can try to access the desired document yourself via your local library catalog.
If you have access problems, please contact us.
5155 results
Sort by:
SSRN
In: Discussion paper series no. 577
This paper introduces private sender information into a sender-receiver game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to fully characterize the set of equilibria robust to the intuitive criterion. In particular, all such equilibria are either separating, i.e., the sender's choice of signal reveals his private information to the receiver, or fully disclosing, i.e., the outcome of the sender's chosen signal fully reveals the payoff-relevant state to the receiver. Incentive compatibility requires the high sender type to use sub-optimal signals and therefore generates a cost for the high sender type in comparison to a full information benchmark in which the receiver knows the sender's type. The receiver prefers the equilibrium outcome over this benchmark for large classes of monotonic sender preferences.
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Signaling in Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: KAIST College of Business Working Paper Series No. 2012-010
SSRN
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 66, Issue 2
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: International Review of Economics & Finance, Volume 29, Issue 2014
SSRN