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Extending coverage through contributory social insurance or other contributory programs is tempting for governments as a potential avenue for mobilizing new resources and creating new fiscal space. Such extension has clear limits, however: it applies only to those in the labor market who have employment status with high degree of formality and whose incomes are significantly above subsistence level and received regularly. It also requires administrative structures with capacity to regularly register incomes of those covered, and to collect contributions. This chapter analyzes the potential of social insurance (also called contributory social protection) in the 16 Asian countries reviewed in this publication to fill the protection and coverage gaps in income security. It focuses on pensions, but also reviews other benefits temporarily replacing lost labor income due to events such as sickness, maternity, and unemployment. As current labor market structures largely determine the chances of extending coverage through these means, this chapter also examines their characteristics and analyzes coverage by the different forms of social insurance and assesses the potential for extension.

This item is part of the Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements (PRISM) digital collection, a collaborative initiative between Florida Atlantic University and University of Central Florida in the Publication of Archival, Library & Museum Materials (PALMM).

At head of title: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The paper argues that a comprehensive activation strategy is called for – in both unemployment and disability insurance – to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a long-lasting decline in labor force participation. A review of recent empirical evidence, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, indicates that "mild" activation requirements effectively counteract moral hazard problems in social insurance. The paper also argues that the distinction between unemployment and disability is blurred, and that both temporary and permanent disability insurance programs should be designed to encourage and support the use of remaining (partial) work capacity.