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This paper deals with taxation, profits of firms and welfare. More specifically it analyses the effect of a lump sum tax on a noncompetitive market with free entry. The main result is that there are relevant situations in which the tax increases the profits of the incumbent firms. Unfortunately this goes with a reduction in consumer suplus (and in social welfare measured by consumer surplus, plus profits of firms plus revenues of the Government). But a way is suggested and some examples given in which that problem can be overcome.

This paper uses spatial econometric methods to investigate property-tax competition among local governments. The theoretical model is drawn from the literature on tax competition, in which local jurisdictions choose property-tax rates taking into account

En este documento se realizó una evaluación del comportamiento del recaudo y las tarifas del impuesto predial en el período de 1999 a 2002, tomando como referencia una muestra de 309 municipios. Con base en los resultados del estudio se puede considerar que los municipios del país tienen un potencial tributario importante, cuyo aprovechamiento no necesariamente requiere la introducción de grandes ajustes legislativos sobre la base y las tarifas del impuesto. Los resultados del trabajo permiten concluir que existe una gran dispersión entre los municipios en los niveles de tributación per cápita. También se encontró que en la mayoría de los municipios estudiados existe una brecha entre las tarifas nominales ponderadas y las efectivas (recaudo / avalúo catastral), que en muchos casos es significativa, lo que indicaría que existen serios problemas de gestión y administración tributaria, evasión, corrupción y violencia. Adicionalmente, se observó que las tarifas nominales son relativamente bajas, dado el amplio margen que les concede la ley a los concejos para su fijación. Finalmente, se pudo constatar que en la mayoría de los municipios del país existe un rezago en la actualización de los avalúos catastrales, que excede los cinco años establecidos por la ley. ; We evaluate the behavior of tax revenues and tariffs of the property tax during the period 1999-2002, using a sample of 309 municipalities. According to the results, Colombian municipalities have an important tax potential that could be exploit without introducing big legislative adjustments neither on the tax base nor on the tariffs. We also found that, among municipalities, there is a great dispersion in their per capita revenues. In addition, there is a gap between the weighted nominal tariffs and the effective tariffs that in some cases is considerable, which could indicate that there could be problems of management, tax administration, tax evasion, corruption and violence. Also, nominal tariffs are relatively low, given the wide margin the Law grants to municipal Councils. Finally, in most of the municipalities the cadaster has not been regularly updated (the Law requires this procedure to be carried out every 5 years).

The aim of this work is to give historical insight into the federal tax co-participation regime. There are two main periods: the pre-Federal co-participation of taxes (1853-1934), characterised as competitive federalism, and the co-participation of taxes from 1935 to the present day. In this second large period, nine stages or periods are distinguished on the basis of legislative developments and quantitative results. The first five stages include birth, maturation and processing, extending from 1935 to the end of the 1970s. The sixth period (1980-1984) starts the path towards the disruption and fall of the regime, leading to the next three periods (1985-87; 1988-89 and 1990 to the present day) of the birth and consolidation of coercive federalism. Each of these periods leaves lessons and lessons that can be useful for the design of a new scheme. Project "Regional Disparities and Fiscal Federalism: A proposal for the reform of the Federal co-participation regime for taxes in Argentina "in the Department of Economics of the UNLP is supported by the Tinker Foundation. Director of the Project: Dr Alberto Porto. Department of Economics ; The aim of this paper is to make an historical review of the Argentine Revenue Sharing System. Two main periods are distinguished: one previous to the Revenue Sharing System (1853-1934), characterized as Competitive Federalism; and the Revenue Sharing period itself, from 1935 onwards. Within this second period nine sub-periods are distinguished according to the evolution Revenue Sharing both legally and quantitatively. The first five sub-periods (from 1935 to the 70s) include the birth, maturing and improvement of the regimen; the system evolved from a Competitive to a Cooperative federalism. The sixth period (1980-1984) starts the way towards the disarticulation and the end of the regimen, giving place to the following three periods of birth and consolidation of the Coercitive Federalism. Each period generates illuminating lessons offering interesting insights for the design of a ...