The article deals with the idea of Central Europe and aims to identify common developmental tendencies of the region in the medieval period and early modern age. The author emphasizes the advantages of the comparative approach primarily in the case of the medieval and early modern Polish, Czech and Hungarian states. Alongside common developmental tendencies the author emphasizes also important differences which cast doubt on the very idea of Central Europe.
The Middle East has been caught in a cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence for the last two years. Last year brought some changes that have the potential to bring about a shift in this violent situation. First, within a very short time period two figureheads of the Islamic militant group Hamas were killed by Israelis: the spiritual leader Sheikh Ahamad Yassin & the leader of Hamas, Abdal Aziz Al Rantissi. Second, an important development in the past year was the change in the policy of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He came up with the so-called "Disengagement Plan," which envisioned the retreat of Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip. Such a plan was not expected from a settlement-pioneer like Sharon. Third, an event of great importance for the Middle East was the re-election of American President George W. Bush. US diplomacy plays a crucial role in the Middle East. Fourth, probably the most important event in the region was the death of long-time Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. His death will have a strong influence on the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The four developments are in the center of this article's analysis. References. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
This study deals with application of the Norbert Elias's theory of sociogenesis to the case of early Czech state formation. For this purpose we focus on the mechanisms of emergence and establishing of the state monopoly, as well as on the aspects of decentralization and privatization of state power during reign of first Premyslid dukes - from 860 to 1230 AD. In the second place, the article tries to compare the process of sociogenesis in the Western Europe with the dynamics of state formation that was typical for the contemporary Czech lands. In this context we claim that Elias made several mistakes, because he supposed that features and mechanisms of state formation were fairly unitary everywhere Europe. We try to challenge this notion show that the history of state making in the Central European region has many autonomous and unique aspects that differentiate it from social dynamics in other parts of the continent. From this critical pointof view, the article attempts a reformulation of Elias's theory for the Central European area.
There are three main geopolitical actors whose interests & specific actions may have impact on Ukraine's geopolitical drift towards the East or the West. From such actors Russia must be named first. Yet author of the article is more interested in two others -- the United States & the European Union. Although in the Huntington's scheme they represent supposedly united Western civilization their interests in Ukraine or towards Ukraine are rather different. For the United States Ukraine is quite an important country, especially for security reasons. Those reasons are related both to containment of Russia -- the USA seeks to contain not only enemies but partners as well -- and to the implementation of national security strategy which treats the Wider Middle East as likely the most important for the USA -- from security point of view -- region of the world. Ukraine borders with this region in which the USA has few reliable partners. Ukraine may became such a partner -- more reliable than Turkey. From the first view the EU is more close to Ukraine than the USA. Yet the EU is more close to Ukraine only from geographical point of view. The EU, especially its core states, so called "old" Europe, treats Ukraine as peripheral country & regards development of closer ties with it as unnecessary or even harmful. One of the many reasons -- Ukraine may become a new Trojan Horse of the USA inside the EU. Different EU countries look at EU neighborhood policy with different eyes. Most of the new members of the EU give priority to the eastern direction but many older -- rather to the southern one. Moreover, for most of the new members Ukraine is more natural candidate for EU membership than Turkey creating much less problems for the European identity of the EU. However, Ukraine's possible accession to EU & NATO will depend not only upon position of the major geopolitical players but on the will of Ukrainians themselves. Ukraine is extremely heterogeneous country. Religious, historical & cultural divides create political ones & at the moment it is not clear which way -- leading towards the East or the West -- the country may choose. In such situation an external encouragement & support is vitally needed -- development of relations with Ukraine must become a priority not only for the USA but for the EU also. Adapted from the source document.
The main purpose of this article is to show by selected case studies to what extent the euro has already managed to establish itself as one of the key international currencies from the point of view of various aspects, to what extent it fulfills the functions of an important international currency, and what are the prospects of the euro's position in the future. Various signals indicate that the euro already fulfills some conditions which would allow it to become a serious competitor to the dollar in a relatively short period of time. The article is also taking notice of some obstacles and drawbacks that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has to and will have to deal with.First of all, the author deals with the question of whether the eurozone is an optimum currency area. This is one of the principal theoretical problems which has been accompanying the EMU since the very beginning. Then he shifts his attention to the question, concerning what role does the euro play in the world economy at present from the point of view of the share of the eurozone on the world GDP, trade, officialforeign exchange reserves, selected indicators offinancial markets etc. Then he deals with the role of the euro in the world monetary system -- one of the main subsystems of the world economy. Here is presented a survey of countries which have accepted the euro as its single or main currency, and also countries whose currencies are narrowly linked to the euro by means of various exchange rate mechanisms. The next part of the article outlines the potential of the euro in its "conquest" offurther regions of the world. Both those where the euro is becoming or will become the number one currency (e.g. in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) in a foreseeable future, and those where it will compete with the American dollar (e.g. in Latin America, in the Middle East etc.). In the final part, the author attemptes (use the same tense) to point out some problems which can influence what?missing subject, if and to what extent the euro really will become a strong and stable currency. At the moment, it is not yet possible to answer concisely and clearly the question of whether the euro will become an equivalent competitor to the American dollar. It is important whether the EMU will or will not break up in the course of the coming years or decades. So far, there have not appeared any signals of this kind. It will be substantial how the member countries of the eurozone will be able to handle the first serious crisis, e.g. analogical to that of 1992-1993. At that time, the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) was abandonned temporarily by the 1talian lira and permanently by the British pound. This crisis of the European monetary system has shown the difficulty or even incapacity to set such a monetary policy which would be simultaneously advantageous for all member countries of a certain monetary system. The question is whetlLer it is possible considering there are usually big differences in economical standing between individual countries. A similar or even a more serious crisis could emerge in a longer time horizon. The EMU thus stays a long term project and a long distance run. It is, however, possible to assume that within the next ten years, it could become totally clear whether the EMU project is a great success or a great error. Adapted from the source document.
