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Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and 'taxable' resources but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destrucrive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is long.

Angesichts einer neuen Unübersichtlichkeit, die die Kriege und politischen Konflikte der Gegenwart kennzeichnet, werden im vorliegenden Beitrag die Figurationen der "Warlords" betrachtet. In entwicklungssoziologischer Hinsicht stellen die Warlordgebilde insofern eine Herausforderung dar, als sie in Raum und Zeit verstreut auftauchen. Sie sind dispersiert und diskontinuierlich und weisen nicht immer die Spuren ihrer Vorgänger auf. Aus der Perspektive des Staates handelt es sich bei den Warlordfigurationen um typische Bifurkationsphänomene, obwohl sie nicht in das allgemeine Schema passen, wonach sich die Entwicklung einer Gesellschaft durch Brüche, Revolutionen oder transformative Schwellen vollzieht. Die Entwicklungspotenziale der Warlordfigurationen liegen dagegen in ihrer Fähigkeit zur Gewaltorganisation und zum Gebrauch der organisierten Gewalt für die Kontrolle von Märkten. Um die außerstaatlichen Kriegführungen seit 1800, die gemeinhin mit dem Begriff der "Warlords" verbunden werden, zu verdeutlichen, geht der Autor auf Beispiele aus Asien, Afrika, Europa und Lateinamerika ein. Sein Interesse gilt dabei weniger den Motiven und Absichten einzelner Warlords, im Vordergrund stehen entwicklungssoziologische Fragen nach der ungeplanten Verflechtungsordnung der Warlords, ihren Figurationen und den anthropologischen Aspekten ihres Wandels. (ICI2)

Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and `taxable' resources, but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases, this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destructive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is sufficiently long.

Argues that long-term international help is needed to prevent a return to turmoil & civil war in postconflict Afghanistan. Although most deadlines of the 2001 Bonn Accords have been met, elections have been postponed until September; the resurgent Taliban poses an increasing threat; & many warlords continue to operate their own "mini fiefdoms." The newly created government institutions are weak &, in some cases, have even undermined the legitimacy of the constitution. Even though the current state of affairs is a great improvement over life under the Taliban, Afghanistan is situated "somewhere between conflict & peace." The potential to move toward sustained peace & genuine democracy depends on crucial political, economic, & military support from the international community. The most serious challenges facing Afghanistan include problems related to the upcoming election; warlordism; increased poppy production/the sophisticated opium trade; & Taliban threats. NATO's takeover of the International Security Assistance Force is encouraging but may not by itself be sufficient to meet the multiple challenges. J. Lindroth