The Inchoate legislative scrutiny of the Myanmar police forces: a study of the USDP legislature (2011–16)

In: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 531-556

Abstract

How do post-authoritarian legislatures craft police oversight? This article applies McCubbins and Schwartz's model of congressional oversight to Myanmar's inaugural post-junta legislature (2011–16). It aims to assess whether parliament began to play a role in police oversight following the end of the junta's rule in 2011. It draws on the analysis of official legislative proceedings and interviews with members of parliament from both the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the opposition. The findings suggest that—echoing large swathes of scholarship on parliamentary scrutiny in fledgling democracies—an inchoate form of "fire alarm" oversight began to develop. The Union legislature under the USDP emerged as a site for occasionally shedding light on police (mis)behaviour, but failed to effectively act on, or sanction, misconduct. Police scrutiny was tentatively fostered by a handful of backbenchers who had a keen interest in police issues, a background in security affairs or were facing pressure from their constituents to ventilate their grievances against the police in parliament. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the practice of police oversight in new legislatures operating under praetorian settings. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)