The origins of international counterterrorism: Switzerland at the forefront of crisis negotiations, multilateral diplomacy, and intelligence cooperation (1969-1977)
In: New perspectives on the Cold War Volume 2
In: New perspectives on the Cold War volume 2
Introduction -- Compliance, Coordination, and Censorship: Switzerland's Response to Palestinian and Brazilian Terrorism -- -- Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday1 -- Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970–71) -- Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management -- At the Forefront through the Backdoor: Switzerland's Counterterrorism Diplomacy -- -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the icao: "An Elegant Way of Doing Nothing" -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the un: A Fastidiously Balanced Position -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts "Making" Foreign Policy -- Conclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Multilateral Fora -- In Defiance of Neutrality: Switzerland's Secret Counterterrorism Cooperation -- -- A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: Intelligence-Sharing within the Club de Berne (1971–1972) -- Conclusions of Part 3: A Glimpse into the Club de Berne in the 1980s -- Conclusions.
In: New perspectives on the Cold War Volume 2
In: New Perspectives on the Cold War Ser
Intro -- The Origins of International Counterterrorism -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- From Bystander to Shaper of European Counterterrorism Cooperation -- Method and Sources -- Defining "Terrorism" -- International Terrorism and the Global Cold War -- State Security and the Culture of the Cold War in Switzerland -- Switzerland and Palestinian Terrorism: The 1969 Kloten Airport Attack and the 1970 Skyjack Sunday -- Meticulously Prepared Crisis Mismanagement -- Swiss Policymakers' Role during the Crisis Management -- Summary of Swiss Reactions to Palestinian Terrorism -- Switzerland and Brazilian Terrorism: The Abduction of Ambassador Bucher (1970-71) -- After Zarqa, Now Rio -- First Round in the "War of the Nerves"-Unmaking of Swiss Policy -- Second Round in the "War of the Nerves"-Limited Options -- The Protracted Last Phase of the Crisis -- Controlling the Kidnapping's Media Coverage -- The Swiss Authorities' Threat Evaluation after the "Bucher Crisis" -- Summary of Swiss Reactions to Brazilian Terrorism -- Conclusions of Part 1: A Comparison of Crisis Management -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the ICAO: "An Elegant Way of Doing Nothing" -- Preparations for Rome: Constructive Obstruction -- The Limit of Enhancing Aviation Security Laws -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the UN: A Fastidiously Balanced Position -- Drafting of the Swiss Position at the UN -- The Swiss Position at the UN -- UN Counterterrorism Efforts Deadlocked -- Swiss Counterterrorism Diplomacy at the CoE: Experts "Making" Foreign Policy -- The "Non-Beginning" of the Convention -- The ECCP Accelerates the Process -- New Terrorist Attacks, Renewed Counterterrorism Efforts -- The Police against the Rest: Inner Swiss Negotiations -- Revision, Fast-Track, and Finalisation of the ECST -- France against the Rest: The CoE Negotiations
In: New perspectives on the Cold War volume 2
France against the Rest: The CoE NegotiationsFrench Decision-Making: Worrying About the Third World; Reinsertion of the Political Offence Clause; ECST: Success or Dead Letter?; The WGT: An Overview; Conclusions of Part 2: Swiss Counterterrorism Policymaking in Multilateral Fora; A Secret Counterterrorism Alliance: Intelligence-Sharing within the Club de Berne (1971-1972); Suspect Profiling: The Conspicuous Traveller; Political Activists as Terrorist Suspects; Tracing Terrorist Organisations; Terrorist Innovations in Weaponry and Tactics; Perpetrated Terrorist Attacks and the Lessons Learnt
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