In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
1. Why Poland? -- 2. The dynamics of the Polish political economy, 1990-1997 -- 3. Creative destruction and economic transition -- 4. The social and distributional costs of transition -- 5. Individual attitudes and voting -- 6. De Nova job creation and election returns -- 7. Liberal economic interests and seat allocations -- 8. The political economy after 1997 -- 9. The political economy of transition : why Poland? -- App. A. Assessing measures of new and small firms in Poland.
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
How did Poland go from an authoritarian one-party state with a faltering centrally planned economy to become a relatively stable multiparty democracy and a market economy? This book explains these successes by the high rate of creation and growth of new, domestically owned firms between 1990-1997
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
This book was first published in 2005. In the time span of a two-term US presidency, Poland went from an authoritarian one-party state with a faltering centrally planned economy to become a relatively stable multiparty democracy and a market economy with one of the highest GDP growth rates in Europe. A central feature of these economic and political reforms is a high rate of entry of new, domestically owned firms. This book uses detailed economic and political data to examine how these new firms contributed to the Polish transition. The authors test propositions about why some regions have more new firms than others and how the success of these new firms contributed to political constituencies that supported economically liberal parties. The book concludes by contrasting the Polish with the experiences of other transitional countries
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
English
Cambridge University Press
Report Issue