Rational Choice
In: Political Analysis Ser.
Cover -- Contents -- List of Boxes, Figuresand Tables -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Political economy to economics -- The emergence of rational choice ( 1950- 1970) -- The take- off to growth ( 1970- 1994) -- A difficult decade ( 1994- 2004) -- Major combat operations are over? ( 2004-) -- Chapter 2 James M. Buchanan and ConstitutionalPolitical Economy -- Setting the stage: the state as an escapefrom Hobbesian anarchy -- Exchange and the constitutional framework -- Choice within rules versus choice among rules -- The Calculus of Consent -- Covenants without the sword -- Assessment -- Chapter 3 Anthony Downs and the Spatial Theory of Party Competition -- Setting the stage: the demands of democracy -- The precursors of party competition -- The median voter theorem -- Qualifying the argument: accounting for divergence -- Assumption 1: there are only two parties -- Assumption 2: political space is one- dimensional -- Assumption 3: parties can move to and occupyany point in this one- dimensional space -- Assumption 4: parties are vote- maximizers -- Assumption 5: voters vote for the party closestto them in political space -- Assumption 6: there is perfect information -- Assumption 7: voters' preferences are fixed -- Assessment -- Chapter 4 William Riker and the Theoryof Coalitions -- Setting the stage: choosing a voting system -- Riker and the theory of the minimal- winningcoalition -- Policy- seeking parties -- The portfolio- allocation model -- The transaction costs of policy agreements -- Assessment -- Chapter 5 Kenneth Arrow and Social Choice Theory -- Setting the stage: democracy and the public will -- The precursors of social choice theory -- Arrow: social choice and individual values -- Riker: liberalism against populism -- The possibility of social choice -- Assessment -- Chapter 6 Mancur Olson and the Logic of Collective Action.