State Capacity, Economic Control, and Authoritarian Elections
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- Acknowledgements -- 1 The puzzle of authoritarian elections -- The puzzle -- The argument -- Time period and cases -- The concepts: authoritarianism, elections, and regime breakdown -- Authoritarian regimes -- The dependent variable: regime stability and breakdown -- The independent variable: authoritarian multi-party elections -- Measuring multi-party elections -- One- and no-party elections and non-electoral regimes -- The spread of authoritarian elections -- Elections over time -- Elections across regions -- Elections across authoritarian regime types -- The plan of the book -- Notes -- References -- 2 Authoritarian capacities and regime stabilization through elections -- Threats to power and survival strategies in authoritarian regimes -- The existing literature on authoritarian elections -- Regime-sustaining elections -- Regime-subverting elections -- Empirical evidence -- A conditional effect -- The argument: authoritarian capacities and the conditional effect of elections -- Voting choices, elite defections, opposition mobilization, and voter protests -- (1) Voter choice -- (2) Candidate choice -- (3) Protester choice -- Authoritarian capacities and electoral strategies -- State capacity -- Economic control -- Authoritarian capacities, vote choice, supermajority victories, and the effect on candidate choice -- Authoritarian capacities and increased costs of being in opposition and protesting -- Hypotheses -- The costs of violence and fraud -- Typical cases and observable implications -- Three scenarios of authoritarian capacities -- Stabilization by election: high administrative capacity and/or economic control -- Breakdown by election: limited capacities -- Electoral survival: high coercive capacity but limited administrative capacity and economic control