The Failure of Presidential Parliamentarism: Constitutional versus Structural Presidentialization in Israel's Parliamentary Democracy

Abstract

Examines the presidentialization of politics in Israel where the Knesset (parliament) adopted a 1992 constitutional change that "presidentialized" the prime minister; however, negative consequences led to its abolishment less than five years later. Both structural-institutional provisions & the personalities of prime ministers contributed to the gradual strengthening of the prime minister's office at the expense of the parliament, parties, & ministers. A look at the causes & consequences of the move from de facto to constitutional presidentialization notes that the prime minister's increased power led to a decrease in his own party's parliamentary strength which in turn adversely affected his ability to govern. It is contended that the presidentialization of the electoral process & executive or party power are not causally linked. Israel's experience with the presidentialization of politics is compared to that of other democracies to conclude that other countries should be discouraged from grafting a presidentialized prime minister onto a proportional parliamentary infrastructure. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 27 References. J. Lindroth