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Keith Hart on the
Informal Economy, the Great Transformation, and the Humanity of Corporations














International Relations
has long focused on the formal relations between states; in the same way,
economists have long focused exclusively on formal economic activities. If by
now that sounds outdated, it is only because of the work of Keith Hart. Famous
for coining the distinction between the formal and the informal economy in the
1970s, Hart is a critical scholar who engages head-on with some of the world's
central political-economic challenges. In this Talk, he, amongst others, discusses the value of the distinction 40
years after; how we need to rethink The
Great Transformation nearly a century later; and how we need to undo the
legal equivalence of corporations to humans, instituted nearly 150 years back.














Print version of this Talk (pdf)




What is, according to you, the
central challenge or principal debate in International Relations? And what is
your position regarding this challenge/in this debate?







I think it is the lack of fit between politics, which
is principally national, and the world economy, which is global. In particular,
the system of money has escaped from its national controls, but politics, public
rhetoric aside, has not evolved to the point where adequate responses to our
common economic problems can be posed. At this point, the greatest challenge is
to extend our grasp of the problems we face beyond the existing national
discussions and debates. Most of the problems we see today in the world—and the
economic crisis is only one example—are not confined to a single country.







For me, the question is how we can extend our research
from the local to the global. Let the conservatives restrict themselves to
their national borders. This is not to say I believe that political solutions
to the economic problems the world faces are readily available.  Indeed, it is possible that we are entering
another period of war and revolution, similar to 1776-1815 or 1914-1945. Only
after prolonged conflict and much loss might the world reach something like the
settlement that followed 1945. This was not only a settlement of wartime
politics, but also a framework for the economic politics of the peace,
responding to problems that arose most acutely between the wars.  It sounds tragic, but my point in raising the
possibility now is to remind people that there may be even more catastrophic
consequences at stake that they realize already. We need to confront these and
mobilize against them. When I go back in history, I am pessimistic about
resolving the world's economic problems soon, since the people who got us into
this situation are still in power and are still pursuing broadly the same
policies without any sign of them being changed. I believe that they will bring
us all into a much more drastic situation than we are currently facing. Yet in
some way we will be accountable if we ignore the obvious signs all around us.











How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about IR?







My original work in West Africa arose out of a view that
the post-colonial regimes offered political recipes that could have more
general relevance for the world. I actually believed that the new states were
in a position to provide solutions, if you like, to the corrupt and decadent
political structures that we had in the West. That's why, when we were demonstrating
outside the American embassies in the '60s, we chanted the names of the great
Third World emancipation leaders—Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Fidel Castro, and so
on.







So for me, the question has always been whether
Africans, in seeking emancipation from a long history of slavery, colonialism, apartheid
and postcolonial failure, might be able to change the world. I still think it
could be and I'm quite a bit more optimistic about the outcome now than I have
been for most of the last fifty years. We live in a racialized world order
where Africa acts as the most striking symbol of inequality. The drive for a
more equal world society will necessarily entail a shift in the relationship
between Africa and the rest of the world. I have been pursuing this question
for the last thirty years or more. What interests me at the moment is the
politics of African development in the coming decades.







Africa began the twentieth century as the least populated
and urbanized continent. It's gone through a demographic and urban explosion
since then, doubling its share
of world population in a century. In 2050, the UN predicts that 24% of the world
population will be in Africa, and in 2100, 35% (read the report here, pdf)! This is because Africa is growing
at 2.5% a year while the rest of the world is ageing fast. Additionally, 7 out
of the 10 fastest growing economies in the world are now African—Asian
manufacturers already know that Africa holds the key to the future of the world
economy.







But, besides Africa as a place, if you will, a number
of anti-colonial intellectuals have played a big role in influencing me. The
most important event in the twentieth century was the anti-colonial revolution.
Peoples forced into world society by Western Imperialism fought to establish
their own independent relationship to it. The leading figures of that struggle
are, to my mind, still the most generative thinkers when we come to consider
our own plight and direction. My mentor was the Trinidadian writer C.L.R. James, with whom I spent a
number of years toward the end of his life. I am by temperament a classicist; I
like to read the individuals who made a big difference to the way we think now.
The anti-colonial intellectuals were the most important thinkers of the 20th
century, by which I mean Gandhi, Fanon and James.







But I've also pursued a very classical, Western
trajectory in seeking to form my own thinking. When I was an undergraduate, I
liked Durkheim and as a graduate student Weber. When I was a young lecturer, I
became a Marxist; later, when I went to the Carribbean, I discovered Hegel,
Kant and Rousseau; and by the time I wrote my book on money, The Memory Bank,
the person I cited more than anyone else was John Locke. By then I realized I
had been moving backwards through the greats of Western philosophy and social
theory, starting with the Durkheim school of sociology. Now I see them as a set
of possible references that I can draw on eclectically. Marx is still probably
the most important influence, although Keynes, Simmel and Polanyi have also shaped my
recent work. I suppose my absolute favorite of all those people is Jean-Jacques
Rousseau for his Discourse on Inequality and his inventive
approach to writing about how to get from actual to possible worlds.











What would a student need (dispositions, skills) to become a specialist
in IR or understand the world in a global way?







In your 20s and 30s, your greatest commitment should
be to experience the world in the broadest way possible, which means learning
languages, traveling, and being open to new experiences. I think the kind of
vision that I had developed over the years was not one that I had originally
and the greatest influence on it was the time I spent in Ghana doing my
doctoral fieldwork; indeed, I have not had an experience that so genuinely
transformed me since!







Even so, I found it very difficult to write a book
based on that fieldwork. I moved from my ethnographic investigations into a
literature review of the political economy of West African agriculture, and it
turns out that I am actually not an ethnographer, and am more interested in
surveying literature concerning the questions that interest me. I am still an
acute observer of everyday life; but I don't base my 'research' on it. Young people
should both extend their comparative reach in a practical way and dig very
deeply into circumstances that they encounter, wherever that may be. Above all,
they should retain a sense of the uniqueness of their own life trajectory as
the only basis for doing something new. This matters more than any professional
training.











Now we see spectacular
growth rates in African countries, as you mentioned, one of which is the DRC.
How can we make sense of these formal growth rates: are they representative of
the whole economies of these countries, or do they only refer to certain
economic tendencies?







The whole question of measuring economic growth is a
technical one, and it's flawed, and I only use it in the vaguest sense as a
general indicator. For example, I think it's more important that Kenya, for
example, is the world leader in mobile phone banking, and also a leader in
recycling old computers for sale cheaply to poor people.







The political dispensation in Africa—the combination
of fragmented states and powerful foreign interests and the predatory actions
of the leaders of these states on their people -- especially the restrictions
they impose on the movements of people and goods and money and so on – is still
a tremendous problem. I think that the political fragmentation of Africa is the
main obstacle to achieving economic growth.







But at the same time, as someone who has lived in
Africa for many years, it's very clear that in some countries, certainly not
all, the economies are very significantly on the move. It's not--in principle—that
this will lead to durable economic growth, but it is the case that the cities
are expanding fast, Africans are increasing their disposable income and it's the
only part of the world where the people are growing so significantly. Africa is
about to enter what's called the demographic dividend that comes when the
active labor force exceeds the number of dependents. India has just gone
through a similar phase.







The Chinese and others are heavily committed to taking
part in this, obviously hoping to direct Africa's economic growth in their own
interest. This is partly because the global economy is over the period of
growth generated by the Chinese manufacturing exports and the entailed infrastructure
and construction boom, which was itself an effect of the greatest shift from the countryside to the city in history. Now, the Chinese
realize, the next such boom will be—can only take place—in Africa.







I'm actually not really interested in technical
questions of how to measure economic growth. In my own writing about African
development, I prefer anecdotes. Like for example, Nollywood—the Nigerian film industry—which has just past
Bollywood as the second largest in the world! You mention the Congo which I
believe holds the key to Africa's future. The region was full of economic
dynamism before King Leopold took it over and its people have shown great
resilience since Mobutu was overthrown and Rwandan and Ugandan generals took
over the minerals-rich Eastern Congo. Understanding this history is much more
important than measuring GDP, but statistics of this kind have their uses if
approached with care.











Is it possible to
understand the contemporary economic predicament that we are seeing, which in
the Western world is referred to as the "crisis", without attributing it to
vague agencies or mechanisms such as neoliberalism?







I have written at great length about the world
economic crisis paying special attention to the problems of the Eurozone. My belief
is that it is not simply a financial crisis or a debt crisis. We are actually
witnessing the collapse of the dominant economic form of the last century and a
half, which I call national capitalism—the attempt to control markets, money
and accumulation through central bureaucracies in the interests of a presumed
cultural community of national citizens.







The term neoliberalism is not particularly useful, but
I try to lay out the history of modern money and why and how national
currencies are in fact being replaced. That, to my mind, is a more precise way
of describing the crisis than calling it neoliberal. On the other hand, neoliberalism does refer to
the systematic privatization of public interests which has become normal over
the last three or four hundred years. The bourgeois revolution claimed to have
separated public and private interests, but I don't think it ever did so. For
example, the Bank of England, the Banque de France, and the Federal Reserve are
all private institutions that function behind a smokescreen of being public
agencies.







It's always been the case that private interests
corrupted public institutions and worked to deprive citizens of the ability to
act purposefully under an ideological veil of liberty. But in the past, they
tried to hide it. The public wasn't supposed to know what actually went on
behind the scenes and indeed modern social science was invented to ensure that
they never knew. What makes neoliberalism new is that they now boast about it
and even claim that it's in everyone's interest to diminish public goods and
use whatever is left for private ends—that's what neoliberalism is.







It's a naked grab for public resources and it's also a
shift in the fundamental dynamic of capitalism from production for profit
through sales tow varieties of rent-seeking. In fact, Western capitalism is now
a system for extracting rents, rather than producing profits. Rents are income
secured by political privilege such as the dividends of patents granted to Big
Pharma or the right to control distribution of recycled movies. This has got
nothing to do with competitive or free markets and much opposition to where we
are now is confused as a result. Sometimes I think western capitalism has
reverted to the Old Regime that it once replaced—from King George and the East
India Company to George W and Halliburton. If so, we need another liberal
revolution, but it won't take place in the North Atlantic societies.











In your recent work,
you refer to The Great Transformation, which invokes Karl Polanyi's famous
analysis of the
growth of 19th century capitalism and industrialization. How can Polanyi
help us to make sense of contemporary global economy, and where does this
inspiring work need to be complemented? In other words, what is today's Great Transformation
in light of Polanyi?







First of all, the
Great Transformation is a brilliant book. I have never known anyone who
didn't love it from the first reading. The great message of Polanyi's work is
the spirit in which he wrote that book, regardless of the components of his
theory. He had a passionate desire to explain the mess that world society had
reached by the middle of the 20th century, and he provided an
explanation. It's always been a source of inspiration for me.







A central idea of Polanyi's is that the economy was
always embedded in society and Victorian capitalism disembedded it. One problem
is that it is not clear whether the economy ever was actually disembedded (for
example capitalism is embedded in state institutions and the private social
networks mentioned just now) or whether the separation occurs at the level of
ideology, as in free market economics. Polanyi was not against markets as such,
but rather against market fundamentalism of the kind that swept Victorian
England and has us in its grip today. The political question is whether politics
can serve to protect society from the excesses produced by this disembedding;
or whether it lends itself to further separation of the economy from society.







And I would say that Polanyi's biggest failure was to
claim that what happened in the 19th century was the rise of "market
society". This concept misses entirely the bureaucratic revolution that was
introduced from the 1860s onwards based on a new alliance between capitalists
and landlords which led to a new synthesis of states and corporations aiming to
develop mass production and consumption. Polanyi could not anticipate what
actually happened after he wrote his book in 1944. An American empire of free
trade was built on a tremendous bureaucratic revolution. This drew on
techniques and theories of control developed while fighting a war on all
fronts. The same war was the source of the technologies that culminated late in
the digital revolution. Karl Polanyi's interpretation of capitalism as a market
economy doesn't help us much to understand that. In fact, he seems to have
thought that bureaucracy and planning were an antidote to capitalist market
economy.







If you ask me what is today's great transformation, I
would prefer to treat the last 200 years as a single event, that is, a period
in which the world population increased from one billion to seven billion, when
the proportion of people living in cities grew from under 3% to around half,
and where energy production increased on average 3% a year. The Great Transformation
is this leap of mankind from reliance on the land into living in cities. It has
been organized by a variety of institutions, including cities, capitalist
markets, nation-states, empires, regional federations, machine industry, telecommunications
networks, financial structures, and so on. I'm prepared to say that in the
twentieth century national capitalism was the dominant economic form, but by no
means all you need to know about if you want to make a better world.







I prefer to look at the economy as being organized by
a plural set of institutions, including various political forms. The Great Transformation
in Polanyi's sense was not really the same Great Transformation that Marx and
Engels observed in Victorian England—the idea that a new economic system was
growing up there that would transform the world. And it did! Polanyi and Marx
had different views (as well as some common ideas), but both missed what
actually happened, which is the kind of capitalism whose collapse is constitutes
the Great Transformation for us today. The last thirty years of financial
imperialism are similar to the three decades before the First World War. After
that phase collapsed, thirty years of world war and economic depression were
the result. I believe the same will happen to us! Maybe we can do something
about it, but only if our awareness is historically informed in a
contemporarily relevant way.











The distinction between
states and markets really underpins much of what we understand about the workings
of world economy and politics. Even when we just say "oh, that's not economic"
or "that's not rational", we invoke a separation. How can we deal with this
separation?







This state-market division comes back to the bourgeois
revolution, which was an attempt to win freedom from political interference for
private economic actors. I've been arguing that states and markets were always
in bed together right from the beginning thousands of years ago, and they still
are! The revolution of the mid 19th century involved a shift from
capitalists representing workers against the landed aristocracy to a new
alliance between them and the traditional enforcers to control the industrial
and criminal classes flocking into the cities. A series of linked revolutions
in all the main industrial countries during the 1860s and early 70s—from the
American civil war to the French Third Republic via the Meiji Restoration and
German unification—brought this alliance to power.







Modernity was thus a compromise between traditional
enforcers and industrial capitalists and this dualism is reflected in the
principal social form, the nation-state. This uneasy partnership has marked the
relationship between governments and corporations ever since. I think that we
are now witnessing a bid of the corporations for independence, for home rule,
if you like. Perhaps, having won control of the political process, they feel
than can go ahead to the next stage without relying on governments.  The whole discourse of 'corporate social responsibility'
implies that they could take on legal and administrative functions that had
been previously 'insourced' to states. It is part of a trend whereby the
corporations seek to make a world society in which they are the only citizens
and they no longer depend on national governments except for local police
functions. I think that it is a big deal—and this is happening under our noses!







Both politicians and economic theorists (OliverWilliamson got a Nobel prize for
developing Coase's theory of the form along these lines)
are proposing that we need to think again about what functions should be
internal to the firm and what should be outside. Perhaps it was a mistake to
outsource political control to states and war could be carried out by private
security firms. The ground for all of this was laid in the late 19th
century when the distinction in law between real and artificial persons was
collapsed for business enterprises so that the US Supreme Court can protect
corporate political spending in the name of preserving their human rights!
Corporations have greater wealth, power and longevity than individual citizens.
Until we can restore their legal separateness from the rest of humanity and
find the political means of restricting their inexorable rise, resistance will
be futile. There is a lot of intellectual and political work still to be done
and, as I have said, a lot of pain to come before more people confront the
reality of their situation.











What role do
technological innovations play in your understanding and promoting of shifts in
the way that we organize societies? Is it a passive thing or a driver of
change?







I wrote a book, the
Memory Bank: Money in an Unequal World
(read it here, with the introduction
here), which centered on a
very basic question: what would future generations consider is interesting
about us? In the late '90s, the dot com boom was the main game in town. It
seemed obvious that the rise of the internet was the most important thing and
that our responses to it would have significant consequences for future
generations.







When I started writing it, I was interested in the
democratic potential of the new media; but most of my friends saw them as a new
source of inequality – digital exclusion, dominance of the big players and so
on. I was accused of being optimistic, but I had absorbed from CLR James a
response to such claims. It is not a question of being optimistic or
pessimistic, but of identifying what the sides are in the struggle to define
society's trajectory. In this case the sides are bureaucracy and the people. Of
course the former wish to confine our lives within narrow limits that they
control in a process that culminates as totalitarianism. But the rest of us
want to increase the scope for self-expression in our daily lives; we want
democracy and the force of the peoples of world is growing, not least in Africa
which for so long has been excluded from the benefits of modern civilization.
Of course there are those who wish to control the potential of the internet
from the top; but everywhere people are making space for themselves in this
revolution. When I see how Africans have moved in the mobile phone phase of
this revolution, I am convinced that there is much to play for in this
struggle. What matters is to do your best for your side, not to predict which
side will win. Speaking personally, Web 2.0 has been an
unmitigated boon for me in networking and dissemination, although I am aware
that some think that corporate capital is killing off the internet. A lot depends
on your perspective. I grew up learning Latin and Greek grammar. The
developments of the last 2-3 decades seem like a miracle to me. I guess that
gives me some buoyancy if not optimism as such.







It's obvious enough to me that any democratic response
to the dilemmas we face must harness the potential of the new universal media.
That's the biggest challenge. But equally, it's not clear which side is going
to win. I'm not saying that our side, the democratic side, is going to beat the
bureaucratic side. I just know which side I'm on! And I'm going to do my best
for our side. Our side is the side that would harness the democratic potential
of the new media. In the decade or more since I wrote my book on money and the
internet, I have become more focused on the threat posed by the corporations
and more accepting of the role of governments. But that could change too. And I
am mindful of the role the positive role that some capitalists played in the
classical liberal revolutions of the United States, France and Italy.











Final Question. I would
like to ask you about the distinction between formal and informal economy which
you are famous for having coined. How did you arrive at the distinction? Does the
term, the dichotomy, still with have the same analytical value for you today?








Around 1970, there was a universal consensus that only states could organize economies for development. You were either a Marxist or a Keynesian, but there were no liberal economists with any influence at that time. In my first publication on the topic (Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana, read it here, pdf)—which got picked up by academics and the International Labor Organization—I was reacting against that; the idea promoted by a highly formal economics and bureaucratic practice that the state as an idea as the only actor. In fact, people in Third World cities engaged in all kinds of economic activities, which just weren't recognized as such. So my impulse was really empiricist—to use my ethnographic observations to show that people were doing a lot more than they were supposed to be doing, as recorded in official statistics or discussed by politicians and economists.






Essentially, I made a distinction between those things
which were defined by formal regulation and those that lay outside it. I posed
the question how does it affect our understanding in the development process to
know more what people are doing outside the formal framework of the economy.
And remember, this came up in West Africa, which did not have as strong a colonial
tradition as in many other parts of Africa. African cities there were built and
provisioned by Africans. There were not enough white people there to build
these cities or to provide food and transport, housing, clothing and the rest
of it.







In my book on African agriculture, I went further and
argued that the cities were not the kind of engines of change that many people
imagined that they were, but were in fact an extension of rural civilizations
that had effectively not been displaced by colonialism, at least in that
region. Now if you ask me how useful I think it is today, what happened since
then of course is neoliberal globalization, for want of a better term, which of
course hinges on deregulation. So, as a result of neoliberal deregulation, vast
areas of the economy are no longer shaped by law, and these include many of the
activities of finance, including offshore banking, hedge funds, shadow banking,
tax havens, and so on. It also includes the criminal activities of the
corporations themselves. I've written a paper on my blog called "How the
informal economy took over the world" which argues that we are witnessing the
collapse of the post-war Keynesian consensus that sought to manage the economy in
the public interest through law and in other ways that have been dismantled; so,
it's a free-for-all. In some sense, the whole world is now an informal economy,
which means, of course, that the term is not as valuable analytically as it
once was. If it's everything, then we need some new words.







The mistake I made with other people who followed me was
to identify the informal economy with poor slum dwellers. I argued that even
for them, they were not only in the informal economy, which was not a separate
place, but that all of them combined the formal and informal in some way. But
what I didn't pay much attention to was the fact that the so-called formal
economy was also the commanding heights of the informal economy—that the
politicians and the civil servants were in fact the largest informal operators.
I realize that any economy must be informal to some degree, but it is also
impossible for an economy to be entirely informal. There always have to be
rules, even if they take a form that we don't acknowledge as being
bureaucratically normal like, for example, kinship or religion or criminal
gangs. So that's another reason why it seems to me that the distinction has
lost its power.







At the time, it was a valuable service to point to the
fact that many people were doing things that were escaping notice. But once
what they were doing had been noticed, then the usefulness of the distinction
really came into question. I suppose in retrospect that the idea of an informal
economy was a gesture towards realism, to respect what people really do in the
spirit of ethnography. I have taken that idea to another level recently in mywork on the human economy at the University of Pretoria in South Africa. Here, in addition to
privileging the actors' point of view and their everyday lives, we wish to
address the human predicament at more inclusive levels than the local or even
the national. Accordingly, our interdisciplinary research program (involving a
dozen postdocs from around the world, including Africa, and 8 African doctoral
students) seeks ways of extending our conceptual and empirical reach to take in
world society and humanity as a whole. This is easier said than done, of
course.







Keith
Hart is Extraordinary Visiting Professor in the Centre for the Advancement of
Scholarship and Co-Director of the Human Economy Program at the University of
Pretoria, South Africa. He is also centennial professor of Economic Anthropology at the LSE.











Related links










Faculty Profile at U-London


Personal webpage


Read Hart's Notes towards an Anthropology of the Internet (2004, Horizontes Antropológicos) here (pdf)


Read Hart's Marcel Mauss: In Pursuit of a Whole (2007, Comparative Studies in Society and History) here (pdf)


Read Hart's Between Democracy and the People: A Political History of Informality (2008 DIIS working paper) here (pdf)


Read Hart's Why the Eurocrisis Matters to Us All (Scapegoat Journal) here (pdf)









Print version of this Talk (pdf)

ENGLISH ABSTRACT My argument, that draws heavily on the works by scholars of social and welfare policy as, among others, Gosta Esping-Andersen (2002, 2013), Bruno Palier (2010, 2012), Brian Nolan (2013), Bea Cantillon (2011, 2012, 2013), Anton Hemerjick (2011, 2012, 2013, 2013, 2015), Maurizio Ferrera (1993, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2000, 2012, 2013), and Chiara Saraceno (2011, 2013) regards social investments as a twofold product of the neoliberal workfare model (Jessop 1990). On the one side, social investment prescriptions are to be understood as a counter-reaction to the neoliberal project of "rolling-back" the public sector involvement in social security. Social Investment infuses public intervention of a new centrality, one that finds its raison d'être in the need to mitigate the disruptive impact of market forces on social cohesion, as well as in the potential of welfare programs to foster individual productivity and sustain growth in post-industrial economies. On the other, social investment demonstrates a degree of continuity with elements of the neoliberal ideology, with particular respect to the stigma placed by the latter on unproductive, 'passive' entitlements, but also concerning the favor accorded to principles of welfare governance such as customer's choice, multi-level provision, and accountability The welfare system intended by proponents of the social investment model is meant to function in a radically different socio-economic context from those of the 1950s or even the 1980s. During the last three decades, along with demographic changes, European countries have witnessed the consolidation of a new service economy marked, as Andersen observed, by an increasing correlation between prosperity and the 'diffusion of knowledge and innovation' (2000). In the post-industrial knowledge society, goes the adage, human capital has become the prime engine of growth – a doctrine crystallized by the European Council in the Lisbon Agenda's notorious passage 'people are Europe's main asset' (European Council 2000). This PhD research project takes issue with the social investment paradigm, in particular the claim that a functionalist childcare strategy constructed upon the needs of currently employed individuals can prove effective for decreasing inequality in educational opportunity across socio-economic groups (SEGs). I advance the view that recent efforts to recalibrate welfare states towards activation policies have generated irregular dynamics of early childhood services expansion. Whereas over the last two decades both the number of day-care centres and overall participation rates in formal childcare have increased across the European Union (EU), this broadening of provision has not been accompanied by an equally broad commitment to create a universal legal entitlement to childcare. Likewise, EU countries have often been found wanting in enacting adequate measures to remove financial and cultural barriers preventing families with low socio-economic status from taking up more hours of formal early education. The PhD focuses on the case of early childhood governance in the Autonomous Province of Trento / APT (Italy) throughout the 1995-2015 period, which makes for a paradigmatic example of social investment-inspired childcare strategy. Over the period in question, renewed public investment has raised childcare participation considerably in the APT, but concurrently it fell short of setting the foundations for a universal model, capable of ensuring access to all SEGs. Overall, the research points to the emergence in the APT of "twin fault lines" of childcare fragmentation, between socio- economically distinct groups and between providers. The socio-economic fault line refers to the unequal distribution of childcare across SEGs, telling apart affluent families from those that struggle to shoulder childcare costs. The second line touches upon the remarkable cleavage in training and qualification requirements that separates the staff employed in day-care centres under public jurisdiction and private providers that are exempt from compliance with these norms. With respect to the 'socio-economic fault line', childcare policies in the APT have followed a choice- increasing pattern, which ensued the rise of para-public and private day-care centres, as well as of family-based services. Whereas the Regional government has attempted to ensure equal access through means-tested subsidies and voucher schemes, both public and non-public centres still present flat fees and higher tariffs that run the substantial risk of crowding out low-income families. In general, the distribution of childcare remains dramatically skewed along socio-economic lines, with higher-income families recording much higher participation rates. Concerning the 'professional fault line', over the same twenty-year period, a concurrent trend of increasing staff professionalism has run parallel to the expansion of services in the APT. Since the late 1990s, both minimum qualification and training requirements for childcare staff have been raised from secondary school to a bachelor's degree in a field related to psychology or education. Applicants are also required to have undergone a minimum of 200 hours of training/practice. Whereas such reforms have translated into a significant upgrade of entry level qualifications for early years practitioners, pointing to a shift towards increasing professionalism in the sector, these regulatory changes have only applied to the public and para-public sectors, leaving fast-growing private and family-based services largely unaffected. ABSTRACT ITALIANO Background Il tema centrale di questo progetto di ricerca, che prende le mosse dai lavori condotti da studiosi di politiche sociali e sistemi di welfare quali, per citare i più noti, Gosta Esping-Andersen (2002, 2013), Bruno Palier (2010, 2012), Brian Nolan (2013), Bea Cantillon (2011, 2012, 2013), Anton Hemerjick (2011, 2012, 2013, 2013, 2015), Maurizio Ferrera (1993, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2000, 2012, 2013) e Chiara Saraceno (2011, 2013), è un'analisi del graduale processo di consolidarmento di un nuovo paradigma welfarista, conosciuto come 'social investment', o 'welfare dell'investimento sociale'. L'emergere di questo approccio, che ha investito tanto la sfera della governance quanto quella relativa alla sostenibilità finanziaria della spesa sociale, ha acquisito forza in Europa a partire dalla seconda metà degli anni Novanta, ed è stato definito come un duplice prodotto di quella che Jessop (Jessop 1990) ha definito la natura lavorista del welfare neoliberale, il così detto workfare state. Alla stregua di questa intuizione, il paradigma del social investment può essere considerato, al contempo, come un contraccolpo, una reazione, all'idiosincrasia liberista verso il dominio pubblico della sfera sociale, affermatosi con prepotenza nei decenn successivi alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale, e come una manifestazione di continuità con alcuni dei principi cardine che, invece, caratterizzarono dal punto di vista organizzativo il sorgere negli anni Settanta e Ottanta di un'alternativa ferocemente anti-keynesiana all'amministrazione del welfare. Se dunque, da un lato, il paradigma del social investment ha infuso di una nuova legittimità l'intervento pubblico nel campo socio-assistenziale (ma anche educativo), legittimità che trova nella tutela della coesione sociale e nella protezione del cittadino dalle forze centrifughe del libero mercato la sua raison d'être essenziale, esso ha comunque mantenuto un alto grado di scetticismo verso la 'passività' degli strumenti di protezione tradizionali, caratteristici della fase espansionista nota come Trentennio Glorioso (1945-1975) e giudicati gravemente inadeguati alla realtà post-industriale del XXI° secolo. Contrariamente al modello welfarista post-bellico, lo Stato dell' investimento sociale ha infatti quale focus d'interesse primario le politiche di attivazione, conciliazione e, in termini più generali, i programmi funzionali ad incrementare lo stock di capitale umano a diposizione dell'economia nazionale, ritenuto fondamentale per sostenere la crescita, sempre più vincolata a settori ad alta intensità di competenze ('skill-intensive'). Ma, se il superamento dei vecchi paradigmi è una mossa dettata da esigenze di adattamento, o di ricalibrazione, a un contesto europeo in profonda trasformazione, la transizione iniziata negli anni Novanta ha anche ridisegnato, in chiave produttivista, il rapporto esistente tra Stato e cittadini, i quali, non più beneficiari garantiti di un regime di sostegno, si sono visti trasformare a tutti gli effetti in attivi fautori della propria dimensione di sicurezza. A cambiare è stata la ratio profonda dello stato sociale europeo, che da "rete protettiva", tesa a tutela di lavoratori e famiglie dai rischi intrinseci al sistema economico industriale (disoccupazione, infortunio, malatia, vecchiaia), diveniva un "trampolino di lancio" nell'economia della conoscenza ('knowledge economy'), una complessa rete di programmi e policies "capacitanti", o di empowerment, orientata a fornire pari opportunità di ingresso e permanenza nel mercato del lavoro a qualsiasi individuo abile, indipendentemente dal genere o dalle condizioni socio-economiche di partenza. Il paradigma dell'investimento sociale si regge, dunque, su tre ipotesi centrali: (i) nel contesto economico post-industriale un ampio bagaglio di competenze (cognitive, sociali, comunicative) rappresenta la più efficace risorsa sulla quale il cittadino possa contare, ai fini di assicurare la propria sicurezza economica; (ii) responsabilità dello stato sociale moderno non è più quella di gararantire il soddisfacimento di una filiera di bisogni essenziali, o diritti sociali acquisiti, bensì creare le condizioni per le quali i cittadini possano, in autonomia, sviluppare le competenze necessarie a raggiungere una condizione di sicurezza; (iii) una società composta da cittadini competenti, equipaggiati degli strumenti appropriati a prosperare nell'economia della conoscenza, è anche una società inclusiva ed egalitaria, e dunque operare per incrementare il capitale umano di un numero sempre maggiore di cittadini significa, implicitamente, muovere verso una riduzione delle disuguaglianze sociali esistenti. In questo nuovo contesto, come è evidente, i sistemi di istruzione e formazione hanno acquisito una rinnovata centralità. I servizi socio-educativi per la prima infanzia, in particolare, sono stati oggetto di una radicale riconfigurazione: da strutture profondamente connotate in senso conciliativo-assistenzialista, finalizzate primariamente a favorire la permanenza all'interno de mondo del lavoro di un numero, relativamente esiguo, di madri lavoratrici, a settore strategico per lo sviluppo precoce di competenze, passaggio imprescindibile per il raggiungimento di quegli obiettivi di crescita economica ed inclusione intrinseci alla strategia dell'investimento sociale (Heckman and Carneiro 2003, Heckman, Stixrud et al. 2006, Cunha and Heckman 2010) Ipotesi e domande di ricerca Questo progetto di prefigge un duplice obiettivo d'indagine. Il primo, in linea con l'approccio discorsivo-istituzionalista definito da Vivienne Schmidt (2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016), consiste nel fornire una ricostruzione della traiettoria di istituzionalizzazione seguita dai servizi socio-educativi per la prima infanzia, in Italia e in Trentino, nel corso degli ultimi 50 anni; un resoconto storico capace di mettere a fuoco i momenti chiave nella lenta e frammentata transformazione del settore da servizio residuale ai margini della tradizionale architettura welfarista, a sfera strategica del progetto di investimento sociale. Nel contesto di questa ricostruzione diacronica si vuole dare risalto non soltanto alla concatenazione di documenti, programmi e decisioni politico-strategiche messe in atto dagli attori istituzionali, quanto sottolineare la corrispondenza tra cambiamenti di strategia e il graduale processo evolutivo che, nel corso dei decenni, ha sostanzialmente modificato il modo di guardare alla prima infanzia. Il secondo obiettivo della ricerca, in linea con la direzione d'indagine indicata da studiosi come Bea Cantillon (2011, 2013), Wim Van Lancker (2013, 2017) ed Emmanuele Pavolini (2008, 2014, 2015), è quello di testare la validità di una delle premesse ipotetiche fondamentali alla base dell'approccio social investment ai servizi socio-educativi: la previsione secondo la quale un incremento degli investimenti nel settore della prima infanzia costituirebbe una leva di inclusione, capace di "rompere la trasmissione intergenazionale della disuguaglianza" (European Commission 2013) intervenendo, in età precoce, sulle competenze di base dei bambini di condizione socio-economica più debole. La ricerca si concentra sul caso della Provincia Autonoma di Trento, la regione italiana che, insieme al Friuli Venezia Giulia, ha registrato tra l'anno 2000 ed oggi i più significativi incrementi nel livello di partecipazione ai servizi socio-educativi. Il progetto si propone di analizzare la distribuzione sociale degli esiti sortiti da questo profondo processo di riforma, che ha investito non solamente la dimensione dell'offerta di asili nido e servizi integrativi, ma anche, e in misura sostanziale, la sfera della formazione del personale educativo. Il quesito che la ricerca, nel quinto capitolo, si propone di affrontare è se, in seguito ad un consistente aumento delle risorse a disposizione, il settore socio-educativo trentino sia oggi più vicino ad erogare un servizio di carattere universalista capace di erogare cura ed educazione di qualità a tutti i cittadini della Provincia, indipendentemente dalla condizione economica e dall'area geografica di residenza; o, viceversa, se il fenomeno riformista a cui si è assistito nel corso degli ultimi decenni sia ascrivibile ad un modello di espansionismo "selettivo", teso a colmare un gap nell'offerta di servizi ma senza riguardo per la costruzione di un sistema effettivamente equo. Strumenti teorici e metodologici. La ricostruzione storico-politica poggia su un framework metodologico di carattere discorsivo-istituzionalista. In termini estremamente generali, l'istituzionalismo rappresenta una prospettiva analitica di meso-livello, che riconosce nell'evoluzione delle istituzioni la variabile decisiva per comprendere e spiegare i processi di cambiamento politico (interessata, dunque, a variabili differenti dalla razionalità individuale, o dai macro-interessi strutturali). Le istituzioni, in questa dimensione di analisi, sono considerate come insiemi multi-livello di regole formali ed informali, capaci di esercitare un'influenza sostanziale sul processo e sugli esiti del policy-making, influenza che si manifesta primariamente tramite la capacità di assetti e strutture organizzative di limitare il numero, o lo spettro, di decisioni e comportamenti a disposizione degli agenti politici. Vincoli istituzionali definiscono il numero di soggetti che possono partecipare alla costruzione di un'agenda politica, dettano il numero di opzioni strategiche a disposizione degli attori, organizzano l'esercizio del potere politico all'interno di sequenze implementative predefinite, financo indicano gli strumenti necessari alla valutazione d'impatto delle decisioni maturate. Analisi di carattere istituzionalista hanno ottenuto un ampio successo nello spiegare le traiettorie evolutive dei sistemi di welfare europeo. L'approccio discorsivo si distingue dalle altre correnti istituzionaliste per il focus che pone su fattori e dinamiche endogeni alle organizzazioni: una postura metodologica che si traduce in attenzione all'evoluzione delle strutture discorsive interne alle organizzazioni (le strutture del linguaggio e degli 'atti comunicativi', i sistemi di percezione, idee e convinzioni degli attori), Questa logica interpretativa considera il cambiamento delle politiche come l'esito di processi evolutivi complessi, mai lineari e spesso prolungati nel tempo, che toccano la costruzione di quelle strutture di significato ('structures of meaning') tramite le quali gli attori interni alle istituzioni interpretano ed attribuiscono senso alle proprie azioni, organizzano il proprio comprotamento e definiscono priorità strategiche. L'analisi del processo di "istituzionalizzazione" dei servizi socio-educativi per la prima infanzia, dunque, fa ampio ricorso a documenti ed atti ufficiali, che forniscono testimonianza della parabola evolutiva compiuta da agenti interni alle istituzioni politiche dell'Unione Europea (nel capitolo terzo), e italiane (nel quarto). Lo scopo dichiarato rimane quello di descrivere come un principio fondamentale del nuovo paradigma welfarista del social investment, la centralità strategica di investire precocemente nel capitale umano tramite i servizi socio-educativi, abbiano progressivamente penetrato i confini delle istituzioni politiche, provocando un profondo cambiamento nelle strutture di significato che esse adoperano per amministrare e governare il settore della prima infanzia. Il secondo obiettivo di ricerca, testare sulla Provicia Autonoma di Trento la validità della "promessa egalitarista" del social investment, si articola nel corso del quinto capitolo nell'analisi di un disposto combinato di dati quantitativi, estratti da database statistici nazionali (ISTAT) e provinciali (ISPAT), e interviste qualitative raccolte nel corso di uno studio di campo condotto tra il mese di Agosto 2016 e Febbraio 2017. I dati quantitativi sono trattati in funzione di semplici analisi descrittive, capaci di catturare la ricaduta degli investimenti compiuti in Trentino tra gli anni 2002 e 2015 su differenti fasce sociali e aree territoriali. I dati raccolti – relativi all'accesso ai servizi per fascia di reddito, tipologia di servizio, e comunità montana di residenza – risultano decisivi a costruire un affresco dettagliato della realtà trentina. La dimensione qualitativa dell'analisi, costruita sulla base dei dati raccolti in più di 30 ore di interviste semi-strutturate con educatori, coordinatori pedagogici, dipendenti dell'Ufficio comunale di Trento per l'infanzia e funzionari provinciali, arricchisce l'interpretazione del processo politico oggetto dello studio di caso con una importante prospettiva "interna" alle istituzioni, aiutando a confermare, sostanziare e spiegare le ipotesi che sorgono dalla rielaborazione dei dati quantitativi. ; open

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Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/18/actualidad/1371555410 _756638.htmlhttp://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/06/10/en-turquie-le-processus-de-pai x-kurde-a-l-epreuve-des-manifestations_3426986_3214.htmlhttp://www.lanacion.com.ar/1590256-advertencia-de-erdogan-a-los-manifestanteshttp://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/08/world/pakistan-drones/index.html?hpt=wo_c2http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-police-clash-with-protester s-in-istanbul-20130611,0,6189707.storyhttp://www.eluniversal.com.mx/internacional/82969.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22790635http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/08/content_16594833.htm http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/primeiro-ministro-turco-aceita-receber-manifestant es-8646402http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21579005-protests-against-recep-tayyip- erdogan-and-his-ham-fisted-response-have-shaken-his-rule-and Alemanes y checos vivan las consecuencias de las devastadoras inundaciones. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/world/europe/10iht-flood10.html?ref=worldhttp://www.lanacion.com.ar/1590680-parte-de-alemania-bajo-el-agua#comentarwww.lemonde.fr/europe/video/2013/06/10/la-police-reprime-les-manifestants-a-ankara_3427273_3214.html La centroizquierda italiana logró un triunfo contundente en las municipales. Para más información:http://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/centro-esquerda-recupera-roma-nas-urnas-8647380http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1590681-la-centroizquierda-italiana-logro-un-triunfo-co ntundente-en-las-municipales Suiza se encierra en sus miedos y endurece su ley de asilo. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/07/actualidad/137063251 4_643009.htmlhttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/ley-de-asilo-en-suiza_12860089-4http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/09/actualidad/1370806897_ 177919.html Los programas electorales muestran que los partidos alemanes coinciden en los recortes. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/08/actualidad/1370722970_ 157146.html Putin apoyará prohibición de adopción a parejas homosexuales en Rusia. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/prohibicin-de-adopcin-a-parejas-ho mosexuales-en-rusia_12844610-4http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/europe/trial-sendss.html?ref=wo rld&_r=0 París se plantea disolver los grupos violentos de extrema derecha tras asesinato de militante comprometido en la defensa de los homosexuales. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/pars-se-plantea-disolver-los-grupos -violentos-de-extrema-derecha_12850632-4 http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/06/actualidad/1370547 423_977824.htmlhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/06/actualidad/13704794 17_014580.html El Asad advierte a Europa de que pagará las consecuencias si arma a los rebeldes. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/18/actualidad/13 71546210_225136.html "El País" de España analiza: "Ni Grexit ni Grecovery". Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/09/actualidad/1370799 092_688308.html ASIA- PACÍFICO/ MEDIO ORIENTE Elecciones en Irán: apatía y lucha de poder. Para más información:http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/06/iran-s-electionhttp://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/15/world/meast/iran-rouhani-profile/inde x.html?hpt=wo_c2http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/relaciones-iran-con-estados -unidos_12875543-4http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/08/content_16591014.htmhttp://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/09/world/meast/iran-nuclear-reactor/index. html?hpt=wo_bn11http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-elections-20130611,0,3357264.story http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg- iran-elections-20130611,0,3357264.storyCumbre del G8 sin acuerdo sobre guerra en Siria. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/europe/g-8-meeting-ends-wit h-cordial-stalemate-on-syria.html?ref=world&gwh=325D51A100831D8E95 A7CDA8915C9A27http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/cumbre-del-g8-evalua-conflicto-en- siria_12877428-4 Continúa la escalada de violencia en Siria. Para más información:http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21579055-fall-qusayr -boost-regime-far-decisive-turning-pointhttp://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/10/18883427-reuters-us-wei ghs-arming-syria-rebels?litehttp://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/visuel/2013/05/23/iran-portraits-de-candidats_3386947_3218.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/middleeast/syria-opposition-won t-attend-talks-unless-rebels-get-arms-commander-says.html?ref=worldhttp://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/30/3425004/syrias-assad-pledges-to -attend.html#storylink=cpyhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22852957Mueren 46 personas en atentado contra un funeral en Pakistán. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/asia/atentado-contra-un-funeral-en-pakis tn_12878029-4 Son más de 511000 sirios refugiados en el Líbano. Para más información:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/09/content_16600893.htm La ONU pide 3920 millones para ayudar a las víctimas de la guerra en Siria. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/07/actualidad/137060 4074_343489.html La premio Nobel de la Paz Suu Kyi reconoce su deseo de ser presidenta de Myanmar. Para más información:http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/06/world/asia/myanmar-suu-kyi-presidential-aspiration/index.html?hpt=wo_c2http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/06/actualidad/13705097 70_497091.html Tras largas conversaciones las dos Coreas acuerdan encuentro. Para más información:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/10/content_16602536.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/world/asia/north-and-south-korea-to-di scuss-restoring-economic-and-other-ties.html?ref=worldhttp://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-north-korea-changes- course-20130606,0,2868588.storyhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/09/actualidad/137074 4334_514863.htmlhttp://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/08/world/asia/koreas-tensions/index.html?hp t=wo_c2 Ataque suicida en el aeropuerto de Kabul. Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2013/06/10/afghanistan-attaque- suicide-d-insurges-pres-de-l-aeroport-de-kaboul_3426919_3216.htmlhttp://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-bombs-201306 04,0,2665212.storyhttp://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/10/content_16603337.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/asia/attacker-in-afghanistan-hid -bomb-in-his-body.html?ref=world&gwh=A020FB85D7BBAF85C119B695F4D126F9 Crisis en Irak: ataques dejan docenas de muertos por día. Para más información:http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/10/18887438-day-long-attack s-kill-more-than-70-in-iraq?litehttp://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iraq-deadly-bomb-a ttacks-20130610,0,2919168.story La oposición india aprende de sus errores. Para más información:http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/06/india-s-oppositionwww.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2013/06/10/inde-un-nationaliste-hin dou-a-la-tete-de-l-opposition_3426921_3216.htmlhttp://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-split-indian-opp osition-party-20130610,0,7283558.storyhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-22851915 Austria retirará a sus 380 cascos azules de la zona desmilitarizada en el Golán. Para más información:http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/06/actualidad/1370503 365_774581.htmlhttp://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-syria-golan-un-mission-20130606,0,6454723.story Palestina inaugura gobierno en un momento crítico para el proceso de paz. Para más información:http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/middleeast/la-fg-palestin ian-premier-20130603,0,549411.storyhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/09/actualidad/1370 781086_914560.html ÁFRICA Salud de Mandela mantiene al mundo en vilo. Para más información:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/11/content_16606127.htmhttp://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/06/10/inquietudes-sur-l-etat-de -sante-de-nelson-mandela_3427099_3212.html Reino Unido compensará con 23 millones de euros a los Mau Mau de Kenia. Para más información:http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-britain-kenya-compensate-20130607,0,2322515.storyhttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/africa/reino-unido-pagar-23-millones-de-euros- a-los-mau-mau-de-kenia_12849864-4 Aumenta la presencia de Al Qaeda en África Sahariana. Para más información:http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/28/3420983/ap-exclusive-rise-of-al- qaida.html Libia vive violentas protestas. Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/world/africa/libyan-violence-threatens-t o-undercut-power-of-militias.html?ref=world Tensión entre Sudán y Sudán del Sur. Para más información:http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/08/world/africa/sudan-oil/index.html?hpt=wo _bn10+http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/17/content_16628556.htm OTRAS NOTICIAS El G8 apoya medidas de transparencia financiera y contra la evasión fiscal. Para más información:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/18/content_16631685.htmhttp://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/06/18/actualidad/1371568829 _378574.htmlhttp://www.economist.com/news/international/21579452-britains-leader -envisages-world-tax-compliance-and-clear-corporate-ownership Fin de pobreza extrema debe ser nuevo objetivo mundial para 2030: ONU. Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/estados-unidos/la-onu-dice-que-el-fin-de-l a-pobreza-extrema-debe-ser-nuevo-objetivo-mundial-para-2030_12845943-4 "Los Angeles Times" presenta portal sobre el crecimiento de la población mundial. Para más información:http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/population/ "The Economist" presenta su informe semanal: "Business this week". Para más información:http://www.economist.com/news/world-week/21579066-business-week

Dottorato di ricerca in Scienze e tecnologie per la gestione forestale e ambientale ; La definizione di biodiversità può avere diverse interpretazioni, ma generalmente con questo termine si indica l'insieme delle specie presenti in un ecosistema: ad una maggior numero di esse, corrisponde una maggiore stabilità del sistema. A livello di specie, la biodiversità è principalmente correlata alle differenze genetiche tra individui; un ricco patrimonio genetico intra-specifico garantisce un ampio spettro di risposte alle pressioni ambientali. D'altro canto, popolazioni con scarsa biodiversità genetica tendono a rispondere in maniera univoca a condizioni di stress, dunque presentandosi più vulnerabili ad essi. Questo fenomeno è particolarmente enfatizzato in contesti di pressione antropica e climate change, specialmente a scala regionale o locale. Individui, popolazioni ed ecosistemi sono strettamente collegati tra loro, ed interagiscono nel mantenimento degli equilibri dei macro sistemi, sia paesaggistici, che socio-economici. Di conseguenza, il mantenimento della biodiversità deve essere garantita attraverso misure attive di conservazione implementate dalle più recenti ed innovative tecniche e politiche di settore. Per molte specie forestali, questo significa sollecitare la sensibilità sullo sviluppo di nuovi ed efficienti strumenti operativi da integrare con le tradizionali strategie di gestione, ad esempio la conservazione in situ ed ex situ del patrimonio forestale. Considerando queste premesse, un tale strumento potrebbe certamente essere identificato nella definizione e delimitazione delle Regioni di Provenienza, promosse dall'Unione Europea attraverso la Direttiva 105/99. I principali metodi finora utilizzati si riferiscono all'utilizzo di parametri ecologici (pedologici, fitoclimatici, ecc.), come descrittori di contesti ecologici omogenei a livello spaziali, quindi identificanti eco provenienze per ogni specie forestale come conseguenza della differenziazione evolutiva secondo i principi della selezione naturale. Tali eco regioni forniscono un quadro di sintesi relativo ad un territorio che, suddiviso in aree ecologicamente omogenee, garantisce l'identificazione dei soprassuoli idonei dai quali prelevare il materiale di propagazione di base, ossia coni, frutti e sementi, parti di piante ottenute da propagazione agamica, embrioni, ecc. Tra i soprassuoli vengono anche contemplati i cosiddetti boschi da seme, le piantagioni, il materiale parentale derivante da incroci, nonché i cloni. Ad oggi molti Paesi dell'Unione Europea hanno promosso dei metodi per determinare le Regioni di Provenienza, basandosi principalmente sulla suddivisione del territorio secondo criteri chimico-fisici; questa scelta è intrinsecamente motivata dal fatto che di tali parametri si ha un ricco database informativo derivante dai molti anni di studio del territorio. Come risultato, ogni Paese ha delimitato con rigidi confini le proprie zone ecologicamente omogenee. Tale approccio rappresenta sicuramente un primo passo fondamentale nel soddisfare appieno i requisiti presenti nella Direttiva 105/99, per quanto uno studio più approfondito viene incoraggiato per identificare le Regioni di Provenienza per ogni specie forestale. Alcuni Paesi come la Francia, la Spagna o la Germania stanno lavorando in questa direzione da circa 15 anni, mentre l'Italia è ancora qualche passo indietro. In particolare, la posizione italiana è anche condizionata dal regime giuridico che demanda le competenze in tema di ambiente dal governo centrale alle Regioni. Il risultato è che la suddivisione del territorio italiano in Regioni di Provenienza per le specie forestali è ancora incompleto o fermo allo stadio preliminare. Lo scopo principale di questo lavoro è stato, quindi, l'applicazione del metodo ampiamente utilizzato in Europa, adeguatamente arricchito con nuovi parametri chimico-fisici e fitoclimatici, per definire le Regioni di Provenienza valide per le specie forestali della Regione Lazio. Un primo passaggio ha interessato la raccolta e l'analisi dei dati presenti circa la caratterizzazione territoriale, in modo da poter selezionare le variabili ecologiche ed ambientali maggiormente rappresentative nel definire delle eco provenienze. Successivamente, in accordo con l'Allegato I della L.R. 39/2002, 28 specie di interesse forestale sono state scelte e mappate sul territorio. Tra queste, 10 specie sono state descritte con una puntuale carta della distribuzione, mentre per le rimanenti 18 specie un areale quantitativo è stato ricostruito dalle informazioni raccolte secondo un criterio di presenza/assenza applicato ad una scala 1:10000. A causa della necessità di identificare dei boschi da seme per queste specie, tali per cui vi fossero già delle condizioni di tutela a livello legislativo, solo la superficie forestale regionale che insiste all'interno delle aree protette è stata presa in considerazione. Un dossier cartografico di 432 mappe è stato realizzato a partire dalle informazioni precedentemente illustrate e correlato con delle informazioni di carattere statistico circa l'estensione ed il numero di siti per ogni specie, per ogni area protetta del Lazio. Allo stesso tempo, uno studio pilota è stato condotto sul pino domestico (Pinus pinea L.) in modo da completare il processo richiesto dalla Direttiva Europea e giungere dall'individuazione delle Regioni di Provenienza fino alla selezione dei soprassuoli candidati ad essere inseriti nel Registro regionale dei Boschi da Seme. Lo sviluppo di questa parte del lavoro ha richiesto un monitoraggio di tutte le principali pinete litoranee laziali, con la raccolta delle informazioni di carattere strutturale e dendrometrico. I risultati hanno composto un ulteriore dossier cartografico, questa volta dedicato al pino domestico, con informazioni relative alle singole pinete studiate. La sovrapposizione della distribuzione puntuale del pino domestico con la carta precedentemente realizzata delle Regioni di Provenienza, o più precisamente "Regioni di Raccolta", unitamente alle considerazioni derivanti dalle indagini in campo, ha permesso di identificare due zone (denominate "Litorale" e "Lauretum caldo") dalle quali sono stati scelti rispettivamente i boschi di Castelporziano e della Foresta Demaniale del Circeo come migliori candidati a boschi da seme. Di questi soprassuoli sono state altresì redatte delle proposte di gestione, da indirizzare all'Assessorato all'Ambiente della regione Lazio, in modo da completare le linee guida per la conservazione, amministrazione e certificazione del materiale di base da utilizzare nei piani di restauro ambientale o di rimboschimento. Infine, la multidisciplinarietà del presente lavoro ha offerto degli spunti di indagine paralleli ma strettamente inerenti le problematiche descritte in precedenza, che hanno condotto a delle ulteriori sperimentazioni confluite in altrettante pubblicazioni di carattere internazionale. In particolare, prendendo spunto dalle metodologie impiegate per la definizione delle Regioni di Provenienza secondo parametri chimico-fisici, è stata testata la possibilità di giungere ad un simile risultato partendo però dall'analisi di alcune risposte biologiche. In tal senso, uno studio ha interessato l'utilizzo combinato della dendroecologia e dell'attività fenologica delle foreste laziali per arrivare alla delimitazione di quattro Regioni di Provenienza, attraverso le analisi PCA e di cluster, basate solo sulle risposte bioclimatiche. Per la caratterizzazione dendroecologica dei soprassuoli forestali si è fatto riferimento ad una network che ha il faggio come specie pilota, mentre i modelli fenologici sono stati quantificati utilizzando il segnale espresso dall'attività fotosintetica attraverso l'NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index). Attraverso uno studio da remoto con sistemi GIS si è ottenuto una corrispondenza tra risposte dendroecologiche e fenologiche tale per cui è stato possibile delimitare delle Regioni di Provenienza basate sulla risposta delle piante al clima. Un secondo approfondimento ha interessato la possibilità di includere in un innovativo strumento operativo per il rimboschimento ed il restauro ambientale, i principi teoretici alla base delle Regioni di Provenienza. Tale tecnica di rimboschimento è stata identificata nel metodo Miyawaki, la quale, mai testata in Europa, è stata oggetto di indagine per verificarne la reale efficacia nel contesto Mediterraneo. L'esperimento è stato condotto in Sardegna ed i risultati incoraggiano l'uso di tale metodo nel nostro contesto ambientale, in particolare perché risponde appieno alle raccomandazioni circa il reperimento del materiale di base della Direttiva Europea, inoltre, è stato verificato come il suo utilizzo possa essere efficace anche in zone dove le tradizionali tecniche di rimboschimento hanno fallito in precedenza. I principali vantaggi interessano il mantenimento di un alto tasso di biodiversità rispetto ai tradizionali metodi e la capacità delle cenosi vegetali che vengono a costituirsi di evolversi senza l'intervento assistito dell'uomo. Questo si traduce in un'interessante riduzione del costo di gestione dei siti rimboschiti, oltre ad una possibilità operativa aggiuntiva per tutti gli esperti di settore che operano nell'ambiente Mediterraneo. ; The definition of biodiversity can have many interpretations, but generally refers to the amount of species occurring in an ecosystem: more species, greater stability. At species' level, biodiversity is mainly related to the genetic differences between individuals; a rich intra-specific gene pool means a wide range of responses to environmental strains. On the other hand, populations with low genetic diversity tend to respond evenly to stress conditions, thus having more difficulties to face currently growing disturbances driven by anthropic pressure and climate change, especially on local and regional scales. Individuals, populations and ecosystems are tightly linked and interact to maintain landscape stability, large socio-economic systems and man's health. As consequence, biodiversity maintenance should be carried out with active conservation measures implemented with the most recent progress in techniques and policies. For forest species, this implies awareness of the availability of new and efficient tools to comply with traditional strategies, such as tree populations management at their natural sites within the environment to which they are adapted (in situ) and artificial, but dynamically evolving populations, elsewhere (ex situ). Under these circumstances an operative tool could certainly be the definition and delimitation of Regions of Provenance, promoted by the European Directive 105/99. The main methods involved the use of ecological parameters (e.g. pedological, phytoclimatic), presumed to be homogeneous within each area, thus identifying ecoprovenances for a species as a consequence of evolutionary differentiation according to the effects of natural selection. They provide a framework for specifying sources of forest reproductive material, i.e. cones, fruits and seeds, all parts of plants obtained by vegetative propagation, including embryos and plants produced from any of these. The plant material from which the forest reproductive material is derived includes seed stands, seed orchards, parent material held by tree breeders in archives, individual and mixtures of clones. Nowadays, many European countries are promoting methods to detect Regions of Provenance, mainly based on chemiophysical parameters, because of the data availability across years of land monitoring. As result, each country has been divided in several ecologically homogeneous sub-zones, with fixed boundaries. This could be represent a preliminary approach to full-fill the Directive's requirements, but a deeper study is encouraged to focus on each forest species for which Regions of Provenance are required. Some countries, as France, Spain or Germany are working since 15 years to provide these results, while Italy is still many steps backward. In particular, the Italian position is partially due to its jurisdiction that devolve power in terms of environmental policy from the central Government to the Regional departments. As consequence, the definition of Regions of Provenance in our country is still incomplete and in many cases at preliminary stages. In the present work, the main goal was to assess a method based on ecological parameters, like in other European scenarios, to define and delineate Regions of Provenance for Latium in order to establish seed stands for selected forest species. A first step regarded data collection and analysis to create the set of most representative chemiophysical variables to point out ecoprovenances; than, distribution ranges of 28 forest species listed as natural and/or autochthonous for Latium have been obtained from remote analysis of cartographic dataset or from previous studies. During this process, 10 species were fully mapped, and for the remaining 18 species quantitative ranges were performed at 1:10000 scale level, with information on presence/absence. Because of the need to identify seed stands of these species that could also benefit from legislative pre-existing conditions, only forest surface within protected areas was taken into account. Totally, a cartographic dossier of 432 maps was produced with information about the number of sites and hectares for study species in each protected areas of Latium. At the same time, a case study was afforded to complete the process from the definition of Regions of Provenance up to seed stands identification. Domestic pine (Pinus pinea L.) stands across Latium coasts were monitored. Forest stands were mapped, dendrometric and structural characteristics were recorded during field surveys and detailed information about each stand were summarized in a specific map set. Overlapping distribution range of domestic pine to the Regions of Provenance previously performed, two zones were identified as containing all the stands and another one was added because of the occurrence of one population on the buffer zone. Finally, two pine forests were chosen as candidate to become seed stands, in order to get one stand for each Region (Castelporziano for Region 12 "Litorale", and Foresta del Circeo for Region 9 "Lauretum caldo"). Forest management proposals were also carried out for these forests, to accomplish guide lines for the Envirnomental Directorate of Latium in order to perform the best practices to protect and maintain seed stands and provide certified base material for reforestation programs. Moreover, mutual points of interest risen up during this work gave the chance to delve into the present methodologies and theoretical ideas in order to approach innovative and practical tools, that could be considered as advanced experiments. In particular, a first investigation point out the use of combined dendroecological and phenological analysis to define Regions of Provenance by biological parameters. Previous dendroclimatic research demonstrated the relationship between plant growth and climatic parameters; in Latium, similar bioclimatic responses from different forest stands growing at similar elevations were statistically grouped into three homogeneous altitudinal belts using principal component analysis and hierarchical cluster analysis. Phenological patterns of forest species were quantified using the photosynthetic activity signals expressed in the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI). Through a beech tree-ring network, NDVI was compared with dendroecological results using Geographical Information System analysis, obtaining high correspondence in overlapping, and underlying the relevance of altitude as a main factor defining homogeneous spatial vegetation dynamics, thus delimiting ecological Regions of Provenance based on tree responses to climate. At the same time, a tentative study was assessed to find a reforestation approach that include in its theoretical principles the concept of Region of Provenance as an ecologically homogeneous well-delimited zone. The effectiveness of the Miyawaki method, never tested in Mediterranean environments was experimented in Sardinia, and point out the possibility to adopt sustainable techniques in principle with the declarations of the European Directive 105/99, in sites where traditional reforestation approach failed. The Miyawaki method has been applied in the Far East, Malaysia, and South America; results have been very impressive, allowing quick environmental restorations of strongly degraded areas. However, these applications have always been made on sites characterized by high precipitation, but never in context with summer aridity and risk of desertification. Results obtained 2 and 11 years after planting are positive: having compared the traditional reforestation techniques, plant biodiversity using the Miyawaki method appears very high, and the new coenosis (plant community) was able to evolve without further operative support after planting. Therefore, the implementation of supplementary technique along with cost reduction might provide a new and innovative tool to foresters and ecological engineering experts for Mediterranean environmental reforestation program.

Vast areas have been subject to an active nature protection policy in Norway over the past decades. Sixteen per cent of the land mass on the mainland is now protected in one way or another, and national parks take up the greatest share of the protected land. In many regions throughout the world, national parks offer excellent opportunities for outdoor recreation and tourism activities. The social values of contact with nature and opportunities for nature-based activities are considered to be a key element of Norwegian /North European culture and tradition. Nature-based tourism is a rapidly growing sector of the tourism industry in many parts of the world. National parks have played a major part in this growth in many countries, because they tend to be associated with relatively pristine nature and beautiful scenery and they attract visitors seeking nature-based experiences. This PhD project explores the social dimension of sustainable tourism development in Norwegian national parks. The study reflects the paradigmatic shift in national park management policy, where the traditional view of protecting nature from human use is gradually being replaced by a vision of safeguarding both nature conservation and recreation/tourism interests. The increasing emphasis on the interests of visitors and local communities related to tourism activities suggests that social values are moving to the forefront of discourses on sustainable tourism development in national parks. The political backdrop for this new integrated management philosophy is rooted in the assumption that nature-based tourism in and around Norwegian national parks (which are typically located in remote mountain regions), represents promising opportunities for rural areas that are affected by the marginalisation of traditional industries, such as agriculture and forestry. Increasing visitation and more nature-based tourism products can potentially generate local jobs and income, and tourism therefore represents a way of stemming the outmigration of the resident populations. The integration of broader social interests in the emerging management regime has also arisen from criticisms of the traditional, expertdriven, segregated and top-down national park management strategies. The inclusion of local, experience-based knowledge, the involvement of community stakeholder interests and the anchoring of management processes and solutions at the local level are now being given political attention. In examining the social preconditions for sustainable tourism development in national parks, this PhD project analyses tourism interests in various ways: Visitor desires and concerns and the viewpoints of local tourism entrepreneurs are taken into consideration, as well as the views of other rural interests with a stake in the utilisation of national parks. Nasjonalparkriket ("The National Park Realm") was chosen as the case study area for the empirical study. This mountainous region is situated in the northern part of Oppland County in Norway. It comprises six municipalities with very high land coverage of protected areas, including six national parks. Visitors' Nature Orientations were examined through two surveys to achieve a detailed understanding of their main types of nature appreciation. The findings illustrate tourists' nature-related motives, values and attitudes and also their behavioural preferences in a nature setting. German, Dutch and Danish motor tourists visiting Norway were surveyed when leaving the country by ferry and four vital dimensions of Nature Orientations were identified: Inspiration, Recreation, Challenge and Sightseeing. Inspiration represents existential values and a strong emotional connectedness with landscape and nature; Recreation signifies the desire for tranquillity, peacefulness and physical relaxation in natural surroundings; Challenge represents the desire for demanding physical exercise and risk taking, and Sightseeing refers to interests in seeing sights and the appreciation of comfort aspects. An additional visitor survey among actual visitors in Nasjonalparkriket, supported these findings but the Sightseeing dimension was re-labelled Comfort due to the relative importance of the comfort aspect in the fourth dimension. Tourism facilities (and visitors' 'quests' for such facilities) in and around national parks can potentially match the different Nature Orientations, and the border survey showed that each of the four identified principal Quest for Facilities dimensions related to distinct nature interests: The Nature Orientations Challenge and Sightseeing supported the expressed wishes for extension and upgrading of "Tracks & signposts" within national parks. The desire for more grand scale "Infrastructure & services" was upheld by Nature Orientations Challenge and Sightseeing but was contested by Recreation. Moreover, "Food & accommodation" products mainly located outside parks were found to be particularly appealing to the Nature Orientation Sightseeing. The expansion of "Tours & interpretation" services and facilities in natural surroundings was supported by the Inspiration or Sightseeing orientations. Tourists who seek pleasures in natural surroundings tend to express great concern for the environment. In the survey among actual visitors in Nasjonalparkriket, respondents generally expressed a very low degree of acceptance for negative ecological impacts resulting from tourism activities and installations in the national parks. The Nature Orientation dimension Inspiration was associated with a particularly great concern for the wild reindeer habitat, raptor nesting and attrition on vegetation. On the other hand, both Comfort (Sightseeing) and Challenge orientations showed less environmental concern compared to visitors in general. The Quest for Facilities dimensions "Infrastructure & service" and "Food & accommodation" (i.e. tourism product interests upheld by Comfort (Sightseeing) and Challenge according to the border survey) fell into the latter domain, and were also (in relative terms) related to a higher degree of acceptance of negative ecological impacts. Tourists' Nature Orientations, Quest for Facilities and views on potential nature destruction (as revealed in the two surveys) represent important knowledge for managers who are looking to develop national parks into viable tourism attractions. In addition, local tourism entrepreneurs need to be aware of their guests' interests and concerns if they want to succeed. Local tourism stakeholders are often totally dependent on the natural resources contained in the protected areas. National park management policies and regulations represent opportunities and constraints for tourism activities, and thus have a direct influence on the prospects for tourism expansion. Qualitative interviews with local tourism stakeholders in Rondane and Jotunheimen national parks (within Nasjonalparkriket) revealed that, despite their general support for national parks status, they felt that the management planning processes and outcomes left a lot to be desired. First, the tourism representatives reported only minor involvement in the national park planning processes, and that they had very little input into the final planning arrangements. Second, they felt that management rules and regulations restricted opportunities for tourism related business operations within the parks. Third, respondents perceived a lack of competence among managers concerning business management and tourism development issues. In Rondane National Park, doubts were expressed about the necessity of the measures implemented to protect the wild reindeer, and the scientific evidence supporting these measures. In Jotunheimen National Park, respondents thought that sustainable tourism development should be more explicitly included in management visions and goals for the national park, and they called for a visitor strategy to be implemented. They also expressed a desire to be involved in the co-management of the park. Considerable investment in communication and relationship-building is likely to be required in these two parks to foster durable social links and trustworthy planning partnerships between responsible managers and local tourism stakeholders. Similar opinions were identified among local tourism stakeholders in a focus group study in the two national parks mentioned above. The traditional rural users (i.e. local landowners, farmers, etc.) of the national parks are social interests defining the freedom of action with respect to existing tourism activities and also new tourism industry initiatives. When exploring the opinions of both groups (i.e. local tourism entrepreneurs and traditional rural users) about tourism in the protected areas, there were few direct clashes of interest. However, contradictory views were evident amongst groups when discussing the need for genuine tourism growth in the area. The local tourism entrepreneurs demonstrated an 'openness to change' in order to sustain their businesses and the local community, whereas the traditional rural user interests had a more sceptical attitude and were afraid that new developments could change the character of their countryside and undermine rural lifestyles and the integrity of their local community. Viable directions for tourism development should therefore be negotiated between the two stakeholder interests. The main contribution of this dissertation is to highlight social preconditions for sustainable tourism development in a Norwegian national park setting. Both 'outsider' and 'insider' social perspectives (i.e. visitor and local stakeholder interests), are equally taken into consideration. Existing opportunities and constraints are discussed and issues of crucial importance for tourism advancement in the national parks are identified. ; Store naturområder er blitt vernet av norske myndigheter i de siste tiårene. 16 prosent av landarealene på Norges fastland er nå vernet i en eller annen form, og nasjonalparkene utgjør den største andelen av disse verneområdene. I mange land er nasjonalparkene svært godt tilrettelagte for rekreasjons- og turistaktiviteter. De sosiale verdiene som er knyttet til befolkningens nærhet til natur og mulighetene for naturbaserte aktiviteter og opplevelser blir ofte ansett som et kjerneelement i norsk/skandinavisk kultur og tradisjon. Naturbasert turisme er en raskt voksende sektor i mange deler av verden, og nasjonalparkene blir gjerne assosiert med godt bevart, verdifull natur og vakre landskaper, som tiltrekker seg et økende antall besøkende i mange land. I dette PhD-prosjektet rettes søkelyset mot den sosiale dimensjonen ved bærekraftig reiselivsutvikling i norske nasjonalparker. Studien reflekterer det pågående paradigmatiske skiftet i nasjonalparkpolitikken, der det klassiske naturvernet mot menneskelig bruk og påvirkning gradvis blir erstattet av forestillinger om at naturforvaltning i denne typen områder bør handle om å ivareta både naturhensyn og reiselivsinteresser. Den voksende oppmerksomheten omkring de besøkendes behov og den økende vektleggingen av lokalsamfunnsinteressene som er relatert til turistaktivitetene indikerer at de sosiale aspektene gradvis får større betydning i diskusjoner om bærekraftig reiselivsutvikling i nasjonalparkene. Det generelle politiske bakteppet for denne nyere, sosialt integrerte forvaltningsfilosofien er knyttet til en antakelse om at norske nasjonalparker, som gjerne er lokalisert i relativt perifere fjellregioner, representerer næringsmuligheter for bygdesamfunn som er blitt marginalisert i økonomisk henseende som følge av tilbakegang i tradisjonelle næringer som jordbruk og skogbruk. Mer besøk i nasjonalparkene og tilpassede naturbaserte reiselivstilbud kan potensielt skape arbeidsplasser lokalt og tilføre lokalsamfunnene nye inntekter. Utvikling av reiselivet fremstår derfor som et egnet redskap for å motvirke utflytting fra disse områdene. Innlemmingen av bredere sosiale interesser i det nye forvaltningsregimet kan også ses på som et svar på kritikken av den dominerende naturvitenskapelige, ekspertpregede og top-downorienterte forvaltningstradisjonen. Inkludering av både lokal og erfaringsbasert kunnskap, involvering av lokalsamfunnsinteresser og sikring av lokalt forankrede forvaltningsprosesser og -beslutninger blir nå i stadig større grad viet politisk oppmerksomhet. I denne studien av sosiale aspekter ved bærekraftig reiselivsutvikling i nasjonalparker rettes søkelyset både mot de besøkendes tilretteleggingsønsker og mot deres omtanke for naturmiljøet. I tillegg analyseres synspunktene på reiselivsutvikling i nasjonalparkene blant lokale reiselivsentreprenører og andre lokale brukerinteresser. Nasjonalparkriket i Nord-Gudbrandsdalen ble valgt som case for den empiriske undersøkelsen. Denne fjellregionen ligger i den nordlige delen av Oppland fylke, og omfatter seks kommuner med seks nasjonalparker, der en svært stor andel av arealet består av vernede landområder. Gjennom to surveyundersøkelser ble turistenes såkalte naturorienteringer belyst. Resultatene illustrerer turistenes naturrelaterte motiver, verdier og holdninger samt deres atferdspreferanser i et naturmiljø. Tyske, nederlandske og danske bilturister ble i den første surveyundersøkelsen bedt om å besvare et spørreskjema ved utreise fra Norge med ferge, og fire typer av naturorienteringer ble identifisert i denne grenseundersøkelsen: Inspirasjon, Rekreasjon, Utfordring og Sightseeing. Inspirasjon representerer eksistensielle verdier og en sterk emosjonell tilknytning til natur og landskaper. Rekreasjon står for ønsker om stillhet, ro og fysisk avkobling i naturomgivelser. Utfordring gjenspeiler ønsker om fysisk krevende aktiviteter og en viss risikoorientering. Sightseeing reflekterer interessen for å se attraksjoner og understreker betydningen av komfort på reisen. Den andre surveyundersøkelsen, en spørreundersøkelse blant faktisk besøkende i Nasjonalparkriket, bekreftet disse funnene, men her ble Sightseeing omskrevet til Komfort pga den sterke betydningen av komfortaspektene på den fjerde dimensjonen. De besøkendes uttrykte ønsker om tilrettelegginger av fasiliteter i og rundt nasjonalparkene kan i utgangspunktet tenkes å være knyttet til de ulike naturorienteringene. Grenseundersøkelsen blant de utenlandske bilturistene viste at hver av de fire identifiserte typene av fasilitetsønsker var relatert til hver av de fire typene av naturinteresser: Naturorienteringene Utfordring og Sightseeing understøttet ønskene om å utvide og oppgradere "Stier & skilter" inne i nasjonalparkene. Ønskene om mer storskala "Infrastruktur & service" ble opprettholdt av naturorienteringene Utfordring og Sightseeing, men var i liten grad relatert til Rekreasjon. Tilrettelagte turistprodukter innen "Mat & overnatting" utenfor nasjonalparkenes grenser hadde først og fremst appell til naturorienteringen Sightseeing, mens "Organiserte turer & formidling" i naturomgivelser var relatert til naturorienteringene Inspirasjon og Sightseeing. Turister som søker seg til naturområder er gjerne opptatt av vern av naturmiljøet. I undersøkelsen blant besøkende i Nasjonalparkriket uttrykte respondentene generelt sett lav grad av aksept for negative økologiske konsekvenser som følge av turistaktiviteter og turistmessig infrastruktur i nasjonalparkene. Naturorienteringsdimensjonen Inspirasjon var forbundet med en spesielt restriktiv holdning til negativ påvirkning av villreinhabitatet, rovfuglenes redebygging og slitasje på vegetasjonen. På den andre siden viste både orienteringene knyttet til Komfort (Sightseeing) og Utfordring større grad av aksept for negative økologiske virkninger. De som ønsket "Infrastruktur og service" og "Mat & overnatting" (dvs. fasilitetsønsker opprettholdt av Komfort /Sightseeing og Utfordring i følge grenseundersøkelsen) falt inn i den siste kategorien, der det var en relativt sett høy grad av aksept for negative økologiske virkninger. Turisters naturorienteringer, fasilitetsønsker og oppfatninger av potensielle naturødeleggelser, slik det ble avdekket i de to surveyundersøkelsene, er viktig kunnskap for forvaltningsmyndigheter som ønsker å utvikle nasjonalparkene til bærekraftige turismeattraksjoner. I tillegg må lokale reiselivsentreprenører ha kjennskap til gjestenes interesser og innsikt i deres miljøengasjement dersom de skal kunne overleve. De lokale næringsaktørene er dessuten helt avhengige av naturressursene som finnes inne i nasjonalparkene. Forvaltningspolitikk og -reguleringer representerer muligheter og begrensninger for turismeaktiviteter og har dermed direkte betydning for utviklingen av reiselivet i nasjonalparkene. Kvalitative intervjuer med lokale reiselivsaktører i Rondane og Jotunheimen nasjonalparker (som begge er lokalisert innenfor Nasjonalparkriket) viste at disse entreprenørene så fundamentale mangler ved både forvaltningsplanprosesser og - bestemmelser, til tross for at de generelt støttet nasjonalparkstatusen for disse fjellområdene: For det første rapporterte aktørene om bare minimal, reell involvering i nasjonalparkenes forvaltningsplanprosesser, og de uttrykte at de hadde hatt liten innflytelse på de endelige vedtakene som ble fattet. For det andre opplevde de at reguleringene begrenset mulighetene for turistaktiviteter inne i nasjonalparkene. For det tredje pekte de på at forvaltningen mangler kompetanse både på forretningsvirksomhet og reiselivsutvikling. I Rondane ble det uttrykt tvil om nødvendigheten av de strenge tiltakene for å beskytte villreinen og det vitenskapelige grunnlaget for disse initiativene. I Jotunheimen mente de lokale reiselivsaktørene at bærekraftig reiselivsutvikling burde bli eksplisitt inkludert i forvaltningens visjoner og målsettinger for nasjonalparken, og de ønsket iverksetting av en besøksstrategi for dette verneområdet. De ville også gjerne bli delaktige i forvaltningen av parken. Betydelige investeringer i kommunikasjon og relasjonsbygging er trolig påkrevd i disse to parkene for å utvikle tillitsfulle og varige sosiale bånd mellom forvaltningsmyndighetene og de lokale reiselivsaktørene. Liknende synspunkter ble identifisert blant lokale reiselivsentreprenører i en fokusgruppeundersøkelse i de to nevnte nasjonalparkene. De tradisjonelle bruksinteressene (dvs. lokale grunneiere, bønder etc.) i nasjonalparkene er sosiale interesser som kan tenkes å sette rammer for reiselivsaktivitetene og dermed også påvirke nye initiativ i reiselivsnæringen. Analysene av alle fokusgruppene (dvs. både blant de lokale reiselivsaktørene og de tradisjonelle brukerinteressene i de to parkene) viste at det var få eksisterende konflikter mellom de ulike interessene. Men ulike synspunkter kom til uttrykk når behovet for fortsatt vekst i turismen i området ble diskutert. De lokale reiselivsaktørene viste en "åpenhet for forandring" for å videreutvikle reiselivet og livskraften i lokalsamfunnet, mens de tradisjonelle brukerinteressene hadde en mer skeptisk holdning og var engstelige for at rask reiselivsvekst kunne endre områdets karakter og underminere lokal livsstil og bygdesamfunnets integritet. Bærekraftige løsninger for videre reiselivsutvikling i området bør derfor framforhandles mellom disse ulike lokale brukerinteressene. Det viktigste bidraget i dette PhD-prosjektet har vært å analysere de sosiale forutsetningene for bærekraftig reiselivsutvikling i norske nasjonalparker. De sosiale aspektene er belyst gjennom både "utenfra"- og "innenfra"-perspektiver, dvs. at interessene til så vel besøkende turister som lokale næringsutøvere er inkludert i denne avhandlingen. ; Norges Bondelag ; Nasjonalparkriket

SUMMARY: Étienne François explores the way in which the French project of creating "symbolic history" through studies of memory initiated by Pierre Nora's work can be continued in a different national context. For François, it is the question of whether history of memory can be pursued in the German case. François notes that despite Nora's insistence on the exclusivity of the French case, Germans have not less a "neurotic" attitude to their past.

At the same time, François admits that in Germany attitude to the national past memorial projects is profoundly different from the French case. Among such points of difference François notes that if in France national history is usually perceived as a long-term development rooted in the Middle Ages, in Germany looking at the past usually implies focusing on such topics as Nazism or "the second German dictatorship" in GDR. History of memory is problematic in Germany partly because most well known "places of memory" are concentration camps. It is also that in Germany perceptions of national identity are questioned to a greater extent than in France, which is a result of German history divided for the most part of the second half of the 20 th century.

Despite these profound differences, François insists that France and Germany entered the "memorial period" simultaneously about 20 years ago. The Franco-German rapprochement and the development of mass cultural tourism greatly contributed to that process. This "memorial boom" is reflected in three major developments: the growth of and greater attention to memorial events, such as the celebration of "Luther's year" in 1983; the public fascination with historical exhibitions; and the rise in popularity of historical museums. A development parallel to the growth of "memory" in Germany can be noticed in professional historical studies: in Germany, at the roots of the study of memory were Thomas Nipperdey and Reinhart Koselleck, while today the leading scholars in the field are Jan and Alaida Assman. The unification of Germany and the disappearance of the "German question" combined with dramatic improvements in the relationships between Germany and its neighbors created most favorable conditions for German memorial projects.

François touches upon the work of the conferences on "Nation and Emotion" held in Berlin in October 1993 and May 1995. At these events researchers agreed that the paradigm of "places of memory" that allows to create a symbolic history of a nation can be successfully implemented not only in France but elsewhere. The second conclusion of researchers was that it was impossible to replicate the French case in other national traditions. François notes four major principles that emerged out of the French-German cooperation in the studies of memory: the first is the preservation of a critical attitude to one's own work and resistance to temptations to legitimate the existing political situation; second, the specifics of German history required more attention to conflicts, ruptures, and breaks in the past; third, such research should be open and pluralistic with respect to chronology and geography, without limiting one's project to XIX and XX centuries or to the national level; finally, the pan-European context should be always taken into account, for varieties of national memory are often shaped by or in contact with "foreigners".

In the last paragraphs of his contribution François informs the reader about the seminar on cultural memory that he and Hagen Schulze conducted in Berlin, as well as touches upon the structure and methodology of the project of German "places of memory" study. François explains the decision to structure the project around the list of key memorial terms, such as "Reich", "Leistung", "Schuld", etc. François ends his article by pointing out the importance of German cultural memory in European context and in German national history.
Tony Judt explores the emergence of Pierre Nora's project of describing the French places of memory by locating it in the context of transformations that France was undergoing in the post-World War II period. As Judt argues, in 1956 France still reminded one the France of 1856 in terms of the social composition of its population, the structure of its economy defined by late industrialization and the importance of agriculture, and the authoritarian political regime. In the 1960s, fundamental changes in the economy led to the growth of urbanization. Rising prosperity undermined the position of the French Communist party and the departure of Charles de Gaulle combined with Mitterand's reluctance to pursue radically socialist policies left behind most divisive political distinctions between the conservative France and the left France. At the same time, the decline in importance of the French language combined with the revival of interest in regional identities and the loss of the French dominant position in world and European affairs contributed to the French perception that by 1980s their country was simultaneously undergoing several transformations: France was shrinking, breaking apart, and loosing its traditional identity. Pierre Nora's project was initiated during this period of flux and uncertainty. Thus, Nora's project was a response to the sense of loss of traditional France in public consciousness and an attempt to fixate in historical categories elements of public memory.

Judt notes the contradiction of Nora's project: designed as an attempt to fixate, explore, and repudiate various historical myths, the project itself finally turned into the celebration of the past. Judt sees several reasons for this transformation. First, Pierre Nora is an important figure on the French intellectual landscape, and he attracted best specialists to write articles in the collection. Second, there is no more consensus on the canon of the past and people disagree profoundly on what can or should be included in such a project. Taking possession of past events and places brought together accidentally underscores the break of the historical tradition. Third, despite many genius insights in the articles of the collection, it turned into a text that displays emotional attraction of researchers to the object of their study. The fact that the collection curiously omitted any references to the legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte or his nephew Louis Napoleon underscores how the project reflects French ambiguities about France's past. Judt also critically surveys Nora's claims of the specificity and exclusivity of the French historical experiences, which, allegedly, make France into a "nation of memory" like no any other nation.

Judt also analyses particular contributions to the volume, focusing on such topics as Catholicism and other religions in French memory. He notes that in the collection those studies that are dedicated to Protestants and Jews are characterized by more methodological innovation then the more traditional explorations of the role of Catholicism in French history and serve as a reminder to the editor of the collection, which avoided the memory of St. Bartholomew's Night. Judt also explores the ambiguity of perceptions of the countryside always characterized positively and of the province and the provincial always characterized negatively in the French history. Judt explores the role played in French history by memory of wars.

From Judt's point of view, Nora's project is informed by the fact that today (unlike earlier in French history) French public memory shaped by official representation differs from history as told by historians. As Judt argues, public memory without a foundation in narrative history looses coherence and turns into "places of forgetting".

According to Judt, Nora's project of describing "places of memory" was a response to the loss of the sense of eternal identity experienced by the French society at the juncture when two leading historical schools – the Annales and the (neo)Marxist historiography of the French revolution – lost their predominant position. Nora's story is about that meaning that the French ascribe to France and its identity, and those aspects of French history, such as Bonaparte's legacy of national minorities, were either omitted or pushed to the periphery of the narrative. In that sense, Nora's collection represents an example of a modern mythology and cannot be called a historical study properly, despite high quality contributions by professional historians.

Concerning the applicability of the French project to the Soviet context, Judt argues that it has little to offer to an understanding of a multinational state. In France, history is an established and respected discipline and Nora can offer an alternative approach to the past, while in post-Soviet societies the task is to return to scholarly writing of history. Finally, Nora's project is the product of the Parisian intelligentsia, self-assured and well versed in all details of French history. It has not been repeated elsewhere in Europe. It is a jeu d'esprit that can hardly be replicated elsewhere.
Marina Loskutova points out that "memory" is an imported methodology in Russia. At the same time, as most researchers of memory explain, the studies of memory are related to profound changes in Western societies in the post-war period. Correspondingly, the importation of memory studies will depend on similarity of experiences. In particular, the sense of the local landscape permeated by memorials of the past, the omnipresence of places of memory in Russia is not a given fact. Despite agricultural and peasant roots of most post-Soviet citizens, very few people will seek to uncover their village roots, and if they do, not industry of memorabilia exists for them. The study of memory in Western societies is also related to the communications revolution and to the new generation of mass-media, which brings forth the problem of the visual image as a sign of the past. It is the prevalence of visual culture, according to the author, that informs the upsurge in memory studies.

Loskutova then focuses on the contents of the concept of "memory". According to the author, it implies 1) social cadres that allow an autobio graphical memory to take shape; 2) oral memories circulating in society; 3) collective commemorations; 4) information devices, from newspaper to CD, delivering information about the past to an audience larger than professional historians' community; 5) habits of the body. As the author argues, these aspects are hardly related, and their combination within one research framework obscures rather then helps to solve the problem. At the same time, none of them is specifically related to the nation-state (with the exception of commemorations). It is traditional narrative history that provides the basis for national identity, even if we consider the explosive "memory" of ethnic minorities, which is often based on semi-professional historical accounts popularized by mass media.

Loskutova agrees with Judt's argument concerning the importance of a historical narrative taught at school; at the same time, she takes issue with him concerning the presence of such a narrative in Eastern Europe. She notes that in post-Soviet Russia there is little doubt about historians' right to talk about the past authoritatively and there is little criticism of traditional narrative historical modes.

For Loskutova, the experience of importing oral history methods into the Russian context is telling. On the one hand, the community of professional historians is skeptical about the use of oral histories interviews, pointing to the need to verify data using traditional methods anyway. Historians are also reluctant to accept the possibility that contemporary perceptions of the past should be in their sphere of competence. With respect to the Soviet past seen through oral history two drastically different positions are prevalent: "Soviet history is only possible on the basis of oral data for historians have always lied to us" and "People don't remember much and they do they won't tell". Loskutova notes that many memories of the Siege of Leningrad in World War II are told according to one scenario, which implies likely following prescribed expectations of such a memory. At the same time, research into what was told in families demonstrated significant variations in memories, thus undermining the interview method. Finally, Loskutova argues that it is possible to study "imperial memory" as informal knowledge of imperial social and political mechanisms. Nevertheless, such studies of memory cannot be an alternative to a meta-narrative of imperial history.
Igor Narskii points out that historiography knows works on functions of collective memory in imperial and Soviet Russia (Lotman, Wortman, Plaggenborg). Narskii criticizes approaches to memory in the editorial introduction as too narrow. For Narskii, memory is cultural context and includes not only images of the past but also mechanisms of their formation, circulation, manipulation, etc. Imperial memory is heterogeneous as much as the national memory. Narskii also focuses on varieties of imperial memory that support/maintain supranational unit without being totalitarian. The author refers to particular junctures in history when addressing the past becomes an important societal aspect. He also argues that the Russian scholarly community focuses on such issues as memory belatedly, when the problem has already been discussed in the West and triggers idiosyncratic reactions from Western colleagues.

For Narskii, historical memory is the field for research in the framework of new social and cultural history and it can become a key in interpreting the subjective world of people in the past. Narskii reminds that it is not just the concept itself but the hard work of adapting it to the needs of historical scholarship that matters.

По мнению Матта Мацуды , память империи следует скорее рассматривать не как коллективную (Хольбвакс), но как память "собранную" ( collected ), состоящую из отдельных фрагментов, артефактов, частей мозаики, порождающих "невольное", а не преднамеренно сконструированное значение. Мнемонические качества таких фрагментов гарантируются их разделенностью, фактом невозможности единого нарратива. Соответственно, противопоставление памяти и истории неправомерно: скорее, речь должна идти о памяти как об одном из видов истории, в котором главную роль играют не хроники развития, а моменты значения. По мнению Мацуды, проекты, подобные "Местам памяти" Пьера Нора, не являются оппозицией истории, они даже не являются "антинациональными": скорее, это – варианты национальных историй, в которых собраны различные субъекты. Такие истории выглядят странными только по сравнению с телеологическими историческими нарративами. Специфика исследований памяти состоит в том, что они делают процесс дистанцирования от прошлого предметом рефлексии. Если в 1950-60-е и затем в 1980-е гг. речь шла о распаде грандиозных территориальных империй, в начале ХХI века вопрос стоит о хроно-политической деколонизации субьектов, колонизированных телеологическими нарративами социализма или империализма.

Традиционное понимание империи состоит в представлении о территориальной замкнутости, множественности подданных и наличии центра власти. Можно, тем не менее, последовать примеру "мест памяти" и представить себе империю не как закрытую территорию власти, но как множество локальностей, каждая из которых является пространством соревнования меняющихся императивов. Исследования национализма говорят о нациях как практиках, а не как о реальных сущностях. Такой же подход должен быть применен к империи. Соответственно, в той же мере, в какой империи не суть закрытые историографические доминантные миры, память не является оппозицией истории. В терминах памяти можно говорить об империи как о наррации правил; при этом имперское пространство характеризуется неровным распространением этих правил. Подход к империи как ко множеству локальностей, определяемых и доминируемых политической, экономической или культурной властью, позволяет уйти от противопоставления "модерного" концепта памяти и "архаичного" концепта империи. Именно "архаичность" памяти об империи (Британской или Российской) позволяет глобальным империям XXI века (США) не замечать имперского характера собственного доминирования в мире.

Касаясь вопроса об "имперской памяти", Мацуда замечает, что она, скорее, является ширмой, за которой осуществляется непростое сосуществование разных народов, взаимоисключающих претензий на культурное наследие или различных культур. Освобождение от имперских уз часто ведет к реконституированию национального, причем агенты такого реконституирования предпочитают не помнить о том, что нации сыграли свою роль в создании империй. Касаясь вопроса о моделях памяти, воплощенных в обществах типа "Памяти" и "Мемориала", Мацуда отмечает, что и ностальгия как исторический принцип, и моральное банкротство попыток использования нарративов прогрессивных перемен для исправления исторических несправедливостей одинаково опасны.

В заключении Мацуда обращается к известной теме восстановления исторической справедливости, к требованиям платежей и репараций, выдвигаемым на основе памяти. По сути, вопрос стоит так: может ли память требовать репараций у истории? Вопросы исторической вины и компенсации в огромной степени зависят от факта признания, т.е. от допущения памяти. Это само по себе – вызов имперскому наследию, ведь главной задачей империи является забывание (поскольку сама империя расколота и неоднородна). Обращаясь к проблематике памяти, исследователи невольно напоминают нам об этой характеристике империи.

Old postcards and posters were used as illustrations to the roundtable.

В оформлении круглого стола использовались старые почтовые открытки и плакаты.

The issue of the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the significant challenges faced by the EU at present. Most researchers focus on the substantive scope of AI regulation, including state law, ethical norms and soft law. In addition to the substantive and legal scope of the regulation, it is worthwhile considering the manner of such regulation.1 Since AI is an algorithmic code, it seems correct to regulate (restrict) AI not so much with traditional law established in natural (human) language as with one implemented into algorithms. They may operate as a tool supporting traditional legislation (RegTech), but it is possible to go further with the issue and create regulation algorithms which implement the law as the effective law. 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73 páginas. ; En Colombia, con la Ley 1407 de 2010 se implementa el sistema acusatorio en la Justicia Penal Militar contando ya con una reforma mediante la Ley 1765 de 2015 en la que establece una nueva estructura administrativa e independencia del mando militar, por lo que se hace necesario realizar el análisis del sistema acusatorio ordinario para determinar las falencias y poder superarlas en el régimen especial, enfocado en el control de la acusación, para obtener un modelo de impartición de justicia más acusatoria. Si bien la acusación está compuesta por dos etapas, un escrito de acusación y otra la lectura final en audiencia pública denominada Audiencia de Formulación de Acusación, en el procedimiento ordinario conforme a la Ley 906 de 2004 esta audiencia se encuentre precedida por el Juez de Conocimiento, el cual requiere en principio del control formal y en desarrollo jurisprudencial en forma excepcional del control material; en el Proceso Penal Militar, establece que la acusación es de recibo del Juez del Control de Garantías, quien es el encargado de dar lugar a las partes para que en forma oral en audiencia pública expresen las causales de nulidades y se efectúen las observaciones sobre el escrito de acusación tanto de orden formal como material. Y aunque la acusación comprende los actos precisos de la investigación y que por lo tanto debe cumplir con ciertas formalidades y exista el deber procesal del Ente Acusador, de realizar el ejercicio responsable de la acción penal, es necesaria una verificación del escrito de acusación ejerciendo además el control material de la misma, pues puede contener vicios o errores que pueden ser corregidos o no: Un primer aspecto a tener en cuenta es evitar que sea un juicio innecesario, al faltar elementos que otorguen certeza tanto de la conducta punible frente al hecho, como de la fundamentación jurídica de la misma conducta, que puedan llevar a un desistimiento del caso, Y el segundo aspecto, es que en efecto se cuente con el factor de convicción y que este deba estar encaminado a la valoración fáctica, jurídica y los presupuestos de la acción penal, estudiados bajo los parámetros de legalidad, pertinencia, conducencia y utilidad. Para lograr un mejor alcance de la temática a tratar, se procederá a explicar brevemente cómo se realiza el control de la acusación en el proceso penal de los Estados Unidos de América, debido a que ofrece la oportunidad de explorar un ordenamiento jurídico completamente diferente y también se estudiará el control de la acusación en el proceso penal Chileno, como primer país suramericano que inicio con el sistema acusatorio oral basado en el sistema procesal alemán, con la finalidad de lograr definir lo que eventualmente debe debatirse al momento de la acusación dentro del Proceso Penal Militar e identificar las ventajas y desventajas frente a los principios fundamentales como la legalidad, la defensa técnica y el debido proceso, además de acudir a fuentes jurisprudencias y dogmáticas, para establecer los retos que la Justicia Penal Militar debe afrontar para implementar el control formal y material de la acusación, frente a los hechos jurídicamente relevantes para llegar a tener los elementos de convicción de la responsabilidad en grado de probabilidad. Así mismo, poder entender el otro papel importante que realiza la acusación en el proceso penal con el que se puede aplicar el principio de oportunidad, logrando de esta manera una solución más fácil de aceptación con un arreglo de los cargos impuestos en la acusación como terminación anticipada del proceso, logrando una justicia negociada sancionatoria, ahorrando tiempo y presupuesto, para otro tipo de casos que ameriten un más arduo trabajo de persecución penal. Este trabajo de grado aportará una reflexión para el desarrollo de la actividad no sólo de las partes e intervinientes en el proceso penal, sino también para que la sociedad sea cada vez más atentada a las incidencias del proceso, como aporte al debido proceso, como pilar fundamental de la convivencia social, al analizar la acusación en el procedimiento penal de los Estados Unidos de América y de la República de Chile y al observar en la práctica el sistema penal acusatorio ordinario Colombiano, en la que se encontrarán diferencias procedimentales y que en efecto cuenta con deficiencias al ejercer el control de la acusación y para que la Justicia Penal Militar pueda superar en el momento de aplicar la norma especial. Por lo que el método de investigación que se empleará es el comparativo - analítico, con el objetivo de contextualizar el escenario de la Audiencia de Formulación de Acusación en el Proceso Penal Colombiano a través de la construcción de novedosas ideas, en torno a la necesidad del cambio de paradigma limitativo que al respecto existe hoy en día en nuestro país. ; Contenido 1. Introducción 1 2. Problema de investigación 4 3. Objetivo General 4 3.1 Objetivos Específicos 4 4. La Acusación: Estados Unidos de América y la República de Chile 5 4.1 La Acusación en el Sistema Procesal Penal de los Estados Unidos de América 5 4.2 La Acusación en el Sistema Procesal Penal de la República de Chile 11 4.3 Ventajas y Desventajas del Control a la Acusación 13 5. La Acusación: Colombia 18 5.1 La Acusación en la Justicia Penal Ordinaria. 18 5.2 La Acusación en la Justicia Penal Militar 25 6. La Acusación Dentro del Proceso Penal Militar Una Propuesta Basada en la Comparación 39 6.1 Sistema Acusatorio de la Justicia Penal Militar Frente a los Principios Rectores y Garantías Procesales 39 6.1.1 El Principio de Legalidad 40 6.1.2 El Derecho de Defensa y Debido Proceso 41 6.1.3 De la Presunción de Inocencia 43 6.1.4 El Derecho a la Libertad 44 6.1.5 El Principio de Oportunidad 45 6.2 Retos Procesales Dentro del Sistema Acusatorio de la Justicia Penal Militar 45 7. Anexos 50 8. Conclusiones 60 9. Referencias Bibliográficas 64 ; In Colombia, with Law 1407 of 2010, the accusatory system is implemented in the Military Criminal Justice, already having a reform through Law 1765 of 2015 in which it establishes a new administrative structure and independence of the military command, which is why it is necessary perform the analysis of the ordinary accusatory system to determine the flaws and be able to overcome them in the special regime, focused on the control of the accusation, in order to obtain a more accusatory model of justice. Although the accusation is composed of two stages, a document of accusation and another the final reading in public hearing called Audience of Formulation of Accusation, in the ordinary procedure according to Law 906 of 2004 this hearing is preceded by the Judge of Knowledge, which in principle requires formal control and case law development in exceptional form of material control; in the Military Criminal Procedure, establishes that the accusation is the receipt of the Judge of the Control of Guarantees, who is in charge of giving rise to the parties so that orally in a public hearing they express the grounds for annulments and observations are made on the written accusation of both formal and material order. And although the accusation includes the precise acts of the investigation and that therefore must comply with certain formalities and there is the procedural duty of the Accuser, to carry out the responsible exercise of the criminal action, a verification of the indictment is necessary. the material control of the same, because it can contain vices or errors that can be corrected or not: A first aspect to take into account is to avoid unnecessary judgment, by missing elements that give certainty of both the conduct punishable against the fact, and the legal basis of the same conduct, which may lead to a dismissal of the case, And the second aspect is that in fact we have the factor of conviction and that it must be aimed at the factual, legal assessment and budgets of the criminal action, studied under the parameters of legality, relevance, conduct and usefulness. In order to achieve a better scope of the subject to be dealt with, a brief explanation will be given of how the prosecution is carried out in the criminal proceedings of the United States of America, since it offers the opportunity to explore a completely different legal order and also the control of the accusation will be studied in the Chilean criminal process, as the first South American country that started with the oral accusatory system based on the German procedural system, with the purpose of defining what should be debated at the moment of the accusation within the Process Military Penalty and identify the advantages and disadvantages against fundamental principles such as legality, technical defense and due process, in addition to sources of jurisprudence and dogmatics, to establish the challenges that the Military Criminal Justice must confront to implement formal control and material of the accusation, in front of the legally relevant facts for to have the elements of conviction of responsibility to the degree of probability. Likewise, to be able to understand the other important role that the accusation makes in the criminal process with which the principle of opportunity can be applied, thus achieving an easier solution of acceptance with an arrangement of the charges imposed in the accusation as a termination anticipated of the process, achieving a sanctioned negotiated justice, saving time and budget, for other types of cases that merit a more arduous work of criminal prosecution. This work of degree will provide a reflection for the development of the activity not only of the parties and intervenors in the criminal process, but also so that the society is more and more attacked to the incidences of the process, as a contribution to the due process, as a pillar of the social coexistence, by analyzing the accusation in the criminal procedure of the United States of America and the Republic of Chile and by observing in practice the ordinary Colombian criminal accusatory system, in which procedural differences will be found and that in effect It has shortcomings in exercising control of the charge and that the military justice system can overcome at the time of applying the special rule. Therefore, the research method that will be used is the comparative - analytical, with the objective of contextualizing the scenario of the Hearing of Formulation of Indictment in the Colombian Criminal Process through the construction of new ideas, around the need of change of limitative paradigm that exists today in our country.

En 1989 John Williamson utilizó por primera vez la expresión "Consenso de Washington" para referirse a una serie de pautas que el modelo económico occidental (los Estados Unidos, el FMI, el Banco Mundial) proponía como receta para el desarrollo. Se trataba de 10 principios asociados al liberalismo económico: disciplina presupuestaria, reorientación del gasto público (de subsidios ineficientes e indiscriminados a inversiones productivas en enseñanza, salud e infraestructura), reforma fiscal, liberalización financiera, tipo de cambio competitivo, apertura comercial, liberalización de la inversión extranjera directa, privatización de empresas públicas, desregulación (principalmente eliminación de trabas no arancelarias), y seguridad jurídica para los derechos de propiedad intelectual.Los países en vías de desarrollo han interpretado en algunas ocasiones tales principios como una nueva forma de dominación de los países desarrollados. En parte debido a que las grandes instituciones del orden internacional han exigido a los países del sur aplicar políticas económicas guiadas por estas pautas y los resultados, en muchos casos, no han sido los esperados.En cambio, quien sí ha obtenido resultados impresionantes con sus lineamientos económicos ha sido China. Desde finales de la década de los 70, cuando su economía comenzó el proceso de reforma, y mucho más intensamente en la última década, su espectacular crecimiento ha logrado que el resto del mundo se detenga a intentar comprender y analizar los aciertos y errores de su modelo de desarrollo. Su evolución económica, manteniendo un crecimiento de dos cifras por un período tan prolongado (algo inimaginable por estos tiempos en las economías occidentales), combinado con una política exterior por momentos desafiante y desconcertante, lleva a los analistas internacionales a observar con atención su estrategia de crecimiento y a examinar los motivos por los cuales, en varias ocasiones, China no suele aceptar las reglas del orden internacional creado por las potencias occidentales –principalmente, Estados Unidos. En el año 2004, Joshua Cooper Ramo popularizó el término "Consenso de Beijing" (en contraste con el "Consenso de Washington") procurando explicar el modelo chino de desarrollo. La comparación entre los resultados de ambos casos ha provocado en el análisis internacional la siguiente interrogante: "¿Es el Consenso de Beijing una alternativa viable para los países en vías de desarrollo?" Este cuestionamiento ha cobrado especial relevancia a partir de la última gran crisis económica internacional que impactó profundamente en las principales economías mundiales.Para poder responder esta pregunta es necesario entender cuáles son los conceptos que están por detrás del Consenso de Beijing y que han permitido, en última instancia, que China se convierta en la segunda economía más grande del mundo.Si bien el Consenso de Beijing no tiene pautas específicas como el Consenso de Washington, existen ciertas características que los analistas destacan como diferenciales del modelo chino de desarrollo.En primer lugar, se destaca la innovación y la experimentación constante. Según Andrés Oppenheimer: "Deng Xiaoping diría que no importa el color del gato, sino que atrape ratones: esa frase es la que te repiten los chinos cada dos minutos, y es de un pragmatismo absoluto" (1). Sin lugar a dudas, es este pragmatismo y capacidad de adaptarse a las situaciones lo que ha permitido que hoy China siga teniendo un régimen comunista de partido único, y a la vez sea el paraíso de las grandes empresas multinacionales. En este sentido, se puede destacar el modo en que China ha gestionado la última crisis mundial reestructurando parte de su economía, potenciando sectores tecnológicamente avanzados, de forma que la economía se mueva hacia segmentos de valor añadido en la cadena productiva.Otra característica muy importante es la autodeterminación: el gigante asiático ha logrado conjugar su nuevo protagonismo internacional con una constante independencia en todos los órdenes del funcionamiento del orden global. A diferencia de lo que sucedía en el pasado con los países en vías de desarrollo, China se ha parado ante el mundo como un actor preparado para participar en las discusiones de igual a igual, sin acatar las órdenes de ningún otro estado y poniendo sus intereses en primer plano.Sin embargo, esta característica ha dado lugar a ciertos reparos del resto de los principales actores del orden internacional ya que por momentos la actitud de China parece desconcertarlos. Un claro ejemplo de este tipo de escenario es la inserción china en el continente africano. Desde el comienzo de la última década, África ha tenido para China una importancia estratégica y económica fundamental (facilitándole ayuda económica, asistencia financiera y militar). Esta estrategia en el manejo de su política exterior desafía las expectativas occidentales de un continente africano gobernado por Estados de Derecho, democracias basadas en el respeto a los derechos humanos, y una estrategia económica de libre mercado. Estados Unidos se encuentra entonces con un poder que no lo enfrenta directamente sino que lo eclipsa; legitima y asiste sin condiciones ni exigencias a regímenes autoritarios africanos lo que hace que la influencia o ayuda que pueda ofrecer Estados Unidos o Europa hacia esa región (fuente de recursos y energía) no despierte interés.Esta situación, no sólo se ve favorecida por la crisis internacional sino que además para Occidente se hace difícil promocionar un proceso de democratización a escala global que se encuentra, luego de esta última década, bastante deslucido: las guerras en Irak o Afganistán en buena medida se han llevado a cabo en nombre de la democracia. China por su parte alega que está jugando con unas reglas que no creó, realizadas en otro tiempo y para otra estructura de poder mundial. Mejorar la sociedad era uno de los objetivos de los países en desarrollo hasta que en los años noventa fue dejado de lado por el Consenso de Washington; el Consenso de Beijing lo toma como uno de sus principios fundamentales. Esta sería la única manera de evitar el caos en una sociedad tan compleja que está viviendo un crecimiento tan vertiginoso. En contraste, muchos países de Latinoamérica que durante fines del siglo XX también aumentaron su PBI, agrandaron la brecha social. Hace un tiempo las tapas del People's Daily solían mostrar a los líderes locales inaugurando grandes y ostentosas obras. En cambio, hoy en día es normal ver a esos mismos líderes reclamando ayuda para algún área rural pobre: las autoridades Chinas saben que mejorar el nivel de vida de sus gobernados es esencial para que la situación no se vaya de las manos. China tiene una historia milenaria y conoce a la perfección las consecuencias nefastas que un levantamiento popular puede tener para las autoridades.Ahora bien, el Consenso de Beijing no puede ser comparado con el Consenso de Washington como diseños del mismo tipo. Mientras que el segundo presenta diez principios puntuales que pueden ser adoptados o no por las autoridades, la principal característica del Consenso de Beijing es justamente la falta de reglas cerradas. Indudablemente, las pautas que propone pueden ser de utilidad para los países en vías de desarrollo, pero no pueden ser equiparadas, analíticamente, a los postulados del Consenso de Washington.Creemos que la pregunta más relevante que cabe preguntarse a partir del análisis del modelo es, ¿se convirtió China en un modelo relativamente maduro para aplicar en otro país? Si hay una lección que dejó el Consenso de Washington, es que no hay ningún modelo de desarrollo universalmente aplicable, pues los países tienen diferentes situaciones económicas y sociales y es imposible crear un modelo que de antemano que pueda asegurar su éxito. China tiene una serie de particularidades que serían imposibles de reproducir y que son base de su modelo: población, territorio, e historia milenaria. Asimismo, China cuenta con la ventaja de ser un miembro permanente del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y de contar con un sexto de la población mundial, lo que le permite defender sus intereses con más poder que el resto de los países subdesarrollados.Cuando comenzó su proceso de apertura económica, se pensaba que el modelo era imposible de mantener sin cambios a largo plazo. No se podría avanzar por un proceso de reformas económicas, decían los analistas, sin avanzar por un proceso de cambios políticos. Hasta hoy los fundamentos del sistema político no han cambiado, por lo que hay analistas que cuestionan hasta que punto podrá continuar la prosperidad mientras se censuran y controlan los medios de comunicación y continúa el monopolio del poder político. Thomas Friedman, en su análisis acerca del mensaje que se había enviado hacia Beijing con el otorgamiento del premio Nobel de la Paz (obtenido por Liu Xiaobo) comenta que sin libertad los individuos no pueden desarrollar su potencial total y, en sí misma, la libertad es un ingrediente esencial para el progreso de la sociedad.La historia enseña que una vez que los hombres asimilan la libertad, ya sea económica o política, procuran obtenerla en todos los ámbitos de la vida. El régimen por lo tanto deberá estar preparado para enfrentar la posibilidad de que su población más tarde o más temprano, comprenda el verdadero valor de la libertad y exija la flexibilización del actual régimen político. Sin dudas, de ocurrir, este será éste uno de los principales desafíos que le toque enfrentar en los próximos tiempos al gobierno chino. *Estudiantes de la Licenciatura en Estudios InternacionalesUniversidad ORT-FACS Bibliografía recomendada sobre el "Consenso de Beijing":-BUSTELO, Pablo. Desarrollo económico: del Consenso al Post-Consenso de Washington y más allá. En: Universidad Complutense de Madrid [on line] 2003.Disponible en internet: -CHIN, Gregory & RAMESH Thakur. Will China Change the rules of Global Order. En: The Washington Quarterly [on line] October 2010.Disponible en internet: -COHEN, Roger. Democracy still matters. En: The New York Times [on line] 20/09/10.Disponible en internet: -COOPER RAMO, Joshua. 2004. The Beijing Consensus. En: The Foreign Policy Centre [on line] 05/11/04.Disponible en internet: - ECONOMIST DEBATES. China model. En: The Economist [on line] 04/08/10.Disponible en internet: http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/179- FANJUL, Enrique. El Consenso de Pekín: ¿un nuevo modelo para los países en desarrollo? En: Real Instituto Elcano [ on line] 31/07/09. Disponible en internet: -FRIEDMAN, Thomas. Going long liberty in China. En: The New York Times [on line] 16/10/10. Disponible en internet: -HALPER, Stefan. 2010. The Beijing Consensus. Perseus Books Group: Basic Books.- KALETSKY, Anatole. We need a new capitalism to take on China .En: The Times [on line] 04/02/10.Disponible en internet: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/anatole_kaletsky/article7014090.ece>- KALETSKY, Anatole. Blaming China won´t help the economy. En: The New York Times [on line] 26/09/10.Disponible en internet: -KRUGMAN, Paul. Chinese New Year. En: The New York Times [on line] 31/12/09.Disponible en internet: -LIU, Henry C.K. In currency struggle, China is victim, not offender. En: Global Times [on line] 06/01/10.Disponible en internet: (1) Letras Libres, Entrevista con Andrés Oppenheimer, Enero de 2006. Disponible online: http://letraslibres.com/pdf/10866.pdf

As elsewhere in the ex-communist/socialist countries, the former planning system in Yugoslavia has been dismantled as from the beginning of 1990s, and the planning practice has from then onwards been steered by an apart mixture of old habits, few institutional innovations and the social, economic and political turbulence of the transition period. The previous system and practice of socioeconomic planning collapsed, so far not to be substituted for by new arrangements, to match the impact of the key factors of the transition period, i.e., political pluralization, privatization and marketisation. On the other hand, albeit the system of spatial/urban and environmental planning has been 're-touched' in the 1990s, the adjustments undertaken have not either been harmonized with the factors mentioned. What can now be recognized as the existing 'planning system' is, however, an strange mix of heterogeneous elements from a number of disparate modes, i.e., 'crisis-management-planning', 'planning-supported-wild-marketisation-and-privatisation', 'project-based-planning', etc. In effect, there is no overall professional and political consensus on the direction and content of reform in this field (which also applies to other key issues). In sum, the existing situation in the planning system and practice reads as follows: (1) The system has almost lost its legitimacy, partly because the majority of the former public interests collapsed, and new, indisputable public interests still not being established. Under such circumstances, new roles of planning are hardly known to the public at large, in part as a consequence of an overall anti-planning stance among the majority of political, economic and expert elites. (2) The inertia rules the professional landscape, since there has been a lack of new approaches and methodologies, to match the impact of new dominant factors and the miserable social and economic conditions in the country. Regarding the approaches and methodologies applied, the traditional ex ante planning evaluation still prevails, and more ex post and ex continuo evaluation is still missing. (3) The planning system is too centralized (within the two republics), since the radical recentralization of Serbia was undertaken in 1990, and subsequently the sub-national tiers were deprived of almost any effective planning instruments. In addition to this, the majority of regional entities ('districts') and communes lack a competent administrative machinery and expertise, as well as other support (e.g., research, planning information support etc.) for effecting autonomous planning policies. (4) There has been no more ambitious strategic planning (which is, however, somehow understandable vis-à-vis only now ended international sanctions and isolation of the country). On the other hand, the majority of the development documents that have been passed in the meantime, grossly lack elaborated implementation devices (policies and instruments). Especially in the field of urban planning, the detailed ('land use') schemes prevail over the more strategic development schemes for larger urban and regional areas. Specific development projects (and, only sometimes, more harmonized programmes) by far outnumber other planning schemes. (5) The integration and harmonization of various aspects of planning and policy, i.e., social, economic, spatial/urban, environmental, is very poor. In effect, physicalism still dominates the scene in spatial and urban planning, and the elements of socioeconomic development and environmental policy are scarce within this block. (6) The stipulated legal propositions pertaining to the openness, participativeness and transparency of the planning/policy procedures fall easily frail in the planning practice, resulting in the very poor content in this regard. (7) There has been a lack of planners and other experts experienced and knowledgeable in practicing planning under the new circumstance of political pluralism and radically changed structure of stakeholders and concomitant institutional arrangements. This also applies to 'educators' in general, because the prolonged international isolation of the FR Yugoslavia has caused the gross of their knowledge and capabilities irrelevant. In sum, it seems that many planners would not be able to assume new roles that they are expected to on the part of the society at large. (8)The planning/policy information, research, institutional and other support provided by the state and other agents often does not satisfy even the most basic needs in this fields, partly for a general scarcity of resources concomitant to the overall and deep social, economic and political crisis the society found itself in the 1990s. (9) Most frightfully, manipulation, paternalism and clientelism still represent dominant forms of power, which is a problem by itself in Yugoslavia being one of the most corruptive countries in the world. What is now most missing is a non-manipulative persuasion, as well as the authority of professional values, as the communication and interaction forms that seem only promising for and supportive to developing of a democratic, emancipatory and transformative planning mode. A number of attempts during the last decade to embark upon the preparation of the new 'Master Plan of the City Belgrade' (in the sequel: MP) came into realization not before the democratic political changes of October 2000 took place in Serbia. However, the so far undertaken steps do not seem promising, as they failed to satisfy a number of methodological and other standards, as well as to introduce necessary innovations. Unfortunately, the MP was commissioned to the Bureau of Urban Planning of the City of Belgrade (otherwise a 'faithful ally' of all non-democratic regimes in the City's urban planning and related matters over the last more than ten years now, during which there has been a so far unrecorded squandering and illegal privatization of public urban assets, mostly uncontrolled and not paid-for). Similarly, vested are to lead and complete the work mostly the experts/planners who 'controlled' and still 'control' the academic and professional scene in the same period (notwithstanding that were compromised and their abilities proved passé on many occasions), now recycled to perform new mission. Albeit the entire project had not been adequately prepared, already two interim documents have been elaborated now, viz., 'A Hypothesis of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021', and 'A Concept of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021'. In what follows, a brief review of the work done so far is presented: (1) The role of the MP is poorly defined, which is strange vis-à-vis the pronounced thesis on the 'insuperable role of market', which one renders puzzle about the veritable role of the MP. In addition to this, physicalism features as the key characteristic of this document: social and economic aspects of development are insufficiently present and poorly integrated into the MP, and so are the environmental aspects. The MP will however have to assume a part of socioeconomic development planning and policy as well, because the latter is predictably not likely to get recuperated in some time to come. Furthermore, the social, economic and environmental problems of Belgrade are so tremendous (e.g., extremely high rate of unemployment, probably around 40% of the total work force, obsolete technological, market and other structure of the larger part of Belgrade economy, prolonged crisis of economic growth, overall pauperization of the overwhelming majority of people, many hundred thousand refugees, few hundred thousand of young and educated people who left the country, disproportionate environmental pollution as compared to the level of economic development, etc.), that they must not be ignored in the development documents like the MP. (2) There is no sound conception on the public interests, particularly under the circumstances of a large number of legitimate individual interests fast emerging on the political scene, some of which also persisting to impose themselves as new and legitimate public interests. This results in a feeble notion on the existing and predictable future conflicts, as well as on the planning mechanisms and instruments that will be used in their control and management. (3) The concept of sustainable development has been only 'flirted with' in the MP, whereby a sound doctrine upon which development is to be directed and articulated is also missing (i.e., that which is of relevance for a territorial entity with the GDP of not more than some USD 1 500 per capita). (4) No efforts have been made to introduce more relevant methodological approach, i.e., those which would contrast the miserable socioeconomic and environmental fixities, viz.: (i) A more rigorous ex post evaluation of past decisions has not been performed, implying that future steps will be undertaken upon rather anecdotal insights in the existing power structure, institutional and organizational arrangements and dominant communication and interaction modes in planning. In the same context, the most significant problem of Belgrade area, i.e., how to approach the economic and ecological renewal and rehabilitation of its economy, has been hardly paid sufficient attention to. (This also applies to the position of Belgrade in the broader regional Euro-Asian context, which has terribly eroded over the last decade). (ii) Although the intention of the whole exercise is to work out a 'hard product', i.e., a urban development plan, no ex ante evaluation scheme has been produced so far, implying that the job is not being performed lege artis. Apart from other implications, this failure is particularly handicapping regarding the criteria of ex ante evaluation, leaving the professional audience and the public at large without the sound answers on key questions: What are the criteria upon which the evaluation has been undertaken? Whose are they? What interests stand behind them? Who decides on the criteria that will be applied? Apart from softening the rigour of the expertise, this flaw also allows for too ample 'maneuvering space' for the subsequent arbitrating to be performed by the politicians. (5) A trend-based extrapolation has been used as the key prognostic technique, which is absolutely unacceptable, keeping in mind the poor predictive power (I) and unstable institutional arrangements in planning and elsewhere (II). Instead, the political community would necessitate a number of veritable alternative scenarios of possible/desirable future development elaborated and presented for discussion, deliberation and decision-making in expert arenas and public forums. (6) Perhaps the weakest part of the MP goes to the issue of implementation of planning decisions, giving way to 'visioning' (in effect, to another planning 'phantasmagory'), which is again unacceptable vis-à-vis the pressing and burning realities of Belgrade and its broader surroundings. (7) Finally, an open, transparent and publicly verified 'offer to strategic partners' would also be needed, as the City does not have enough internal resources to cope with the problems of its economic, social, physical and environmental renewal. To conclude, major improvements are needed regarding the planning approach and methodology applied in the preparation of the Master Plan of the City of Belgrade 2021. As this project is likely to carry considerable demonstrational effects throughout the planning scene in Yugoslavia, its highly professional execution is of necessity, so that a major damage is avoided, i.e., that of a further loss of the legitimacy of planning and erosion of the planning profession.

In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Degree Completion category. ; 1 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century Michael J. Bearden Norwich University SOCI401: Cultural and Anthropology Studies Dr. Timothy Maynard April 30, 2020 2 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. 3 Since its beginning in circa 610 CE, when the prophet Muhammad ibn Abdullah was visited by the angel Gabriel in a cave near Mecca, Islam has shaken the foundations of the Middle East and remained in a state of near-perpetual conflict with the Western world. Islam is an Arabic term most closely relating to the English words submission or surrender. Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, spread this new religion by the sword throughout Asia, forcing the "submission" of thousands, and have hardly been at peace with their neighbors since. Centuries later, in the two decades following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, radical Islam's stance against the West has altered the diplomatic landscape between the world's great powers, fundamentally changed the United States' national strategic direction, and caused youth from all walks of life to sacrifice the best years of their lives in holy war to protect the supra-national community of Islam. From the invasion of Afghanistan to the subsequent invasions of Iraq and Syria to the ongoing peace talks with the Taliban, diplomatic and military efforts to eradicate jihadists from the Middle East have to-date been nearly ineffectual. Not only have these efforts failed to contain or defeat jihad, but at times have served to strengthen Islamic extremists' resolve in their call to arms against the West. Because jihad is such a fundamental part of the Islamic faith, it can never be "defeated" in the sense of traditional military eradication of an enemy force, but it can be confronted, contained, or refocused, as this paper will address. I argue that enabling local solutions and promoting education, alongside tailored surgical strike and security cooperation operations where necessary, are the keys to confronting, containing, and countering jihad. 4 Background Defining Jihad and Salafism Jihad is a transliterated form of the Arabic word meaning to struggle or to strive. In the traditional teachings of the Islamic faith, jihad is broken into two distinct categories: Greater jihad and lesser jihad. Greater jihad includes the personal struggle against selfish desires, emphasizing discipline and morality, as well as the struggle against Satan and the forces of evil. It includes jihad of the heart, jihad of the mind, and jihad of the tongue, involving praise for those who follow the will of Allah and correction for those who have gone astray (Gorka, 2016). The second category, lesser jihad, is viewed as the struggle against the enemies of Islam and the defense of its people. Lesser jihad is commonly referred to as Jihad of the Sword. Gorka (p. 60) reveals that, over time, this category of jihad has been used as justification for at least seven different subsets of holy war: 1. Using holy war to build an empire 2. Going after apostate regimes or individuals 3. Revolting against non-pious Muslim leaders 4. Fighting against the forces of imperialism in Muslim lands 5. Countering the West's pagan influence 6. Guerrilla warfare against a foreign invader 7. Using jihad as justification for terrorist attacks against civilian targets In a broad sense, lesser jihad can be viewed as offensive or defensive martial action. On the offensive side, jihadists use religion to justify building an empire, such as the Islamic State, attack apostate regimes, like those of the Taliban against Afghan government forces, and use terrorism against civilians, like the attacks on the World Trade Center. This offensive action 5 often takes jihadists beyond the borders of the ummah, or the people of Islam, striking fear into hearts of unbelievers around the globe. The defensive variety, especially in recent history, has most often correlated directly with the use of guerrilla warfare against foreign invaders, such as al-Qaeda's attacks on the international military coalitions that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. This radical view of Islam is mostly practiced by those who follow the way of the Salafi, or the pious predecessors from the time of Muhammad, who experienced Islam in its purest form. It is believed that the first three generations who practiced the teachings of the prophet Muhammad are the ones who all Muslims thereafter should try to emulate. Themes of Salafism focus on complete adherence to sharia law, the fight against apostate Muslim regimes, and the spread and protection of Islam and its followers. At its core, Salafism is a very traditionalist view of Islam and has been practiced by multiple 21st Century terrorist organizations. The terms jihad and Salafi have shared such a close relationship in the last few decades that they have become nearly synonymous, at times described as Salafi-Jihadism or Jihadi-Salafism (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019) What Cultural Influences Lead One to the Path of Jihad? Before the attacks on 9/11, the largest call to jihad answered by the international Muslim community was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Stopping the spread of communism and defending the ummah against the atrocities of Russian ground forces was seen as a noble and just cause for young Muslim men, and not just among Muslims (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019). Many nations, including the United States, funded, equipped, and trained the Afghan mujahedeen (those who conduct jihad) for the fight against the Soviet empire. Jihad in the 21st Century has been viewed in a much different light, as it is most closely associated with acts of extreme violence against Western nations. While the piles of rubble that used to be the 6 World Trade Center smoldered, and a gaping hole scarred the wall of the Pentagon, people of the world were forced to ask themselves, "How could a person do this? Why would someone take their own lives and thousands of others in the name of Allah?" Religious Justification for Jihad. Though jihad has become almost entirely associated with Islamic holy war, the term itself is still simply the Arabic word for striving. Struggling against one's selfish desires, striving to maintain traditional values, and defending a community against a common enemy are not just Islamic concepts, they are universal to most tightly-knit cultures. Similarly, Christians and Jews are taught self-discipline, adherence to moral codes, and defending their belief against enemies of their faith. So, why has the Islamic flavor of this common cultural theme become so violent, causing deep unrest around the world in our modern era? Verses from the Qur'an can begin to unpack why horrific public executions, suicide bombings, and advocating for generalized violence against non-Muslims may be justifiable in jihadist culture. The Qur'an (2015) lays out the following decree in chapter 9, verse 29: Fight those from among the People of the Book who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor hold as unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay the tax with their own hand and acknowledge their subjection (p. 208). My personal study of Islam and conversations with Muslims in the field revealed that this bit of prose has been used as motivation and justification for jihad by groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham of our modern age. Some of the following themes are evident in the translation: 7 • Jews and Christians are recognized as People of the Book, but are required to accept the following—Allah as the one true god, sharia as the acceptable law, and Islam as the one true religion. • If Jews and Christians refuse to accept these statutes, they must pay a tax called the jizyah to show their subjugation. • If they refuse to do either of these, they are to be put to the sword (p. 208). Salafi-jihadist groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State have tried to revive the jizyah tax in areas under their control. Likewise, hundreds of Christians, Jews, and even Muslims who refuse to adhere to strict sharia law have been publicly executed. This vehement enforcement of arcane Islamic law is seen as a return to the purest form of Islam, as pious as the first few generations who followed the Prophet Muhammad. Another common religious cultural theme that ties these jihadist organizations together is a message of religious oppression. They preach to young Muslims that the Islamic world is under siege by the West and that their god, their value systems, and their way of life are being threatened by the evils of capitalism and democracy (Venhaus, 2010). In joining organizations like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, young men from across the globe find a sense of purpose and direction in their cause to protect the ummah. This theme is manifested in the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda and the father of home-grown terrorism in the United States. He calls on Muslims living among those in the West: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims? Hence, my advice to you is this, you have two choices: either hijra [migration 8 to an Islamic land] or jihad. You either leave or you fight. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth, and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers on the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (as cited in Gorka, 2016). This way of thinking is also captured in chapter 9, verse 5 of the Qur'an (2015): Kill the idolaters wherever you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free (p. 204). When taken literally, as they are by followers of Salafi-jihad, scriptures such as these leave no choice. To these men who have committed themselves fully to the ways of the pious ones, they are compelled to become shahid, or martyrs in the protection of the ummah. The Qur'an promises paradise for those who do: Surely, Allah has purchased of the believers their persons and their property in return for the Garden they shall have; they fight in the cause of Allah, and they slay and are slain—a promise the He has made incumbent on Himself in the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur'an. And who is more faithful to his promise than Allah? Rejoice, then, in your bargain which you have made with Him; and that it is which is the supreme triumph (p. 222). The concept of becoming a martyr in the struggle for Islam is romanticized by jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and even state governments in local programming. In Lebanon, Mothers of Martyrs are interviewed to share the stories of their sons' glorious end while fighting abroad against the infidels (Venhaus, 2010). The Qur'an itself calls this sacrifice the supreme triumph for a jihadist, striving for the glory of Allah. 9 Though enforcing the jizyah, publicly executing those who do not follow sharia law, and seeking opportunities to kill infidels through suicide attacks represent a very small, extremist cultural sect of Islam, each of these practices is still justifiable if one looks to the Qur'an. This could be viewed as no different than a rural Pentecostal church in the Deep South who maintains strict standards for how women must dress and act: it all comes down to interpretation and a community's willingness to subjugate themselves to these standards. Spiritual leaders of jihadist groups in the 21st Century have used the Qur'an as continued justification for a variety of cruel, inhumane, and brutal actions that served to shock the West. The holy book of Islam acts as the essential glue, binding together all facets of Arab and Islamic culture. Artistic Inspiration for Jihad. A far cry from the harsh proclamations of the Qur'an, Arabic poetry predates Islam by centuries and serves as a bedrock of Arabic culture across the Middle East. Early desert nomads composed poems mostly in mono-rhyme and in one of sixteen standard canonical measures, which made them easy to commit to memory (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Naturally, this beautiful form of cultural expression has found a home in the modern jihadist movement, where it has become an inspiration for new recruits to join the cause and crucial in the sustainment of those already fighting infidels abroad. Creswell and Haykel assert that although analysts have generally ignored this facet of jihadist culture, it is woven deeply into the fabric of modern Islamic extremism. Osama bin Laden, most recognized as the former head of al-Qaeda, was also a highly-celebrated jihadist poet. Without question, his lyrical genius inspired young Arabs with stories of a return to the heroic and chivalrous past of Islam. One of his most famous works celebrates the martyrdom of the 9/11 hijackers. This is a theme among modern jihadist poetry, which preserves the tales of suicide bombers, the conquered apostate regimes of Iraq and Syria, and the glories of jihadist heroes (Creswell & Haykel). Likewise, in a 10 group of individuals who have each traveled far from home to defend Islam against the kuffar, these poems help to establish a sense of cultural identity, strengthening their wartime bond and solidifying their resolve. In seeing the videos of the Islamic State as they carved a path of destruction across large swathes of Iraq in early 2014, it may be difficult for one to believe that its members were motivated by the rhythmic lines of jihadist poetry. It is hard to accept that the same young fighter who is willing to behead an infidel for all the free world to see, could also be found passionately reciting lines celebrating the glorious return of an Islamic caliphate. During its rise, the Islamic State capitalized on the lyrical talent of a Damascus-born woman named Ahlam al-Nasr. In her first broadcast, called the Blaze of Truth, she sang each one of her 107 works a cappella, in accordance with the Islamic State's ban on musical instruments. The video was uploaded to Youtube, receiving thousands of views and further shares on multiple social media platforms (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). In the early days of the group's brutal campaign in Iraq, al-Nasr celebrated victory in Mosul as a new dawn for the country: "Ask Mosul, city of Islam, about the lions— how their fierce struggle brought liberation. The land of glory has shed its humiliation and defeat and put on the raiment of splendor" (as cited in Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Her choice of words helps one sense her deep passion for jihad, hidden within the lines. Mujahedeen are called lions and liberators. Mosul is called both a city of Islam and a land of 11 glory that, because of its liberation, has been released from the chains of shame and can now live in the splendor and pride of its former renown. Poetry has succored those serving in times of war for hundreds, even thousands of years. In the same manner, this key element of artistic cultural expression has helped bind together the modern jihadi movement, capturing the heroic deeds of martyrs who would otherwise remain nameless and unrecognized by the outside world. Serving in lands far away from home, young jihadists find inspiration, strength, and a renewed sense of identity in these haunting bits of rhyme. Social Pressure to Join Jihad. Abdullah Anas was an Algerian who served as one of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and spent several years studying under Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian "Father of Resistance to the Soviets" (Gall, 2020). Working to help Algerians achieve nonviolent change in their government, Anas, now in his 60s, has spent a life living and working among jihadists. To Anas, jihad is a fundamental principle of Muslim culture through which mujahedeen receive rewards in heaven: "I will never denounce jihad. As a Muslim, I know this to be a noble deed—where man can be the most beastly" (Gall). In a study of three Swedish jihadists, with experiences ranging from 1980s Afghanistan to the modern fight in Syria, Nilsson (2019) suggests that one of the fundamental social justifications for joining jihad is the sense that Islam and Muslims are collectively under attack. This, again, is a theme that applies to more than just the modern jihadist movement: Americans lined up in droves outside recruiting stations following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and decades later after September 11, 2001. Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many Muslims from around the world began to see this not as just the West going after the 9/11 conspirators, but as a global attack on Islam. Each day, fresh news stories of coalition soldiers' crimes against 12 Muslim civilians and pictures of burning villages continued to motivate men to join the fight to protect the ummah from the foreign invaders. Nilsson contends that since most jihadists are very young, in their teens and early twenties, they are very susceptible to the influences of close friends and social groups. Safet, a young Muslim living in Sweden, was pressured by a friend to join the Islamic State in Syria, saying that he became convinced by his friend Ahmed that the group was fighting to protect Muslims (Nilsson). However, after realizing that the Islamic State was actually killing other Muslims in a practice called takfir, or excommunication, Safet became disillusioned and returned to Sweden (Nilsson). From the fight against the foreign invaders in the early 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in 2015, it seems jihadists have most often been motivated by the need to protect the international Muslim community. Aside from the social responsibility of defending their faith and people, the need for adventure also seems to permeate the ideations of young men seeking to join a jihadist group. One of Nilsson's (2019) most interesting theories is that jihad is not the radicalization of Islam, but rather the Islamization of radicalism. Individuals who are already naturally predisposed to such adventurous or nihilistic behavior get caught up in the social dynamics of their time, ending up in a jihadist movement. Venhaus (2010) explains that in interviews with over 2,000 al-Qaeda prisoners from Iraq to Guantanamo Bay, he found that young Muslim men sought the cause of jihad for a number of normal social pressures felt by normal teens worldwide: "Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure" (Venhaus). The Effects of Social Media and Technology on Jihad. In the modern era, news is no longer bound by the time it takes for an article to be published, printed, and distributed across 13 great distance in a community. Social media platforms like Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, and Instagram have made sharing news instantaneous. Additionally, the advent of the smartphone, which acts simultaneously as a hand-held computer, high definition camera, and telephone with nearly world-wide coverage has forever changed the media landscape. In the era of modern jihad, one can post a single video that moves the minds of thousands in a matter of seconds. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, news stories of atrocity among the efforts of coalition troops over the next decade served to further the cause of local and foreign jihadists to protect the ummah from these invaders. Accidental bombing of civilians, mistreatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and a general ignorance toward Muslim culture were fueled by social media and smartphone technology. Venhaus (2010) claims that throughout this early phase of the war in Iraq, al-Qaeda very rarely had to actively recruit, their global brand was aggressively promoted through satellite television, internet chat rooms, and social media platforms; willing candidates sought them out. This use of media continued to be perfected by jihadist organizations like the Islamic State, who published a digital magazine called Dabiq, named for the ideological capital of the proposed caliphate, which rallied Muslims to jihad through stories of glory and heroism in the cause for Islam. The Islamic State also posted grisly execution videos, with stunning music and production value, including super high-definition shots of their brutality. Publications and videos such as these could be copied, saved, shared, and re-shared before any sort of government intervention could stop them. Creswell and Haykel (2015) reveal that jihadists were running a massive, secret network of social media websites and fake accounts that could be rapidly assembled and dissembled by hackers. The effects of social media and technology on modern jihadist culture are easy to understand, but challenging to measure in scope and reach. Just as easily as videos of Islamic 14 State propaganda or poetry can be shared, so too can stories of coalition force atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has put strategists in a unique position, where it is nearly impossible to control the narrative. Unfortunately, the story that breaks first is still the one that is liked and shared the most, even if the truth comes out after. Effects of Western Culture on Jihad. Rapid globalization, including the widespread diffusion of the internet and technology into the Middle East in the last two decades has continued to foment jihadist hatred for the West. Personal conversations with multiple Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that the decadence, lavish richness, and sinful lifestyles portrayed by Western movies and media served to fuel the fires of disdain among the pious Salafi-jihadists. Additionally, Muslim men living in Western nations following the attacks on the World Trade Center were ostracized and feared by society, often leading them to an eventual radicalization process. Being denied a peaceful coexistence because of continued Western misperception, caused many young Muslims to become angry and seek community and brotherhood among other Muslims experiencing the same problems. Venhaus (2010) notes that out of the over 2,000 captured jihadists interviewed, more than 30 per cent of them sought al-Qaeda because they were angry. Under the tutelage of local al-Qaeda mentors, the frustrations of these young men were then turned upon their neighbors through careful instruction and manipulation. They were taught to see the West as the enemy of Islam, with hundreds of the ummah being harmed by their military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq each day. They were instructed in the ways of the pious ones who came before them, inspiring them to turn from the sinfulness of their Western neighbors and take pride in their newfound self-discipline and righteousness in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, many of these young men would travel to their 15 ancestral homelands to join the struggle, or conduct terrorist attacks on their own Western communities. Analysis A Unique Challenge Given the litany of reasons one might join jihad, the incredibly complex cultural and social environment, and the fluidity of the modern jihadist movement, how can the United States begin to contain this problem? The reasons one individual might join a jihadist cause are as various and sundry as why one might choose to join any movement or profession over another. As Nilsson (2019) and Venhaus (2010) have detailed, there appears to be no singular marker: one could be an extremely religious or a passive Muslim, rich or poor, single or married with a family, have a completely stable social life or be isolated with no friends. Jihadists can be from any country, any walk of life, and usually do not widely broadcast their intentions prior to taking part in acts of violence for the cause of Islam. It is because of the near-impossibility of clearly identifying a pattern of distinguishable cultural markers that make it such a challenge for the United States government and its allies to address the threat of jihad. Targeting an individual before they become a jihadist or before they commit a terrorist act has been one of the most formidable challenges of our time for military and law enforcement professionals alike. Usually, the much simpler job is finding a jihadist who has allowed their communications discipline to slip before an act, or catching them in a pitched battle on foreign soil. In order to protect citizens of the West and East alike against jihadists' aims, the United States Government must be prepared to confront, contain, and counter the jihadist narrative "left of bang," before an attack occurs. 16 The Global War on Terrorism: Taking the Fight to the Jihadists. In the months that followed September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush deployed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary officers and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to find, fix, and finish pockets of al-Qaeda militants being harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan. A fierce campaign of relentless aerial bombardment and mounted assaults by the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance led to a swift and decisive defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. With Kabul and Kandahar in allied hands, and an interim government established under the leadership of the Pashtun Hamid Karzai, the future of a free and prosperous Afghanistan seemed assured, but what came to be known as The Long War had only just begun. Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and 19 years later, the United States and its allies have been forced to the negotiating table with the Salafi-jihadist Taliban. Likewise, after Saddam Hussein's continued disregard for international law, threats against the United States, and open violence against his own people, the administration of President Bush decided again to pursue a military option. Much like Afghanistan, the coalition was led by CIA operatives and SOF operators, coordinating airstrikes on key positions in a tactical display of American firepower affectionately titled Shock and Awe. However, unlike Afghanistan, a massive conventional invasion followed the bombing campaign, bent on toppling the Baathist regime and finding Saddam's chemical weapons stockpiles. What followed was a series of policy failures, leading to a steady influx of jihadists partnering with local insurgents seeking to oust the foreign invaders and protect the ummah from the atrocities of the kuffar. In my professional opinion, Iraq is still recovering from the decade-long military occupation, cleaning up the destruction left by the Islamic State, and on the brink of civil war due to concerns about being an Iranian puppet state. 17 Ineffective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Operation Iraqi Freedom. During my first combat rotation as an Infantryman in the Triangle of Death in southern Iraq in 2005-2006, I experienced the initial rumblings of a civil war between the Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq, each wrestling for power in a post-Saddam world. I was also witness to the inundation of foreign jihadists, joining the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who at times headquartered in my area of operations. As I analyze our highly-kinetic and aggressive initial campaigns years later, I can see that the coalition's fight, first against Saddam, then against al-Qaeda, only bolstered jihadist motivation. In being a foreign invader, we inadvertently created a jihadist resistance movement, bent on the removal of their occupiers. Kilcullen (2010) explains this dilemma by explaining that focusing on the wrong metrics in a fight against insurgents can be deceptive: If you kill 20 insurgents, they may have 40 relatives who are now in a blood feud with your unit and are compelled to take revenge. Again in 2007-2008, I was deployed to Iraq as an Infantry squad leader to the sacred city of Khadimiyah in Northwest Baghadad. This was during the famous troop surge, meant to fix the ongoing problems with stability throughout the country. Being in the home of the beautiful Shrine of the Seventh Imam, it was a predominantly Shia area. Over the course of 15 months, my unit fought several engagements against Iranian-backed Shia militias and worked on project after project to strengthen local civil infrastructure, all while maintaining the utmost discretion against damaging homes or creating civilian casualties. Yet again, although we had conducted a nearly perfect counterinsurgency fight, it seemed that Kilcullen's insurgent math still applied: Fighting the jihadists only served to create more unrest within the population, no matter if we were restoring essential services and reducing damage to homes or not. 18 Operation Enduring Freedom. Nearly a decade after the fall of al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts, I was deployed to the mountains of Afghanistan from 2010-2011. Stationed along the Arghandab River, just north of Kandahar, we were in the heart of the Pashtun Taliban. Again, the same story remained true: We fought the Taliban jihadists almost daily, but could not seem to win over the true key terrain in a counterinsurgency fight: The hearts and minds of the people. The Taliban would harass our unit's base of operations with a few pop shots as we called them, which would unleash a massive response in firepower and resources. Thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition would be fired into the farm fields surrounding our Combat Out Post (COP), squads would be sent in pursuit of the attackers, and helicopters would spend hours scouring the terrain in an attempt to heap justice on the insurgents. This massive effort against so few served to erode the unit's motivation, exhaust our supplies, and alienate the civilian population whose homes and fields had been damaged in the process. Reflections on Personal Combat Experience. After years of combat experience and deeply studying Muslim culture, I can now see how the mistakes the coalitions made early-on in both operations only fueled the fires of insurgency, resistance to foreign occupiers, and generalized hatred for the West. Porch (2013) argues brilliantly that US counterinsurgency doctrine made the same mistake as its imperialistic predecessors of centuries before: Believing that military action was a proper vehicle for providing Middle Easterners with Western values, as well as a foundation for governance, social programs, and economic transformation in a region. This became evident in my own experience, realizing that no matter what sort of social, infrastructure, or economic programs ran alongside our military efforts, the people of both Afghanistan and Iraq felt the enormous social weight of being occupied by a foreign power, rendering these efforts nearly ineffectual. On the contrary, local and foreign jihadist movements 19 capitalized on each and every mistake of coalition forces, increasing their recruitment and resolve against the West. Though our military may have been winning every major battle against the jihadists, our policy makers and field commanders made the fundamental mistake of believing that these non-Western nations lived in some sort of time-warp, in which the adoption of Western democracy, rule of law, and capitalism would allow them to thrive as a nation (Porch). Effective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Surgical Strike and Precision Targeting. A unique feature of the Global War on Terrorism was the US military's continued perfection of covert strike operations with surgical precision deep into enemy safe havens. This was put on display in the rout of al-Qaeda by CIA and SOF in Afghanistan, in the kill/capture missions against the Baathists in the deck of cards in Iraq, and later in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Sheik Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Having the ability to appear out of nowhere in the middle of the night, kill or capture an intended target with zero damage to infrastructure or civilian casualties, and leave within minutes of arrival struck fear into the hearts and minds of jihadists across the globe. The success and efficacy of this type of operation was acknowledged in the 2015 National Military Strategy, which stated: "The best way to counter VEOs [violent extremist organizations] is by way of.military strengths such as ISR, precision strike [emphasis added], training, and logistical support" (p.11). Likewise, President Obama's massive expansion of the use of drones, which could watch individuals for days and execute a precise strike that only touched the intended target, has continued to sow fear and deny jihadists' freedom of maneuver on a global scale. The US military and its allies have only continued to master these types of operations throughout the 20 fights in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other locations. The jihadists know this, and realize that one wrong move at any time could mean disaster. Security Cooperation. An additional theme that has spelled the end for jihadists throughout the globe has been the training, advising, and equipping of security forces and partners within Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other nations. Enabling the host-nation military to handle jihadist movements on their own helps the United States military work itself out of a job. US Army Special Forces are uniquely suited to accomplish this mission: With specialized training, language capability, and cultural understanding, they are able to train foreign security forces through a variety of Principle Tasks. These tasks include Foreign Internal Defense, which focuses on a holistic approach to internal security and protection of citizens against lawlessness and insurgency, and Security Force Assistance, which can be focused internally or externally against threats to a nation's stability and security. The success of these mission sets was evident in 2014, during my own experience with the Afghan Commando Kandaks' continued fight against the Taliban and in closely following the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service's efforts against the Islamic State. Both of these forces, built from the ground-up by US Army Special Forces have continually fortified weak conventional military force operations against jihadist groups in their respective nations. Muslim Youth Efforts Against Jihad Globalization, though it has been proven to bolster the jihadists' narrative against the West, has also been beneficial to the movement against jihad itself. Because youth of the world have access to technology that allows them to see the atrocities and lies associated with global jihadist organizations, they are beginning to turn the tide. During the Islamic State's rise to power in Iraq and Syria, Muslim youth from across Europe travelled to join the jihadists in their 21 fight against the West. However, groups of Muslim youth also spoke up to counter this narrative. In 2015 the Muslim Youth League, an anti-Islamic State cultural movement, declared a holy war against all extremist organizations (Dearden, 2015). The group called on all Muslims to stand united against those who have hijacked Islam and misrepresented the faith. Through engagement work in schools and communities, as well as a robust online campaign, the Muslim Youth League is fighting back against jihadist propaganda that bids young Muslims join the Islamic State and other extremist groups (Dearden). Since the time of this publication, the Muslim Youth League has spread to several countries throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, each with their own social media presence, outreach programs, community events, and websites. Local Government Efforts Against Jihad In the years following the Islamic State's spread across Iraq and Syria, the United Kingdom has developed a robust strategy to help at-risk Muslims avoid the radicalization process. The program itself is called Contest, and includes four distinct categories: Prevent, Prepare, Protect, and Pursue (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2017). Police departments and social organizations have built relationships with doctors, faith leaders, teachers and others, who are required to report suspicious persons to the proper authorities. In response to these reporting requirements and recommendations, over 7,500 reports were filed between 2015-2016, with one in 10 being actionable intelligence for government and police forces (BBC). In 2015 alone, over 150 people, including 50 children, were kept from traveling to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria (BBC). The strategy has of course drawn criticism, for fear that it will further alienate Muslims from their local communities, but it presents as an excellent plan of action for identifying individuals who are at risk beyond just using traditional signals intelligence and 22 surveillance techniques. It does more than just target the individual, it also seeks to reform them through education, outreach, and community programs. Counterarguments You Can Kill an Idea. I have heard the opinion throughout my time in the military that jihad and the idea of Islamic supremacy can be completely eradicated. The example most often given is that Nazism, including the idea that the Aryan race was superior to all others, was effectively destroyed by a global military campaign. This argument is weak. The Nazis represented a very small portion of German culture, including among those serving in the military, so it was relatively easy to contain once there was an overwhelming military victory by the Allies. However, although the German Army of the 1940s was defeated militarily, the idea of white supremacy lives on in small social groups throughout the world to this day. The Ongoing Taliban Peace Talks. I have colleagues throughout the military who are convinced that the current negotiations with the Taliban are a key indicator of success in our two decades at war against the Salafi-jihadist group. The issue with this is that temporary cease fires have already been violated several times, leading one to believe that the strategic level leadership's messages are simply not reaching their subordinates or that local factions are not adhering to the agreement. Trusting that radical Muslim extremists will not allow Afghanistan to become a future safe haven for other jihadists, as it has in the past, is simply unrealistic. Believing some sort of quasi peace deal is going to miraculously pacify an organization that hates everything the West stands for is misguided. My own experiences throughout the Middle East have proven that the spirit of jihad and hatred will live on in Afghanistan. The Islamic State is Nearly Defeated. Multiple global media outlets continue to run stories about the dismantling of the Islamic State, as though the battle is won. Though Sheik Abu 23 Bakr al-Baghdadi has been killed, and the proposed Islamic caliphate was never fully realized, it would be naïve to think that the Islamic State's jihad is over. The movement will metastasize and take on new forms in other parts of the globe: It is already happening. Jihadists are continually leaving the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, headed back to their former homes in mainland Europe. As these individuals reenter the diaspora, the concern is that they will radicalize other individuals and conduct terrorist attacks within the continent. Conclusion The reasons an individual seeks to join a jihadist movement are deeply rooted in personal social dynamics, the security situation of their country, and a multitude of other religious, cultural, and economic factors. I agree with Venhaus (2010) and Gorka (2016) who assert that there is no singular military operation or strategy that can bring about a decisive victory against something so intangible as why one might join the modern jihadist movement. Use of the US military as a vehicle for the establishment of Western democracy and nation-building efforts in tribal nations like Afghanistan and Iraq only served to invigorate the jihadists' call to arms. Jihad is not something that can be eradicated completely by military force. Jihad must be confronted, contained, and countered through a comprehensive approach that empowers state and non-state actors to develop local solutions and directs expeditious military applications only where completely necessary. Recommendations Promote and Protect the Muslim Youth Leagues In order to truly create a cultural paradigm shift in Muslim youth at risk of radicalization, groups like the Muslim Youth League (BBC, 2017) should be promoted by governments worldwide as a bastion of true and peaceful Islam. While they should no doubt be supported, 24 governments must also protect these organizations from becoming targets for violent acts of terrorism or influence operations by jihadists. Through a combination of deep cultural understanding and positive messaging, the Muslim Youth League has already shown its effectiveness in the United Kingdom and beyond. Because the youth of each nation understand the social pressures and cultural influences that may lead one to seek jihad, they can effectively develop tailored, local solutions to persuade at-risk individuals. The Muslim Youth Leagues are on the front lines of countering the jihadist worldview, taking a stand and declaring war on jihad and its misrepresentations of Islam. Enable Local Solutions for Local Problems This should be accomplished through unified government action that involves all the United States' instruments of national power including diplomacy, information sharing, military action where necessary, and economic stimulus as needed. The specific issue with efforts like these, is that they cannot be accomplished during what is perceived by locals as a military occupation. This was proven true in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Despite massive efforts to rebuild infrastructure, aid in agricultural processes, build schools, and organize community projects, the United States and its allies were still viewed as pushing Western values and democracy on nations through military occupation. As much as possible, we must limit our military presence in areas that are ripe for developing a jihadist movement, or in ones that are recovering. I have seen firsthand that government efforts against jihadist organizations or at-risk communities have often been fragmented, poorly staffed, and uncoordinated. Venhaus (2010) suggests the creation of an agency that is staffed, trained, funded, enabled, and equipped for strategic communications, calling it the United States Strategic Communications Agency. An 25 agency like this could ensure that a comprehensive national communications strategy is developed and achieved, with a focus on enabling local community efforts to counter the jihadist narrative. By promoting social outreach, religious education, and community programs, this agency could bolster the efforts of community leaders and stifle jihadist aims in their areas. Support Religious Education and Reintegration Reintegration programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and elsewhere have successfully rehabilitated former jihadists through religious education (Venhaus, 2010). Countering the apocalyptic world view of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State requires local religious leaders who understand their community's issues to band together and refute the extremist narrative. Through careful, patient, and individually-tailored instruction, Muslim religious leaders can invalidate each and every one of the extremists' claims. Individuals who turn to jihad are often seeking this type of direction, they just find it in the wrong places. Counter Threats with Tailored Military Force Packages Continued themes among the military failures in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations during the early years of the Global War on Terrorism are indiscriminate use of force, lack of cultural understanding, and hyper-focus on tactical gains while failing at the strategic level. US government nation-building efforts on the backs of the military cost our country trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and years of frustration, bogged-down in an endless quagmire of misunderstanding. US Army Special Forces are selected, trained, equipped, and enabled to clandestinely handle complex problem sets in denied or politically-sensitive environments. Each Special Forces Group is regionally-aligned, with Operational Detachments developing deep cultural understanding through Area Studies and continuous relationship-building with regional state and 26 non-state actors. Special Forces operators understand the complex cultural and security situations in their areas of responsibility and have the language capability and strategic understanding to operate with complete independence of outside support. Frankly, if given the authority and autonomy to do their jobs, Special Forces can coerce, disrupt, or overthrow jihadist organizations unilaterally, or train, advise, and equip foreign security forces to accomplish this task on their own. This can all be done independent of a large, slow, and expensive conventional military occupation. Organizations like al-Qaeda must be kept in a state of constant fear and uncertainty. US Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to this task. Through structured, rapid application of military force, SOF can find, fix, and finish intended targets with surgical precision. This has proven true in the capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, among numerous other targets throughout the Global War on Terrorism. Continuing to deny safe havens through short, precise applications of combat power is crucial and does not rely on a conventional military occupation of the target area. Operations such as these, characterized by discriminate use of force and strategic impact, should be the main avenue for denying the relative safety, security, and freedom of maneuver of jihadist organizations. 27 References British Broadcasting Corporation (2017, June 4). Reality check: What is the prevent strategy? Reality Check. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991. Creswell, R., & Haykel, B. (2015, June 1). Battle lines: Want to understand the jihadis? Read their poetry. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/08/battle-lines-jihad-creswell-and-haykel. Dearden, L. (2015, March 21). Young British Muslims declare own jihad against ISIS and other terrorists who 'hijack' Islam. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-british-muslims-declare-own-jihad-against-isis-and-other-terrorists-who-hijack-islam-10146534.html. Dempsey, M. (2015). The national military strategy of the United States of America 2015: The United States military's contribution to national security. The Joint Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf. Gall, C. (2020, January 31). From armed struggle to peaceful protest, a road still to travel: A veteran of the Afghan jihad working for nonviolent change in Algeria. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/world/middleeast/from-armed-struggle-to-peaceful-protest-a-road-still-to-travel.html. Gorka, S. L. (2016). Defeating jihad: The winnable war. Regnery Publishing. Kilcullen, D. J. (2010). Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press. Nilsson, M. (2019, 18 June) Motivations for jihad and cognitive dissonance: A qualitative analysis of former Swedish jihadists. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1626091. 28 Porch, D. (2013). Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war. Cambridge University Press. Qur'an (M. Ali, Trans.; 7th ed.) (2015). Islam International Publications. (Original work published ca. 1537). Venhaus, J. (2010). Why youth join al-Qaeda. Special Report, 236(1), 1-12. https://www.usip. org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has moderated from 6.7 percent in FY11 to 6.3 percent in FY12 due to unfavorable external economics and internal supply constraints. Monetary policy remained accommodative for most of 2011 but gradual tightening is occurring. With the high fiscal deficit and domestic borrowing by Government, monetary policy is now bearing the brunt of macroeconomic policy adjustment. The balance of payments (BoP) is on a deteriorating track, with reserves falling to below three months of imports and export growth turning negative in March 2012. A coordinated policy response is required to ease macroeconomic pressures and improve growth prospects. Key actions include the need to create fiscal space, contain government borrowing to mitigate the risk of crowding out of credit to the private sector, better regulate the capital market, and stimulate investment and job growth in the export sector. Unlike in 2008, Bangladesh has insufficient policy space to avert the negative impact of a global slowdown through fiscal stimulus packages and monetary easing.

Moldova has suffered over the last two decades from rising poverty, territorial secession, armed conflict, and the spillover effects of a regional financial crisis, with declining population size and life expectancy, and an economy approximately one-half of what it was in 1990. The return of the Moldovan Communist Party (PCRM), which won two major elections after 2001, contributed to increasing centralization of governmental authority along with a reform agenda that emphasized greater state control over the economy, fiscal support to state enterprises and collective farms, land consolidation, economic protectionism, and the tolerance of monopolies in industry and energy. At the same time, the government has increased social expenditures, and taken major steps to improve public financial management. Bank engagement was moderately effective at the country and project levels, and substantially effective at the sector level. There was progress in several aspects of public financial management (PFM). Regulatory streamlining has reduced costs to business, although resistance to civil service reform has left much work to be done. The Bank has also helped achieve progress on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) issues in primary education, roads, and private sector development. Education progress is highly uneven across regions, for example, overweight trucks continue to tear up roads, and private investment is not enough to make a dent in high unemployment. A graduated approach to country systems and road sector technical audits help address GAC issues at the project level. The overall impact of GAC strategy implementation was moderate. The GAC committees set up at the regional and sectoral Bank department levels are particularly useful mechanisms for disseminating practices from the GAC Council. Staff has been proactive in using Country Governance and Anticorruption (CGAC) resources. However, three applications for window one funding were not approved, reducing the ability of this small program to seize opportunities.

The approach taken in this report reflects the view of the collaborating international organizations that price volatility and its effects on food security is a complex issue with many dimensions, agricultural and non-agricultural, short and long-term, with highly differentiated impacts on consumers and producers in developed and developing countries. The report begins with a discussion of volatility and of the ways in which volatility affects countries, businesses, consumers and farmers. Lessons learned from recent experiences are briefly reviewed as well as the factors determining likely levels of volatility in future. This report offers suggestions for a systematic and internationally coordinated response building on the lessons learned as a result of the 2007-2008crisis. It is important to distinguish between policy options designed to prevent or reduce price volatility and those designed to mitigate its consequences. Both types of intervention are explored in detail. Scope is identified for actions at individual, national, regional and international level. Some would help to avert a threat; others are in the nature of contingency plans to improve readiness, while still others address long-term issues of resilience. Finally, the report explores mechanisms of international cooperation to implement this report's recommendations and to monitor progress.

This paper looks at the existing tools and approaches most commonly used in developed and developing countries to review the stock of regulations. The tools reviewed can generate benefits in the short term, but they are most effective as part of a longer-term sustained initiative. This paper has a particular focus on the challenges that arise from their use in emerging and developing countries. The objectives of this paper include: 1) explaining the rationale for the use of these tools and approaches; 2) discussing each one of them in a succinct way; 3) considering the extent to which these tools can support more systemic regulatory reforms in the medium and long terms; and 4) considering the particular challenges and opportunities regarding their use in developing and emerging economies. Section one is a brief description of the rationale and context for applying tools and approaches to review the stock of regulation. It includes a reference to benefits and preconditions to make use of these tools. It also presents a categorization of the most commonly used tools and a comparative table on the way these tools can be applied. Section two presents a description of each of the different tools and approaches available, and discusses the way they are used and their main components. It includes references to international experiences in which these tools have been integrated into the regulatory reform process. Section three presents preliminary commentary about some of the potential advantages, disadvantages, and impacts of using these tools and approaches in developing countries. Some particular cases are presented to illustrate these trends. The section also includes a short description of the sequence observed in the use of some of these tools. Moreover, this section illustrates how these tools can (or cannot) generate gains in the short term and also provide a basis for further and broader regulatory reform programs.