Since 2011, Arab states have faced unprecedented challenges to their territorial integrity. Movements in Kurdistan, southern Arabia, and Cyrenaica have all made unilateral bids to secure administrative and coercive control over territory. While some disavow secessionism, their agendas for separation clearly undermine their respective parent state, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. Added to this is the Islamic State (IS), intent on breaking all the borders of the region and establishing a new caliphate. It is easy to see the emergence and empowerment of these movements as steps in the crumbling of artificial colonially constructed states and the reassertion of more ancient and organic clan, sect, and tribal allegiances. Yet these movements represent less a reversion to primoridialism than a reassertion of claims to self-determination that had been overridden in the course of 20th-century state formation.
On 30 June 1989, a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in Sudan and replaced it with a fundamentalist Muslim dictatorship headed by Colonel ʿUmar Hasan al-Bashir and adhering to the radical Islamic ideology of the National Islamic Front (NIF), under the leadership of Dr. Hasan al-Turabi. Since June 1881 when Muhammad Ahmad ibn ʿAbdallah declared that he was the expected mahdī, the religious-political scene of Sudan had been largely dominated by Mahdists and Khatmiyya adherents. Even under colonial rule, in the years 1899–1955, Mahdism continued to flourish despite the fact that the British rulers treated it with suspicion and preferred Sayyid ʿAli al-Mirghani, leader of the more docile Khatmiyya Sufi order. The defeat of the Mahdist Umma Party in the first general elections in 1953, by a coalition of secularists and Khatmiyya supporters was only a temporary setback. After Sudan became independent, in 1956, Mahdist supremacy was challenged both by the Khatmiyya and other groups, but its mass support among the Ansar, a political Islamic movement, enabled them to gain control, except during brief periods when so-called secularists governed independent Sudan. This happened in 1953–56 when the Khatmiyya joined forces with the intelligentsia, and again between October 1964 and March 1965 when the country was governed by a secular, transitional, nonelected government that was ousted from power as soon as the sects regained control. Secularism also thrived briefly under the military dictatorship of Jaʿfar al-Numayri between 1969 and 1977.
The main aim of this paper is to show the participation of mercenaries in the war in former Yugoslavia who fought on the Muslim side. The author presents the thesis that they were recruited to participate in the defense of Muslim community, which they believed was threatened by Serbs. However, their goal soon became to conduct jihad. Muslim mercenaries, also known as warriors of Allah (warriors of God) or Garibi, often proved to be cruel and committed war crimes. Among them were veterans of the war in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen. After the end of hostilities, many of God's warriors remained in the Balkans, and their settlement brought a lot of negative changes to the social and political life of the region. The Garibi contributed greatly to the strengthening of influence of Islamic states and institutions in the Balkans, as well as to the development of Wahhabi sects supporting terrorism.
The relationship between nash (text) and al-waqi' (the fact) both are territories that if mated will bring up a deeper understanding of komprehensip. The pattern in the text read according to ash-Syatibi there are three i.e. qira'ah salafiyyah qira'ah, ta'wiliyyah, and maqashidiyyah qira'ah. While in the area of al-waqi ' there are some disciplines that are used in understanding the phenomenon of social, political and other areas such as sociology, anthropology, and so on. Thus ideally when doing a reading of the text that is associated with the social phenomena should not leave the existing disciplines on the al-Waqi '. If not then an understanding of the text is out of date, so no aplicable. Thus ijtihad should always digelorakan and the door of ijtihad never closed. In this context, the science of ijtihad raiseth Usul Fiqh is a standard methodology has proved its role by Islamic thinkers like the priest sect in Islamic law, and digging in the field to the other, from the original sources (Qur'an and as-Sunnah). But nowadays the Islamic fiqh is considered barren because of the role of the framework teoritik the science of Usul fiqh is considered less relevant again to respond to contemporary problems. Then simply grounded if it appears a lot of bids for a new methodology of contemporary Islamic scholars in an attempt to dig out the original source of Islamic law to be adapted to the dynamics of the times. This fact can not be denied because the phenomenon of the global arrogance of modernity and industrialization has been menghegemoni the whole line of the lives of human beings so as to trigger the dynamics of contemporary Islam by all perangkat-perangkatnya including methodology Usul Fiqh (qawaid ushuliyah) methodology and the understanding of Fiqh (Fiqhiyyahi al-qawaid). This is a big job to be done in order to build the Islamic ideals of self (self image of Islam) in the midst of modern life that is constantly changing and evolving. In Indonesia over the past decades has appeared the development thinking of Islamic law that is adapted to the real conditions of life in Indonesia. This is effected by the realization that classical fiqh with the device its methodology have been unable to answer the question.
Abstract. This study discusses the social history and development of Shiite groups in Manado. It is known in Manado that there are Shi'ite religious groups with various organizations. This study wants to answer the question: how come and the development of Shi'ite followers in Manado. Start when it comes and develops. Who are the characters, and how they relate to similar flow groups in Indonesia. Through the method of observation and in-depth interviews with various parties involved in Manado and surrounding areas, this research found several important things including: the understanding or ideological thinking of the Shi'a sect has basically been accepted since the development of Islamic activism which was rolled out after the 1979 Iranian revolution. became a religious organization along with the opening of the taps of political reform in Indonesia, precisely in 2005 when the Shiite-based study groups began to develop in Manado. The acceptance of this group is mainly due to emotional closeness both in terms of kinship or other social relations between the group figures and their followers. The acceptance of this group is also due to the phenomenon of "curiosity" about the new flow that is opposed but it actually makes new followers get a new "interesting" understanding in religion. Meanwhile, the refusal of the sect was due to unbalanced information from actual Shiite sources. The Shi'a sect in Manado is not in an extreme Shia category that infiltrates, opposes and spread hatred towards other Islamic groups. With these findings, this study recommends that the Shiite sect is not a scourge or threat to Muslims in North Sulawesi. In fact, they must be embraced to cooperate in advancing Muslims in this region. Differences in furu or non-fundametal understandings should not be used as an excuse to marginalize this group of Muslims in Manado, North Sulawesi. Keywords: Syiah, Manado. Abstrak. Penelitian ini mendiskusikan tentang sejarah sosial dan perkembangan kelompok Syiah di Manado. Diketahui di Manado terdapat aliran kelompok keagamaan Syiah dengan berbagai organisasinya. Penelitian ini ingin menjawab pertanyaan: bagaimana datang dan berkembangnya penganut aliran Syiah di Manado. Mulai kapan datang dan berkembang. Siapa tokoh-tokohnya, dan bagaimana keterkaitannya dengan kelompok aliran serupa di Indonesia. Melalui metode observasi dan wawancara mendalam dengan berbagai pihak yang terkait di Manado dan sekitarnya, penelitian ini menemukan beberapa hal penting di antaranya : pemahaman atau pemikiran ideologis aliran Syiah pada dasarnya sudah diterima sejak berkembangnya aktivisme islam yang di gulirkan pasca revolusi Iran 1979. Namun baru berkembang menjadi organisasi keagamaan bersamaan dengan dibukanya kran reformasi politik di Indonesia, tepatnya tahun 2005 saat mulai berkembangnya kelompok-kelompok pengajian berpaham Syiah di Manado. Penerimaan yang terjadi terhadap kelompok ini utamanya karena kedekatan emosi baik secara kekerabatan atau hubungan sosial lainnya antara figur-figur kelompok tersebut dengan para pengikutnya. Penerimaan terhadap kelompok ini juga karena fenomena "penasaran" terhadap aliran baru yang ditentang tapi justru membuatpengikut baru mendapatkan pemahaman baru yang "menarik" dalam beragama. Sementara itu, penolakan-penolakan terhadap kelompok aliran ini lebih disebabkan karena informasi yang tidak seimbang dari sumber-sumber Syiah yang sebenarnya. Kelompok aliran Syiah di Manado bukan dalam kategori syiah ekstrim yang mengkafirkan, memusuhi, dan menyebarkan kebencian terhadap kelompok Islam lainnya. Dengan temuan ini, penelitian ini merekomendasikan agar kelompok aliran Syiah tidak dijadikan momok atau ancaman bagi umat Islam di Sulawesi Utara. Bahkan harus dirangkul untuk bekerja sama dalam memajukan umat Islam di Wilayah ini. Perbedaan pemahaman yang bersifat furu atau bukan fundametal janganlah dijadikan alasan unntuk meminggirkan kelompok ini dari bagian umat Islam di Manado Sulawesi Utara. Keywords: Syiah, Manado.
The fundamental objective of this research paper is to examine how interfaith dialogue can be an effective mechanism to combat the forces of radicalization and extremism in Bangladesh. To unveil the answer to this question, this study has explored the nature of the politicization of Islam and the scope of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. Reviewing the existing pieces of literature, this research paper has identified that there has been a rise in Islamic extremism since the beginning of the 21st century, which evolved throughout the last two decades changing in its nature and intensity. It has illustrated that after the military coup of 1975, the military rulers and the following democratic governments of Bangladesh carried on the tendency of politicizing religion and have used state mechanisms to Islamize Bangladeshi society. However, to address this recent trend of rising militancy, interfaith dialogue can be an effective approach that will shrink the potential of radicalization and extremism in Bangladesh. This study proposes incorporating an interreligious curriculum in the education system of Bangladesh and the engagement of religious preachers as well as mass people of different faiths including various sects of each religion in such interfaith dialogue initiatives to improve understanding and compassion. Social Science Review, Vol. 40(1), Jun 2023 Page 165-184
The current difficulties and insurgency in Islamic states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) led this study to examine why this region has seen more volatility than any other region today. Furthermore, the unusual nature of the insurgency and turmoil in this region, particularlywhere Muslims oppose Muslims and Muslim regimes, makes one ask what is the cause. As a result,this study has attempted to analyze today's Muslim divisions through the lens of schisms in doctrinesand beliefs, which always lead to sectarian divisions. This paper takes a historical journey into the pastto explore the origins of the schisms and their consequences. The emergence of many ulama (or Ayatollahs and Sheikhs) shortly after the Prophet's death and over the centuries of Islamic religion, each with own claim to piety, teachings, and illuminations, has led to the emergence of many sects, each claiming to be more pious than the others and adhering to the precepts, teachings, and examples laid down in the Qur'an and set by Muhammad. The fundamental differences in ideas and interpretations are what have fueled and generated today's sectarian and religious difficulties and instability in MENA. As a result, this instability may continue for many years to come, especially when one group sees theothers not only as apostates, but also as an infidels who are divinely intended to be exterminated.
The emergence of various groups of schools of thought in Islam has given its own color in the Islamic religion. These thoughts arose after the death of the Prophet. There are several factors that cause the emergence of various groups with all of their thoughts. Among them are political factors as there has been a conflict between the Ali group with Muawiyah followers, so that it raises a new group, the khawarij group. Then came the other groups as a reaction from group one to another group. These groups have different thoughts from one another. Some are still in the corridor of the Qur'an and Sunnah, but there are also those who deviate from the two sources of Islamic teachings. There are those who hold the revelation, and some who put excessive reason so that it comes out of revelation. And there are also those who call themselves Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah. As a reaction from a misguided firqah, at the end of the 3rd century H came a group known as Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah led by two great ulemas in Usuluddin, Sheikh Abu Hassan Ali Al Asy'ari who was the founder of the Ash'ariyah sect and Sheikh Abu Abu Mansur Al Maturidi as the founder of the Maturidiyah school. This Ash'ariah and Maturidiyah school is used in this discussion.Keywords: Epistemology, Asy'ariyah, Al-maturidiyah.
Based on the first-person narratives of young born-again Muslims in mid-2000s' Pakistan, this article points to several ways in which a renewed sociology of self-reform and faith-based activism could usefully draw more systematic attention to emotions. This empirical and inductive study first explores the role of emotions in the micro-foundations of re-Islamisation. It stresses the need to locate the emotive experiences that trigger this process, and sustain it through times and in opposition to others, in the body and the senses. It also discloses specific sensibilities, which, when linked to individual biographies, elucidate why potential followers are receptive, or not, to the various 'sensitising devices' deployed by Islamic organisations. In the second section, the expression of emotions is addressed in regard to its collective implications. Indeed, re-Islamisation often translates into rigid emotional boundaries separating the born-again from other communities, the 'Muslims by birth' and members of other sects. Reshaping togetherness is nevertheless not devoid of ambivalence: The young born-again Muslims I met in Pakistan were clearly torn between their contemptuous pleasure of occupying the moral high ground and the equally compelling aspiration to be tolerant and abide by the 'feeling rules' valued in Islamic ethics. They were also fully aware of the dangerous political implications of their feelings in a country disfigured by sectarian violence.
In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures, including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate professing any party affiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the limits of Indonesia's much lauded religious tolerance.
In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures, including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate professing any party affiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the limits of Indonesia's much lauded religious tolerance.
It is difficult to appreciate and understand Sufism fully without an informed exposure to the expressive cultural forms that help define and enhance it. It is this dimension of Islamic mysticism that transports the seeker on the path of spiritual attainment into higher states of consciousness that promise spiritual intoxication (Wajd) and a unique and intimate union, even annihilation (fanā), in the supreme being. This emotional expression of faith is intensified and externalized in elaborate forms of meditation and esoteric techniques that are part of ritual ceremonies.Through ritual, many Sufi orders and Sufi-related sects throughout the world of Islam have been able to articulate doctrines and beliefs through artistic traditions such as sung poetry, instrumental music and dance-like movements (samā' or spiritual concerts) and have utilized meditation patterns that combine corporeal techniques and controlled breathing (dhikr, Turkish, zikr) to induce or conduct trance and ecstatic states.
Given to several intellectual, social, economic, or political factors, religious sectarianism has been an ancient and ongoing phenomenon of human history. Sectarian "Islamic" groups also have a long history and some enjoyed substantial following and power. Recent resurgence of the classical sectarian "Islamic" groups and growth of the new ones, however, took place under the Western colonisation project. The discovery of Americas provided a haven to all sorts of religious sects. Individuals identifying with various sectarian "Islamic" groups have also been immigrating to the US for more than a century, and found in American environment a context for freedom of religious expression and potential to propagate and flourish. This paper skimming through these issues seeks to focus on the foundational stage of a unique American-born small modernist sectarian group, United Submitters International. Its founder, Rashad Khalifa, going through several stages finally claimed to be "God's messenger to the new world" and "God's messenger of the covenant." This claim, according to him, is validated by his discovery, through a rigorous computer-assisted analysis of the Quranic text, that the ultimate proof of the Quran's truth and its being ultimate miracle is based on and revolves around number 19. This paper studies issues related to Khalifa's birth, education, professional life, activism, and initial claims and culminates with the study of his computer-assisted discovery that the ultimate miracle of the Quran is based on number 19. The study of his further and final claims and the group's activities will be the focus of another paper.
Abstract Any attempt to resolve political violence in religious or ethnic terms is bound to fail at the outset, for it settles for addressing a representation of the symptoms and manifestations of violence rather than disclosing its constitutive moments and the political terrain of its lived relevance. My argument runs counter to such a phenomenological presentation of violence, asserting that the contemporary violent conflicts within Iraq are not a war of sect against sect, but rather one among powerful political contenders and their regional and/or international backers. To generalize and present war in the first sense is to apologetically cover up what essentially is a class conflict, above all among fractions of the ruling class and their political representatives, an explanatory that creates an image of senseless violence. This class scenario cries for a security state, order and the monopolization of violence, i.e., the making of a hierarchical class-based state. The constitution, coherence and homogeneity of any ruling class is not pre-given, rather it necessitates a project of political hegemony within the power block in which it is established, reproduced and guaranteed by the state. The absence of such a hegemony witnesses conflicts among fractions of the ruling class that permeate all societal levels to the extent that the state apparatus itself becomes an instrument, mean and object of the conflicts rather than its purveyors and means of pacification. The intersection of imperialist occupation, violent claims for hegemony among regional contenders and domestic struggle over political power assumes inevitably fractured and particularist forms: religion, confession and ethnicity. In this way, religion, confession and ethnicity are not the cause of violence; rather the contest for hegemony violently manufacture and set them in motion. The destructive occupation regime and the lack of political will to make a unified national field empower sects and ethnicities to be recast as ideological centrifuges. In this article I will reconstruct the developments up to the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) in December 2013/January 2014, in order to decipher the present and to warn that such catastrophes are to be expected in the future unless radical changes and reforms are made to the whole state edifice imposed on Iraqis from 2003.
