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On November 9, 1962, the Gotham Hotel in Detroit was raided in a co-ordinated operation by the Detroit Police Department, the Michigan State Police, and the Federal Internal Revenue Service. Forty-one persons arrested either have been convicted of gambling activities or are charged with such in state or federal courts. Vast quantities of gambling paraphernalia, much of it crooked, and evidence, including cash and bet slips, were seized. This attack on "The Fortress" of the numbers racket in the Detroit area has been described by federal revenue agents as one of the biggest and most suc cessful gambling raids ever conducted. Findings demonstrate that the Gotham's operations were not only illegal but dis honest as well. This is helping to decrease public tolerance for organized gambling in the area. Also, ties of organized gambling to organized and unorganized crime of other kinds were disclosed. The raid on the Gotham did not end illegal gambling in the Detroit area, but it had other results. It eliminated any gambling location boasting immunity in the city. It forced many of the numbers operators still in busi ness out of town and has kept the rest continually on the move, multiplying their chances of mistake and being caught in police surveillance. Illegal gambling, the foundation of organized crime, is a substantial foundation which required a long time to build. It will not be destroyed quickly, but law-enforce ment measures can be taken.—Ed.

There was one change in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1958 Term. Justice Harold H. Burton of Ohio, who had been appointed by President Truman late in 1945, retired on October 13, 1958. For his place President Eisenhower selected 44-year-old Potter Stewart, a Cincinnati Republican whom he had appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1954. A graduate of Yale College and the Yale Law School (1941), Justice Stewart was given a recess appointment on October 14, 1958, but it was not confirmed by the Senate until May 5, 1959. The vote was 70 to 17, all Senators voting against confirmation being Southern Democrats. This experience underscored once more, as in the case of Justice Brennan, the risks involved in recess appointments to the Court, since Justice Stewart sat there for most of the Term before confirmation was had. Whether this affected his votes on cases is a matter of sheer speculation, but the occasion for it is highly regrettable. A new Justice should be as independent as an old one, from the very beginning his service.Public controversy over the Court's recent decisions, particularly in the security field, continued during the 1958 Term. Pressure for legislation designed to overturn specific Court decisions or to curb the Court's powers continued in the First Session of the 86th Congress, but was less intense than in the previous Congress.

Der funktionale Ansatz der geplanten Securities Law Directive ist nicht geeignet, Rechtssicherheit im Hinblick auf den grenzüberschreitenden Finanzinstrumententransfer in der Europäischen Union zu erzielen. Die Vereinheitlichung der Gutschrift auf dem Finanzinstrumentenkonto, ohne Eingriff in das mitgliedstaatliche Recht bei gleichzeitiger Begründung von Rechtssicherheit, ist eine Illusion. Schlimmer noch – das bisherige System wird durch die Hintertür abgeschafft, ohne ein einheitliches neues Finanzinstrumentensystem bereitzustellen. Aus den gewonnenen Erkenntnissen folgt, dass nur eine umfassende Vereinheitlichung der unterschiedlichen Finanzinstrumentensysteme im Sinne einer Vollharmonisierung zu Rechtssicherheit führen kann. Der Grundgedanke des Richtlinienentwurfs im Hinblick auf die Anknüpfung an die Gutschrift geht grundsätzlich in die richtige Richtung. Allerdings muss der funktionale Ansatz aufgegeben und ein verbindliches System etabliert werden. »The Credit to a Securities Account« Changes in the praxis of custody and transferring of securities, besides legal uncertainty in spite of cross border transactions, verify the requisite of unified regulations. The intended Securities Law Directive for legal certainty of securities holding and disposition aims to harmonise by means of the credit to a securities account as a core element material law and conflict law additionally. Veränderungen in der Verwahrungs- und Übertragungspraxis von Finanzinstrumenten sowie die Rechtsunsicherheit im Bereich der grenzüberschreitenden Transaktionen belegen die Erforderlichkeit vereinheitlichender Regelungen. Die angestrebte Securities Law Directive für Rechtssicherheit in Bezug auf Erlangung und Disposition von Finanzinstrumenten beabsichtigt anhand der Gutschrift als zentralem Ansatzpunkt die Harmonisierung des materiellen Rechts sowie die Vereinheitlichung des Kollisionsrechts. Rowina Ullner studierte Rechtswissenschaft an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt am Main mit dem Schwerpunkt Law and Finance. Nach dem Abschluss des Ersten Staatsexamens im August 2011 promovierte sie am Lehrstuhl für Zivilrecht, Insolvenzrecht, europäisches und internationales Wirtschaftsrecht von Herrn Prof. Dr. Peter von Wilmowsky, LL.M., an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Promotionsbegleitend arbeitete sie zunächst ein Jahr als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin in einer internationalen Großkanzlei im Bereich Kapitalmarktrecht und anschließend an der Professur für Bürgerliches Recht, Wirtschaftsrecht und Bankrecht von Frau Prof. Dr. Katja Langenbucher im House of Finance der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Seit März 2015 ist sie Rechtsreferendarin am Landgericht Frankfurt am Main.

We investigate how the international investment regime turned into an investment vehicle. Through the process called third-party funding, financiers back international legal claims by firms against countries and in turn seek a share of any potential award. More generally, we add to debates on how international regimes evolve and at times generate unanticipated consequences. Building off work on the sociology of fields, we argue that institutional change can occur when individuals from different fields interact. Each field has its own local practices and beliefs about how governance institutions like international regimes function. When professionals from one field analyze problems in another, they use the tools from their native field. If potential solutions provide material and status benefits for the dominant actors in the targeted regime, cross-field coalitions can form and change the targeted regime's practice. As hedge funds in the finance field and lawyers in the international law field sought to reinvent themselves after the 2008 financial crisis, they teamed up to make Investor State Dispute Settlement a speculator's game. Theoretically, we embed theories of regime change within larger social relations, highlighting the importance of informal interactions among regime operators for the use and function of governance institutions. We underscore the role of field interdependence as actors engage in contestation across social and political domains. Empirically, we demonstrate the way in which financialization has had far-reaching consequences that extend well beyond traditional economic sectors, reconfiguring the practice of international law.

The Supreme Court dominates American campaign finance law. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission dramatically illustrates this basic truth, but Citizens United is nothing new. The Court has been the preeminent force in shaping and constraining our campaign finance laws since Buckley v. Valeo, and the Court's role as arbiter of what regulations may or may not be enforced only continues to grow. The President of the United States can wag his finger at the Court during the State of the Union Address and denounce its Citizens United ruling to the Justices' faces on national television, but even he does not propose to challenge the Court's decision. Instead, the President proposes only to regulate in those areas where the Court indicated some regulation is still permissible. According to public opinion polls, as much as two-thirds of the population opposes the Court's holding that corporations and unions have an unlimited right to spend money in elections. But the public is, in practice, powerless to have the law changed. The central features of American campaign finance law are the product of the Court's actions and opinions. Unlike many other Western democracies, which impose monetary limits on campaign spending, the United States does not do so because the Court has said that is unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court has sustained the ability of wealthy candidates to convert their personal resources to campaign uses without constraint and has also upheld the ability of independent organizations and groups to spend without limit to influence election outcomes. Similarly, the Court has decided what political activity can be deemed election-related, and thus regulated by campaign finance law, and what political activity must be treated as beyond the scope of campaign regulation, even if that activity plainly has direct implications for political campaigns. So, too, the Court has defined – narrowly – the permissible purposes of campaign finance regulation. In so doing, it has rejected as a legitimate regulatory purpose – accepted by many other Western democracies – the promotion of political equality. To be sure, the campaign finance laws that we have are the ones that are adopted by our elected representatives in Congress or state and local legislatures, or by the people, or acting through state or local voter initiatives. But the Court has consistently – and, particularly in the last few years, aggressively – had the last word in deciding which laws may be allowed to take effect. Court determination of campaign finance law might not be a bad thing if the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence were stable, coherent, workable, and closely tied to the text and values of the Constitution. Unfortunately, our Court-determined campaign finance law is none of these things. As Citizens United's overturning of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the electioneering communication portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission demonstrates, the Court's jurisprudence has hardly been a model of stability. Nor are the results particularly coherent. For the two decades between Austin and Citizens United, the jurisprudence governing corporate and union election spending barred restrictions on spending in ballot proposition elections but, oddly, permitted spending prohibitions in candidate elections.Citizens United eliminated that anomalous distinction by rejecting the idea that the corporate form poses any special dangers that justify special restrictions. But Citizens United left in place – at least for now – laws completely barring corporations and unions from making contributions to candidates and parties. Banning corporate contributions seems at odds with Citizens United's view that corporations do not present special dangers justifying especially restrictive regulation, while the radical difference in the treatment of corporate contributions and expenditures seems doctrinally inconsistent.