In Vietnam rural area, agricultural production is still a main occupational activity of millions laborers and be major income source of them. Despite this important role, it is often debated that the most concerning issue in labor market of Vietnam rural areas is job creation. In other word, the actual capacity of agriculture to create new employment is rather low compare to non-agricultural sectors. This issue leads to the large migration of young, experienced and skilled laborers from rural to urban areas as well as from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors. As a consequence, agricultural labor in many provinces of the country are mostly un-trained and the old aged. This shortage of skilled laborers not only directly affects agricultural production at farm household level but also is a challenge to the implementation of rural renewal targets of the Vietnamese Government. Furthermore, the lack of new job creation for agricultural works in parallel with poor skilled and old aged result in the low wage rate of laborers who work in agricultural sector. This wage rate is equivalent to two-third of the wage of employees in industrial sector, and 50% of the wage of those working in service sector. Not only wage, other forms of value of agricultural employees such as social protection, working condition are also less concerned by employers in rural labor market and the current Vietnam Labor Code neither. In order cope with the shortage of skilled farm labor, rural households in the Red River delta diversify their use of labor by combining family laborers with hired laborers for agricultural activities. Family labor source contains both family farm laborers and family non-farm laborers but still participating in farming activities of the household, especially in the peak season. Within 220 households of the three provinces investigated in this thesis, the highest proportion of family farm laborers is over 45 years old and women are discovered to mostly in charge in agricultural production, especially in rice farming. That is because more non-farm jobs opportunities open for young, healthy, and skilled men rather than women. Hired laborers in agriculture in Bac Ninh, Hai Duong and Thai Binh provinces are divided into two types, seasonal hired laborers and permanent hired laborers. Seasonal laborers are often hired to work in peaking time. In rice farming households, seasonal hired laborers usually work for short period of time such as for the land preparing, transplanting, and harvesting. In clam farming households, seasonal laborers are widely rent in preparing clam plots and harvesting. In general, women are observed to work in seasonal hiring more frequently than men in both household groups. However, seasonal hired laborers are not detected in pig farming group. Alternatively, laborers in this group are hired on a permanent or longer-term basis, normally from three months to a year. When using hired laborers in agricultural production, farm households give the laborers payment that are equivalent to their labor value. Of these payment, wage is considered as the most important value of hired laborers. Basically, the wage is paid in two methods, daily wage for seasonal laborers and monthly wage for permanent ones. The daily wage is applied for farming activities which last within a few days such as manual transplanting, manual harvesting in rice farming or clam harvesting. The daily wage may be paid in piece for activities such as land preparation and spraying pesticide. Whereas, the monthly wage is common for laborers in pig farming and clam plot guarding. The wage is counted for 30 working days. Average monthly wage of a hired laborer is 161 USD in pig farming and 175 USD in clam farming. Thus, wage rate of hired farm labor in the study sites is equivalent to 70% and 66% of the wage of laborers in industrial and service sector, respectively. A part from the wage, there are different forms of labor values paid by the householders through remuneration such as drink, lunch, bonus for good performance and support for sickness. Such remuneration can be paid in cash or in kind which ranges from 0.3 to 9 USD. For hired laborers, labor welfare usually is a luxury metric as they work in farm households with only verbal agreement. Without written contract, they receive no health insurance and social insurance support. Despite the rather low in wage and labor welfare, hired laborers still present the satisfaction with their employment. Wage is a work feature which contributes the most to their satisfaction, relation with householder is the second important factor. This relationship proves a crucial function of social relation in driving labor supply and demand in agricultural labor market rather than an economic one. Similar to many developing countries, imperfect information is a typical characteristic of the agricultural labor market of the Red River delta, Vietnam. This imperfection influences labor demand in terms of raising cost for monitoring hired laborers of farm households. On the other side, labor migration is considered as a determinant impacting on labor supply of the rural labor market. This study discovers a positive correlation between remittance of migrated laborers sending home and wage paid to hired laborers in the pig and clam farming groups. Conversely, the more development of agricultural machinery renting market, the less value that householders have to pay for hiring manual farm laborers. In addition to these external determinants, farm size of household, gender and work experience are internal factors which impact on the wage rate that hired laborers can receive. Among the three household groups, the wage of hired laborers in the clam farming is 3.9% higher than the one in the rice farming group. In order to increase the labor value in agricultural production, several interventions by central government and local authorities at different levels in the Red River delta should be taken into account: (1) including agricultural wage laborers into the governance of labor code; (2) promoting the operation of employment service centers in rural areas; (3) improving work skill of farm laborers above 40 years old through training courses which connect with labor demand in the rural labor market. ; Dans la zone rurale du Vietnam, la production agricole reste une activité professionnelle principale de millions de travailleurs et en est la principale source de revenus. Malgré ce rôle important, il est souvent débattu que la question la plus préoccupante sur le marché du travail des zones rurales du Vietnam est la création d'emplois. En d'autres termes, la capacité réelle de l'agriculture à créer de nouveaux emplois est plutôt faible par rapport aux secteurs non agricoles. Cette question entraîne une forte migration de jeunes travailleurs expérimentés et qualifiés des zones rurales vers les zones urbaines ainsi que de l'agriculture vers les secteurs non agricoles. En conséquence, la main-d'œuvre agricole dans de nombreuses provinces du pays est pour la plupart des personnes non formées et âgées. Cette pénurie/le manque de travailleurs qualifiés affecte non seulement directement la production agricole au niveau des ménages agricoles, mais constitue également un défi pour la mise en œuvre des objectifs de l'innovation rurale du gouvernement vietnamien. En outre, le manque de création de nouveaux emplois pour les travaux agricoles en parallèle avec les personnes peu qualifiées et les personnes âgées se traduit par le faible taux de salaire des travailleurs qui travaillent dans le secteur agricole. Ce taux de salaire est équivalent aux deux tiers du salaire des salariés du secteur industriel et à 50% du salaire de ceux qui travaillent dans le secteur des services. Non seulement le salaire, ni les autres formes de valeur des employés agricoles tels que la protection sociale, les conditions de travail sont également moins concernés par les employeurs du marché du travail rural et le Code du travail Vietnamien actuel. Afin de faire face à la pénurie de main-d'œuvre agricole qualifiée, les ménages ruraux du delta du fleuve Rouge diversifient leur utilisation de la main-d'œuvre en combinant les travailleurs familiaux non rémunérés avec des travailleurs embauchés pour les activités agricoles. La source de main-d'œuvre familiale comprend à la fois des travailleurs des familles agricoles et des travailleurs des familles non agricoles, mais participant toujours aux activités agricoles du ménage, en particulier pendant la haute saison. Au sein de 220 ménages des trois provinces étudiées dans cette thèse, la proportion la plus élevée de travailleurs des familles agricoles a plus de 45 ans et les femmes se retrouvent principalement responsables de la production agricole, en particulier de la riziculture. C'est parce que plus d'opportunités d'emplois non agricoles s'ouvrent aux hommes jeunes, en bonne santé et qualifiés plutôt qu'aux femmes. Les travailleurs embauchés dans l'agriculture dans les provinces de Bac Ninh, de Hai Duong et de Thai Binh sont divisés en deux types, les travailleurs saisonniers et les travailleurs permanents. Les travailleurs saisonniers sont souvent embauchés pour travailler en période de pointe. Dans les ménages de la riziculture, les travailleurs saisonniers embauchés travaillent généralement pendant une courte période, par exemple pour la préparation des sols, la transplantation et la récolte. Dans les ménages d'éleveurs de palourdes, les travailleurs saisonniers sont largement loués pour la préparation des parcelles de palourdes et la récolte. En général, on observe que les femmes travaillent en embauche saisonnière plus fréquemment que les hommes dans les deux groupes de ménages. Cependant, les travailleurs saisonniers embauchés ne sont pas observés dans le groupe d'élevage de porcs. Alternativement, les travailleurs dans ce groupe sont embauchés sur une base permanente ou à plus long terme, normalement de trois mois à un an. Lorsqu'ils utilisent des travailleurs embauchés dans la production agricole, les ménages des familles agricoles versent aux travailleurs une rémunération équivalente à leur valeur de travail. De ces paiements, le salaire est considéré comme la valeur la plus importante des travailleurs embauchés. Fondamentalement, le salaire est payé selon deux méthodes, le salaire journalier pour les travailleurs saisonniers et le salaire mensuel pour les travailleurs permanents. Le salaire journalier est appliqué pour les activités agricoles qui durent quelques jours comme le transplantation manuelle, la récolte manuelle en riziculture ou la récolte de palourdes. Le salaire journalier peut être payé en proportion de l'ouvrage effectué pour des activités telles que la préparation des sols et la pulvérisation de pesticides. Tandis que, le salaire mensuel est commun pour les travailleurs dans l'élevage porcin et la garde des parcelles de palourdes. Le salaire est calculé pendant 30 jours ouvrables. Le salaire mensuel moyen d'un ouvrier embauché est de 161 USD dans l'élevage porcin et de 175 USD dans l'élevage de palourdes. En moyenne, le taux de salaire de la main-d'œuvre agricole embauchée dans les sites d'étude équivaut à 70% et 66% du salaire des ouvriers du secteur industriel et des services, respectivement. Hormis le salaire, il existe différentes formes de valeur du travail payées par les ménages par le biais de rémunérations telles que la boisson, le déjeuner, la prime aux bonnes performances et le soutien en cas de maladie. Cette rémunération peut être versée en espèces ou en nature dans la gamme de 0,3 à 9 USD. Pour les travailleurs embauchés, le bien-être du travail est souvent un droit luxueux, car ils travaillent dans des ménages agricoles avec accord verbal seulement. Sans contrat écrit, ils ne reçoivent ni assurance maladie ni soutien aux assurances sociales. Malgré le salaire et le bien-être du travail plutôt bas, les travailleurs embauchés présentent toujours la satisfaction de leur emploi. Le salaire est une caractéristique du travail qui contribue le plus à leur satisfaction, la relation avec le chef de ménage est le deuxième facteur important. Cette relation s'avère une fonction cruciale de la relation sociale pour stimuler l'offre et la demande de main-d'œuvre sur le marché du travail agricole plutôt que sur l'économie. Similaire à de nombreux pays en développement, les informations imparfaites sont une caractéristique typique du marché du travail agricole du delta du fleuve Rouge, au Vietnam. Cette imperfection influe sur la demande de main-d'œuvre en termes d'augmentation des coûts de surveillance des travailleurs salariés des ménages agricoles. D'un autre côté, la migration de main-d'œuvre est considérée comme un facteur déterminant de l'offre de main-d'œuvre du marché du travail rural. Cette thèse découvre une corrélation positive entre les transferts d'argent des travailleurs migrants renvoyés chez eux et le salaire payé aux travailleurs embauchés dans les groupes d'élevage de porcs et de palourdes. Inversement, plus le marché de la location de machines agricoles est développé, moins les ménages doivent payer pour embaucher des ouvriers agricoles. En plus de ces déterminants externes, la taille de la ferme du ménage, le sexe et l'expérience professionnelle sont des facteurs internes qui influent sur le taux de salaire que les travailleurs embauchés peuvent recevoir. Parmi les trois groupes de ménages, le salaire des travailleurs embauchés dans l'élevage de palourdes est supérieur de 3.9% à celui du groupe de la riziculture. Afin d'augmenter la valeur du travail dans la production agricole, plusieurs interventions du gouvernement central et des autorités locales à différents niveaux dans le delta du fleuve Rouge devraient être prises en compte: (1) inclure les travailleurs du salaire agricole dans la gouvernance du code du travail; (2) promouvoir le fonctionnement des centres de services d'emploi dans les zones rurales; (3) améliorer des compétences professionnelles des travailleurs agricoles de plus de 40 ans grâce à des cours de formation liés à la demande de main-d'œuvre sur le marché du travail rural.
Not Available ; Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed an honor for us to be here with you in the presence of our honorable host, Dr. Raghava Reddy, the Honorable Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Raghu Veera Reddy, Asian PGPR board members and the many other scientists and entrepreneurs who have come to participate in this Congress. It is our privilege to welcome all of you. To me, this is a very special and a spectacular way of coming to our mother land, particularly Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh to speak to you about PGPR technology. The initial idea of having the First Asian PGPR Congress in Hyderabad was sparked by Dr. Y. R. Sarma, when he visited me in Auburn, Alabama, USA, seven months ago. We wanted to have an outlet where we could have alternative workshops and congresses that could be more accessible to people in this region of the world, given that it is difficult for many people interested in PGPR research to attend every International Conference. From those ideas we arrive at this Congress in Hyderabad. The creation of biotechnologies, bio-businesses, biotechnopreneurs, bio-farmers, bio-students and bio-billionaires is the theme of this "ASIAN PGPR CONGRESS FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE". What is PPGR? Why Asian PGPR? Let's take a moment to discuss PGPR and its importance. Plant growth promoting rhizobacteria (PGPR) are root associated bacteria representing many different genera and species that colonize the rhizosphere, rhizoplane and improve plant growth when artificially introduced onto seeds, seedpieces, roots, or into soil. PGPR improve plant growth by one or more mechanisms: direct stimulation of plant growth; enhancement of nutrient uptake; suppression of plant pathogens; and/or induction of resistance in host plants against pathogens. The first PGPR Workshop was held in Canada in 1987 and since then the workshop has been held every three years at various locations around the world: Switzerland (1990), Australia (1994), Japan (1997), Argentina (2000), India (2003) and The Netherlands (2006). The 8th International PGPR Workshop was held very recently in the Portland, Oregon, USA (2009). xviii Plant Growth Promotion by Rhizobacteria for Sustaninable Agriculture In 2003, the PGPR workshop held in India achieved considerable recognition and was attended by more than 300 delegates. Since then, PGPR research has increased exponentially and has resulted in continued boosting of new companies in a growing industry for the production of PGPR related products in India. Asian PGPR Congress for Sustainable Agriculture aims to assemble any professional who want to gain and share their knowledge on PGPR under one roof and to present their views on the following themes: • Status of PGPR research • PGPR applications in crops • Biofertilizers and PGPR in integrated nutrient management • Mechanisms, signaling, plant responses, bioactive metabolites • Plant pathogen - PGPR interactions • Farmers – academia - industry interaction • Biogeography, genomics, bioinformatics • Rhizosphere interactions, climate change and new technologies • Round table discussion on research – industry - policy interfacing • Commercialization, regulatory issues, trade barriers in PGPR • Human resource development and transfer of technology Today, many economically important agricultural, horticultural and ornamental crop plants are attacked by various soil borne and foliar diseases, resulting in billions of dollars in crop losses. Currently, the most widely used disease management strategy is the use of chemical fungicides. However, the use of these fungicides has encountered problems, such as development of resistance by pathogen to fungicides and rapid degradation of the chemicals. Other factors leading to increased interest in alternatives include the increasing cost of soil fumigation, lack of suitable replacements for methyl bromide and public concerns over exposure to fungicides. Both the agriculture and agri-food sector are now expected to move toward environmentally sustainable development, while maintaining productivity. These concerns and expectations have led to renewed interest on the use of "biologically based pest management strategies". One approach to such biologically based strategies is the use of naturally occurring and environmentally safe products such as PGPR. It has long been known that many microorganisms in the soil root ecosystem are attracted by nutrients exuded by plant roots. This soil-root ecozone is called rhizosphere. Many bacteria from the rhizosphere can influence plant growth and plant health positively, and we refer to them as PGPR. The beneficial effect of these bacteria have been variously attributed to their ability to produce various compounds including phytohormones, organic acids and siderophores, fixation of atmospheric Preface xix nitrogen, phosphate solubilization, antibiotics that suppress deleterious rhizobacteria or to some other unidentified mechanisms. Worldwide, PGPR technology is being considered as the latest pursuit for expertise in knowledge intensive sectors. Currently, the global agriculture biotech industry is valued at an estimated US$ 45 billion and is expected to grow at 25% annually. Indian Ag biotechnology industry is currently valued at US$ 2.5 billion. Much of the credit for growth of the Indian Ag biotechnology industry goes to the government that created a separate department for biotechnology under the Ministry of Science and Technology. Our state governments are also equal contributors towards making India an emerging hub of Ag biotechnology. Today, we have the benefit of having both Central and State Governments partnering with us for this congress. I see similar capabilities in all participating Asian countries and we all inherently have the strengths, excellent networks of research laboratories, rich biodiversity, well-developed seed industries and most importantly highly skilled and trained pool of scientific manpower. Today, Asian countries are slowly but steadily preparing themselves for an emerging Ag biotechnology revolution. The success in this sector, however, depends on a number of enabling factors like facilitating venture capital funding, technology absorption and strengthening of links between the industry, academic and government institutions, not only within each country but amongst all Asian countries and our International partners. The green revolution of agriculture brought an enormous increase in food production. It not only made the world self sufficient in food but also gave the world's scientists and farmers an immense amount of selfrespect. Though the green revolution did increase food production, the productivity levels have remained low and increase was achieved at a cost of intensive use of water, fertilizer and other inputs which have caused problems of soil salinity, ground water pollution, nutrient imbalances, emergence of new pest and diseases and environmental degradation. To feed the ever increasing population globally and in Asia more and more food now has to be produced from less and less land, water and other natural resources. It is therefore apparent that we have to do things differently and doing more of what we did yesterday will not take us forward. With the advent of PGPR technology and its use on crops, we can achieve higher productivity, better quality, improved nutrition, improved storage properties, increased pests and disease resistance and achieve higher prices for farmers in the global market place. PGPR technology has the immense potential of eradicating rural poverty and fueling Asia's GDP growth. By exploiting our knowledge of PGPR technology we have the opportunity to make Asia the global center of bioresearch. The PGPR industry is a relatively new venture, just coming out of its infancy. Its potential is being tested, realized and used. The public xx Plant Growth Promotion by Rhizobacteria for Sustaninable Agriculture awareness and acceptance of PGPR will accelerate the process. Currently these are being supplemented by private individual entrepreneurs for developing PGPR products for local needs as well as for the export market. Technologies are flowing into the country due to the changed economic scenario. With continued support we can soon become global players in PGPR technology. I hope I have been able to impart upon you the great enthusiasm I feel about the future through the use of PGPR. We must bring about a massive collective global effort dedicated to funding new research in PGPR's. I encourage all of you here to bolster the spirit in your colleagues and yourselves as you now enable Asia to become a world leader in the application of PGPR technology to the betterment of our agriculture. I am confident that by working together we can overcome the obstacles and seize the opportunities in the PGPR technologies in the new millennium. I am taking this opportunity to call upon all stakeholders from the wide range of Asian countries to join hands and use PGPR to make our world a better place to live. Join me and let us see the future we can create with PGPR through this Congress. ; Not Available
The aim of the article is to analyze the impact of women's integration into the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the military prestige. The study used discourse analysis as a method of research, which historically have focused on the meaningful characteristics of communication caused by the system of power relations and institutions of power. 677 comments, which include the concepts "woman" and "military" as the central ideas of discourse and which were posted during 2021 in the Ukrainian sector of the social network Facebook were analyzed in this research. We argue that the process of women's integration into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which is associated with a change in the gender composition in favor of women, has a significant impact on the prestige of the military profession. On the one hand, women's integration into the armed forces causes in the Ukrainian sector of social networks the forthcoming of pretentious image of a woman-defender of the Motherland. This image is characterized by a certain amount of narcissism, belief in her exclusivity, superiority over men and it is a harmful and destructive force against the prestige of the military profession, because it challenges the moral and ethical norms, which define the value orientation of the officer's outlook and which are incorporated into the Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. On the other hand, assessments of professional prestige embody cultural beliefs, stereotypical images, prejudices and biases. The portrayal of servicewomen reflects deep-rooted stereotypes and discrimination against women. Such gender stereotypes as the requirement of physical strength for male-dominated professions; the disparity between male and female intellect; gender typicality for women to have personality traits incompatible with the military profession, for example, light-mindedness and emotionality; the higher social value of a man compared to a woman, impede women's integration into the Ukrainian Armed Forces and undermine the prestige of the military profession because they question such important components of professional prestige as qualification, competence, professionalism, social usefulness of all personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine without exception. The direct sexual objectification of women broadcasts the idea that women in the military are only a resource for entertainment and satisfying male sexual desire. With a significant increase in number of women serving in armed forces, such idea is detrimental to the prestige of the military profession, its destructive effect aimed to undermine respect, esteem, admiration, and social trust as factors of professional prestige. The same negative consequences for the prestige of the military profession are caused by cases where women join the armed forces motivated by such factors as mercantilism and the search for material benefits, which are covered by hypocrisy and double standards tactics. ; Мета статті – з'ясувати вплив процесу інтеграції жінок у Збройні сили України на еволюціонування престижу професії військовослужбовця. В дослідженні використовувався дискурс-аналіз як метод дослідження, який історично фокусуються на змістовних особливостях комунікації, обумовлених системою владних відносин та інститутів влади. Матеріалом цього дослідження стали 677 коментарів, які були розміщені в 2021 році в українському секторі соціальної мережі Фейсбук і які включають концепти «жінка» і «армія» як центральні ідеї дискурсу. Було доведено, що процес інтеграції жінок у Збройні сили України, з яким пов'язана зміна ґендерного складу на користь жінок, значно впливає на оцінку престижу професії військового. З одного боку, це дає поштовх для створення в українському секторі соціальних мереж претензійного образу жінки-захисниці Батьківщини, який відрізняється неабиякою часткою нарцисизму, вірою у свою винятковість, перевагою над чоловіками, і є шкідливою та руйнівною силою відносно престижності професії військового, оскільки піддає сумніву морально-етичні норми, які визначають ціннісну орієнтацію світогляду офіцера і відображені у Кодексі честі офіцера Збройних сил України. З іншого боку, оцінка професійного престижу втілює культурні переконання та стереотипні образи, а також пов'язані з ними передсуди та упередження. Зображення жінок-військовослужбовців відображає патріархальні стереотипи і дискримінацію по відношенню до жінок. Такі ґендерні стереотипи, як обов'язковість силової витривалості в професіях, де домінують чоловіки; диспаритет чоловіків та жінок в інтелектуальному плані; наявність у жінки якостей, наприклад, легковажності та емоційності, які несумісні із професією військового; більша соціальна цінність чоловіка у порівнянні з жінкою, у період проведення політики інтеграції жінок до армії завдають шкоди престижності професії військового, оскільки вони піддають сумніву такі важливі для професійного престижу фактори, як кваліфікація, компетентність, професіоналізм, соціальна корисність всього особового складу України без винятку. Пряме сексуальне опредметнення жінок транслює ідею, що вона в армії – це лише ресурс для розваг і задоволення сексуальних потреб. За значного збільшення кількості жінок, які служать у Збройних Силах України, така ідея є згубною для престижності професії військового, її руйнівний ефект спрямований на підрив поваги, шанування, соціальної довіри як факторів професійного престижу. До таких же негативних наслідків щодо престижності професії військового призводять випадки, коли вступ жінок до лав ЗСУ мотивується такими факторами, як меркантильність та пошук матеріальної вигоди, що може прикриватися лицемірством та тактикою подвійних стандартів. ; Мета статті – з'ясувати вплив процесу інтеграції жінок у Збройні сили України на еволюціонування престижу професії військовослужбовця. В дослідженні використовувався дискурс-аналіз як метод дослідження, який історично фокусуються на змістовних особливостях комунікації, обумовлених системою владних відносин та інститутів влади. Матеріалом цього дослідження стали 677 коментарів, які були розміщені в 2021 році в українському секторі соціальної мережі Фейсбук і які включають концепти «жінка» і «армія» як центральні ідеї дискурсу. Було доведено, що процес інтеграції жінок у Збройні сили України, з яким пов'язана зміна ґендерного складу на користь жінок, значно впливає на оцінку престижу професії військового. З одного боку, це дає поштовх для створення в українському секторі соціальних мереж претензійного образу жінки-захисниці Батьківщини, який відрізняється неабиякою часткою нарцисизму, вірою у свою винятковість, перевагою над чоловіками, і є шкідливою та руйнівною силою відносно престижності професії військового, оскільки піддає сумніву морально-етичні норми, які визначають ціннісну орієнтацію світогляду офіцера і відображені у Кодексі честі офіцера Збройних сил України. З іншого боку, оцінка професійного престижу втілює культурні переконання та стереотипні образи, а також пов'язані з ними передсуди та упередження. Зображення жінок-військовослужбовців відображає патріархальні стереотипи і дискримінацію по відношенню до жінок. Такі ґендерні стереотипи, як обов'язковість силової витривалості в професіях, де домінують чоловіки; диспаритет чоловіків та жінок в інтелектуальному плані; наявність у жінки якостей, наприклад, легковажності та емоційності, які несумісні із професією військового; більша соціальна цінність чоловіка у порівнянні з жінкою, у період проведення політики інтеграції жінок до армії завдають шкоди престижності професії військового, оскільки вони піддають сумніву такі важливі для професійного престижу фактори, як кваліфікація, компетентність, професіоналізм, соціальна корисність всього особового складу України без винятку. Пряме сексуальне опредметнення жінок транслює ідею, що вона в армії – це лише ресурс для розваг і задоволення сексуальних потреб. За значного збільшення кількості жінок, які служать у Збройних Силах України, така ідея є згубною для престижності професії військового, її руйнівний ефект спрямований на підрив поваги, шанування, соціальної довіри як факторів професійного престижу. До таких же негативних наслідків щодо престижності професії військового призводять випадки, коли вступ жінок до лав ЗСУ мотивується такими факторами, як меркантильність та пошук матеріальної вигоди, що може прикриватися лицемірством та тактикою подвійних стандартів.
This dissertation explores the role of co-production in transforming existing urban governance frameworks. Specifically, it interrogates how the co-production of housing between civil society or urban poor groups and the public sector influences urban governance processes. While referring to the existing interpretations of co-production, this thesis focuses on the hitherto largely unexplored issue of extending the co-production approach from a project or neighbourhood scale to broader governance structures. In so doing, this dissertation builds on the classic understanding of co-production as primarily a service delivery strategy, through linking it to the debate on social-movements-initiated or bottom-up co-production. Herein, the intricacies of the co-production process are analysed in the context of low-income housing provision within an exclusionary governance setting (as is commonly found in rapidly urbanising areas). Through a review of the extant literature, this thesis discusses the differences in understandings of co-production in various intellectual traditions and develops a framework for the analysis of governance transformation processes in the aforementioned contexts. The central empirical part of the thesis is based on field research in Metro Manila, and concerns activism among the urban poor and civil society that led to the establishment of the Oplan LIKAS programme for the relocation of and development of housing for circa. 120,000 Informal Settler Families. Based on the findings from this fieldwork, the overarching argument of the thesis is that while co-production is typically explored and analysed in settings at the project level, its distinct features undergo important transformations when attempting to scale-up projects. This process, termed here the 'co-production of governance', gains new features and experiences new challenges in comparison to project-level interventions. Namely, the process of scaling-up urban poor solutions requires the application of more diverse approaches than in classic co-productive projects. Its typical features such as networking, and showing by doing, are essential for the internal organisations of movements and groups attempting to reach the higher governance level; however, to leverage the impact of people and effect change on governance processes, a number of additional external strategies are also required. These include, among others, a readiness to engage in more politicised arenas, where ad hoc coalitions and conflict-based action become essential. In this way, the thesis supports the view that co-production, rather than being seen as a pure ideal model approach, needs to coincide with a range of different strategies to be effective in higher governance settings. Finally, this thesis reflects on the complexities of the governance creation phase in which people's movements attempt to successfully position themselves as co-creators of policies or programmes at the metropolitan scale. Through this, some key assumptions frequently found in a variety of international studies are questioned. Firstly, the institutionalisation of pro-poor solutions, as much as they are empowering, may also have exclusionary effects. These occur when 'formal' sectors use informal mechanisms to shape institutionalised frameworks in such a way that their fixed regulatory logic counters the principles of flexibility inherent in people's approaches. Secondly, a significant challenge relates to power imbalances within the urban poor sector, where the capacity to engage in complex co-productive activities is not shared uniformly by all urban poor actors, particularly in situations where ready-made housing products are on offer. In conclusion, this thesis supports the view that co-production is one of the most effective approaches available to the urban poor for building relations with governance structures at the local level. However, this approach inevitably experiences new challenges when applied at higher levels of governance, and therefore needs to be supported by a variety of different strategies and undergo thorough restructuring to ensure long-lasting, pro-poor inclusionary outcomes. The theoretical concept of co-production of governance understands this process as an open-ended engagement that, rather than being a form of institutionalised deliberation, enables the urban poor to continuously influence, review and update policies within or outside of formally recognised bodies. At the same time, the approach should ensure that newly established approaches continue to mirror urban poor groups' own protocols and safeguard principles of flexibility and collective action. ; Diese Dissertation untersucht die Rolle von Koproduktion als einen von den städtischen Armen und der Zivilgesellschaft gesteuerten Ansatz mit dem Ziel, zu einer Wandlung des existierenden städtischen Governance-Rahmens zu führen. Sie stellt die Frage, inwiefern der Prozess der Koproduktion von Wohnraum zwischen der Zivilgesellschaft oder städtischen Armen und dem öffentlichen Sektor städtische Governance beeinflusst. Hierbei verweist die Dissertation auf die existierenden Interpretationen von Koproduktion und befasst sich mit der weitgehend unberücksichtigten Frage des Übergangs des koproduktiven Ansatzes von einer lokalen oder projektbezogenen Ebene zu umfassenderen Governance-Strukturen. Dabei baut die Dissertation auf dem klassischen Verständnis von Koproduktion, hauptsächlich als Modell der Dienstleistungserbringung, auf und ist eng verknüpft mit der Debatte über die von sozialen Bewegungen erzeugten oder bottom-up Koproduktion. Die Feinheiten und Komplexitäten dieses Prozesses werden im Kontext von Wohnungsraum für einkommensschwache Haushalte innerhalb exklusiver und elitärer Governance-Strukturen, ein charakterisierendes Phänomen in schnell urbanisierten Gebieten, analysiert. Indem sie die Unterschiede in der Analyse von Koproduktion in diversen intellektuellen Traditionen anerkennt, erarbeitet die Dissertation einen Rahmen zur Analyse des Prozesses zur Wandlung der Governance-Strukturen in dem vorgenannten Umfeld. Der empirische Teil der Dissertation basiert überwiegend auf einer in der Metro Manila durchgeführten Feldforschung und betrifft den Aktivismus der städtischen Armen und der Zivilgesellschaft, was zur Schaffung des Oplan LIKAS Programms führte, mit dem Ziel der Umsiedlung von ca. 120,000 Familien von "informellen Siedlern" und der Schaffung von für sie bestimmten Wohnraum. Das übergreifende Argument der Dissertation ist, dass Koproduktion typischerweise und hauptsächlich auf der reinen Projektebene erkundet und erforscht wird, jedoch dass ihre gut definierten Eigenschaften einen wichtigen Transformationsprozess durchlaufen, bei dem Versuch, den Ansatz hochzuskalieren. Der Prozess, der hier als Koproduktion von Governance definiert wird, gewinnt neue Eigenschaften und begegnet neuen Herausforderungen, die es auf Projektebene nicht gab. Die Hochskalierung von Koproduktion erfordert die Anwendung von stärker diversifizierten Ansätzen im Vergleich zu sogenannten "klassischen" koproduktiven Projekten. Typische Eigenschaften von Koproduktion, wie unter anderem Networking und Showing by Doing, spielen weiterhin eine wesentliche Rolle für die interne Organisierung der Bewegungen und Gruppen, die versuchen, eine höhere Governance-Ebene zu erreichen. Dennoch sind etliche externe Strategien erforderlich zur Entfaltung der Wirkung der Menschen auf Governance-Angelegenheiten. Es handelt sich hierbei, unter anderem, um die Bereitschaft, sich in stärker politisierenden Bereichen zu engagieren, in denen ad-hoc-Koalitionen und konflikt-basierte Aktionen unverzichtbar werden. Somit unterstützt die Dissertation die Auffassung, dass Koproduktion sich weniger als ein rein ideales Modell versteht, sondern eher mit einer Vielzahl an unterschiedlichen Strategien übereinstimmen soll, um im Rahmen der Higher Governance wirksam zu sein. Schließlich beschäftigt sich die Dissertation mit den Komplexitäten der Kreationsphase der Governance, wenn es den städtischen Armen gelingt, sich auf der Ebene der Metropole als Kokreatoren der Stadtpolitik zu positionieren. Dieser Bestandteil der Forschungsfragen hinterfragt mehrere Annahmen, die in internationalen Studien mitschwingen. Erstens kann die Institutionalisierung der Lösungen zugunsten der Armen sowohl Befähigung als auch Ausgrenzung bewirken. Diese Ausgrenzung findet statt wenn "formale" Sektoren informelle Mechanismen nutzen, um institutionalisierte Rahmenregelungen zu gestalten. Diese gesetzte Regulationslogik widerspricht den Prinzipien der Flexibilität, die die von den städtischen Armen angewendete Herangehensweise charakterisieren. Zweitens liegt eine große Herausforderung in der Komplexität des Sektors der städtischen Armen: nicht alle sind gleichermaßen dazu befähigt, sich an komplexen koproduktiven Aktivitäten zu beteiligen, ganz besonders wenn die Möglichkeit eines gebrauchsfertigen Wohnraumes besteht. Insgesamt unterstützt die Dissertation die Ansicht, dass Koproduktion einer der effektivsten Ansätze für die städtischen Armen ist, um mit Governance-Strukturen Beziehungen auf einer lokalen Ebene aufzubauen. Dennoch kommt die Dissertation zu dem Schluss, dass auf der höheren Ebene der Governance Koproduktion vor neuen Herausforderungen steht. Nur dank unterschiedlicher Strategien und einer umfassenden Restrukturierung können nachhaltige und inklusive Ergebnisse zugunsten der städtischen Armen auch gewährleistet werden. Das theoretische Konzept von Koproduktion der Governance versteht diesen Prozess mehr als ein Engagement mit offenem Ende als eine festgesetzte institutionalisierte Deliberation. Dieses Engagement gibt den städtischen Armen die Möglichkeit, politische Richtlinien kontinuierlich zu beinflussen, zu überprüfen und zu aktualisieren, innerhalb oder außerhalb von formellen anerkannten Strukturen und Institutionen. Idealerweise sollte somit die Wirkung der städtischen Armen ihre eigenen Protokolle widerspiegeln und ihre Leitlinien von Flexibilität und gemeinsamem Handeln sicherstellen.
This dissertation aims at studying from a variety of perspectives the collective vocalisations in Tacitus. The voices of the crowd are usually treated as mere background, annoying noise by the historian; but they are actually linked to different key issues on the socio-political, historiographical and literary levels. These should not be considered separately but as an ideological system of representation. Thus, we try in this study to adopt a historical and literary approach, showing how the social phenomena are turned into a literary material by Tacitus.The first section takes a look at the political vocabulary of Tacitus, starting with the concept of crowd (chap. 1). The key word here is certainly uulgus (uulgus urbanum or uulgus militum), which should not be considered as an empty concept, but rather as a very specific type of crowd, whose voice became central in the institutions of the imperial regime. We apply our conclusions to the text with two case studies (the crowds in the mutinies of Annals I, the crowd in the banishment of Octavia). In chap. 2, we look into the clamour, defined as vertical communication between the crowd and the individual. We first determine Tacitus' main formulae to refer to the collective shouts, and then show how the historian turned it into a way to characterise the crowd's state of mind and to make his narrative more vivid or pathetic.Chap. 3 to 5 (= section 2) form a historical analysis of the rumour, a phenomenon that is closely connected to Tacitus' works but whose comprehension is more accurate if other sources – for the late Republican or early Imperial period – are taken into account. In chap. 3, we go beyond the negative stereotypes of our sources to define the rumour as a true channel of information and communication. This channel was reticular and exponential, and thus opposite to the linearity of the aristocratic media. In chap. 4, we build on the theories of the interactionist sociology of the rumour to address the question of the times and places where rumours were exchanged in Rome and in the military camps, focusing on the sociability networks as well as on the motivation and social profile of the gossipers. Chap. 5 concerns the place of the rumours within the "media landscape" of ancient Rome. Most of the time, the crowd would use rumour to acquire pieces of information which the authorities did not have yet or were not willing to disclose. Yet, rumours also played an active – and more conventional – part in delivering official news beyond the primary place of interaction where it was broken to the crowd (the contiones, for example).In the last part of this dissertation, we come back to the literary analysis of Tacitus' text to investigate how he combines the historical features of the rumour with the narrative elaboration. Chap. 6 analyses how Tacitean rumours work as a narratological device, used to bring forward innuendoes or to characterise individuals, but also to structure the transition points of the narrative or to create thematic unity. Chap. 7 delves into more historiographical issues. Starting from the consideration that rumours are frequently excluded from the reconstruction of historical causation, we first examine the choral function of some collective discourses: they allow Tacitus to step outside the framework of rational history, to which he should normally be compelled, and to incorporate into the text elements of emotional and even counterfactual history. The end of the chapter reflects upon the use of the rumour as a source (auctor) for the historian.The conclusion offers some perspective on a sociocritical approach of the subaltern voices in Tacitus, followed by two appendices: a complete status quaestionis about rumours in Classics and Ancient History, and a lexico-syntactic survey of the Tacitean rumours. ; Ce travail analyse sous différentes perspectives les formes de la voix collective chez Tacite. Souvent réduites par l'historien à un simple son dérangeant, les voix de foule engagent des problématiques diverses (sociopolitiques, historiographiques, littéraires) qui ne sont pas indépendantes les unes des autres mais forment un système de représentation. Méthodologiquement, nous ne dissocions donc pas l'approche littéraire et l'approche l'historique et cherchons à montrer comment des faits sociaux comme la communication des masses sont encodés dans le récit.La première des trois parties trouve son unité dans l'analyse lexicographique du vocabulaire politique de Tacite, en commençant par le concept de foule (chap. 1). On y voit surtout que uulgus (uulgus urbanum ou uulgus militum) renvoie à un type de foule particulier, celle qui, par sa voix, devient l'un des acteurs principaux du régime impérial. Deux études de cas (les foules dans les mutineries du livre I des Annales ; la foule dans l'épisode de la répudiation d'Octavie) ancrent l'analyse dans l'étude suivie du texte tacitéen. Le chap. 2 étudie la clameur, définie comme communication verticale entre la foule et l'individu. Après avoir relevé les caractéristiques formulaires de l'écriture tacitéenne, nous montrons que le cri collectif a constitué pour l'historien un puissant outil de caractérisation des foules et a servi à l'élaboration de l'historia ornata, via des déplorations pathétiques et des hypotyposes.La deuxième partie étudie au plan historique le phénomène de la rumeur, dont l'œuvre de Tacite constitue un réceptacle exceptionnel. Dans le chap. 3, nous définissons la rumeur comme média : au-delà des stéréotypes, le phénomène peut être caractérisé par son mode particulier (réticulaire et exponentiel) de transmission de l'information, qui l'oppose aux médias traditionnels et aristocratiques. Le chap. 4 adopte une approche interactionniste : il s'agit de déterminer où, quand, comment et par qui s'échangeaient les rumeurs, en nous focalisant sur les réseaux de sociabilité (urbains tout autant que militaires) qui leur permettaient de circuler. Le chap. 5 replace la rumeur dans le « paysage médiatique », à Rome et dans les castra, et interroge la relation entre les bruits publics et les autres canaux de communication, notamment les médias de l'officialité. Si la situation la plus récurrente est celle d'une rivalité entre la foule et les autorités autour de l'acquisition de l'information, une autre configuration se trouve de manière régulière dans les sources : la rumeur permettait d'assurer la dissémination d'une information officielle auprès du grand nombre, au-delà des lieux d'interaction ritualisés entre la masse et le pouvoir. Dans ces trois chapitres, l'assise documentaire est élargie aux textes et auteurs de la fin de la République et du Haut-Empire.Nous retournons ensuite au seul Tacite (troisième partie) pour synthétiser les différentes fonctions littéraires qu'assume la rumeur chez lui, en interrogeant leur rapport avec les propriétés historiques du phénomène. Le chap. 6 propose une analyse des fonctions narratologiques de la rumeur, certaines connues (la rumeur comme insinuation ou comme support du portrait), d'autres plus neuves (la rumeur comme embrayeur de transition). Dans le chap. 7, nous élargissons le cadre en observant le lien de la rumeur à la causalité historique : certains bruits, de forme chorale, semblent détachés des événements et permettent de faire résonner une contre-histoire au sein du récit tacitéen (histoire des émotions, voire histoire contrefactuelle). La fin de ce dernier chapitre se penche sur la problématique de l'utilisation des rumeurs comme sources par Tacite.Après une conclusion ouvrant sur des perspectives sociocritiques dans l'analyse du discours collectif tacitéen, on trouve deux annexes : un état de la question de la rumeur dans les sciences de l'Antiquité, et une étude lexico-syntaxique des rumeurs tacitéennes.
Una delle sfide più difficili in biologia è la conservazione delle specie a crescita lenta con ciclo vitale lungo. Corallium rubrum, ottocorallo endemico del Mediterraneo e delle vicine coste atlantiche, è la specie marina di maggior valore economico, per questo motivo le sue popolazioni sono state spesso sovrasfruttate. Al fine di formulare adeguati piani di gestione per questa risorsa è necessario tener conto delle caratteristiche della specie (crescita lenta, ciclo vitale lungo e una lenta dinamica di popolazione) e delle popolazioni (struttura di taglia ed età, durata massima del ciclo vitale, densità e mortalità). Il presente lavoro ha lo scopo di stimare la struttura di taglia ed età di popolazioni profonde (50 - 200 m) di C. rubrum, di incrementare le conoscenze sul tasso di accrescimento individuale e di ottenere informazioni sulle modalità di crescita delle ramificazioni, fino ad ora sconosciute. Il campionamento è stato effettuato ad una profondità compresa tra 50 e 130 m nell'Arcipelago Toscano e in Campania, durante due crociere oceanografiche svolte nel 2010 e nel 2012, finanziate dal Ministero dell'Ambiente e dal Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali. In questo studio è stata stimata l'età di 95 colonie, applicando il metodo messo a punto da Marschal et al. nel 2004. Tale tecnica prevede il conteggio diretto degli anelli di accrescimento annuale su sezioni sottili, di 50 μm di spessore, ottenute tagliando le colonie nel punto di flesso della base. Dopo decalcificazione in acido acetico, la matrice organica viene colorata con il blu di Toluidina al fine di mettere in evidenza i cerchi di accrescimento. Ogni anello annuale è formato da due bande, una estiva chiara corrispondente a zone con basse concentrazioni di matrice organica ed una invernale scura relativa a concentrazioni più elevate. L'accrescimento delle colonie avviene in maniera proporzionale fra i due diametri (il rapporto medio tra diametro minimo e massimo è 0.88), con piccole oscillazioni al variare dell'età delle colonie. Il tasso medio di crescita in diametro (0.24 mm/anno) tende a diminuire con l'invecchiamento; questa riduzione sembra essere influenzata dall'elevato tasso di crescita della regione centrale nei primi 4 anni di vita. Il numero degli anelli di crescita diminuisce allontanandosi dalla base; questo risultato conferma che i cerchi di accrescimento sono un buon descrittore dell'età e sono legati alla crescita in diametro della colonia. L'accuratezza del metodo delle sezioni sottili è stata, inoltre, valutata sulla base dell'ampiezza del coefficiente di variazione del numero degli anelli di crescita in colonie di differenti età. Tale parametro non aumenta significativamente all'aumentare dell'età delle colonie. La crescita lineare in altezza è estremamente variabile tra colonie ed anche fra ramificazioni di una stessa colonia; non si osserva, infatti alcuna relazione tra accrescimento in altezza ed età della colonia. Le colonie di corallo rosso ramificano per la prima volta a 5-6 anni. Il numero delle ramificazioni è correlato con il peso, ma tale andamento varia a seconda dell'area geografica. Questo suggerisce che il pattern di ramificazione sia influenzato da fattori ambientali. La popolazione oggetto di studio presenta un massimo life span (111-112 anni) mai misurato prima nella specie tramite conteggio diretto degli anelli di crescita. Il 51 % della popolazione risulta avere un diametro medio superiore o uguale ai 7 mm (taglia minima commerciale) che corrisponde ad un'età media di 30-35 anni. Le conoscenze ottenute con il presente studio costituiscono le basi per la realizzazione di modelli demografici, largamente utilizzati in biologia della conservazione per stimare le probabilità di sopravvivenza delle popolazioni sovrasfruttate. Conservation of long-lived and slow-growing species is one of the most difficult challenges in biology. Corallium rubrum, endemic octocoral to the Mediterranean Sea and neighbouring Atlantic coasts, is the marine species with the greatest economic value, for that reason its populations have been overexploited. In order to develop suitable management plans for this resource, it is necessary to know the characteristics of the species (i.e. slow growth, long life cycle and slow dynamics of the population) and populations (size and age structure, life span, density and mortality). The aim of this thesis is to estimate the age and size structure of deep (50-200 m) Corallium rubrum populations, to increase the knowledge on individual growth rate and to obtain further information on branching patterns, so far unknown. The colonies were collected between 50 and 130 m in Tuscan Archipelago and in Campania, during two cruises carried out in 2010 and in 2012, both promoted by Italian Ministry of Environment and by Italian Ministry of Agricultural and Forest Policies. In this work, the age of 95 colonies was determined using the method validated by Marschal et al. in 2004. This technique consists of counting the annual growth rings on thin sections (50 μm), obtained by cutting the colony at 1 cm from the base. After decalcification in acetic acid, the organic matter was stained by Toluidine Blue in order to point out the annual growth rings. Each growth ring is made up of two bands, a summer light band corresponding to a zone where the concentration of the organic matrix is low and a winter dark thin band where the concentration of organic matrix is much higher. The growth of colonies is proportional between minimum and maximum diameter (the average ratio is 0.88), with small fluctuations according to the age of colonies. The average growth rate in diameter (0.24 mm/y) decreased with the ageing; this trend seems to be influenced by high growth rate of core (that corresponds to the first 4 years). The number of growth rings decreased with the progressive distance from the base; this confirms that growth rings are a good indicator of colony's age. They are proportional to the colony diameter growth. The accuracy of OMS (Organic Matrix Staining) method has been also evaluated on variation coefficient width of growth rings number counted in colonies of different ages. This parameter doesn't increase significantly with the colonies' age. The linear growth in height is extremely variable among colonies but also among branches of the same colony; there isn't a relationship between height and age. For the first time C. rubrum branches at 5-6 years old. The number of branches is related to weight, but the trend is variable according to the geographic area. This suggests that branching pattern is influenced by environmental factors. The maximum life span of this population is 111-112 years; this value has never been observed for C. rubrum by direct counting of growth rings. Colonies which have diameter bigger than 7 mm (commercial minimum size) are 51 % of population; such size corresponds to the age of 30-35. The data obtained during this study are the basis to develop demographic models, that are widely used in conservation biology to estimate the probability of overharvested population survival.
In this study, the public dance or ball (the principal type of public fête in France: more than 50 percent of events, with 150,000 every year) is used to examine on the one hand the relations between social processes, and on the other, spatial conceptions, forms and structures and temporal practices emphasizing a major change. Indeed, though the ball may be perceived as outdated, this activity is thriving, and adjusts to a changing society. It still plays an important part in the shaping of spatial relations and the framing of territories, and also makes it easier to observe them: 30 percent of the French go out dancing every year - twice as many in some regions.This study draw on various sources so as to show the diversity of the phenomenon at various levels. It reveals that the standard pattern—that of the public ball, an open ball inherited from republican tradition—is fading. Organised by local authorities whose legitimacy it reinforces, this republican ball contributes to the cohesion of the community and offers its members a clear image of that community.Meanwhile, new and more selective forms of socialisation are developing rapidly, in accordance with the specific lifestyle of extremely mobile commuters living in the suburbs. A drift towards more autonomy can be noticed in this space that until now has been considered a cross between town and country.Furthermore, underprivileged and isolated rural spaces develop a specific form of festive meal-with dancing that is suited to their demographic situation.In all these balls, small groups of people seem to play a decisive role. Their influence is due to the prestige they enjoy, which is reinforced by their ability to structure local communities through the planning of such events. It now seems that legitimacy is shifting:•from a political legitimacy to a private one.•from territorial structuration under a dominant spatial logic to social, elective and even segregative structuring.•from an elected member representing a community to a leisure supplier and sometimes a charismatic leader.•from citizen to consumer and even worshipper.•from mythic feast refounding the community to utopia: the dream of a perfect community, grafted on an indistinct real space and without any symbolic territorial signification.The extent of those changes, especially in the northern and eastern parts of the country, in the metropolitan areas, reveals that the decline of spatial, social and political bonds is far more advanced than is usually thought. ; La sortie au bal concerne chaque année 30 % des Français, le double dans plusieurs régions. A rebours d'une image désuète, cette activité bien vivante s'adapte aux mutations de la société et, avec 160 000 bals par an (1 pour 350 habitants), ne connait pas le déclin qu'on lui prête. Pour le géographe, ils se révèlent intéressants à deux titres. Avec une moyenne de 4,5 bals par commune et par an, ils jouent toujours un rôle important dans la structuration des relations spatiales et l'institution des territoires. Ils facilitent aussi l'observation de celles-ci, généralement difficile à mener de manière rigoureuse.Avec cette préoccupation, l'étude utilise des données nombreuses de très bonne qualité (les relevés de la SACEM, Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique). Pour montrer la diversité de cette activité à quatre niveaux d'échelle, du national au local, ces données sont aussi variées; on y adjoint donc des informations fournies par deux enquêtes, l'une auprès d'orchestres, l'autre réalisée dans des bals, et enfin une observation plus générale sur environ deux cent bals. S'y ajoutent des informations fournies par des organismes officiels: Ministère de la Culture, INSEE (RGP, enquête sociale, Inventaire Communal). La densité de cette information permet des synthèses précises, sous forme de graphiques ou de typologies. Cela a conduit à la réalisation d'environ cent cinquante cartes dont une soixantaine ont été retenues dans l'étude.Celle-ci remet en question un certain nombre de clichés tels que ceux d'un bal des jeunes, d'un bal exclusivement rural, d'un bal populaire en soulignant son rôle politique. L'étude privilégie cet angle d'observation afin de mettre en valeur des évolutions importantes dans la relation des communautés à leur territoire.Elle fait apparaître le recul du modèle dominant (60 % de l'ensemble des manifestations), le bal public, bal ouvert hérité de la tradition républicaine. Très encadré par les autorités municipales dont il renforce la légitimité, il contribue à la cohérence de la collectivité localisée et donne à ses membres une forte visibilité de celle-ci. Il reste néanmoins déterminant sur de vastes portions du territoire: le Massif Central, le Sud, particulièrement le Sud-Ouest, mais aussi -bien que différent et plus rare- dans le centre des grandes agglomérations; d'une manière générale, c'est le cas partout où la relative stabilité de la population ces dernières décennies n'a pas modifié trop en profondeur les liens forts du groupe au territoire et où les autorités municipales gardent une légitimité importante.En même temps, se développent rapidement de nouvelles formes de socialisation plus sélectives, adaptées aux modes de vie spécifiques des populations très mobiles de larges périphéries urbaines. En effet, les repas dansants y progressent au rythme de 2 à 4 % l'an. On assiste ainsi à une processus d'autonomisation des comportements dans ces espaces considérés jusqu'alors comme intermédiaires entre villes et campagnes. Leur situation n'est plus transitoire avant une consolidation; il s'agit bien d'une pérennisation.Ces bals reposent sur des associations dont la légitimité n'est plus la même que celle des autorités municipales. Refusant la large mixité sociale qui caractérise les bals ouverts, elle pratiquent la sélection de leur clientèle et se ferment pour éviter toute intrusion indésirable et déqualifiante. Elles la recrutent dans un réseau installé sur une aire beaucoup plus vaste et mal définie, sinon par la distance. Elles refusent ainsi l'idée de l'institution symbolique d'un territoire local commun à tous ses habitants. Du bal républicain on évolue ainsi vers les loisirs, mais on voit même parfois s'ébaucher la constitution de communautés rêvées, utopiques, politiquement dangereuses.L'ampleur de ces évolutions, surtout dans le nord et l'est du pays, montre que la déstructuration des liens spatiaux, sociaux et politiques est bien plus avancée qu'on le croit généralement.En même temps, les espaces ruraux isolés en difficulté développent une forme propre de repas dansants adaptée à leur situation démographique qui cependant se rapproche des bals publics par leur logique républicaine. Mais il s'agit-là d'un repli vers une communauté protectrice qui révèle surtout sa fragilité et laisse planer un doute sur son avenir.Dans tous ces bals, on fait apparaître le rôle déterminant de certains groupes peu nombreux dont l'influence est due à leur prestige renforcé par la capacité à structurer les sociétés locales par le biais de l'organisation de tels événements.On semble donc basculer:- d'une légitimité à caractère politique vers une privatisation- d'une structuration des groupes territorialisés selon une logique spatiale à des logiques plus sociales et électives, voire ségrégativesdu citoyen au consommateur et même au fidèle- de l'élu représentant une communauté à un pourvoyeur de service quand ce n'est pas un leader charismatiqued'une fête mythique car refondatrice à l'utopie, au rêve greffé sur un espace réel indistinct, dénué de signification symbolique territoriale.
In this study, the public dance or ball (the principal type of public fête in France: more than 50 percent of events, with 150,000 every year) is used to examine on the one hand the relations between social processes, and on the other, spatial conceptions, forms and structures and temporal practices emphasizing a major change. Indeed, though the ball may be perceived as outdated, this activity is thriving, and adjusts to a changing society. It still plays an important part in the shaping of spatial relations and the framing of territories, and also makes it easier to observe them: 30 percent of the French go out dancing every year - twice as many in some regions.This study draw on various sources so as to show the diversity of the phenomenon at various levels. It reveals that the standard pattern—that of the public ball, an open ball inherited from republican tradition—is fading. Organised by local authorities whose legitimacy it reinforces, this republican ball contributes to the cohesion of the community and offers its members a clear image of that community.Meanwhile, new and more selective forms of socialisation are developing rapidly, in accordance with the specific lifestyle of extremely mobile commuters living in the suburbs. A drift towards more autonomy can be noticed in this space that until now has been considered a cross between town and country.Furthermore, underprivileged and isolated rural spaces develop a specific form of festive meal-with dancing that is suited to their demographic situation.In all these balls, small groups of people seem to play a decisive role. Their influence is due to the prestige they enjoy, which is reinforced by their ability to structure local communities through the planning of such events. It now seems that legitimacy is shifting:•from a political legitimacy to a private one.•from territorial structuration under a dominant spatial logic to social, elective and even segregative structuring.•from an elected member representing a community to a leisure supplier and sometimes a charismatic leader.•from citizen to consumer and even worshipper.•from mythic feast refounding the community to utopia: the dream of a perfect community, grafted on an indistinct real space and without any symbolic territorial signification.The extent of those changes, especially in the northern and eastern parts of the country, in the metropolitan areas, reveals that the decline of spatial, social and political bonds is far more advanced than is usually thought. ; La sortie au bal concerne chaque année 30 % des Français, le double dans plusieurs régions. A rebours d'une image désuète, cette activité bien vivante s'adapte aux mutations de la société et, avec 160 000 bals par an (1 pour 350 habitants), ne connait pas le déclin qu'on lui prête. Pour le géographe, ils se révèlent intéressants à deux titres. Avec une moyenne de 4,5 bals par commune et par an, ils jouent toujours un rôle important dans la structuration des relations spatiales et l'institution des territoires. Ils facilitent aussi l'observation de celles-ci, généralement difficile à mener de manière rigoureuse.Avec cette préoccupation, l'étude utilise des données nombreuses de très bonne qualité (les relevés de la SACEM, Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique). Pour montrer la diversité de cette activité à quatre niveaux d'échelle, du national au local, ces données sont aussi variées; on y adjoint donc des informations fournies par deux enquêtes, l'une auprès d'orchestres, l'autre réalisée dans des bals, et enfin une observation plus générale sur environ deux cent bals. S'y ajoutent des informations fournies par des organismes officiels: Ministère de la Culture, INSEE (RGP, enquête sociale, Inventaire Communal). La densité de cette information permet des synthèses précises, sous forme de graphiques ou de typologies. Cela a conduit à la réalisation d'environ cent cinquante cartes dont une soixantaine ont été retenues dans l'étude.Celle-ci remet en question un certain nombre de clichés tels que ceux d'un bal des jeunes, d'un bal exclusivement rural, d'un bal populaire en soulignant son rôle politique. L'étude privilégie cet angle d'observation afin de mettre en valeur des évolutions importantes dans la relation des communautés à leur territoire.Elle fait apparaître le recul du modèle dominant (60 % de l'ensemble des manifestations), le bal public, bal ouvert hérité de la tradition républicaine. Très encadré par les autorités municipales dont il renforce la légitimité, il contribue à la cohérence de la collectivité localisée et donne à ses membres une forte visibilité de celle-ci. Il reste néanmoins déterminant sur de vastes portions du territoire: le Massif Central, le Sud, particulièrement le Sud-Ouest, mais aussi -bien que différent et plus rare- dans le centre des grandes agglomérations; d'une manière générale, c'est le cas partout où la relative stabilité de la population ces dernières décennies n'a pas modifié trop en profondeur les liens forts du groupe au territoire et où les autorités municipales gardent une légitimité importante.En même temps, se développent rapidement de nouvelles formes de socialisation plus sélectives, adaptées aux modes de vie spécifiques des populations très mobiles de larges périphéries urbaines. En effet, les repas dansants y progressent au rythme de 2 à 4 % l'an. On assiste ainsi à une processus d'autonomisation des comportements dans ces espaces considérés jusqu'alors comme intermédiaires entre villes et campagnes. Leur situation n'est plus transitoire avant une consolidation; il s'agit bien d'une pérennisation.Ces bals reposent sur des associations dont la légitimité n'est plus la même que celle des autorités municipales. Refusant la large mixité sociale qui caractérise les bals ouverts, elle pratiquent la sélection de leur clientèle et se ferment pour éviter toute intrusion indésirable et déqualifiante. Elles la recrutent dans un réseau installé sur une aire beaucoup plus vaste et mal définie, sinon par la distance. Elles refusent ainsi l'idée de l'institution symbolique d'un territoire local commun à tous ses habitants. Du bal républicain on évolue ainsi vers les loisirs, mais on voit même parfois s'ébaucher la constitution de communautés rêvées, utopiques, politiquement dangereuses.L'ampleur de ces évolutions, surtout dans le nord et l'est du pays, montre que la déstructuration des liens spatiaux, sociaux et politiques est bien plus avancée qu'on le croit généralement.En même temps, les espaces ruraux isolés en difficulté développent une forme propre de repas dansants adaptée à leur situation démographique qui cependant se rapproche des bals publics par leur logique républicaine. Mais il s'agit-là d'un repli vers une communauté protectrice qui révèle surtout sa fragilité et laisse planer un doute sur son avenir.Dans tous ces bals, on fait apparaître le rôle déterminant de certains groupes peu nombreux dont l'influence est due à leur prestige renforcé par la capacité à structurer les sociétés locales par le biais de l'organisation de tels événements.On semble donc basculer:- d'une légitimité à caractère politique vers une privatisation- d'une structuration des groupes territorialisés selon une logique spatiale à des logiques plus sociales et électives, voire ségrégativesdu citoyen au consommateur et même au fidèle- de l'élu représentant une communauté à un pourvoyeur de service quand ce n'est pas un leader charismatiqued'une fête mythique car refondatrice à l'utopie, au rêve greffé sur un espace réel indistinct, dénué de signification symbolique territoriale.
In this study, the public dance or ball (the principal type of public fête in France: more than 50 percent of events, with 150,000 every year) is used to examine on the one hand the relations between social processes, and on the other, spatial conceptions, forms and structures and temporal practices emphasizing a major change. Indeed, though the ball may be perceived as outdated, this activity is thriving, and adjusts to a changing society. It still plays an important part in the shaping of spatial relations and the framing of territories, and also makes it easier to observe them: 30 percent of the French go out dancing every year - twice as many in some regions.This study draw on various sources so as to show the diversity of the phenomenon at various levels. It reveals that the standard pattern—that of the public ball, an open ball inherited from republican tradition—is fading. Organised by local authorities whose legitimacy it reinforces, this republican ball contributes to the cohesion of the community and offers its members a clear image of that community.Meanwhile, new and more selective forms of socialisation are developing rapidly, in accordance with the specific lifestyle of extremely mobile commuters living in the suburbs. A drift towards more autonomy can be noticed in this space that until now has been considered a cross between town and country.Furthermore, underprivileged and isolated rural spaces develop a specific form of festive meal-with dancing that is suited to their demographic situation.In all these balls, small groups of people seem to play a decisive role. Their influence is due to the prestige they enjoy, which is reinforced by their ability to structure local communities through the planning of such events. It now seems that legitimacy is shifting:•from a political legitimacy to a private one.•from territorial structuration under a dominant spatial logic to social, elective and even segregative structuring.•from an elected member representing a community to a leisure supplier and sometimes a charismatic leader.•from citizen to consumer and even worshipper.•from mythic feast refounding the community to utopia: the dream of a perfect community, grafted on an indistinct real space and without any symbolic territorial signification.The extent of those changes, especially in the northern and eastern parts of the country, in the metropolitan areas, reveals that the decline of spatial, social and political bonds is far more advanced than is usually thought. ; La sortie au bal concerne chaque année 30 % des Français, le double dans plusieurs régions. A rebours d'une image désuète, cette activité bien vivante s'adapte aux mutations de la société et, avec 160 000 bals par an (1 pour 350 habitants), ne connait pas le déclin qu'on lui prête. Pour le géographe, ils se révèlent intéressants à deux titres. Avec une moyenne de 4,5 bals par commune et par an, ils jouent toujours un rôle important dans la structuration des relations spatiales et l'institution des territoires. Ils facilitent aussi l'observation de celles-ci, généralement difficile à mener de manière rigoureuse.Avec cette préoccupation, l'étude utilise des données nombreuses de très bonne qualité (les relevés de la SACEM, Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique). Pour montrer la diversité de cette activité à quatre niveaux d'échelle, du national au local, ces données sont aussi variées; on y adjoint donc des informations fournies par deux enquêtes, l'une auprès d'orchestres, l'autre réalisée dans des bals, et enfin une observation plus générale sur environ deux cent bals. S'y ajoutent des informations fournies par des organismes officiels: Ministère de la Culture, INSEE (RGP, enquête sociale, Inventaire Communal). La densité de cette information permet des synthèses précises, sous forme de graphiques ou de typologies. Cela a conduit à la réalisation d'environ cent cinquante cartes dont une soixantaine ont été retenues dans l'étude.Celle-ci remet en question un certain nombre de clichés tels que ceux d'un bal des jeunes, d'un bal exclusivement rural, d'un bal populaire en soulignant son rôle politique. L'étude privilégie cet angle d'observation afin de mettre en valeur des évolutions importantes dans la relation des communautés à leur territoire.Elle fait apparaître le recul du modèle dominant (60 % de l'ensemble des manifestations), le bal public, bal ouvert hérité de la tradition républicaine. Très encadré par les autorités municipales dont il renforce la légitimité, il contribue à la cohérence de la collectivité localisée et donne à ses membres une forte visibilité de celle-ci. Il reste néanmoins déterminant sur de vastes portions du territoire: le Massif Central, le Sud, particulièrement le Sud-Ouest, mais aussi -bien que différent et plus rare- dans le centre des grandes agglomérations; d'une manière générale, c'est le cas partout où la relative stabilité de la population ces dernières décennies n'a pas modifié trop en profondeur les liens forts du groupe au territoire et où les autorités municipales gardent une légitimité importante.En même temps, se développent rapidement de nouvelles formes de socialisation plus sélectives, adaptées aux modes de vie spécifiques des populations très mobiles de larges périphéries urbaines. En effet, les repas dansants y progressent au rythme de 2 à 4 % l'an. On assiste ainsi à une processus d'autonomisation des comportements dans ces espaces considérés jusqu'alors comme intermédiaires entre villes et campagnes. Leur situation n'est plus transitoire avant une consolidation; il s'agit bien d'une pérennisation.Ces bals reposent sur des associations dont la légitimité n'est plus la même que celle des autorités municipales. Refusant la large mixité sociale qui caractérise les bals ouverts, elle pratiquent la sélection de leur clientèle et se ferment pour éviter toute intrusion indésirable et déqualifiante. Elles la recrutent dans un réseau installé sur une aire beaucoup plus vaste et mal définie, sinon par la distance. Elles refusent ainsi l'idée de l'institution symbolique d'un territoire local commun à tous ses habitants. Du bal républicain on évolue ainsi vers les loisirs, mais on voit même parfois s'ébaucher la constitution de communautés rêvées, utopiques, politiquement dangereuses.L'ampleur de ces évolutions, surtout dans le nord et l'est du pays, montre que la déstructuration des liens spatiaux, sociaux et politiques est bien plus avancée qu'on le croit généralement.En même temps, les espaces ruraux isolés en difficulté développent une forme propre de repas dansants adaptée à leur situation démographique qui cependant se rapproche des bals publics par leur logique républicaine. Mais il s'agit-là d'un repli vers une communauté protectrice qui révèle surtout sa fragilité et laisse planer un doute sur son avenir.Dans tous ces bals, on fait apparaître le rôle déterminant de certains groupes peu nombreux dont l'influence est due à leur prestige renforcé par la capacité à structurer les sociétés locales par le biais de l'organisation de tels événements.On semble donc basculer:- d'une légitimité à caractère politique vers une privatisation- d'une structuration des groupes territorialisés selon une logique spatiale à des logiques plus sociales et électives, voire ségrégativesdu citoyen au consommateur et même au fidèle- de l'élu représentant une communauté à un pourvoyeur de service quand ce n'est pas un leader charismatiqued'une fête mythique car refondatrice à l'utopie, au rêve greffé sur un espace réel indistinct, dénué de signification symbolique territoriale.
In this study, the public dance or ball (the principal type of public fête in France: more than 50 percent of events, with 150,000 every year) is used to examine on the one hand the relations between social processes, and on the other, spatial conceptions, forms and structures and temporal practices emphasizing a major change. Indeed, though the ball may be perceived as outdated, this activity is thriving, and adjusts to a changing society. It still plays an important part in the shaping of spatial relations and the framing of territories, and also makes it easier to observe them: 30 percent of the French go out dancing every year - twice as many in some regions.This study draw on various sources so as to show the diversity of the phenomenon at various levels. It reveals that the standard pattern—that of the public ball, an open ball inherited from republican tradition—is fading. Organised by local authorities whose legitimacy it reinforces, this republican ball contributes to the cohesion of the community and offers its members a clear image of that community.Meanwhile, new and more selective forms of socialisation are developing rapidly, in accordance with the specific lifestyle of extremely mobile commuters living in the suburbs. A drift towards more autonomy can be noticed in this space that until now has been considered a cross between town and country.Furthermore, underprivileged and isolated rural spaces develop a specific form of festive meal-with dancing that is suited to their demographic situation.In all these balls, small groups of people seem to play a decisive role. Their influence is due to the prestige they enjoy, which is reinforced by their ability to structure local communities through the planning of such events. It now seems that legitimacy is shifting:•from a political legitimacy to a private one.•from territorial structuration under a dominant spatial logic to social, elective and even segregative structuring.•from an elected member representing a community to a leisure supplier and sometimes a charismatic leader.•from citizen to consumer and even worshipper.•from mythic feast refounding the community to utopia: the dream of a perfect community, grafted on an indistinct real space and without any symbolic territorial signification.The extent of those changes, especially in the northern and eastern parts of the country, in the metropolitan areas, reveals that the decline of spatial, social and political bonds is far more advanced than is usually thought. ; La sortie au bal concerne chaque année 30 % des Français, le double dans plusieurs régions. A rebours d'une image désuète, cette activité bien vivante s'adapte aux mutations de la société et, avec 160 000 bals par an (1 pour 350 habitants), ne connait pas le déclin qu'on lui prête. Pour le géographe, ils se révèlent intéressants à deux titres. Avec une moyenne de 4,5 bals par commune et par an, ils jouent toujours un rôle important dans la structuration des relations spatiales et l'institution des territoires. Ils facilitent aussi l'observation de celles-ci, généralement difficile à mener de manière rigoureuse.Avec cette préoccupation, l'étude utilise des données nombreuses de très bonne qualité (les relevés de la SACEM, Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique). Pour montrer la diversité de cette activité à quatre niveaux d'échelle, du national au local, ces données sont aussi variées; on y adjoint donc des informations fournies par deux enquêtes, l'une auprès d'orchestres, l'autre réalisée dans des bals, et enfin une observation plus générale sur environ deux cent bals. S'y ajoutent des informations fournies par des organismes officiels: Ministère de la Culture, INSEE (RGP, enquête sociale, Inventaire Communal). La densité de cette information permet des synthèses précises, sous forme de graphiques ou de typologies. Cela a conduit à la réalisation d'environ cent cinquante cartes dont une soixantaine ont été retenues dans l'étude.Celle-ci remet en question un certain nombre de clichés tels que ceux d'un bal des jeunes, d'un bal exclusivement rural, d'un bal populaire en soulignant son rôle politique. L'étude privilégie cet angle d'observation afin de mettre en valeur des évolutions importantes dans la relation des communautés à leur territoire.Elle fait apparaître le recul du modèle dominant (60 % de l'ensemble des manifestations), le bal public, bal ouvert hérité de la tradition républicaine. Très encadré par les autorités municipales dont il renforce la légitimité, il contribue à la cohérence de la collectivité localisée et donne à ses membres une forte visibilité de celle-ci. Il reste néanmoins déterminant sur de vastes portions du territoire: le Massif Central, le Sud, particulièrement le Sud-Ouest, mais aussi -bien que différent et plus rare- dans le centre des grandes agglomérations; d'une manière générale, c'est le cas partout où la relative stabilité de la population ces dernières décennies n'a pas modifié trop en profondeur les liens forts du groupe au territoire et où les autorités municipales gardent une légitimité importante.En même temps, se développent rapidement de nouvelles formes de socialisation plus sélectives, adaptées aux modes de vie spécifiques des populations très mobiles de larges périphéries urbaines. En effet, les repas dansants y progressent au rythme de 2 à 4 % l'an. On assiste ainsi à une processus d'autonomisation des comportements dans ces espaces considérés jusqu'alors comme intermédiaires entre villes et campagnes. Leur situation n'est plus transitoire avant une consolidation; il s'agit bien d'une pérennisation.Ces bals reposent sur des associations dont la légitimité n'est plus la même que celle des autorités municipales. Refusant la large mixité sociale qui caractérise les bals ouverts, elle pratiquent la sélection de leur clientèle et se ferment pour éviter toute intrusion indésirable et déqualifiante. Elles la recrutent dans un réseau installé sur une aire beaucoup plus vaste et mal définie, sinon par la distance. Elles refusent ainsi l'idée de l'institution symbolique d'un territoire local commun à tous ses habitants. Du bal républicain on évolue ainsi vers les loisirs, mais on voit même parfois s'ébaucher la constitution de communautés rêvées, utopiques, politiquement dangereuses.L'ampleur de ces évolutions, surtout dans le nord et l'est du pays, montre que la déstructuration des liens spatiaux, sociaux et politiques est bien plus avancée qu'on le croit généralement.En même temps, les espaces ruraux isolés en difficulté développent une forme propre de repas dansants adaptée à leur situation démographique qui cependant se rapproche des bals publics par leur logique républicaine. Mais il s'agit-là d'un repli vers une communauté protectrice qui révèle surtout sa fragilité et laisse planer un doute sur son avenir.Dans tous ces bals, on fait apparaître le rôle déterminant de certains groupes peu nombreux dont l'influence est due à leur prestige renforcé par la capacité à structurer les sociétés locales par le biais de l'organisation de tels événements.On semble donc basculer:- d'une légitimité à caractère politique vers une privatisation- d'une structuration des groupes territorialisés selon une logique spatiale à des logiques plus sociales et électives, voire ségrégativesdu citoyen au consommateur et même au fidèle- de l'élu représentant une communauté à un pourvoyeur de service quand ce n'est pas un leader charismatiqued'une fête mythique car refondatrice à l'utopie, au rêve greffé sur un espace réel indistinct, dénué de signification symbolique territoriale.
The article by Chantal Medici that opens this issue of the magazine discusses critical contributions to the conventional theory of collective action inherited from the works seminars of Charles Tilly and the assumption of the sharpness of a hypothetical boundary between the public and the private, grouping them into three types of approach: those that emphasize the institutional activism of the State, those that do it in the construction of networks or communities of political attention and those that give special to the public / private articulation in the construction of the problem and in its implementation. Revised contributions are connected with a variety of approaches from Political Science, in particular the thesis of Lindblom on the relationship between states and markets in policymaking public, Migdal's statement about "the State in society" or, in our America, the Carlos Matus' theory on the complexity of the social game. Sofya Surtayeva's text shows the strategic role of the State in gestation and development of a public policy in a highly complex matter, in a country on the semi-periphery of the capitalism. Almost two decades ago our compatriot Hugo Notcheff demonstrated the close linking the dependent character of Argentine capitalism and the consequent fragility of science and technology policy, with the guidance of the economic leadership towards the appreciation of its capital by means of obtaining extraordinary profits from the exploitation of natural resources, the availability of cheap labor and the obtaining of subsidies and other state-owned, much more than the stimulus to innovation technological scientist and a policy aimed at its development. The corollary is a modernization of the economy based on the importation of innovations from the central economies, favored by close integration with foreign capital, with an effect on the fragility of scientific and technological development policies and the preservation of dependency. Taking as a common thread the role of the National Atomic Energy Commission in the development of nanotechnology the author shows the peculiarities of a process of innovation in a double facet: the promotion of an area of knowledge and the promotion by the CNEA of its own approach more akin to a sustainable development strategy and greater national autonomy. The article also provides a detailed approach to plurality of actors and interests, the relevance of leadership in the definition of politics and the gravitation of all this in the scientific-technological development and the insertion in the subject and the gravitation of the different possible responses in the insertion of Argentina in the global system. In this line of elaboration, Mariano Gil describes the public policies implemented in the province of Santa Fe to address problematic substance use. His work highlights the various public, private and community actors that intervene with unequal effectiveness in the construction of the problem, the incidence of that construction in the actions and organisms that will have to face it, the modifications that the adopted policy undergoes as it is being implemented and that same implementation introduces changes in the settings, in the subjects to whom it is addressed, in the state apparatuses and in the agents who are in charge of implementation. Bureaucrats, political decision-makers, non-governmental organizations, families, public security organizations, professionals and health technicians make up a wide range of subjects that intervene in the management of politics. For his part Miguel Alfredo and Pablo Granovsky deal with two experiences of training centers professional within the framework of actors that intervene at the intersection between education policies, labor policies and categorical organizations: the management cases of professional training policies of the UOCRA (Unión Obrera de la Construcción of the Argentine Republic) and the SMATA (Union of Mechanics and Transport Related Automotive). The article by Pablo Schamber and Francisco Suárez offers a detailed analysis of an experience of state / social actors articulation in the execution of a policy urban environment, through the inclusion of informal collectors of recyclable waste in the state policy of waste management. An experience that, in the opinion of authors, surpasses any other existing in the world. Beyond the specificity of their study topics, the three articles highlight the plurality of actors who participate from both "side" of the public-private differentiation in each of these topics, in the effort to configure a policy that is forever tool of a construction of power that, insofar as it institutionalizes some form of transaction between those who participate, is projected towards more broader than the specific ones. The promotion of public education is normally presented as a way for the reduction of levels of social inequality: a typical "window of opportunity". Judith Pinos Montenegro discusses this issue in her work on the promotion of basic education in Ecuador during the governments of the Citizen Revolution. The polysemy of the word equality stands out as it appears in official documents, increased due to the multiethnic nature of Ecuadorian society and the cultural contradictions and of class that are registered between public and private education. Jose Candelario Osuna García addresses the issue from the perspective of the temporary displacement of thousands of low-income Mexican families for work reasons, which leads to the interruption of the school career of the children and young people involved in these migrations and relativizes in this regard, the principle of equality in access to the right to education. Article focuses on the Education Program for Migrant Populations prepared by the government of the state of Baja California, in order to minimize the risks in terms of training school and cultural derived from the insertion of families in the cross-border structure of the labor market and the productive system. It is easy to see then that the mode of insertion in the social matrix conditions the effective access to rights. Poor peasants, migrant workers, native populations referred to in the preceding texts see their opportunities reduced education because of the position they occupy in that social matrix; in the absence of intervention state inequalities are strengthened because the educational system does not comply with these subjects the promotional function that should contribute to a change in their position in the structure. The political regime, with its own conception of equality, reinforces and expands or limits and neutralizes the dominant system of inequalities. Aristotle twenty-five centuries ago He emphasized that the prevailing ideas regarding equality and inequality and their causes vary according to the political regime, that is, to the organization and distribution of power. By changing the political regime, sooner or later the ideas of equality change, and therefore justice promoted by the State and public policies. The assumption in Uruguay in March 2020 of a neoliberal government implied important changes in policies social in general and care in particular, in sharp contrast to those that characterized to the fifteen previous years of government of the Broad Front. Ximena Baráibar Ribero analyzes the conceptualization of the new government's policy of assistance to populations in situation of poverty: a set of actions to encourage individual self-improvement and personal responsibility of those affected, and a residual role of the State. Poverty and inequality are, in the intellectual design of the new authorities, individual phenomena both in its causes as well as its effects. Social policies would have no other purpose than to facilitate a transit to individual opportunities that are assumed discursively, not discussed as reality and leave aside the question of the social, that is, collective, factors that create conditions for the gestation and development of individual situations. Carlos M. Vilas director ; El artículo de Chantal Medici con que se inicia este número de la revista discute contribuciones críticas a la teoría convencional de la acción colectiva heredera de los trabajos seminales de Charles Tilly y del supuesto de la nitidez de una hipotética frontera entre lo público y lo privado, agrupándolas en tres tipos de abordaje: las que ponen énfasis en el activismo institucional del Estado, las que lo hacen en la construcción de redes o co[1]munidades de políticas y las que dan especial atención a la articulación público/privado en la construcción del problema y en su implementación. Las contribuciones revisadas entroncan con una variedad de enfoques desde la Ciencia Política, en particular la tesis de Lindblom sobre la relación entre estados y mercados en la formación de las políticas públicas, el planteo de Migdal sobre "el Estado en la sociedad" o, en nuestra América, la teoría de Carlos Matus sobre la complejidad del juego social. El texto de Sofya Surtayeva muestra el rol estratégico del Estado en la gestación y desarrollo de una política pública en un asunto de alta complejidad, en un país de la semiperiferia del capitalismo. Hace casi dos décadas nuestro compatriota Hugo Notcheff demostró la estrecha vinculación del carácter dependiente del capitalismo argentino y la consiguiente fragilidad de la política de ciencia y tecnología, con la orientación de la cúpula del poder económico hacia la valorización de su capital por la vía de la obtención de ganancias extraordinarias de la explotación de recursos naturales, la disponibilidad de trabajo barato y la obtención de subsidios y otras preferencias estatales, mucho más que del estímulo a la innovación científico tecnológica y a una política encaminada a su desarrollo. El corolario es una modernización de la economía basada en la importación de innovaciones provenientes de las economías centrales, favorecida por la estrecha integración con capitales extranjeros, con efecto en la fragilidad de las políticas de desarrollo científico y tecnológico y la preservación de la dependencia. Tomando como hilo conductor el papel de la Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica en el desarrollo de la nanotecnología la autora muestra las particularidades de un proceso de innovación en una doble faceta: el impulso a un área de conocimiento y la promoción por la CNEA de un enfoque propio más afín a una estrategia de desarrollo sostenible y mayor autonomía nacional. El artículo brinda asimismo una detallada aproximación a la pluralidad de actores e intereses, la relevancia del liderazgo en la definición de la política y la gravitación de todo ello en el desarrollo científico-tecnológico y la inserción en el tema y la gravitación de las diferentes respuestas posibles en la inserción de Argentina en el sistema global. En esta línea de elaboración, Mariano Gil describe las políticas públicas ejecutadas en la provincia de Santa Fe para el abordaje del consumo problemático de sustancias. Su trabajo destaca los varios actores públicos, privados y comunitarios que intervienen con desigual eficacia en la construcción del problema, la incidencia de esa construcción en las acciones y organismos que habrán de encararlo, las modificaciones que la política adoptada experimenta a medida que va siendo implementada y esa misma implementación introduce cambios en los escenarios, en los sujetos a quienes se dirige, en los aparatos del estado y en los agentes que tienen a cargo la implementación. Burócratas, decisores políticos, organizaciones no gubernamentales, familias, organismos de seguridad pública, profesionales y técnicos de la salud integran un arco amplio de sujetos que intervienen en la gestión de la política. Por su parte Miguel Alfredo y Pablo Granovsky se ocupan de dos experiencias de centros de formación profesional en el marco del entramado de actores que intervienen en la intersección entre políticas de educación, políticas laborales y organizaciones categoriales: los casos de gestión de políticas de formación profesional de la UOCRA (Unión Obrera de la Construcción de la República Argentina) y del SMATA (Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor). El artículo de Pablo Schamber y Francisco Suárez ofrece un detallado análisis de una experiencia de articulación estado/actores sociales en la ejecución de una política ambiental urbana, a través de la inclusión de los recolectores informales de residuos reciclables en la política estatal de gestión de los residuos. Una experiencia que, a juicio de los autores, supera cualquier otra existente en el mundo. Más allá de la especificidad de sus temas de estudio, los tres artículos destacan la pluralidad de actores que participan desde uno y otro "lado" de la diferenciación público-privada en cada uno de esos temas, en el empeño de configurar una política que es siempre herramienta de una construcción de poder que, en la medida en que institucionaliza alguna forma de transacción entre quienes participan, se proyecta hacia ámbitos más amplios que los específicos. El fomento de la educación pública es presentado normalmente como una vía para la reducción de los niveles de desigualdad social: una típica "ventana de oportunidades". Judith Pinos Montenegro discute este asunto en su trabajo sobre la promoción de la educación básica en Ecuador durante los gobiernos de la Revolución Ciudadana. Destaca la polisemia del vocablo igualdad como aparece en los documentos oficiales, incrementada por la naturaleza pluriétnica de la sociedad ecuatoriana y las contradicciones culturales y de clase que se registran entre la educación pública y la privada. José Candelario Osuna García encara el tema desde la perspectiva del desplazamiento temporal de miles de familias mexicanas de bajos ingresos por razones laborales, que lleva a la interrupción de la trayectoria escolar de los niños, niñas y jóvenes involucrados en esas migraciones y relativiza a su respecto el principio de igualdad en el acceso al derecho a la educación. El artículo enfoca el Programa de Educación para Poblaciones Migrantes elaborado por el gobierno del estado de Baja California, con el fin de minimizar los riesgos en materia de formación escolar y cultural derivados de la inserción de las familias en la estructura transfronteriza del mercado de trabajo y el sistema productivo. Fácilmente se advierte entonces que el modo de inserción en la matriz social condiciona el acceso efectivo a derechos. Los campesinos pobres, los trabajadores migrantes, las poblaciones originarias a quienes se refieren los textos precedentes ven reducidas sus oportunidades de educación por la posición que ocupan en esa matriz social; en ausencia de intervención estatal las desigualdades se potencian porque el sistema educativo no cumple respecto de esos sujetos la función promocional que debería contribuir a un cambio en su posición en la estructura. El régimen político, con su propia concepción de la igualdad, refuerza y expande o acota y neutraliza el sistema dominante de desigualdades. Hace veinticinco siglos Aristóteles destacó que las ideas predominantes en materia de igualdad y desigualdad y sus causas va[1]rían de acuerdo al régimen político, es decir a la organización y distribución del poder. Cambiando el régimen político, cambian antes o después las ideas de igualdad, y por tanto de justicia promovidas desde el Estado y las políticas públicas. La asunción en Uruguay en marzo 2020 de un gobierno de corte neoliberal implicó cambios importantes en las políticas sociales en general y asistenciales en particular, de fuerte contraste con las que caracterizaron a los quince años precedentes de gobierno del Frente Amplio. Ximena Baráibar Ribero analiza la conceptualización de la política del nuevo gobierno de asistencia a poblaciones en situación de pobreza: un conjunto de acciones de estímulo a la superación individual y la responsabilidad personal de los afectados, y un papel residual del Estado. Pobreza y desigualdad son, en el diseño intelectual de las nuevas autoridades, fenómenos individuales tanto en sus causas como en sus efectos. Las políticas sociales no tendrían otro fin que facilitar un tránsito a oportunidades individuales que se asumen discursivamente, no se discuten como realidad y dejan de lado la pregunta sobre los factores sociales, es decir colectivos, que crean condiciones para la gestación y desarrollo de las situaciones individuales. Carlos M. Vilas Director
Clare Hutchinson is the NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and SecurityOn 31 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, women's concerns in relation to peace and security were formally discussed and acknowledged within the Security Council. Resolution 1325 recognises the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women and stresses the need for full participation of women as active agents in peace and security.Building on the earlier UN Security Council resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict and Protection of Civilians, UNSCR 1325 was revolutionary, bringing to global attention the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls. UNSCR 1325 is a political and operational tool that has changed the conceptualisation of security and reframed the issue of women's rights within this space. Its 3 pillars of prevention, protection and participation remain the bedrock of WPS and, as such, demand that all actors recognize the different impact of armed conflict on women and girls is something for which the global community can find concrete remedies with and for women.As the UN WPS resolutions have evolved[1] and grown in stature and number, so has the recognition that so-called 'marginal' actors such as women are no longer on the periphery. The Women, Peace and Security agenda collectively recognises that women are not only victims in conflict; often subject to heinous brutality and marginalized politically and economically, but they also make up to 30% of combatants in many conflicts and are sometimes actively engaged in terrorist organisations. The role of women in conflict, like that of men, is complex and layered and a gender lens needs to be applied to the entire cycle of conflict without preconceptions.In November 2017, Canada launched 'The Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers'. The 'Principles' are a set of 17 political commitments focused on child protection in peacekeeping, but also specifically recognise the contribution of women to peacekeeping and the critical roles women can play in the protection of children.Over the last few years the attention to the lack of women in peace operations has become central. Discussions, initiatives and activities have increased in volume in their focus on gender parity and increasing the number of women, for both uniformed and civilian peacekeepers.For international organisations, including NATO, this has propelled a call for increased attention to the recruitment and retention of women in national forces, as a basis of operational effectiveness. The UN 2028 target for women serving in military contingents is 15%. Currently, NATO is ahead of the global average, with women making up 12% of NATO forces. However, more needs to be done. NATO's strategy has been to encourage our nations to dismantle barriers standing in the way of the full participation of women in the Alliance and national forces. We will continue to push and encourage the deployment of women, not because they are women to match targets, but because they have a right to contribute to the service of their nation and NATO.We should, however, be cautious about resting the efficacy of the agenda on parity alone. While greater diversity and a broadened skillset can be linked to better decision‐making, planning and results - numbers are not enough. It is only in balancing the issues of parity and participation, that equality can be efficiently and effectively actioned.The Vancouver Principles highlight the 'distinct and critical roles of both men and women in the protection of children and the prevention of the recruitment and use of child soldiers'[2]. Yet, we do need to be cautious about making assumptions women are innately suited to protection of children tasks – assumptions that are both inaccurate and dangerously essentialist. Where attention needs to be placed is in the gendering of responses to child protection. To what extent can gender perspectives enhance the political framework on children and armed conflict and the operational response to prevention and protection?Vancouver Principle 11 provides an important political foundation from which to move forward. As we forge a path towards the next twenty years, we must all continue to do our part, to strengthen both parity and participation, to secure a lasting peace for all.[1] There are currently ten United Nations Security Council resolutions on WPS, UNSCRS 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888(2009) 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), 2493 (2019) [2] The Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 2017 ; Clare Hutchinson es la Representante especial de la OTAN sobre Mujeres, Paz y SeguridadEl 31 de octubre de 2000, el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas adoptó de manera unánime la Resolución 1325 sobre Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad (MPS). Por primera vez en la historia de las Naciones Unidas, las inquietudes de las mujeres respecto a la paz y la seguridad fueron debatidas y reconocidas formalmente en el Consejo de Seguridad. La Resolución 1325 reconoce el impacto único y desproporcionado del conflicto armado en las mujeres y enfatiza la necesidad de que las mujeres participen de manera integral como agentes activos para el mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad.Con base en resoluciones anteriores del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU sobre Niños y conflicto armado, y sobre Protección de civiles, la Resolución 1325 fue revolucionaria, pues atrajo la atención mundial sobre el impacto desproporcionado de los conflictos en mujeres y niñas. La Resolución 1325 es una herramienta política y operacional que ha modificado la conceptualización de la seguridad y replanteado el tema de los derechos de las mujeres en este ámbito. Sus tres pilares de prevención, protección y participación siguen siendo la base de MPS y, como tales, exigen que todos los actores reconozcan que el impacto diferente de los conflictos armados en mujeres y niñas es un problema que la comunidad mundial puede resolver mediante medidas concretas con y para las mujeres.A medida que las resoluciones sobre MPS de la ONU evolucionan[1] y crecen en envergadura y número, también lo hace el reconocimiento de que los famosos actores "marginales", como las mujeres, ya no se encuentran segregados. El plan sobre Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad reconoce de manera colectiva que las mujeres no son solo víctimas en un conflicto; a menudo sufren brutalidades abominables y son marginadas tanto política como económicamente, pero también representan hasta el 30% de los combatientes en numerosos conflictos y a veces participan de manera activa en organizaciones terroristas. El rol de las mujeres en un conflicto, al igual que el de los hombres, es complejo y matizado, por lo que es necesario abordar desde una perspectiva de género el ciclo completo del conflicto sin ideas preconcebidas.En noviembre de 2017, Canadá publicó "Los Principios de Vancouver sobre Mantenimiento de la Paz y Prevención del Reclutamiento y Uso de Niños Soldados". Los "Principios" son un conjunto de 17 compromisos políticos focalizados en la protección infantil durante misiones de paz, pero también reconocen específicamente la contribución de las mujeres en el mantenimiento de la paz y los roles críticos que pueden desempeñar en la protección infantil.Durante los últimos años, la ausensia de mujeres en misiones de paz se ha convertido en un tema de análisis fundamental. Los debates, las iniciativas y las actividades han reforzado su enfoque en la igualdad de género y aumentado las cifras de mujeres como pacificadoras uniformadas y civiles.Para las organizaciones internacionales, incluida la OTAN, esto ha llevado a solicitar una mayor atención en el reclutamiento y retención de mujeres en fuerzas nacionales con el objetivo de promover la eficacia operativa. El objetivo 2028 de la ONU para las mujeres que prestan servicio en contingentes militares es del 15 %. Actualmente, la OTAN se encuentra por sobre el promedio mundial, con una representación de mujeres del 12 % en sus fuerzas. Sin embargo, aún queda mucho por hacer. La estrategia de la OTAN ha sido animar a nuestros países a derribar las barreras que impiden la participación integral de mujeres en la Alianza y en las fuerzas nacionales. Seguiremos esforzándonos y fomentando el despliegue de mujeres, no solo para cumplir las metas de participación femenina, sino porque ellas tienen derecho a contribuir al servicio de su nación y de la OTAN.No obstante, debemos tener cuidado de no supeditar la eficacia del plan solo a la paridad. Aunque la mayor diversidad y los conjuntos de habilidades más amplios se pueden vincular a una mejor toma de decisiones, planificación y resultados, las cifras no bastan. Solo si equilibramos los problemas de paridad y participación, será posible aplicar con eficiencia y eficacia esa igualdad.Los Principios de Vancouver resaltan "los roles distintos y fundamentales de hombres y mujeres en la protección infantil y la prevención del reclutamiento y uso de niños soldados".[2] Aun así, debemos tener cuidado de no suponer que las mujeres son inherentemente idóneas para labores de protección infantil, pues estas suposiciones no solo son inexactas sino que peligrosamente esencialistas. Es necesario concentrar la atención en la dimensión de género de las medidas de respuesta para proteger a los niños. ¿En qué medida las perspectivas de género pueden optimizar el marco político sobre niños y conflicto armado, así como la respuesta operativa de prevención y protección?El Principio de Vancouver 11 ofrece una base política importante para avanzar. Mientras preparamos el camino para los próximos veinte años, debemos seguir haciendo nuestra parte para garantizar una paz duradera para todos.[1] Actualmente, existen diez resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre MPS, UNSCRS 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888(2009) 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), 2493 (2019) [2] Los Principios de Vancouver sobre Mantenimiento de la Paz y Prevención del Reclutamiento y Uso de Niños Soldados 2017 ; Clare Hutchinson est la représentante spéciale du secrétaire général de l'OTAN pour les femmes, la paix et la sécuritéLe 31 octobre 2000, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a adopté à l'unanimité la Résolution 1325 sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité. Pour la première fois dans l'histoire des Nations Unies, les préoccupations des femmes en matière de paix et de sécurité ont été formellement discutées et reconnues au sein du Conseil de sécurité. La Résolution 1325 reconnaît l'impact disproportionné et particulier des conflits armés sur les femmes et souligne la nécessité d'une pleine participation des femmes en tant qu'agentes actives de la paix et de la sécurité.S'appuyant sur les résolutions antérieures du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies sur les enfants face aux conflits armés et sur la protection des civils, la Résolution 1325 était révolutionnaire, attirant l'attention du monde entier sur l'impact disproportionné des conflits sur les femmes et les filles.La RCSNU 1325 est un outil politique et opérationnel qui a modifié la conceptualisation de la sécurité et recadré la question des droits des femmes dans cet espace. Ses trois piliers, à savoir la prévention, la protection et la participation, restent le fondement du programme « Femmes, paix et sécurité » et, à ce titre, exigent que tous les acteurs reconnaissent l'impact différent des conflits armés sur les femmes et les filles, ce à quoi la communauté mondiale peut trouver des remèdes concrets avec et pour les femmes.Au fur et à mesure que les résolutions des Nations Unies sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité ont évoluées[1], ont pris de l'ampleur et se sont multipliées, il est également reconnu que les acteurs dits « marginaux » tels que les femmes ne sont plus à la périphérie. Le programme « Femmes, paix et sécurité » reconnaît collectivement que les femmes ne sont pas seulement des victimes dans les conflits, souvent soumises à des brutalités odieuses et marginalisées politiquement et économiquement, mais qu'elles représentent aussi jusqu'à 30 % des combattants dans de nombreux conflits et sont parfois activement engagées dans des organisations terroristes. Le rôle des femmes dans les conflits, comme celui des hommes, est complexe et multiple, et il convient d'appliquer une optique sexospécifique à l'ensemble du cycle du conflit, sans préconceptions.En novembre 2017, le Canada a lancé Les Principes de Vancouver sur le maintien de la paix et la prévention du recrutement et de l'utilisation d'enfants-soldats. Les Principes sont un ensemble de 17 engagements politiques axés sur la protection des enfants dans le cadre du maintien de la paix, mais ils reconnaissent aussi explicitement la contribution des femmes au maintien de la paix et les rôles essentiels qu'elles peuvent jouer dans la protection des enfants.Au cours des dernières années, l'attention portée à l'absence des femmes dans les opérations de paix est devenue centrale. Les discussions, les initiatives et les activités se sont multipliées pour mettre l'accent sur la parité entre les sexes et l'augmentation du nombre de femmes, tant parmi les soldats de la paix en uniforme que parmi les civils.Pour les organisations internationales, y compris l'OTAN, cela a conduit à demander qu'une attention accrue soit accordée au recrutement et au maintien en poste des femmes dans les forces nationales, comme base de l'efficacité opérationnelle. L'objectif des Nations Unies pour 2028 est de 15 % de femmes dans les contingents militaires. Actuellement, l'OTAN est en avance sur la moyenne mondiale, puisque les femmes représentent 12 % des forces de l'OTAN. Cependant, il faut en faire plus. La stratégie de l'OTAN a consisté à encourager nos pays à démanteler les obstacles qui s'opposent à la pleine participation des femmes aux forces de l'Alliance et aux forces nationales. Nous continuerons à promouvoir et à encourager le déploiement de femmes, non pas parce qu'elles sont des femmes qui permettent d'atteindre des objectifs, mais parce qu'elles ont le droit de contribuer au service de leur pays et de l'OTAN.Nous devrions toutefois être prudents quant à la possibilité de faire reposer l'efficacité du programme sur la seule parité. Si une plus grande diversité et un éventail de compétences élargi peuvent être liés à une amélioration de la prise de décision, de la planification et des résultats, les chiffres ne suffisent pas. Ce n'est qu'en équilibrant les questions de parité et de participation que l'égalité peut être mise en œuvre de manière efficace et réelle.Les Principes de Vancouver soulignent les « rôles distincts et cruciaux que jouent les hommes et les femmes dans la protection des enfants et la prévention du recrutement et de l'utilisation d'enfants-soldats[2] ». Cependant, nous devons faire attention à ne pas présumer que les femmes sont naturellement douées pour les tâches de protection des enfants, des présomptions qui sont à la fois inexactes et dangereusement essentialistes. Il convient d'accorder une attention particulière à la dimension sexuée des réponses apportées à la protection de l'enfance. Dans quelle mesure les perspectives sexospécifiques peuvent-elles améliorer le cadre politique sur les enfants et les conflits armés, et la réponse opérationnelle en matière de prévention et de protection ?Le Principe 11 de Vancouver fournit une base politique importante pour aller de l'avant. Alors que nous traçons la voie vers les vingt prochaines années, nous devons tous continuer à faire notre part pour renforcer à la fois la parité et la participation, afin de garantir une paix durable pour tous. [1] Il existe actuellement dix résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, à savoir les résolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019) et 2493 (2019).[2] Les Principes de Vancouver sur le maintien de la paix et la prévention du recrutement et de l'utilisation d'enfants-soldats, 2017
La producción de aceite en Galicia como actividad generalizada es históricamente constatable hasta el siglo XVIII. A partir de ese momento comienza su declive hasta casi su desaparición. Fue a partir de bien entrada la década de los noventa cuando se produjo un tímido auge de la actividad olivarera en esta comunidad, con la recuperación de olivos centenarios y/o la plantación de nuevas variedades. En la actualidad, perduran y conviven estas dos políticas en cuanto al cultivo del olivo. Por un lado, se está fomentando la plantación de variedades principales, Arbequina y/o Picual, con la finalidad de alcanzar una producción oleícola intensiva a corto plazo. Por otro lado, se están recuperando olivos centenarios de las variedades conocidas por los olivicultores de la zona como Brava y Mansa para elaborar aceites de oliva gallegos con un valor añadido. Para proteger y garantizar el valor añadido de los aceites elaborados con ejemplares de olivo centenarios ha sido necesario, en primer lugar, identificar correctamente este material vegetal mediante técnicas moleculares para demostrar que no se trata de variedades registradas en el Banco de Germoplasma Mundial del Olivo (BGMO) de la Universidad de Córdoba. Mayoritariamente el perfil molecular de las muestras coincidió con el de la variedad Brava, actualmente en fase de registro. Únicamente el perfil de dos muestras no pudo asociarse a ninguna de las variedades incluidas en dicho BGMO. Este hecho puede deberse a que sean variedades autóctonas, o bien a variedades conocidas pero sin introducir todavía en el BGMO. El aceite de oliva virgen se caracteriza, entre otros atributos, por su aroma asociado a la presencia minoritaria de compuestos volátiles que se transfieren al aceite, en gran medida, desde la molienda del fruto. Comprobar si el perfil aromático de las aceitunas se puede extrapolar a su correspondiente aceite, permitiría evaluar el potencial aromático de cada variedad previo a la elaboración del aceite. En base a los resultados obtenidos, se ha demostrado que el perfil aromático de las aceitunas no es extrapolable al de sus aceites puesto que la actividad de las enzimas endógenas a lo largo del proceso de elaboración es el principal factor que determina la síntesis de los compuestos volátiles más relevantes del aroma. La actividad de estas enzimas se puede modular variando distintos parámetros durante el proceso de elaboración, siendo los más importantes la temperatura y el tiempo de la etapa de batido. Los valores de estos parámetros pueden afectar a la composición minoritaria de los aceites, incluyendo también a los compuestos fenólicos. La elección de la combinación temperatura/tiempo de batido dependerá de si se prioriza su funcionalidad o su aroma, además de estar supeditada al rendimiento de la extracción. En general, la formación de compuestos volátiles C6 se ha visto favorecida por tiempos de batido largos (90 minutos) y temperaturas bajas (20oC), mientras que la formación de compuestos C5 no siguió una tendencia tan evidente. En cuanto a los compuestos fenólicos, éstos se han generado en mayor cantidad a temperaturas más elevadas (30oC) y tiempos más bajos (30 minutos) para las variedades estudiadas. Se ha observado, por tanto, una correlación inversamente proporcional en la formación de estos dos grupos de compuestos minoritarios. La calidad sensorial de los aceites elaborados con variedades principales está ampliamente evaluada y reconocida. Sin embargo, los aceites de oliva virgen obtenidos a partir de variedades no clasificadas hasta el momento podrían presentar características diferentes, e incluso superiores a éstos. Si ello se demuestra, no solo se podría facilitar la elaboración de aceites monovarietales de estas variedades minoritarias sino que además se podrían diseñar nuevos aceites resultantes de procesos de molienda con variedades principales y/o coupage de sus aceites. En el desarrollo de estos nuevos aceites, la co-molienda de aceitunas Brava/Mansa con Arbequina o Picual así como el coupage de aceites aumentaron significativamente las series odorantes principales que conforman el perfil sensorial de los aceites y, al mismo tiempo, su funcionalidad debido al incremento de los compuestos fenólicos. En relación a la funcionalidad de los aceites, la Comisión Europea aprobó recientemente la alegación de propiedad saludable, "los polifenoles del aceite de oliva contribuyen a la protección de los lípidos de la sangre frente al daño oxidativo", para aquellos aceites que contengan al menos 5 mg de hidroxitirosol y sus derivados/por 20 gramos de aceite de oliva virgen. La funcionalidad de estos aceites se podría potenciar si se demuestra que se alcanzan estos valores y si, al mismo tiempo, se desarrolla una herramienta simple y rápida para su cuantificación que pueda ofrecerse al sector oleícola. Los resultados obtenidos a partir de un protocolo analítico sencillo y validado demostraron que los aceites elaborados a partir de las aceitunas Brava/Mansa satisfacen los requisitos exigidos por el marco de la Unión Europea para poder indicar en su etiquetado la declaración de propiedad saludable, superando incluso el umbral establecido en la legislación. ; Olive oil production in Galicia as a widespread activity is historically visible until the eighteenth century. From that moment it begins its descent to near extinction. It was not until well into the nineties when there was a boom in olive oil production in this community, with the recovery of ancient olive trees and/or the planting of new varieties. Currently, they endure and live with the following policies regarding olive cultivation. On the one hand, the planting of leading varieties, such as Arbequina and/or Picual, is encouraged in order to achieve an intensive olive oil production in a short amount of time. On the other hand, olive trees of the varieties known to olive growers in the area as Brava and Mansa are being recovered to develop Galician olive oils with an added value. To protect and guarantee the added value of olive oils made with specimens of ancient olive trees, it was first necessary to properly identify this plant material using molecular techniques to show that it is not registered in the World Olive Germplasm Bank of Cordoba (BGMO) of the University of Cordoba. The molecular profile of the samples mainly matched that of the Brava variety, which is currently undergoing registration. Only two sample profiles could not be associated with any of the varieties listed in that BGMO. This may be because they are indigenous varieties, or possibly well-known varieties, which still haven't been added to the BGMO. Virgin olive oil is characterized, among other attributes, by its aroma, which is associated with the minority presence of volatile compounds that are transferred when the fruit is crushed. Checking if the aromatic profile of the olives can be matched to its corresponding oil would allow the aromatic potential of each variety to be assessed before the oil production process begins. Based on the results, it has been shown that the flavor profile of olives cannot be matched to their oils since the activity of endogenous enzymes throughout the process is the main factor determining the synthesis of the most important volatile compounds in the aroma. The activity of these enzymes can be modified by varying different parameters during the process, the most important being the temperature and time of the malaxation step. The values of these parameters can affect the minority oil composition including the phenolic compounds. The combination of temperature/time malaxation will depend on whether its functionality or aroma is prioritized, in addition to being subject to extraction yield. In general, the formation of C6 volatile compounds has been favored by long malaxation times (90 minutes) and low temperature (20°C), while the formation of C5 compounds didn't follow such an obvious trend. Regarding 4 the phenolic compounds, the studied varieties are generated in greater quantities at higher temperatures (30°C) and with lower malaxation times (30 minutes). Therefore, an inverse correlation in the formation of these two groups of minor compounds has been observed. The sensory quality of oils made with main varieties is widely evaluated and recognized. However, virgin olive oils obtained from varieties not classified until now may have different characteristics, and even exceed them. If this is proved, it could not only facilitate the development of monovarietal (one) oils of these minority varieties but it could also result in new oil by co-crushing leading varieties and/ or their blend of oils. In developing these new oils, co-crushing the olives Brava/Mansa, Arbequina or Picual and the oil blend significantly increased the main odorant series comprising the sensory profile of the oil and, at the same time, their functionality because of the increase of phenolic compounds. Regarding the functionality of the oil, the European Commission recently approved the health claim submission, "olive oil polyphenols contribute to the protection of blood lipids from oxidative stress" to those olive oils which contain at least 5 mg of hydroxytyrosol and its derivatives per 20 grams of olive oil. The functionality of these oils could be enhanced if it is demonstrated that these values are achieved and if, at the same time, a simple and fast tool for quantification that can be offered to the olive sector is developed. The results obtained from a simple and validated analytical protocol showed that oils made from Brava/Mansa olives meet the requirements of the framework of the European Union to indicate on the label, surpassing even the threshold set in the legislation.
Der Hintergrund vorliegender Forschungsarbeit über den Kleinprivatwald leitet sich aus der forstpolitischen Fragestellung ab, zu untersuchen, wie sich veränderte Rahmenbedingungen (Agrarstrukturwandel, Strukturwandel in der Holzbe- und verarbeitung) auf die Einstellungen, Interessen und Verhaltensweisen der Kleinprivatwaldbesitzer auswirken. Holzbe- und verarbeitung als Marktpartner des Kleinprivatwaldes Der Wandel in der Holzbe- und verarbeitung beeinträchtigt/gefährdet zunehmend die wirt-schaftliche Inwertsetzung ( Vermarktung von Holz aus dem Kleinprivatwald ), da die strukturellen Nachteile der Forstbetriebe im Kleinprivatwald ( Kleinflächigkeit, aussetzende Bewirtschaftungsweise, . ) eine nachfragegerechte Orientierung am Markt nicht zulassen. Aufgrund seines Flächenumfanges ( Kleinprivatwald (<200 ha): ca. 47% der Waldfläche in Bayern ) besteht aber die forst- und holzmarktpolitische Notwendigkeit, das Nutzungspotential ( des nachwachsenden, klima-neutralen Rohstoffes Holz ) im Kleinprivatwald auch wirtschaftlich in Wert zu setzen und die Bewirtschaftung von Wald als Quelle von Wertschöpfung und Einkommen in den ländlichen Räumen zu stützen. Aus Wettbewerbsgründen sind rundholzverarbeitende Betriebe zunehmend auf weiterverar-beitungsgerechte Holzlose angewiesen, die ein einzelner Forstbetrieb im Kleinprivatwald nicht mehr gewährleisten kann. Auswirkungen des Agrarstrukturwandels aus Sicht der Revierleiter und Zusammen-schlüsse Der Wandel in den Agrarstrukturen ( v.a. Betriebsaufgaben landwirtschaftlicher Voll- und Nebenerwerbs-betriebe ) führt dazu, dass sich die ehemals überwiegend bäuerlich geprägte Kleinprivatwald-struktur ( Land- und fortwirtschaftliche Mischbetriebe ) zunehmend in eine Struktur aus nicht-bäuerlichen Forstbetrieben umändert. Die Änderungen, die Privatwaldberater und Verantwortliche der Zusammenschlüsse im Zuge des Agrarwandels feststellen, formulieren sich wie folgt: Bäuerliche Waldbesitzer: Der Druck, die Betriebsabläufe im bäuerlichen Betrieb zu rationalisieren, führt zu drei wesentlichen Veränderungen: Das Ertragspotential des Waldes wird verstärkt als Einkommensquelle herangezogen. Der Einsatz von Fremdarbeitskraft wird als Alternative wahrgenommen, das verfügbare Arbeitspotential auf die Landwirtschaft zu konzentrieren und trotzdem Erträge aus dem Wald zu erwirtschaften. Schließlich werden diejenigen Fälle beschrieben, in denen das Waldeigentum aus Kosten- und Zeitgründen wegen fehlender Rentabilität abgestoßen bzw. liquidiert wird. Ehemals bäuerliche Waldbesitzer: Zeitmangel, eine sinkende materielle Bedeutung des Waldes und eine sinkende Ausstattung mit forsttauglichen Geräten haben zwei ein-schneidende Veränderungen zur Folge: Die materielle Bedeutung des Waldes als Einkommensquelle verliert als Nutzungsgrund an Gewicht. Entweder beschränkt sich die Nutzung auf die Gewinnung von Brennholz oder die Notwendigkeit bzw. die Sinnhaftigkeit einer Bewirtschaftung wird bei fehlendem Eigenbedarf an Holz an sich in Frage gestellt. Die Nutzungsintensität und vor allem die Vermarktungsintensität reduziert sich (bei den kleinen Waldbesitzen) erheblich. Die verfügbare Zeit, die maschinelle Ausstattung und damit die Arbeitskapazität verringern sich. Nichtbäuerlicher Waldbesitzer: Die Sichtweisen, wie Waldeigentum wahrgenommen wird, individualisieren sich und werden stark inhomogen. Damit verlieren Teile der Waldbesitzer die Bindung an alte tradierte Normen in der Waldbewirtschaftung: Die Beschäftigung und die Arbeit im Wald als Hobby reduzieren Wald auf einen Gebrauchswert. Daneben führt eine verkürzte Sichtweise des Nutzwertes von Wald auf seinen abstrakten aktuellen materiellen Wert zu einer unterschiedlichen Auffassung von Rentabilität: Es werden nur mehr sich selbst rentierende Eingriffe durchgeführt und Investitionen in Form von Pflegeeingriffen unterbleiben. Ebenfalls werden belastende Elemente beobachtet, die durch die Eigentümerschaft an Wald und damit einhergehenden Verpflichtungen empfunden werden. Die Tendenz, dass sich bestehende Wertvorstellungen und Bewirtschaftungsvorstellungen ändern, kann zu folgenden Ausrichtungen bei Waldbesitzern führen: Freizeit, Hobby, körperlicher Ausgleich, die in der Beschäftigung am und im Wald gesucht werden, treten in den Vordergrund. Zum Hauptbestreben des Waldbesitzers wird es, so wenig Zeit und Aufwand wie möglich mit dem Waldeigentum zu haben. Das Ziel in der Bewirtschaftung reduziert sich auf den reinen statischen Erhalt des Waldes im Ist-Zustand, ohne irgendwelche eigenen Vorstellungen, Ansprüche oder Ziele für die Waldbewirtschaftung zu entwickeln. An materiellen Zielen, die im Grunde nichts mit Holzproduktion, nachhaltiger Bewirtschaftung und Entwicklung des Waldes zu tun haben, sind zu nennen: Wald als "schlafende" Geldanlage oder als Spekulationsobjekt. Aus dem Wald wird ausschließlich der Brennholzbedarf gedeckt. Einzelne Aspekte von Waldeigentum und Forstwirtschaft werden also überhöht und als isolierte Ziele verfolgt. Durch die erhöhte Mobilität in der Gesellschaft nimmt auch der Anteil an ausmärkischen Waldbesitzern zu. Dies stellt vor allem die forstfachlichen Institutionen vor neue Heraus-forderungen: Die Unterschiede zwischen In- und Ausmärkern lassen sich in Kontaktformen, Beratungs-anlässe, -inhalte und -intensitäten, in Unterschieden in den Wertvorstellungen/Wissen und im Verhalten gliedern. Für die staatlichen Berater gestaltet sich die Erreichbarkeit oft umständlich und zeitaufwendig (so z.B. oft nur an Nichtwerktagen). In der Regel sind nur Einzelberatungen möglich bzw. ein Kontakt beschränkt sich auf schriftliche Formen. Über Gruppenberatungen erscheint diese Gruppe i.d.R. kaum erreichbar. Als Beratungsanlässe -inhalte und -intensitäten treten überdurchschnittlich auf: Konkrete An-lässe (akute Problemsituationen), zeitaufwendige Beratungen, die oft erst eine Grundwissens-basis herstellen müssen, und Nachfrage nach "Rundumservice". Aufgrund der Entfernung zum Wald ist eine rasche Reaktion erschwert und auch fehlende Fertigkeiten und mangelnde Ausstattung mit Forsttechnik führen dazu, dass notwendige Arbeiten nicht mehr durchgeführt werden können (z.B. Forstschutz). Ausmärkische Waldbesitzer sind in das traditionelle Informations- und Kommunikations-netzwerk ( Netz aus Waldbesitzern untereinander, WBV, staatliche Forstämter, das vor allem auf persönlichen Kontakten, Versammlungen, Rundbriefen, .beruht ) nicht mehr adäquat eingebunden und damit auch für forstpolitische Instrumente nur mehr schwer zugänglich. Entwicklungen beim Waldbesitz Seit 1960 stieg die Zahl der Betriebsaufgaben in der ostbayerischen Waldbesitzerstichprobe bis zum Jahr 1999 auf knapp 10% der bestehenden landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe pro Dekade an. Der Anteil nichtbäuerlicher Waldbesitzer hat sich innerhalb der letzten 40 Jahre von 10% auf fast 40% annähernd vervierfacht. Insgesamt ( Mittelwerte für alle Waldbesitzer zusammengefasst, inklusive kein Einschlag und keine Vermarktung ) liegt die Einschlagsintensität bei Nichtlandwirten um ca. 20% niedriger als bei Landwirten. Die Vermarktungsintensität sinkt sogar um über 50% ab. Zur Zeit führt also das Ausscheiden von Wald aus einem landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb gerade in den flächenstarken Besitzgrößen 1-20 ha zu einem nicht ignorierbaren Rückgang der Nutzungs- und Vermarktungsintensitäten. Eine weitere Entwicklung, die sich beim Übergang vom bäuerlichen zum nichtbäuerlichen Wald abzeichnet, ist häufig eine individuell sinkende Bewirtschaftungsbefähigung. Ab ca. 20 ha kann aber davon ausgegangen werden, dass Waldbesitzer bei fehlenden eigenen Möglich-keiten selbständig und aktiv nach Fremdleistungen suchen. Bei kleineren Waldflächen entwickelt sich eine passive, reaktive und nutzungsextensive Haltung, wenn sich die Besitzer nicht mehr ausreichend selbst befähigt sehen. Eine geringe Ausstattung mit forsttauglichen Geräten, geringe Erfahrung im Umgang mit Werkzeug und Maschinen und in der Waldbewirtschaftung verstärken sich mit oft geringer Motivation, Nutzungen durchzuführen und führen letztendlich bei kleinen Waldbesitzen zu drei (idealtypischen) Möglichkeiten: Entweder werden immaterielle Werte und eine "Freude" an der Waldarbeit an sich überhöht und wandeln sich vom Mittel zum Zweck. Hier wird zwar eine intensive Eigentumsbindung und eine z.T. hohe Zufriedenheit erreicht (solange keine größeren Katastrophen zu Arbeitsüberlastungen führen), doch vermarkten diese Waldbesitzer, wenn überhaupt, in hohem Maße marktunabhängig. Zudem besteht die Bewirtschaftungs-orientierung "in einem bewahrenden Erhalten des Status Quo". Nichtlandwirtschaftliche Besitzer mittlerer bis größerer Waldflächen (ab 10 ha beginnend, ab 20 ha die Regel) bewirtschaften überdurchschnittlich häufig ausschließlich oder mit Fremdarbeit. es treten belastende Elemente in den Vordergrund. Dies ist nun gehäuft bei Besitzern zu beobachten, die keine Verwertungsmöglichkeiten für genutzte Holzmengen haben oder/ und aus verschiedenen Gründen keine Bewirtschaftung mehr ausführen können und nicht mit Fremdarbeit bewirtschaften. Entwicklung der Bewirtschaftungsvorstellungen: Überträgt man die vorgefundene Verteilung der Sichtweisen auf eine zeitliche Entwicklungsdynamik, so können folgende "Trends" erwartet werden: Waldbesitzer, die keine eindeutigen Schwerpunkte in den Waldbedeutungen erkennen, nehmen zu. Waldbesitzer, die keine klaren Bewirtschaftungsziele entwickeln, nehmen zu. Waldbesitzer, die reaktiv (natürliche Anfälle, Erhalt eines Status Quo) und am Eigenbedarf orientiert nutzen, nehmen zu (< 20 ha). Waldbesitzer, die zum Eigenwert der Waldarbeit ( Freude an der Waldarbeit ) an sich indifferent stehen, einem Zeitmangel ausgesetzt sind und so belastende Element im Waldeigentum empfinden, nehmen (leicht) zu. Waldbesitzer, die auf Fremdhilfe angewiesen sind, nehmen zu. Als Hauptmangel lässt sich damit eine sinkende Befähigung zur eigenständigen Bewirtschaftung identifizieren, die aber kaum mehr durch einzelbetriebliche Maßnahmen verbessert oder aufgehoben werden kann. Zur Vermittlung von Wissen und Schlüssel-fertigkeiten tritt nun das Angebot an Bewirtschaftungsdienstleistungen und Fremdarbeits-leistungen hinzu. Aufgrund der vielfältigen Entwicklungen im Kleinprivatwald und der Vielfalt an Eigentümerinteressen kann die Nutzungsintensität auf absehbare Zeit nur wirksam erhöht werden, wenn zum einen die Einschläge zwischen den Besitzern koordiniert werden (um Kleinmengen in vermarktbaren Mengen zu bündeln und damit verwertbar zu machen) und zum anderen ein flexibles Angebot an Bewirtschaftungsdienstleistungen besteht. Als Träger-organisation, die dieses flexible Angebot leisten kann, prädestinieren sich die forstlichen Zusammenschlüsse nach dem BWaldG, da sie sowohl ökonomische, ökologische und gesellschaftliche Belange vertreten, somit die Vielfalt an Eigentümerinteressen repräsentieren können und ihre Leistungskraft auf drei Standbeine abstellen können: Ziel öffentlicher Finanzmittel, materieller und immaterieller Ressourcen ( Beratungen zur Selbsthilfe, geldwerte Koordinations- und Kommunikationsleistungen ). Die Selbstverpflichtung von Waldeigentümern zum aktiven und engagierten Gestalten von Eigen- und Gesamtinteressen ( Ehrenamt und persönliches Engagement ). Die Erbringung und Realisierung von Wertschöpfung mit Dienstleistungen und Produktionsprozessen. Das Prinzip der organisierten Selbsthilfe erscheint auch im "Zeichen" des Agrarstruktur-wandels die zukunftsfähigste Lösung für die Sicherung der Bewirtschaftung im Klein-privatwald, wenn die Selbsthilfe ein klares Profil als Dienstleister gewinnt. Fazit: Forstliche Zusammenschlüsse und ihr Profil als Dienstleister Waldbesitzerorganisationen bilden mit ihrer Aufgabe, Rundholz aus dem Kleinprivatwald zu vermarkten, einen Teil eines wirtschaftlichen Leistungsprozesses. Ein Orientierungsrahmen leitet sich dementsprechend ab und zwingt Waldbesitzerorganisationen, sich in diesem Leistungsprozess Betätigungsfelder und Entwicklungspotentiale zu schaffen. Die Rolle der Waldbesitzerorganisationen als Träger von Leistungen ( wobei hier sowohl Leistungen in der Rundholzproduktion, aber auch in nachgeordneten rundholzbe- und verarbeitenden Produktionen eingeschlossen sind ) Träger von Kompetenzen Träger von Dienstleistungen steht dabei im Vordergrund und aus diesen Teilbereichen setzt sich schließlich das Profil einer Waldbesitzerorganisation zusammen, das je nach Öffnung und Realisierung von Ent-wicklungspotentialen in den einzelnen Bereichen erweitert und neu akzentuiert werden kann. Die Vermarktungsaufgabe verlangt eine Orientierung im Absatzmarkt. Eine grobe Segmen-tierung besteht in mittelständisch strukturierten Abnehmern und industriellen Abnehmern, zu denen unterschiedliche Marketingziele gebildet werden, zum Beispiel, welche Rolle als Anbieter man für die Abnehmer erfüllen soll. Während bei mittelständischen Betrieben durchaus angestrebt werden kann, möglichst deren gesamte Versorgung zu übernehmen, sollten sich die Waldbesitzerorganisationen bei industriellen Abnehmern als fester Bestandteil in deren Lieferantenmix etablieren. Das Ausmaß der Leistungsfähigkeit als Rundholzanbieter und -lieferant wird von der "inneren" Koordinierungsfähigkeit der Waldbesitzerorganisation bestimmt. Diese bildet damit einen weiteren Orientierungsrahmen. Um sowohl die einzelnen Phasen der Leistungsprozesse, die von der Waldbesitzerorganisation gesteuert bzw. getragen werden, effektiv und effizient zu erfüllen, und die notwendige Zusammenarbeit und das Vertrauen der Waldeigentümer ( als Ressourcenhalter ) in die Waldbesitzerorganisationen zu erreichen, wird der Aufbau von drei funktionellen Kompetenzbereichen als notwendig erachtet. Marktkompetenz schließt alle Fähigkeiten zur Vermarktung von Rundholz ein, die der Waldbesitzerorganisation von innen (Mitglieder der Organisation) als von außen (abnehmende Betriebe) zugesprochen werden. Logistische Kompetenz bedeutet die Fähigkeit zur effizienten und kostenbewussten Koordination, nämlich den Einschlag und die Losbildung in einem (definierten und abgrenzbaren) Raum über Waldbesitzgrenzen hinaus zeitlich zu steuern und zu beeinflussen. Waldkompetenz schließlich besteht in der Fähigkeit, Möglichkeiten, Chancen und Risiken von Waldbewirtschaftungskonzepten glaubwürdig, fundiert und wissensbasiert und mit individuellem Bezug zum einzelnen Waldbesitz und Waldeigentümerhaushalt zu vermitteln. Dieses Konzept, Einschlag, Aushaltung und Losbildung überbetrieblich zu koordinieren, bietet Möglichkeiten zur Erlössteigerung für den Holzanfall auf der Fläche durch erweiterte Sortier- und Losbildungsmöglichkeiten und die Bildung bedarfsgerechter Lose, und zur Kostensenkung, indem mechanisierte Erntesysteme oder/und Schnittstellen übergreifende logistische Lösungen eingesetzt werden können, die in ihrer Wirkung allerdings immer aus Sicht des betroffenen Waldbesitzerhaushaltes zu beurteilen sind. Daneben werden die Zusammenschlüsse auch als Koordinatoren und Dienstleister rund um Wald und Forstwirtschaft sogenannte gesellschaftspolitische "Non-Profit"-Aufgaben übernehmen ( Information, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Interessensvertretung, Mitwirkung bei gesellschaftlicher und politischer Entscheidungsfindung, Mitwirkung beim Interessensausgleich zwischen Allgemeinheit und Waldbesitz, . ) und aufgrund ihrer Stellung als regionalwirksame Entwicklungsträger fungieren müssen. Fördermittel für forstliche Zusammenschlüsse und vor allem Fortbildungsangebote für Verantwortliche der Zusammenschlüsse auf allen Ebenen erscheinen aus dieser Blickwarte dann auch, wenn sie derartige Entwicklungen stützen, aus gesamtwirtschaftlicher und gesellschaftspolitischer Sicht als hochwirksame Investitionen in das Kultur- und Naturgut Privatwald. ; This study about small scale private forestry in south east Bavaria addresses one main question: What are the effects of structural changes in the agricultural sector and the wood industry on the behaviour, attitude and interests of small scale private forest owners? Results: Traditionally, small scale forests were run by farmers, who were interested in versatile benefits from their forest land such as fire wood, wood for building and repairing their farms, certain amounts of growing stock as their (independent) bank savings, and last but not least the necessity of an irregular revenue from the timber sale. In order to meet these demands each farmer normally spends a lot of time managing the small scale forest himself. But the felling volume is relatively low compared to the annual increment (approximate 3 to 4 cubic meter per hectare and year compared to an annual increment of 7 or more cubic meter per hectare and year). The change in agricultural structures (on the one hand closure of farms, on the other hand expansion and specialisation of remaining farms) results in an increasing number of non-farmers. The differences between farmers and non-farmers are that non-farmers are lacking experience, technical equipment and time for managing their land. The cuttings of non-farmers are twenty percent below the yield harvested by farmers. The selling of non-farmers are fifty percent less than selling of farmers. At the same time, several changes in attitude take place: The number of forest owners, who have no unambiguous idea of forestry and thus don't actually manage but would like to conserve a certain structure of their forest land, increases. For a rising number of land owners with neither enough time nor technical equipment, forest property, has become a burden. More and more forest owners seem to hand their responsibility over to independent contractors. In conclusion it can be assumed that in future times, the number of forest owners will continuously decline with both the ability and the desire to manage their forest land themselves. The structural changes of the timber industry affects the earning capacities of small scale forestry. The ability of small scale forestry to meet the demands of huge industrial wood processing companies is getting worse and worse. The situation for small scale forestry has become more serious with these developments (structural changes in the agricultural sector and the timber industry). Therefore the economic potential of small scaled forestry is jeopardised. Two efforts might contribute to improving the situation: On the one hand forest management services ought to be available an a larger scale and on the other hand, there lies great potential in forest owner associations which if developing into major service companies face much better options of a more efficient forest management and timber sale.
In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Hanse Law Review, Vol.4, No.1, (2008). p.16 [27] Ibid. p. 12 [28] Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa. "The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation." Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) Vol.84, No.1, pp: 89-126 p. 18 [29] Bolt, Cassidy. "Leveraging Reputation in Implicit Regulation of MNEs: An Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' Capacity to Influence Corporate Behavior." Corporations and International Law, 20 Jan. 2018, Available at: sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/leveraging-reputation-in-implicit-regulation-of-mnes-an-analysis-of-the-oec
