Suchergebnisse

Der Fiskalpakt und der ESM-Vertrag sind zur Überwindung der Krise nicht zielführend. Kurzfristig dürfte der Fiskalpakt das Vertrauen in die Stabilität des Euroraums schwächen, da seine Umsetzung die Konjunktur dämpft. Das strukturelle Defizit ist zudem nicht eindeutig zu messen und eine darauf gerichtete Fiskalpolitik wirkt tendenziell prozyklisch. Die im Fiskalpakt implizit festgeschriebene langfristige Schuldenstandsquote von rund 30 Prozent hat keine ökonomische Rechtfertigung. Auch der ESM wird die Lage nicht beruhigen. Er ist vom Volumen her zu gering und einzelne Regelungen, wie die Ausstattung von Staatsanleihen mit Umschuldungsklauseln, würden Renditedifferentiale am Markt für Staatsanleihen zementieren. Künftige Krisen können beide Vertragswerke nicht verhindern, da sie zu eng auf die Verschuldung des Staates gerichtet sind. Eine erfolgreiche Strategie zur Überwindung der Krise im Euroraum muss Konsolidierung, Wachstum und den Abbau der Leistungsbilanzungleichgewichte verbinden. Von herausragender Bedeutung ist es gegenwärtig, das Vertrauen wiederherzustellen, beispielsweise, indem die Regierungen mittels eines Schuldentilgungsfonds Garantien für Staatsanleihen übernehmen. Dann werden sich die Krisensymptome des hohen Refinanzierungsbedarfs der Banken in den Krisenländern und der immens gestiegenen TARGET2-Salden zwischen den nationalen Zentralbanken des Eurosystems zurückbilden, so dass die Geldpolitik eine expansive Wirkung entfalten kann, die den restriktiven Impulsen der fiskalischen Konsolidierungspolitik entgegenwirkt. ; The fiscal compact and the ESM treaty will not be able to play a role in overcoming the current crisis in the euro area nor in preventing future crises. In the short run, the fiscal compact is likely to reduce confidence in the stability of the euro area as its implementation dampens economic activity. Furthermore, the structural deficit cannot be measured with accuracy and focusing on it tends to make fiscal policy pro-cyclical. Implicitly, the fiscal compact codifies a long-term debt ratio of around 30 % which lacks economic justification. The ESM does not have sufficient means to inspire confidence and certain regulations in the ESM treaty, such as collective action clauses, reinforce the yield differentials in the euro area. To overcome the current crisis, fiscal consolidation must be combined with a growth strategy and measures to reduce current account imbalances in the euro area. It is of utmost importance to regain the confidence of market participants, for example, by establishing a jointly guaranteed debt redemption fund. Once confidence is regained, the crisis symptoms of high central bank borrowing by banks in the crisis countries and enormous TARGET2-balances will abate and monetary policy can be effectively expansionary, thus counteracting the restrictive effects of fiscal consolidation.

In the judgment Pringle v. Ireland, the full Court
of Justice of the European Union (Court or ECJ) upheld the validity of the
decision of the European Council enabling the simplified amendment of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union(TFEU). In its Decision 2011/199/EU, the
Council had provided for the establishment of a permanent European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) by those member states of the European Union (Union or EU) that
had adopted the euroas their common currency and legal tender. The Court also
found in this judgment that those member states had not violated EU law by
negotiating and concluding the Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM Treaty). The Court based the latter finding on the long-awaited
clarification of the scope and content of the TFEU's "no-bailout clause" (Art.
125(1)), which had been the subject of intense controversies among legal scholars,
in particular in Germany.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Workshop "Revising European Treaties", organised by the RSCAS/EUI on 11 November 2013. ; This working paper explores the challenges and opportunities of a possible euro area flexibility clause. Such a clause, if introduced through a limited revision of the current EU Treaties, could be used to partially respond to one of the institutional challenges exposed by the Eurozone crisis, namely that member states (permanently) outside the euro area can block change desired by the member states within the euro area. It would provide an alternative to a comprehensive treaty revision and to going outside the treaties by concluding additional intergovernmental treaties.

After explaining the role of Collective Action Clauses (CAC), this paper explores how these have been developed in the 'statutory' CAC operation in Greece in 2012 and the Euro-area CAC provisions found in the ESM Treaty which apply to all Euro-area bonds issued from 2013. The paper explains the legal risks that arise and the capacity of CAC to assist in debt restructuring. Noting certain remaining weaknesses in the existing Euro CAC, the paper closes by offering some modifications as well as more long term solutions to debt restructuring. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum ESM-Vertrag hat 'Markierungsarbeiten' bei der Durchsetzung des Demokratieprinzips geleistet. Konflikte zwischen Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischem Gerichtshof befürchtet der Autor allerdings bei der zu erwartenden Entscheidung über den unbeschränkten Erwerb von Staatsanleihen durch die EZB. Bedenklich findet er die zunehmende Verschränkung von Fiskal- und Geldpolitik, denn sie gefährde die vom Bundesverfassungsgericht als wichtigen Bestandteil der Stabilitätsarchitektur angesehene Unabhängigkeit der EZB. ; The paper analyses the German Federal Constitutional Court's ruling on the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Pact in the framework of the interim measures and provides an outlook on the decision in the main action. The material scope of the judgment and the standards of review are identified as well as the possible effects on the political scope of further euro bailout policy.The current crisis does not allow sufficient time for making the required changes to the EU treaties and to the German constitution. In view of the expected decision on the monetary policy strategy of the ECB, legal and economic aspects are considered, and the role of the central bank is critically reflected.

"Every power comes through crisis" has long been a motif of European integration. The financial and sovereign debt crises, which have shaken the European Union (EU) in recent years, are at first glance no different. Treaty reforms, intergovernmental treaties such as the Fiscal Compact and the Treaty Establishing a European Stability Mechanism (ESM Treaty) have significantly altered the constitutional landscape of the EU and its Member States. The crisis has also inspired many European legal scholars to critically analyse the EU's system of economic governance, as have other events throughout the history of the European Union, from the Empty Chair Crisis to the referenda in the aftermath of the Treaty of Maastricht and the failure of the Constitution for the European Union. What does seem to be different is the way in which scholars approach the issue of the Eurozone crisis. Instead of a purely legal perspective on economic governance, European legal scholars have realised that in order to understand and analyse the euro crisis, interdisciplinarity is the word of the moment.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium provided that the original work is properly attributed. ; After explaining the role of Collective Action Clauses (CAC), this paper explores how these have been developed in the 'statutory' CAC operation in Greece in 2012 and the Euro-area CAC provisions found in the ESM Treaty which apply to all Euro-area bonds issued from 2013. The paper explains the legal risks that arise and the capacity of CAC to assist in debt restructuring. Noting certain remaining weaknesses in the existing Euro CAC, the paper closes by offering some modifications as well as more long term solutions to debt restructuring. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

The case of Greece has reveiled an institutional gap remains in the institutional framework of EMU: an orderly insolvency mechanism for sovereign states. After weighing the pros and cons of such a mechanism, requirements are devised to max-imise the advantages and minimise the potential drawbacks. Overall, an insolvency procedure for sovereign states needs to be effective, reliable and fair. It should limit the negative effects of a default for the debtor country, but must not provide incentives for the debtor country to default strategically. Bearing these requirements in mind and based on a combination and change of existing proposals, this study pro-poses an insolvency regime for sovereign states, but one only as an ultima ratio. As a rule, the debtor country starts the procedure - and is then supported by ESM bridge financing and can benefit from a moratorium on debt service, litigation and enforcement in order to sustain basic government functions. These support measures are time-limited and go hand in hand with a robust reform programme of the ESM to avoid problematic incentives for fiscal policy. The ESM can also trigger the procedure under restrictive conditions as an ultima ratio, if the debtor country clearly delays this step. The ESM treaty (also) has to be changed to ensure that the insolvency mechanism is triggered, if a country applies for ESM loans but proves to be insolvent instead of illiquid. Finally, if an ESM programme for a formely illiquid country ends unsuccessfully, an insolvency procedure is triggered automatically. [.] ; In der Folge der Euro-Schuldenkrise sind vielfältige Reformen im institutionellen Regelwerk der Europäischen Währungsunion erfolgt. Doch nicht zuletzt der Fall Griechenland hat deutlich gemacht, dass im reformierten EWU-Regelwerk noch eine wesentliche Lücke klafft. Diese Studie spricht sich daher, nach eingehender Abwägung von Vor- und Nachteilen, für die Schaffung eines Staatsinsolvenzverfahrens für Euroländer aus. Eine Schuldenrestrukturierung darf aber nur die Ultima Ratio sein. Um die No-Bailout-Klausel des EU-Vertrags und die Disziplinierungsfunktion der Finanzmärkte zu stärken, muss ein Staatsinsolvenzverfahren glaubwürdig durchgeführt werden können. Dabei sind Ansteckungseffekte auf andere Euroländer zu begrenzen und vor allem Banken im Euroraum weniger verletzbar gegenüber Staatsbankrotten zu machen. Dazu sollten Anforderungen an die Eigenkapitalbasis der Banken weiter erhöht und die Bevorzugung von Staatsanleihen in der Bankenregulierung abgeschafft werden. Zudem muss ein Staatsinsolvenzverfahren möglichst effektiv, schnell, fair und rechtssicher sein, darf aber keine Einladung zu einer zu leichten Entschuldungsmöglichkeit sein. Um diese Anforderungen möglichst gut zu erreichen, unterbreiten die Autoren (unter Rückgriff, Kombination und Abwandlung bestehender Vorschläge) einen konkreten Vorschlag für ein Staatsinsolvenzverfahren. [.]