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This study attempts to replicate recent findings suggesting a reversal of the standard knowledge gap, i.e., that the relationship between television news use and knowledge is greater among those with less than with more education. We also extend this approach to examine need for cognition and campaign interest as additional moderators beyond the standard education-based analysis. Our results reveal mixed support for the general hypothesis that the pattern of interaction between these moderators and news media use varies depending on whether the medium of interest is television news or print newspapers.

A large percentage of the public believes that the news media are biased, and the majority of these individuals consider the direction of bias to be against their own viewpoints. Past research has examined how individual factors such as strength of partisanship or extent of political involvement heighten bias perceptions, but little attention has been paid to interpersonal factors such as the ideological similarity or dissimilarity of personal communication networks. Results of a national survey show that perceptions of media bias were unrelated to the overall amount of discussion but were positively related to conversations with ideologically like–minded individuals. Moreover, the impact of conversations with similar others was stronger among Republicans than among Democrats, a finding consistent with recent work on news self–coverage of media bias claims.

Variations in perceptions of media influence based on the locus of impact (self vs other) & the valence of the message (pro- vs antisocial) were investigated in an experiment in which 406 undergraduates in the eastern US read one of four versions of rap lyrics either advocating or condemning violence or misogyny, then completed a survey measuring the perceived impact of songs with that type of lyrics on themselves & on other students. Results replicate previous findings of a third-person perception for the antisocial messages. Based on an ego-enhancement motivational explanation, it was predicted that there would be a reverse third-person perception for the pro-social messages. The findings did not support this hypothesis, & for the pro-social message regarding the treatment of women, a traditional third-person perception was found. However, consistent with the ego-defensive motivational explanation, the size of the third-person perception differential was significantly greater for anti- than for pro-social messages. Implications of these findings for explanations of the third-person perception are discussed. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

The increasing use of online news, particularly by young Americans, pointsto the importance of understanding what users learn from this form of news and whether features of online news encourage or discourage various types of learning. This experimental study demonstrates that online news that takes advantage of one of the key characteristics of the Web—the use of in-text hyperlinks—may actually discourage learning of the facts that make up many news stories. But this same linking structure apparently encourages those who commonly use the Web to have more densely interconnected knowledge structures for public affairs topics. However, those who rarely use the Webfor news do not gain such advantages and may even suffer disadvantages. These findings point to limitations in most past online news learning research, which has been limited to "just the facts" in its measurement of learning from the news.

We test an uninvestigated proposition from spiral of silence theory that fear of social isolation (FSI) prompts people to seek out information about the climate of public opinion. Taking a trait-based individual difference perspective, the authors develop and validate a measure of FSI that is less likely to produce the interpretational problems that plague existing measures. Then, using data from eight countries spread across four continents, the authors examine whether those who fear social isolation to a greater extent are more likely to attend to a particular source of information in the social environment about public opinion—mass media reports of public opinion polls. Study results support spiral of silence theory's prediction—FSI does appear to motivate people to ascertain what the public thinks. However, there may be some cultural boundaries to this process.

This two-wave national panel study was designed to test the causal claims of the "cognitive mediation model." The data indicate strong support for the following causal relationships predicted by the model: (a) surveillance motivations influence information processing, (b) information processing influences knowledge, and (c) motivations influence knowledge only indirectly through information processing. However, additional analyses demonstrated that these variables are not related in a simple unidirectional causal pattern. Instead, panel analyses found that most of these relationships are mutually causal. Future research should consider the reciprocal nature of relationships between information processing and knowledge, particularly as it relates to the study of the knowledge gap hypothesis.

Analyzes actual & perceived support for the 1991 Persian Gulf war in the US, drawing on telephone interviews with 292 residents of New Castle County, DE, during the war. Results show that support for the war was not the strong consensus reported in mainstream media: 53.1% of the respondents fell within the neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree ranges of a support for the war scale. Only 6.6% of the respondents were in the strong support range. However, responses were significantly higher on an item measuring perceived support for the war. Consistent with Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann's (1994) spiral of silence theory, perceived public support for the war was a significant predictor of individual support even after 14 variables were controlled. The alternative explanation that Ss were projecting their own perceptions onto the public is discounted by the finding that liberals, moderates, & conservatives did not differ in their perceptions of public support. 4 Tables, 27 References. Adapted from the source document.