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THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE RESULTS OF THE GULF WAR HAVE NOT ONLY ANOINTED THE U.S. AS THE SOLE SUPERPOWER, BUT HAVE ALSO LEFT IT THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CUSTODIAN OF THAT REGION'S BALANCE OF POWER. THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE COMPLEX AMALGAM OF FOUR SEPARATE BUT INTERLOCKING BALANCES; THE LAST DECADE WHICH WAS A PERIOD OF RELATIVE STABILITY COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS DECADE; THE IRAQI CHALLENGE; THE EMERGING POST-WAR BALANCE; AND AMERICA'S CHOICE. IT DEFINES THE CHOICE AS ONE OF PRESERVING ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS BY ATTEMPTING TO QUARANTINE THE REGION, OR BY UNDERTAKING A MORE ARDUOUS EFFORT TO BEGIN THE TRANSFORMATIOAN OF THE MIDDLE EAST FROM A BALANCE OF POWER SYSTEM TO ONE BASED MORE ON NATIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

This essay addresses the question of whether the war on terrorism has changed understanding of the balance of power as the best tool of realist theory for analysis of international relations by displacing traditional forms of balancing with an era of asymmetric warfare. After examining the key realist concepts of hegemony & balancing & then discussing whether terrorist violence is an asymmetric form of balancing, the implications for balance of power theories of the war on terror & the US hegemonic grand strategy are explored. While acknowledging current US hegemony, it is argued that the US' economic strength & military power may lure it into a situation of "imperial overstretch" & a consequent decline in its relative power, thus allowing other great powers to engage in counter-hegemonic balancing. J. Stanton

The primary proponents & theorists of balance of power contend that balancing is important in international politics because it can deter conflict. As Jack Levy's contribution notes, "potential hegemons anticipate that expansionist behavior would lead to the formation of a military coalition against them & refrain from aggression for that reason." Others believe that a preponderance of power deters war; ie, a relatively weak state would be deterred from engaging in conflict with a strong state, while the latter could obtain what it wants without war because of its opponents' fear. However, if the strong state is already engaged with another country or countries, the weaker state might perceive an opportunity to strike. What really needs to be weighed is the relative strategic balance. Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) is drawn on to explain how this paradox in the balance of power can lead to inaccurate predictions of the behavior of weak & strong states in a bipolar system, as it did in the Vietnam War. The implications of this paradox for US hegemony in the 21st century are great. J. Stanton

Approximate parity in power capabilities between states creates uncertainty of victory if war were to occur. Whether, therefore, decisional uncertainty inhibits war between states or makes a breaking of the peace likely, is a central question in the host of 'balance of power' theories of interstate conflict. Some argue one way; others a different way; and some appear to argue one way, then the other. For along time each found support in armchair reflection—common sense bolstered with diplomatic anecdotes from ancient and modern state systems. Arguments could be made to command diverse historical examples because they rested upon the common assumption that calculations of power, security and conflicts of interest are essentially the same in any system of sovereign states. Anarchy, if you will, orders anachronisms. Now, however, each side can find support in quantitative evidence from far more systematic empirical analyses. The latter analyses are intended to bring some order and discipline to contrary insights by replacing anecdote with data.