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Abstract
This essay raises the question whether citizens in the digital age can learn from how credibility is treated in international negotiations. Negotiators face problems both in attempting to send credible signals and in making credibility assessments of received signals. Several studies, starting with Schelling's seminal analysis of commitments, indicate that credible signals are those that are somehow costly to the sender. Contributions to our understanding of how recipients make credibility assessments include Jervis's distinction between signals (with no inherent credibility) and indices (believed to be untainted by deception). The most general conclusion emerging from existing research is that there is no definitive, infallible solution to the problem of credibility, insofar as deception and misperception are intrinsic to all signaling systems. Today's unfortunate combination of limited awareness of credibility problems, on the one hand, and technological advances facilitating deception, on the other, calls for intensified education as well as multidisciplinary research.

We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution, where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of repeated interaction, any form of coordination - between governments, and between governments and their respective private sectors - improves policy making. Nevertheless, under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy domestically can help support international policy cooperation.

We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution, where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of repeated interaction, any form of coordination - between governments, and between governments and their respective private sectors - improves policy making. Nevertheless, under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy domestically can help support international policy cooperation.

Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the absorb-and-spend strategy recommended by the IMF leads to capital flight, higher inflation, and large current account surpluses inclusive of aid. The right policy package combines a critical minimum degree of fiscal restraint with reverse sterilization.

Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the absorb-and-spend strategy recommended by the IMF leads to capital flight, higher inflation, and large current account surpluses inclusive of aid. The right policy package combines a critical minimum degree of fiscal restraint with reverse sterilization.

Donors cannot pre-commit to support scaled-up public spending programs on a continuing basis, nor can governments credibly commit to curtail expenditure rapidly in the event that aid revenues contract. An aid boom may therefore be accompanied by a credibility problem. When this is the case, the absorb-and-spend strategy recommended by the IMF leads to capital flight, higher inflation, and large current account surpluses inclusive of aid. The right policy package combines a critical minimum degree of fiscal restraint with reverse sterilization.

Creating a new government agency presents some interesting
management challenges. The "Start‐up Problem" is how to
balance demands for credibility outside with the need to create internal
order. "Liability of Newness" whereby young organizations
will perish unless they quickly supply a credible product to external
expectations must be reduced. Explores some processes used by three new
Canadian agencies in solving the start‐up problem and identifies several
lessons that may help others.

Stormy Daniels

AbstractWe provide empirical evidence of research practices that can undermine the credibility of empirical research in agricultural economics. We find that, in four popular journals, most studies are underpowered, a characteristic that, when coupled with publication bias, yields unreliable and exaggerated effect sizes. This problem is exacerbated by selective reporting of statistically significant results and multiple hypothesis testing without any adjustments to statistical inferences. Survey respondents self‐report engaging in practices that are consistent with these empirical findings. Addressing these problems in agricultural economics will require that editors, reviewers, and donors change the norms and incentives for authors.

The paper compares the credibility of currency boards and (standard) pegs. Abandoning a currency board requires a time-consuming legislative process and an abolition will thus be previously expected. Therefore, a currency board solves the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. However, policy can react to unexpected shocks only with a time lag, thus the threat of large shocks makes the abolition more likely. Currency boards are more credible than standard pegs if the time inconsistency problem dominates. In contrast, standard pegs, that can be left at short notice, are more credible if exogenous shocks are highly volatile and constitute the dominant problem.

This anicle deals with the problem of credibility in political spots used by political parties candidates that contended in the July 2"", 2000 elections to the Mexican Presidency. ; El presente artículo aborda el problema de la credibilidad en los spots de los candidatos de los partidos y alianzas políticas que contendieron en las elecciones del 2 de julio de 2000 por la presidencia de México.

Part of the Volume on Digital Media, Youth, and CredibilityAs concern about the credibility of information on the Internet grows, so do pressures for government attempts to mitigate the problem. This chapter examines the potential roles of government in dealing with public concerns about information credibility. It argues that public policy will be a political negotiation between a positive view of digital media as crucial infrastructure for education, and a negative view of an unregulated, dangerous environment especially for children. The chapter concludes that more attention should be paid to developing policies that support both users and educators to find and evaluate the information they need.