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"To these people who say democracy is being dismantled, my answer is yes, we are not dismantling it, we are eliminating it, we are replacing it with something new," Félix Ulloa, the vice president of El Salvador, told The New York Times earlier this month, days before El Salvador's presidential election.Two days after Ulloa's blunt declaration regarding the direction of President Nayib Bukele's administration, the candidate amended his running mate's statement, insisting he was constructing El Salvador's first "true" democracy, discarding a broken system that failed the population and served the interests of only a corrupt few. Bukele's determination to remake the Salvadoran state is clear. His political party, after all, is named Nuevas Ideas. However, the "something new" promised by Ulloa looks suspiciously like something old, one-man rule. Even so, Bukele's popularity is complicating efforts to counter his corrosive effect on democracy, with implications beyond El Salvador. The 'something new' promised by Ulloa looks suspiciously like something old, one-man rule. Even so, Bukele's popularity is complicating efforts to counter his corrosive effect on democracy."That is troubling. In the United States, Latin America experts argue that democracy matters more in this hemisphere than in other regions for reasons of geography and cultural proximity. Undoubtedly, the US record defending democracy in the region is mixed, blemished by a history of interventions against elected governments and support for authoritarian right-wing governments during the Cold War. Still, beginning in the late 1970s, the United States has largely supported democrats against threats to democracy from the right and left. That policy is based on the idea that democracy is more likely to produce sustainable social, political, and economic gains to satisfy popular aspirations and undermine the logic of revolutionary change. This argument is not only heard in Washington; on September 11, 2001, 34 countries in the region signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, pledging to "promote and defend" representative democracy.Nevertheless, more than 20 years later, democracy is under strain in many parts of the region and the Inter-American Democratic Charter feels more like a high point than a turning point. In that context, the Biden administration has viewed Bukele with wariness. His storming of the Salvadoran Congress in 2020, alongside soldiers and police, to pressure lawmakers over a budgetary dispute raised alarm bells. So did his tendency to use state instruments to persecute critics; the presence of corrupt figures in his inner circle; his hostility to independent journalists; and his disregard for constitutional constraints on his power. Bukele's economic mismanagement, including his bet on Bitcoin to spur growth, elevated concerns that an economic failure there could add vast numbers of Salvadoran migrants to the 20 million people already on the move across the Americas.For now, El Salvador is not Nicaragua, where the regime imprisoned all major opposition candidates before the last election. But nor can it be called a constitutional republic, given the circumstances of its February 4 elections. Bukele held the election under a state of emergency and won a second term despite a constitutional ban on reelection.That poses a challenge for US policymakers because Bukele's successes, especially in fighting criminal gangs, and his popularity tend to overshadow his authoritarian behavior and stand in contrast to the inability of many democratic governments to address violent crime. That is not a minor issue. Latin America and the Caribbean is among the most violent regions in the world, accounting for around one-third of all murders though it is home to just 8% of the world's population, according to the International Crisis Group.El Salvador is not Nicaragua, where the regime imprisoned all major opposition candidates before the last election. But nor can it be called a constitutional republic, given the circumstances of its February 4 elections."El Salvador was long among the most violent countries in this violent region, with a history of failed negotiations between governments and gang leaders that allegedly continued into the Bukele administration. That changed in 2022 following the announcement of a state of exception that suspended civil liberties and led to the arrest of 75,000 people suspected of gang affiliation. Salvadorans, at least those who have avoided arbitrary detention, are generally, and understandably, relieved by the suppression of gang violence. The vastly improved security climate, and Bukele's sleek public messaging, have restored a sense of national pride. In a region that features mass migration, stagnant economies, and increasingly powerful organized crime groups, El Salvador sometimes feels more like a success than a crisis to many observers outside the country.The problem is that the policies that brought Bukele quick success carry the seeds for long-term failure. The concentration of power in the hands of a single individual intolerant of competition is a common pattern in Latin America–one that almost always leads to policy errors and democratic decline. There is a reason the most autocratic nations in the hemisphere are also its largest sources of migrants. In El Salvador, for example, the same opaque decision-making apparatus that brought the gangs to heel also led to the failed Bitcoin experiment and has discouraged domestic and foreign investors.As a result, the United States faces the awkward challenge of dealing with a popular, twice elected leader, unfettered by constitutional guidelines. Public criticism by the US government of Bukele's subversion of democratic institutions seems to have migrated to private channels, and demonstrations of public engagement with Bukele are now common. Even so, in congratulating Bukele on his controversial reelection, Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized the importance of "fair trial guarantees and human rights." But Bukele seems impervious to international pressure, public or private. In hisvictory speech, he assailed foreign critics, asking, "Why do they want to see the blood of Salvadorans?" That dynamic of intolerance for even mild critiques seems likely to continue. That approach might be effective, especially where US goals do not run counter to core interests of the Salvadoran government, such as cooperation to improve El Salvador's economic performance. It will be less effective when Salvadorans interpret the lack of public US criticism of Bukele's undemocratic behavior as tacit approval of such actions. More distressingly, US silence in the face of human rights abuses signals to others in the Americas that patience and popularity are the recipe for swatting away criticism from Washington and undermining the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

"To these people who say democracy is being dismantled, my answer is yes, we are not dismantling it, we are eliminating it, we are replacing it with something new," Félix Ulloa, the vice president of El Salvador, told The New York Times earlier this month, days before El Salvador's presidential election.Two days after Ulloa's blunt declaration regarding the direction of President Nayib Bukele's administration, the candidate amended his running mate's statement, insisting he was constructing El Salvador's first "true" democracy, discarding a broken system that failed the population and served the interests of only a corrupt few. Bukele's determination to remake the Salvadoran state is clear. His political party, after all, is named Nuevas Ideas. However, the "something new" promised by Ulloa looks suspiciously like something old, one-man rule. Even so, Bukele's popularity is complicating efforts to counter his corrosive effect on democracy, with implications beyond El Salvador. The 'something new' promised by Ulloa looks suspiciously like something old, one-man rule. Even so, Bukele's popularity is complicating efforts to counter his corrosive effect on democracy."That is troubling. In the United States, Latin America experts argue that democracy matters more in this hemisphere than in other regions for reasons of geography and cultural proximity. Undoubtedly, the US record defending democracy in the region is mixed, blemished by a history of interventions against elected governments and support for authoritarian right-wing governments during the Cold War. Still, beginning in the late 1970s, the United States has largely supported democrats against threats to democracy from the right and left. That policy is based on the idea that democracy is more likely to produce sustainable social, political, and economic gains to satisfy popular aspirations and undermine the logic of revolutionary change. This argument is not only heard in Washington; on September 11, 2001, 34 countries in the region signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, pledging to "promote and defend" representative democracy.Nevertheless, more than 20 years later, democracy is under strain in many parts of the region and the Inter-American Democratic Charter feels more like a high point than a turning point. In that context, the Biden administration has viewed Bukele with wariness. His storming of the Salvadoran Congress in 2020, alongside soldiers and police, to pressure lawmakers over a budgetary dispute raised alarm bells. So did his tendency to use state instruments to persecute critics; the presence of corrupt figures in his inner circle; his hostility to independent journalists; and his disregard for constitutional constraints on his power. Bukele's economic mismanagement, including his bet on Bitcoin to spur growth, elevated concerns that an economic failure there could add vast numbers of Salvadoran migrants to the 20 million people already on the move across the Americas.For now, El Salvador is not Nicaragua, where the regime imprisoned all major opposition candidates before the last election. But nor can it be called a constitutional republic, given the circumstances of its February 4 elections. Bukele held the election under a state of emergency and won a second term despite a constitutional ban on reelection.That poses a challenge for US policymakers because Bukele's successes, especially in fighting criminal gangs, and his popularity tend to overshadow his authoritarian behavior and stand in contrast to the inability of many democratic governments to address violent crime. That is not a minor issue. Latin America and the Caribbean is among the most violent regions in the world, accounting for around one-third of all murders though it is home to just 8% of the world's population, according to the International Crisis Group.El Salvador is not Nicaragua, where the regime imprisoned all major opposition candidates before the last election. But nor can it be called a constitutional republic, given the circumstances of its February 4 elections."El Salvador was long among the most violent countries in this violent region, with a history of failed negotiations between governments and gang leaders that allegedly continued into the Bukele administration. That changed in 2022 following the announcement of a state of exception that suspended civil liberties and led to the arrest of 75,000 people suspected of gang affiliation. Salvadorans, at least those who have avoided arbitrary detention, are generally, and understandably, relieved by the suppression of gang violence. The vastly improved security climate, and Bukele's sleek public messaging, have restored a sense of national pride. In a region that features mass migration, stagnant economies, and increasingly powerful organized crime groups, El Salvador sometimes feels more like a success than a crisis to many observers outside the country.The problem is that the policies that brought Bukele quick success carry the seeds for long-term failure. The concentration of power in the hands of a single individual intolerant of competition is a common pattern in Latin America–one that almost always leads to policy errors and democratic decline. There is a reason the most autocratic nations in the hemisphere are also its largest sources of migrants. In El Salvador, for example, the same opaque decision-making apparatus that brought the gangs to heel also led to the failed Bitcoin experiment and has discouraged domestic and foreign investors.As a result, the United States faces the awkward challenge of dealing with a popular, twice elected leader, unfettered by constitutional guidelines. Public criticism by the US government of Bukele's subversion of democratic institutions seems to have migrated to private channels, and demonstrations of public engagement with Bukele are now common. Even so, in congratulating Bukele on his controversial reelection, Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized the importance of "fair trial guarantees and human rights." But Bukele seems impervious to international pressure, public or private. In hisvictory speech, he assailed foreign critics, asking, "Why do they want to see the blood of Salvadorans?" That dynamic of intolerance for even mild critiques seems likely to continue. That approach might be effective, especially where US goals do not run counter to core interests of the Salvadoran government, such as cooperation to improve El Salvador's economic performance. It will be less effective when Salvadorans interpret the lack of public US criticism of Bukele's undemocratic behavior as tacit approval of such actions. More distressingly, US silence in the face of human rights abuses signals to others in the Americas that patience and popularity are the recipe for swatting away criticism from Washington and undermining the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

Amid Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, erosion of the rule of law is deepening not only internationally but also domestically. This is evidenced by the destruction of independent media in Russia, citizens' inability to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, and the intensification of political repression against antiwar citizens and anyone who otherwise demonstrates disloyalty to the Kremlin. Alongside these practices, which can be considered traditional for authoritarian regimes, an informal practice of disciplining society is actively developing. This practice, existing outside the realm of law, is a new "tradition" of public apologies and repentance. According to the human rights project OVD-Info, between February 24, 2022, and June 2023, ninety-four cases of public apologies for disagreeing with the Russian authorities were recorded.Breaking a Person from WithinThe practice of public apologies in Russia stems mainly from the Chechen Republic, where it has been documented since 2015. The first high-profile case was the apology, on Chechen television, of Aishat Inayeva, a Chechen resident. At one point she had complained publicly about the difficult economic conditions and high cost of living, including housing and utilities costs. She was then forced to retract her words at a televised meeting with the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov.Over the next few years, public apologies spread throughout Russia. In 2021, following protests in support of Alexei Navalny, the press services of the Investigative Committee and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs released videos in which detained demonstrators apologized for participating in or calling for protests.After February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion of Ukraine, a wave of public apologies by people who had previously professed an antiwar position spread over the official media outlets of the Russian security agencies and other platforms. The reasons for apologizing could be anything from expressing an antiwar viewpoint in public to videotaping the work of the air defense forces.Apologizing publicly is a humiliating procedure. It is meant to be that. Often, people are forced to apologize for things that cannot be formally recognized as crimes. A public apology affects both the person's own human dignity and his or her public standing. As Russian anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova observes, "You'll support an unyielding opposition leader, but you won't support a person who bleats something on camera and says he's wrong."Through this practice, the state asserts its claim not only on citizens' freedoms but also on their consciousness. As a result, people often end up broken from within and unable to resist. From Apology to RepentanceAt the end of 2023, the phenomenon of public apology in Russia acquired a new form, the public act of repentance. The difference between apology and repentance is that in the latter, a person is forced to admit to a moral offense, such as wearing "indecent" clothing, rather than to a civic one, such as taking part in a protest event.The phenomenon of public repentance surfaced in December 2023 after a nationwide controversy sparked by the "almost naked" party at the Moscow club Mutabor. Photos of the party participants in revealing outfits, including many famous Russian artists loyal to the Kremlin, hit the internet and became the focus of mass denunciations. Russia's war supporters claimed that such an event was unacceptable in a country that stands for traditional values and is conducting a "special military operation" against "Nazis."One of the party attendees, a rap performer who goes by the name of Vacio (Nikolai Vasilyev), arrived at the venue wearing only a white sock to cover his genitals, an homage to the famous Red Hot Chili Peppers poster from the 1980s. He was charged with petty hooliganism, a misdemeanor, and with spreading "gay propaganda." The artist, who is twenty-five years old, was incarcerated for twenty-five days and was served a summons to the military recruitment office immediately thereafter. Lawsuits were also filed against the organizer of the event, the Instagram influencer Nastia Ivleyeva, for "inflicting moral harm," with a demand for compensation of one billion rubles (approximately $11 million). The activity of the Mutabor club itself has been suspended for three months by a court order.A veritable wave of public repentance ensued. The party attendees posted videos on their social media in which they asked the Russian people to forgive their immoral behavior. Some of the artists donated money to emergency relief programs or visited the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Ukraine's territories annexed by Russia. The club's owner publicly gave a Moscow church fragments of alleged relics of Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker that he had purchased in Vatican City. In January 2024 the Russian singer Charlot, arrested for publicly criticizing the Russian authorities, wrote a letter of repentance to Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his address from the detention center, the singer, who is also twenty-five years old, said that he now "writes patriotic works and is ready to perform them later." He asked to be released but remains in jail. Disciplining Russian Society on Many LevelsPublic repentance is an instrument of ideological warfare. Young, edgy artists are presented to Russian society as carriers of "Western values." By publicly shaming them, the Russian authorities purport to demonstrate the West's degradation and flimsiness and the existential superiority of Russia's "traditional values."At the same time, the Russian authorities are demonstratively going beyond the limits of the law and actually engaging in new practices of state coercion that combine legal and quasi-religious procedures. The Russian nationalist philosopher Ivan Ilyin probably had something similar in mind when he wrote in 1951 about the "Russian law": "Russian law must save itself from Western formalism, from self-indulgent legal dogma, from legal unprincipledness. Russia needs a new legal consciousness, national in its roots, Christian-Orthodox in its spirit and creative in its purpose."By proposing repentance as one of the conditions for returning to Russia, the state offers dissenters a deal, the price of which is betrayal of their beliefs and loss of their civic agency. At the same time, the loan of mercy declared by the state will obviously be issued under the obligation of political loyalty and secured by the threat of severe punishment in case of repeated misbehavior.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

Amid Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, erosion of the rule of law is deepening not only internationally but also domestically. This is evidenced by the destruction of independent media in Russia, citizens' inability to exercise their right to freedom of assembly, and the intensification of political repression against antiwar citizens and anyone who otherwise demonstrates disloyalty to the Kremlin. Alongside these practices, which can be considered traditional for authoritarian regimes, an informal practice of disciplining society is actively developing. This practice, existing outside the realm of law, is a new "tradition" of public apologies and repentance. According to the human rights project OVD-Info, between February 24, 2022, and June 2023, ninety-four cases of public apologies for disagreeing with the Russian authorities were recorded.Breaking a Person from WithinThe practice of public apologies in Russia stems mainly from the Chechen Republic, where it has been documented since 2015. The first high-profile case was the apology, on Chechen television, of Aishat Inayeva, a Chechen resident. At one point she had complained publicly about the difficult economic conditions and high cost of living, including housing and utilities costs. She was then forced to retract her words at a televised meeting with the Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov.Over the next few years, public apologies spread throughout Russia. In 2021, following protests in support of Alexei Navalny, the press services of the Investigative Committee and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs released videos in which detained demonstrators apologized for participating in or calling for protests.After February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion of Ukraine, a wave of public apologies by people who had previously professed an antiwar position spread over the official media outlets of the Russian security agencies and other platforms. The reasons for apologizing could be anything from expressing an antiwar viewpoint in public to videotaping the work of the air defense forces.Apologizing publicly is a humiliating procedure. It is meant to be that. Often, people are forced to apologize for things that cannot be formally recognized as crimes. A public apology affects both the person's own human dignity and his or her public standing. As Russian anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova observes, "You'll support an unyielding opposition leader, but you won't support a person who bleats something on camera and says he's wrong."Through this practice, the state asserts its claim not only on citizens' freedoms but also on their consciousness. As a result, people often end up broken from within and unable to resist. From Apology to RepentanceAt the end of 2023, the phenomenon of public apology in Russia acquired a new form, the public act of repentance. The difference between apology and repentance is that in the latter, a person is forced to admit to a moral offense, such as wearing "indecent" clothing, rather than to a civic one, such as taking part in a protest event.The phenomenon of public repentance surfaced in December 2023 after a nationwide controversy sparked by the "almost naked" party at the Moscow club Mutabor. Photos of the party participants in revealing outfits, including many famous Russian artists loyal to the Kremlin, hit the internet and became the focus of mass denunciations. Russia's war supporters claimed that such an event was unacceptable in a country that stands for traditional values and is conducting a "special military operation" against "Nazis."One of the party attendees, a rap performer who goes by the name of Vacio (Nikolai Vasilyev), arrived at the venue wearing only a white sock to cover his genitals, an homage to the famous Red Hot Chili Peppers poster from the 1980s. He was charged with petty hooliganism, a misdemeanor, and with spreading "gay propaganda." The artist, who is twenty-five years old, was incarcerated for twenty-five days and was served a summons to the military recruitment office immediately thereafter. Lawsuits were also filed against the organizer of the event, the Instagram influencer Nastia Ivleyeva, for "inflicting moral harm," with a demand for compensation of one billion rubles (approximately $11 million). The activity of the Mutabor club itself has been suspended for three months by a court order.A veritable wave of public repentance ensued. The party attendees posted videos on their social media in which they asked the Russian people to forgive their immoral behavior. Some of the artists donated money to emergency relief programs or visited the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Ukraine's territories annexed by Russia. The club's owner publicly gave a Moscow church fragments of alleged relics of Saint Nicholas the Wonderworker that he had purchased in Vatican City. In January 2024 the Russian singer Charlot, arrested for publicly criticizing the Russian authorities, wrote a letter of repentance to Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church. In his address from the detention center, the singer, who is also twenty-five years old, said that he now "writes patriotic works and is ready to perform them later." He asked to be released but remains in jail. Disciplining Russian Society on Many LevelsPublic repentance is an instrument of ideological warfare. Young, edgy artists are presented to Russian society as carriers of "Western values." By publicly shaming them, the Russian authorities purport to demonstrate the West's degradation and flimsiness and the existential superiority of Russia's "traditional values."At the same time, the Russian authorities are demonstratively going beyond the limits of the law and actually engaging in new practices of state coercion that combine legal and quasi-religious procedures. The Russian nationalist philosopher Ivan Ilyin probably had something similar in mind when he wrote in 1951 about the "Russian law": "Russian law must save itself from Western formalism, from self-indulgent legal dogma, from legal unprincipledness. Russia needs a new legal consciousness, national in its roots, Christian-Orthodox in its spirit and creative in its purpose."By proposing repentance as one of the conditions for returning to Russia, the state offers dissenters a deal, the price of which is betrayal of their beliefs and loss of their civic agency. At the same time, the loan of mercy declared by the state will obviously be issued under the obligation of political loyalty and secured by the threat of severe punishment in case of repeated misbehavior.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

Lorenzo is an intern at the Adam Smith Institute.Some argue that the current UK welfare state discourages people to work, rather than specifically targeting low-income individuals.An example of such policies are the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) and the Income Support (IS) (Niemietz, 2010). As a matter of fact, these welfare-enhancing policies impose elevated implicit marginal tax rates on the most vulnerable segments of the labour market (Blundell et al., 1998; Meghir and Phillips, 2008), essentially functioning as an additional income tax for individuals receiving transfers who strive to go back to the labour market. Consequently, they give rise to detrimental effects on labour dynamics, as clearly highlighted in Table 1. Adam et al. (2006) find indeed that, as the ratio of benefit income without work to disposable income in a low-paid occupation increases, the share of working adults strongly decreases. Despite recognising that there might not be a causal link between the two, the authors conclude that UK benefits might discourage job-seeking and return to work.












































































These policies extend economic support to a significant portion of the population including those who do not necessarily require it, rather than providing incentives for individuals with the lowest incomes to work and escape poverty. As Table 2 shows, government transfers have evolved into a regular source of income across various income levels, as opposed to being limited to those with the lowest earnings (Office for National Statistics, 2020). In 2019-2020, the 5th, 6th and 7th income decile groups, namely the middle and upper-middle class, received a higher percentage of benefits than the lowest decile group. This is mainly because the coverage of a spending programme, as opposed to its net distributional impact, is a much better predictor of its popularity (Niemietz, 2010).












































































The advantages of a Negative Income TaxA negative income tax (NIT) supplements the incomes of the poor by achieving systematic structure of marginal rates, without poverty trap problems or cliff-edges. According to Friedman (1962)'s proposed scheme, at a "break-even" level of income, households pay no income tax (Figure 1). Above this level, households pay tax at constant rate on each additional pound while, below this level, they receive a payment of such rate for each pound by which income falls short of the breakeven level tax. This net benefit can therefore be considered a "negative" income tax as it makes the income tax symmetrical. Under such a proposal, some households would now pay no taxes, others would pay less taxes than before while other households with relatively high incomes would be unaffected (Tobin et al., 1967). NIT's main advantages are therefore claimed to be reducing poverty, supplementing the incomes of low-income earners, reducing expenditure on social security, welfare and administrative costs as well as contributing to the development of social capital (Humphreys, 2001).












































































Empirical EvidenceFrom 1968 to 1980, the U.S. Government conducted four experiments on the NIT, while the Canadian government conducted one, aiming to evaluate the policy's effectiveness and economic viability. Some scholars argued in favour of the policy's success as the experiments did not find any evidence suggesting that a NIT would cause a portion of the population to withdraw from the labour force (Robins, 1985; Burtless, 1986; Keeley, 1981). On the other hand, some scholars declared the failure of the policy based on two main arguments. First, there was a statistically significant work disincentive effect for some subgroups such as primary earners in two-parent families, allowing scholars to conclude that a NIT discourages certain people to work. Second, the work disincentive would increase the cost of the program of about 10 to 200% over what it would have been if work hours were unaffected by the NIT (Rees and Watts, 1975; Ashenfelter, 1978; Burtless, 1986; Betson et al., 1980; Betson and Greenberg, 1983). Despite its theoretical economic advantages - reducing poverty by supplementing the incomes of low-income earners until they reach better paid work as well as lowering expenditure on benefits payments, welfare and administrative costs - further field research is required to assess NIT overall efficiency and economic feasibility.BibliographyAdam, S., Brewer, M. and Shephard, A. (2006) 'Financial work incentives in Britain: Comparisons over time and between family types', Working Paper 06/2006, Institute for Fiscal Studies.Ashenfelter, O., 1978. The labor supply response of wage earners. In: Palmer, J.L., Pechman, J.A. (Eds.), Welfare in Rural Areas. Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.Betson, D., Greenberg, D., (1983). Uses of microsimulation in applied poverty research. In: Goldstein, R., Sacks, S.M. (Eds.), Applied Policy Research. Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ.Betson, D., Greenburg, D., Kasten, R., (1980). A microsimulation model for analyzing alternative welfare reform proposals: an application to the program for better jobs and income. In: Haveman, R., Hollenbeck, K. (Eds.), Microeonomic Simulation Models for Public Policy Analysis, vol. 1. Academic Press, New York.Blundell, R.; Duncan A., Meghir, A., (1998) 'Estimating labor supply responses using tax reforms', Econometrica, 66, 4, 827-861.Burtless, G., (1986). The work response to a guaranteed income. A survey of experimental evidence. In: Munnell, A.H. (Ed.), Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, BostonFriedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Humphreys, J. (2001). Reforming wages and welfare policy: six advantages of a negative income tax. Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas, 17(1), 19-22.Keeley, M.C., (1981). Labor Supply and Public Policy: A Critical Review. Academic Press, New York.Meghir, C. and Phillips, D. (2008), 'Labour supply and taxes', Working Paper 08/04, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies.Niemietz, K. (2010). Transforming welfare: incentives, localisation and non-discrimination. Institute of Economic Affairs.Office for National Statistics (2020) "Working and workless households in the UK: April to June 2020"Rees, A.,Watts,H.W., (1975). An overview of the labor supply results. In: Pechman, J.A.,Timpane, P.M. (Eds.),Work Incentives and Income Guarantees: The New Jersey Negative Income Tax Experiment. Brookings institution, Washington, DC.Robins, P.K., (1985). A comparison of the labor supply findings from the four negative income tax experiments. Journal of Human Resources 20 (4), 567–582.Robins, P.K., Brandon, N., Yeager, K.E., (1980). Effects of SIME/DIME on changes in employment status. The Journal of Human Resources 15 (4), 545–573.Widerquist, K. (2005). A failure to communicate: What (if anything) can we learn from the negative income tax experiments? The journal of socioeconomics, 34(1), 49-81.

Nicht-erneuerbare oder erschöpfbare Ressourcen beziehen sich auf die Ressourcen, deren Gesamtbestand in der Erde über den für die menschliche Planung relevanten Zeitraum konstant ist. Aufgrund ihrer begrenzten Verfügbarkeit und wichtigen Anwendungen in der Entwicklung der menschlichen Gesellschaft ist ihrer Versorgungssicherheit immer mehr Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt worden. Darüber hinaus sind schlimme Umweltauswirkungen und riesige Mengen an Abfällen während der Produktions- und Verbrauchsprozesse nicht-erneuerbarer Ressourcen und Materialien entstanden. Recycling ist ein wirksamer Weg gegen diese Probleme. Ein Recyclingprozess setzt sich normalerweise aus zwei Teilen zusammen: zuerst werden die verwertbaren Materialien am Ende der Produktlebensdauer wiederverarbeiet und dann in die Lieferkette zurückgeschickt. Diese Arbeit befasst sich überwiegend mit dem Gleichgewicht eines erschöpfbaren Ressourcenmarktes mit Recyclingaktivitäten. Boyce (2012) baut ein solches Modell, das auf der berühmten Hotelling-Regel basiert. Diese Regel besagt, dass der Nettopreis, auch als Knappheitsprämie bezeichnet, einer erschöpfbaren Ressource im Laufe der Zeit mit der Zinsrate in einem wettbewerblichen Marktgleichgewicht anwachsen sollte. Seiner Ansicht nach sind Sammlungsaktivitäten nur dann wirtschaftlich, wenn der aktuelle Wert der erschöpfbaren Ressourceneinheiten die Sammlungskosten übersteigt. Die externe Validität dieses Modells wird dann durch ökonomische Laborexperimente verifiziert. In jeder Session des Basis-Treatments werden zwei exakt identische Runden (oder Märkte) zum Testen der Lerneffekte durchgeführt. In den Perioden, in denen Sammlung theoretisch wirtschaftlich ist, erscheint in den beiden Märkten die Recyclingperformance mit der Standardentwicklung übereinzustimmen. In den Perioden, in denen sich Sammlung theoretisch nicht lohnt, ist jedoch die Recyclingperformance der zweiten Märkte schlechter als die der ersten Märkte. Darüber hinaus spiegelt sich die Knappheit der erschöpfbaren Ressource in den frühen Perioden der beiden Märkte nicht wider. Die unbefriedigenden experimentellen Ergebnisse lassen sich durch "rolling planning horizons" erklären. Jeder Agent machte einen Plan für eine begrenzte Anzahl von Perioden und aktualisierte ihn regelmäßig. Nur die erste Periode wurde durchgeführt und dann ein neuer Plan für eine ebenso lange Zukunft gemacht. Da der verbleibende Ressourcenbestand in den frühen Perioden hoch war und seine Handelsentscheidungen für den Planungshorizont immer erfüllt werden konnten, war in den frühen Perioden die Ressourcenbeschränkung nicht bindend und es bestand kein Zusammenhang zwischen der Preisentwicklung und dem Zinssatz. Mit weiteren Transaktionen wurde der Ressourcenbestand jedoch schließlich so klein, dass er innerhalb des Planungshorizonts erschöpft sein könnte. Die neuen Pläne mussten die bindende Ressourcenbeschränkung berücksichtigen und die Knappheit der erschöpfbaren Ressource wurde schließlich Teil ihres Preises. Obwohl die Probanden die Knappheit ihrer Ressourceneinheiten seit der letzten Phase der ersten Märkte bemerkt und berücksichtigt haben könnten, trafen sie in den fühen Perioden der zweiten Märkte sogar höhere Recyclingentscheidungen. Das Sammlungskriterium von Boyce (2012) erhielt in den beiden Märkten keine Unterstützung. Das komplexe Design des Basis-Treatments könnte die dynamische Optimierung erschweren, da die Probanden in einem intertemporalen Kontext Preis-, Handels- und Recyclingentscheidungen treffen mussten. In einem neuen Treatment, nämlich dem Recycling-Treatment, wird mehr Aufmerksamkeit auf Recyclingentscheidungen gelenkt werden. In diesem Treatment sollten Sammlungsaktivitäten nur dann stattfinden, wenn der Transaktionspreis einer recycelten erschöpfbaren Ressourceneinheit die durch Recycling- und Produktionsaktivitäten entstehenden Gesamtkosten übersteigt. Damit der Einfluss sozialer und ökologischer Präferenzen auf Recyclingentscheidungen untersucht werden kann, müssen die Probanden ihr eigenes Umweltbewusstsein im Fragebogen nach dem Experiment bewerten. Die Experimente des Recycling-Treatments zeigten bessere Recyclingperformance, aber nur in den profitablen Perioden für Recycling hatten soziale und ökologische Präferenzen einen klaren positiven Effekt auf Recyclingentscheidungen. Die stark umweltbewussten Probanden wagten sich in den beiden Märkten daran, mit den steigenden vorgegebenen Transaktionspreisen ihre Recyclingmengen stark zu erhöhen. Im Gegensatz dazu könnten die Probanden mit geringerem Umweltbewusstsein mehr auf ihre Payments achten und daher konservative Recyclingstrategien durchgeführt haben. Sie trafen relativ niedrigere Recyclingentscheidungen, um große Verluste zu vermeiden, und erst spät in den zweiten Märkten erhöhten sie ihr Recycling deutlich. ; Non-renewable or exhaustible resources refer to the resources whose total stocks provided by the earth are constant over the period relevant to human planning. Due to their limited availability and important applications in human society development, their supply security has been widely concerned by the public. Moreover, severe environmental impacts and huge amounts of waste have been generated during the extraction, processing and use of these resources and materials. Recycling, a process of reprocessing recoverable materials at the end of product life and sending them back into the supply chain, seems to be an effective way to alleviate the above problems. Although there are technical, economical and practical obstacles to recycling, efforts have been made in the product design stage, the separate collection systems, the cooperation between developing countries and industrialized countries and the effective application of political instruments. The economic models of most interest in this work are those that focus on the competitive equilibrium of an exhaustible resource market with recycling activities. Based on the famous Hotelling rule which argues that the net price (also called the scarcity rent) of a non-renewable resource should rise over time at the rate of interest in a competitive market equilibrium, Boyce (2012) provides a typical model of this kind. In his view, sorting activities are economic only when the current value of the non-renewable resource units exceeds the sorting cost. The external validity of this model is then verified by economics laboratory experiments. Two same rounds (or markets) are conducted in each session of the basic treatment to see whether learning happens. The experimental results, however, "polarize". The recycling performance shown in the periods when sorting is theoretically worthwhile seems to be in line with the standard development in both markets, while the recycling performance of the second markets is even worse than that of the first markets in the periods when sorting is theoretically not economic. Moreover, the scarcity of the non-renewable resource is not reflected in the early periods in both markets. The unsatisfactory experimental results can largely be explained by rolling planning horizons. Each agent made a plan for a finite number of periods and updated it regularly. Only the first period was carried out and a new plan was then made for an equally long future. Since the remaining resource stock was high in the early periods and his trading decisions for the planning horizon could always be met, the resource constraint was not binding and there was no connection between the price development and the interest rate in the early periods. When the resource stock finally became so small that it could be exhausted within the planning horizon, the new plans had to take the binding resource constraint into account and the scarcity of the exhaustible resource finally became a component of its price. However, even though the subjects may have realized and taken the resource scarcity into account since the latter phase of the first markets, they still made even higher recycling decisions in the early periods of the second markets. The subjects did not realize the sorting criterion proposed by Boyce (2012) in both markets. The complex design of the basic treatment makes it difficult for the subjects to do dynamic optimization, since they had to make pricing, trading and recycling decisions in an intertemporal context. A much simplified treatment which focuses on recycling decisions is then proposed. In this new treatment, sorting activities should occur only when the transaction price of a recycled non-renewable resource unit exceeds the total costs incurred by recycling and production activities. In addition, to verify whether and to what extent social and environmental preferences can affect recycling decisions, the subjects are required to evaluate their environmental awareness in the post-experiment questionnaire. Better recycling performance was shown in the experiments of the new treatment. However, environmental awareness had a clear positive impact on recycling decisions only in the periods when recycling is theoretically profitable. The highly environmentally conscious subjects dared to greatly increase their recycling quantities with the increasing predetermined transaction prices in both markets. The subjects with lower environmental awareness might value their payments more and thus haven taken conservative recycling measures. They maintained a relatively low recycling level to avoid big losses and only dared to greatly increase their recycling in the later periods of the second markets.

In this article we reflect on the role of social action in promoting well-being in periods of crisis and in the present pandemic period. The exercise of Social Work in society is applied by social workers who, despite being a specialised resource, have little professional autonomy in decision-making, little recognition of the theoretical knowledge of the social worker by institutional decision-makers and work mostly in single-professional teams. But the social worker, being a specialised professional, has a theoretical and practical training sustained by the acquisition of theoretical, instrumental, and practical skills for an intervention in complexity. The social worker is trained in networking and social advocacy, without forgetting the training in observation of the social reality of the person's life. The social worker as a professional of the relationship and communication, performing a strong mediation activity in connecting the different agents for a sustainable social change.
In preparing the article we used a qualitative methodology based on techniques of observation of social reality and techniques of documentary research and analysis.
The article instigates professional reflection, innovation of intervention approaches and a new matrix of thinking about emancipatory social action promoting greater social inclusion in a strong and effective application of human rights for social and human development. We highlight the need for public interventions in the pursuit of collective goals based on a development strategy that promotes a more sustainable and equitable future. The pandemic has drawn attention to the need to rethink social protection, namely the regulation of telework, responding to informality and promoting a greater willingness of society to mobilise more financial resources for risk minimisation through Social Security. It becomes necessary to design more equitable and sustainable policies, based on a social dialogue and institutional cooperation, contributing to increase public confidence in institutions in order to make the economy and society more inclusive and sustainable, without forgetting the family as a participative and active partner in the intervention of the Social Work.
En este artículo reflexionamos sobre el papel de la acción social en la promoción del bienestar en períodos de crisis y en el actual período de pandemia. El ejercicio del Trabajo Social en la sociedad es aplicado por los trabajadores sociales que, apesar de ser un recurso especializado, tienen poca autonomía profesional en la toma de decisiones, poco reconocimiento del conocimiento teórico del trabajador social por parte de los responsables institucionales y trabajan mayoritariamente en equipos uniprofesionales. Pero el trabajador social, al ser un profesional especializado, tiene una formación teórica y práctica sustentada en la adquisición de habilidades teóricas, instrumentales y prácticas para una intervención en la complejidad. El trabajador social está formado en el trabajo en red y en la defensa social, sin olvidar la formación en la observación de la realidad social de la vida de la persona. El trabajador social como profesional de la relación y la comunicación, realizando una fuerte actividad de mediación en la conexión de los diferentes agentes para un cambio social sostenible.
En la elaboración del artículo hemos utilizado una metodología cualitativa basada en técnicas de observación de la realidad social y técnicas de investigación y análisis documental.
El artículo incita a la reflexión profesional, a la innovación de los enfoques de intervención y a una nueva matriz de pensamiento sobre la acción social emancipadora que promueve una mayor inclusión social en una aplicación fuerte y efectiva de los derechos humanos para el desarrollo social y humano. Destacamos la necesidad de intervenciones públicas en la búsqueda de objetivos colectivos basados en una estrategia de desarrollo que promueva un futuro más sostenible y equitativo. La pandemia ha llamado la atención sobre la necesidad de repensar la protección social, concretamente la regulación del teletrabajo, la respuesta a la informalidad y la promoción de una mayor disposición de la sociedad a movilizar más recursos financieros para la minimización de riesgos a través de la Seguridad Social. Se hace necesario diseñar políticas más equitativas y sostenibles, basadas en el diálogo social y la cooperación institucional, contribuyendo a aumentar la confianza de los ciudadanos en las instituciones para hacer la economía y la sociedad más inclusivas y sostenibles, sin olvidar a la familia como interlocutor participativo y activo en la intervención del Trabajo Social.
Neste artigo refletimos sobre o papel da ação social na promoção de bem-estar em períodos de crise e no presente, durante o período pandémico. O exercício do Serviço Social na sociedade é aplicado por assistentes sociais que, embora seja um recurso especializado, tem uma fraca autonomia do profissional na tomada de decisão, um fraco reconhecimento do saber teórico do assistente social pelos decisores institucionais e trabalha maioritariamente em equipas uniprofissionais. Mas o assistente social sendo um profissional especializado tem uma formação teórico-prática sustentada na aquisição de competências teóricas, instrumentais e práticas para uma intervenção na complexidade. O assistente social é formado no trabalho em rede e na social advocacy, sem esquecer o treino da observação da realidade social de vida da pessoa. O assistente social, como profissional da relação e da comunicação, desempenha uma forte atividade de mediação na conexão dos diferentes agentes para uma mudança social sustentável.
Na elaboração do artigo utilizamos uma metodologia qualitativa baseada em técnicas de observação da realidade social e em técnicas de pesquisa e análise documental.
O artigo instiga à reflexão profissional, à inovação das abordagens de intervenção e a uma nova matriz de pensar a ação social emancipatória e promotora de maior inclusão social numa forte e efetiva aplicação de direitos humanos para o desenvolvimento social e humano. Destacamos a necessidade das intervenções públicas na prossecução de objetivos coletivos fundamentados numa estratégia de desenvolvimento que promova um futuro mais sustentável e equitativo. A pandemia veio chamar a atenção para a necessidade de se repensar a proteção social, nomeadamente a regulamentação do teletrabalho, dando resposta à informalidade e promover uma maior disponibilidade da sociedade para mobilizar mais recursos financeiros para a minimização de riscos através da Segurança Social. Torna-se necessário conceber políticas mais equitativas e sustentáveis, baseadas num diálogo social e cooperação institucional contribuindo para aumentar a confiança do público nas instituições de forma a tornar a economia e a sociedade mais inclusivas e sustentáveis, sem esquecer a família como parceiro participativo e ativo na intervenção do Serviço Social.

The objective of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the performance of Indonesia's civilian regimes in security sector reform and the military's response to these reforms. The period of investigation spanned the entire process of democratic transition from the resignation of President Soeharto and the collapse of his authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998 to the end of the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri in October 2004. With the subsequent presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia entered a period of political consolidation. By that time, a lengthy process of constitutional change had come to an end and ushered in a new presidential political system which has been rated by Freedom House and other democracy indices as the most democratic in Southeast Asia. Yet, this study shows that democratic consolidation is still incomplete. By the end of the transition process the military as the former authoritarian regime's major pillar had regrouped and rescued many of its erstwhile privileges and reserved domains into the Era Reformasi. This thesis examines the reasons why military reform in Indonesia was only partial and why military influence resurged in the post-Soeharto years. The thesis departs from the theoretical transition literature by combining actor-oriented, structural and cultural perspectives. Empirically, the study rests on extensive interviews, newspaper analysis, internet research and analysis of websites, publicly accessible documents, statistics and scientific literature. The study explores for each of the three transitional civilian presidencies between 1998 and 2004 (Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri) military responses to civilian reform in areas such as prosecution of human rights violations by the military and the investigation of corruption cases (KKN --Kolusi, Korupsi, Nepotisme) involving the former President Soeharto and his cronies, as well as separatism and Islamic radicalism. The study demonstrates that even though the armed forces were in retreat after the end of the New Order regime and discredited in large parts of the public due to flagrant human rights violations and severe military repression in the Soeharto era, the TNI managed to remain a major power factor in the Indonesian political system. The Megawati presidency confirmed the second hypothesis formulated at the outset of the study: The less reform policies of the democratic civilian regimes threatened the vested interests of the Indonesian military, the more likely it was that the military behaved cooperatively towards the respective regimes. However, while this brought back political stability to the country, it also shut doors to further military reform. By the end of her presidency, the military had regrouped and regained a position which, although less powerful than in the Soeharto era, was far more influential than the armed forces in a full-fledged (Western) democracy. Finally, the study also confirms the hypothesis that the combination of historical and cultural factors and the civilian regimes' poor performance was conducive to the Indonesian military's resistance to reform. It was amply demonstrated that the ideological underpinnings of the TNI still resonated strongly with the integralistic and organicist conception of statehood which became the main characteristic of the 1945 State Constitution. Indonesian organicism was closely linked to seemingly traditional Javanese notions of power and kingship, which also attributed an elevated role to the ksatria, the warriors. These notions of statehood, which combined conservative Western influences with Javanese tradition, were inculcated into the collective memory of the armed forces through the soldier's oath, military doctrines such as the Sapta Marga and at all levels of officers training. They fell on fertile ground as until today a majority of the TNI officer corps is of Javanese descent. More importantly, however, many of the organicist and integralistic notions of statehood are shared not only by the military, but also by wide sections of the public. Especially Megawati Soekarnoputri shared these ideas which she adopted from her father, Indonesia's first president, Soekarno, but they are also highly popular in her party, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and many other nationalist forces in the country. With these cognitive predispositions in wide sections of the Indonesian political class, the military and the public, it may be explained why the military influence on Indonesian politics is so resilient. It also does not bode well for military reform, which after the stalemate reached under the Megawati presidency will proceed only very slowly in the future. ; Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich im Rahmen der politikwissenschaftlichen Transitionsforschung mit der Problematik der zivilmilitärischen Beziehungen und deren Einfluss auf den Demokratisierungsprozess in Indonesien. Der Untersuchungszeitraum umfasst die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Prozesse seit dem Zusammenbruch des autoritären Regimes im Jahre 1998 bis hin zum Ende der Präsidentschaft von Megawati Sukarnoputri im Oktober 2004. Ausgangspunkt der politischen Transition in Indonesien waren der Rücktritt Suhartos und der damit verbundene Zusammenbruch der autoritären "Neuen Ordnung" im Jahre 1998. Im Zuge des sich daran anschließenden Demokratisierungsprozesses wurden von den Zivilregierungen der Folgejahre mehrfach Versuche einer Reformierung des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors vorgenommen. Das Widererstarken des Militärs in den letzten Jahren lässt jedoch erkennen, dass speziell im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors bislang nur partiell Reformen durchgesetzt werden konnten. Am Ende des Transitionsprozesses hat es das Militär, welches die wichtigste Stütze des autoritären Vorgänger-Regimes war, geschafft, sich zu reorganisieren und eine Vielzahl seiner alten Privilegien in die Reformasi-Ära zu überführen. Obwohl Indonesien mit der Präsidentschaft von Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono im Jahre 2004 in die Phase der demokratischen Konsolidierung eingetreten ist und das neue demokratische System von verschiedenen Demokratie-Indizes durchaus positiv bewertet wurde, muss in Anbetracht der gegenwärtigen Einflussmöglichkeiten des Militärs auf zivil-politische Prozesse davon ausgegangen werden, dass der Konsolidierungsprozess in Indonesien noch nicht abgeschlossen ist. Ausgehend von der Frage, warum der Einfluss der Streitkräfte in der post-Suharto-Ära wieder zugenommen hat, wird untersucht, was die Gründe für die lediglich partielle Reformierung des Militärs in Indonesien waren. Diesbezüglich werden die Reformvorhaben im Bereich des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors und die Reaktionen des Militärs auf diese in den drei Präsidentschaftsperioden der indonesischen Transitionszeit zwischen 1998 und 2004 in welcher Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid und Megawati Soekarnoputri regierten, analysiert. In allen drei untersuchten Regierungsphasen wurden Reformvorhaben im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors angestoßen. Diese bezogen sich unter anderem auf die Strafverfolgung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die Untersuchung von Korruptionsfällen im Umfeld des ehemaligen Präsidenten Suharto und den Umgang mit separatistischen und militanten islamischen Gruppierungen. Die theoretische Fundierung der Dissertation bilden politikwissenschaftliche Transitionstheorien, anhand welcher durch die Kombination von akteurszentrierten, strukturalistischen und kulturalistischen Ansätzen eine multiperspektivische Herangehensweise intendiert wird. Empirisch beruht die Studie auf umfangreichen Interviews, Internetrecherchen und der Analyse von Zeitungsartikeln, Internetseiten, öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, Statistiken und fachwissenschaftlicher Literatur. Die Ausgangsthese der vorliegenden Arbeit lautet, dass das Militär in Indonesien nach wie vor einen bedeutenden Machtfaktor innerhalb des politischen Systems darstellt. Trotz des Rückzuges der Streitkräfte infolge des Endes der "Neuen Ordnung" und ihrer Diskreditierung in weiten Teilen der Öffentlichkeit aufgrund von Menschenrechtsverletzungen und militärischen Repressionen während der Suharto-Ära, hat es das Militär geschafft, einige zentrale Einflusssphären in die Phase der demokratischen Konsolidierung zu überführen und sich als fester Bestandteil des neuen politischen Systems zu etablieren. Die unzureichende Entmachtung der Streitkräfte kann sowohl auf interne als auch auf externe Einflussfaktoren zurückgeführt werden. So wurde das Wiedererstarken des Militärs durch die Schwäche der zivilen Regierungen und die Machtkämpfe innerhalb der politischen Elite, welche diese zur Kooperation mit militärischen Kräften veranlasste, begünstigt. Darüber hinaus hat aber auch der nachlassende externe Druck, der auf einen Bedeutungszuwachs des Militärs im Rahmen der internationalen und nationalen Terrorismusbekämpfung zurückzuführen ist, zu einem Wiedererstarken der Streitkräfte beigetragen. Die Terroranschläge in den USA und Europa und insbesondere jene in Indonesien selbst, lenkten die Aufmerksamkeit zunehmend auf Strategien der Terrorismusbekämpfung. Demzufolge wurde das Militär, welches als wesentlicher Akteur des "Krieges gegen den Terrorismus" innerhalb Indonesiens betrachtet wurde, auch von internationalen Mächten wie den USA rehabilitiert, was zu einem Nachlassen des Reformdrucks im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors führte. Zudem können für jede der drei untersuchten Regierungsphasen spezifische Problemkonstellationen herausgestellt werden, die das Verhalten von Zivilregierung und Militär hinsichtlich der Reformierung des Sicherheitssektors beeinflusst haben. Zusammenfassend lässt sich mit diesen empirischen Befunden nachweisen, dass die Reformverweigerung des indonesischen Militärs letztendlich durch eine Kombination aus historischen und kulturellen Faktoren und unzureichender Regierungsperformanz begünstigt wurde.

The Pakistani economy faced four major domestic shocks as of April 2015: (i) a political sit-in by opposition parties in Islamabad that lasted between August and December and raised significant political uncertainty; (ii) the September floods in Punjab that affected agricultural crops; (iii) the postponed sale of Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) equity shares in November that reduced its expected privatization proceeds and foreign direct inflows (FDI); and (iv) the terrorist attack in a school in Peshawar that heightened security concerns. However, supported by a favorable slump in international oil prices, and steady implementation of structural reforms by the government, the economy is improving. Preliminary data for the first half of FY15 show growth picking up, driven mainly by strong performance in the agriculture and services sectors. Despite the floods last year, growth improved in the cotton, wheat, and rice crops. The services sector was boosted by transport, storage, communications, finance, and insurance. On the demand side, growth continues to be driven by private consumption partly fuelled by high remittance inflows. Credit to the private sector continued to grow, but slightly less rapidly than last year: as a percentage of GDP, it fell to 13.4 percent in January 2015 compared with 14.1 percent in January 2014. Pakistan is on track to meet a fiscal deficit target of 4.8 percent of GDP in FY15. The newly elected government appears to be committed to fiscal discipline and has made fiscal consolidation the cornerstone of its economic program supported by the IMF, the World Bank and other donors. At present, Pakistan is facing three sources of risk: first is the prospect of an early reversal of the fall in oil prices. Second is the repeat of political events of the first half that keep FDI flows and private investment low; and also affects foreign reserves, privatization program and growth prospects. An uncertain political environment undermines investor confidence and depresses economic activity. Third is the continuation of a troubled domestic energy sector that continues to endure a long-due complex inheritance on its circular debt. Given past trends and the current growth rate, poverty is expected to continue to fall and shared prosperity to improve in this and the next fiscal year. However, a large mass of the population is clustered around the official poverty line, so that small improvements in household real consumption can translate into substantial movement in poverty in either direction.

Dogajanje v času komunistične revolucije bistveno vpliva tako na stanje kot tudi na razumevanje sodobne slovenske družbene situacije. V disertaciji avtorica v luči idejnega nasprotja med krščanstvom in komunizmom ter na podlagi konflikta, ki se je obenem razvil v obdobju revolucije, razišče vzroke in podlage za omenjeni vpliv. Avtorica v delu pokaže na temeljno povezanost sodobnega položaja in komunistične revolucije na Slovenskem. Kot pojmovni okvir ter orodje za razumevanje izbere Girardovo mimetično teorijo in teorijo o grešnem kozlu. Girard namreč kulturo opisuje kot mimetični cikel, kjer posameznik posnema drugega (tako se začne že v samem otroštvu, ko otrok posnema starše in s tem postane družbeno bitje). Posnemanje je gonilo vsake družbe. Poleg tega pa posnemanje lahko omogoči tudi uničenje družbe, kulture. Girard vpelje grešnega kozla kot razrešitev konflikta, kjer imata dva subjekta enako željo in se skupaj obrneta proti grešnemu kozlu, ki zanju predstavlja vzrok mimetične krize, in je njegovo žrtvovanje pogoj za ponovno vzpostavitev družbenega reda in socialne varnosti. Ta teo-retični okvir omogoča tudi raziskovanje preteklih družbenih konfliktov, posebej pa tudi njihovih posledic v sodobnosti, vključno z vidiki spravnih procesov ter tranzicijske pra-vičnosti. Zato ga avtorica plodno uporabi pri omenjenem raziskovanju. Kot dve nasprotujoči idejni podlagi avtorica predstavi krščanstvo in komunizem, ki sta že v svojem idejnem temelju diametralno nasprotni, posebej pa ju prikaže preko Girar-dove teorije. Krščanstvo s krističnim pojmovanjem osebne svobode izstopi iz cikličnosti mehanizma grešnega kozla, komunizem pa prav nasprotno temelji na mimetičnosti. Žrt-vena znamenja v Girardovem pojmovanju, ki opravičijo umor grešnega kozla, temeljijo na dejstvih, ki postanejo sprejemljiva za umor, ne glede na (ne)resničnost le-teh. Implementacija Girardove teorije na slovensko situacijo zajema dva ključna vidika. Prvi vidik je žrtvovanje nasprotnikov komunistične revolucije z žrtvenimi znamenji kolabo-racije, nemirov … Omenjeno žrtvovanje omogoči vzpostavitev totalitarnega komunisti-čnega režima v kraljevini Jugoslaviji in s tem tudi na Slovenskem. Komunizem kot tota-litarni režim ne dopušča alternative, človeka uniformira in osami. Obenem vzpostavi totalni nadzor in teror. Krščanstvo po drugi strani človeka opolnomoči z bogopodobnos-tjo in s tem edinstvenostjo, nedotakljivostjo, nezamenljivostjo ter svobodo. Drugi vidik pa zadeva dejstvo, da konflikt iz časa komunistične revolucije še vedno ni razrešen ter je vladavina prava in vzpostavitev demokratične družbe še vedno nedokon-čan projekt. Kljub demokratični državni ureditvi in propadu komunizma kot dolgoroč-nega družbenopolitičnega in ekonomskega sistema avtorica poudari dva izziva sodobne družbe na Slovenskem. Prvi je prisotnost komunistične ideologije v razmišljanju in delovanju posameznikov, drugi izziv pa je nezadostna uveljavitev tranzicijske pravično-sti. Omenjeni vidiki analize temeljijo najprej že v samem idejnem nasprotju in zasnovi tako komunizma kakor tudi krščanstva. Krščanstvo in komunizem sta v svojem temelju različna. Poseben poudarek je na vidikih dojemanja človeka kot svobodnega in razumskega bitja v obeh idejnih okvirih. Komunizem s komunistično revolucijo nastopi proti človeku, proti človekovemu dostojanstvu in proti človekovi svobodi in s tem krščanstvo postavi v obrambno držo. S tem pa tudi Cerkev, ki je kot ene vidnejših institucij komunistična revolucija ni prevzela in obvladovala, postane braniteljica človekovega življenja in človekovih pravic, obenem pa je postavljena nasproti komunistični revoluciji. Krščanstvo in tudi Cerkev se posluži različnih načinov obrambe in upora, ki niso vselej povsem skladni s krščanskim naukom. Metode obrambe so bile: krščanska drža v odnosu do vojne, do sočloveka, do okupatorja in do revolucionarnih sil, fizična obramba, sodelovanje tako z okupacijskimi kakor tudi revolucionarnimi silami, kulturna, medijska in politična udejstvovanja. Kljub temu je revolucionarno nasilje eskaliralo predvsem v zadnjih letih druge svetovne vojne in prvih letih po revoluciji. Situacije, v katere so bili postavljeni posamezniki na Slovenskem, niso bile enoznačne ali enostavne. Ni šlo zgolj za izbiro med revolucionarno ali protirevolucionarno stranjo, temveč so bile okoliščine zaradi okupacijskih sil bolj zapletene. Ljudem je grozilo neodobravanje, preganjanje ali nasilje z vseh strani. Komunistična partija je monopolizirala odpor proti okupacijskim silam. Že zametki kakršnekoli druge neodvisne organizacije upora so bili lahko kaznovani. Nemalo kristjanov je z namenom domoljubnosti ali nezmožnosti izognitve mobilizaciji postalo del osvobodilnega gibanja, ne glede na ideološko podlago gibanja ali organizacije, ki je gibanje organizirala. Cerkev kljub temu ni bila preveč zaželen partner v uporu, o čemer priča tudi Kardeljevo navodilo: "Duhovne v četah vse postreljajte" (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109). Ne zgolj navodilo, tudi načrtno degradiranje duhovnikov z zaporom, priporom, deportacijami in usmrtitvami so priča odnosu komunistične partije do cerkvenih dostojanstvenikov. Revolucionarno nasilje je pustilo neslutene posledice ne zgolj v tedanjem obdobju, temveč tudi za sedanji čas, pri čemer pri avtoričinem raziskovanju teh posledic pomembno vlogo igrajo tudi osebne zgodbe, odgovornost na osebni ter družbeni ravni in medgeneracijski prenos travm, ki onemogočajo pravo tranzicijo iz totalitarnega v demokratični sistem. Tranzicija in tranzicijska pravičnost je torej mehanizem, ki si prizadeva v polnosti izpeljati tranzicijo na osebni in družbeni ravni ter vzpostaviti zaupanje v državne institucije, delovanje državnih struktur. Situacija na Slovenskem sicer nakazuje na nekatere pozitivne učinke tranzicijske pravičnosti, kot sta denacionalizacija in odprtje arhivov. Še vedno pa umanjka uveljavitev pravičnosti na osebni ravni, pri čemer so pomemben vidik spravni procesi ter prekinitev medgeneracijskega prenosa travm. Podobno kot na osebni ravni umanjka pravičnost v javni sferi, na primer pluralizacija medijskega prostora, urejene gospodarske pobude, dialog med različnimi družbenimi skupinami, vključno z vstopanjem verskih skupnosti v javno razpravo, vzpostavljanjem zaupanja v državne institucije ipd. Pogled na komunistično revolucijo na Slovenskem skozi prizmo Girardovega grešnega kozla ponudi edinstven okvir, ki poveže razumevanje komunistične revolucije in komu-nističnega sistema s sodobnim položajem slovenske družbe. Po eni strani Girardov mehanizem grešnega kozla lahko razumemo kot dopolnjenega v komunistični revoluciji, po drugi strani pa mehanizem stremi k dopolnitvi v smislu celovite uveljavitve tran-zicijske pravičnosti. ; The events during the communist revolution significantly influence the state and understanding of the contemporary Slovenian social situation. In the dissertation, in the light of the ideological contradiction between Christianity and Communism, and on the basis of the conflict that developed during the revolution, the author explores the causes and grounds for this influence. In this work the author shows the fundamental connection between the contemporary situation and the communist revolution in Slovenia. She chooses Girard's mimetic theory and scapegoat as a conceptual framework and tool for understanding. Girard describes culture as a mimetic cycle, where the individual imitates the other (this starts from the very childhood, when the child imitates his parents and thus becomes a social being). Imitation is the driving force of every company. In addition, imitation can also become a destruction of society, culture. Girard therefore implements the scapegoat as a conflict resolution where the two entities share the same desire and together turn against the scapegoat, which causes them a mimetic crisis and its sacrifice is a condition for restoring social order and social security. This general theoretical framework also makes it possible – to explore past social conflicts, and in particular their consequences in the present, including aspects of reconciliation processes and transitional justice. Therefore, the author fruitfully uses it in the mentioned research. The author embraces Christianity and communism as two opposing ideological bases, which are already diametrically opposed in their conceptual bases, and are especially illuminated by Girard's theory. Christianity, with its cristian notion of personal freedom, stands out from the cyclical nature of the scapegoat, but communism is, on the contrary, based on mimeticism. Victims of character in Girard's conception that justify the murder of a scapegoat are based on facts that become acceptable for murder, regardless of the (un) reality of them. The implementation of Girard's theory on the Slovenian situation thus encompasses two key aspects. The first aspect is the sacrifice of the opponents of the communist revolution with the sacrificial signs of collaboration, riots, … This sacrifice makes it possible to establish a totalitarian communist regime in Yugoslavia, and thus in Slovenia. Communism, as a totalitarian regime, does not allow an alternative, it uniforms and isolates man. At the same time, it establishes total control and terror. Christianity, on the other hand, empowers man with uniqueness, inviolability, irreplaceability and freedom. Another aspect concerns the fact that the conflict from the communist revolution has still not been resolved, and that the rule of law and the establishment of a democratic society are still, in the eyes of many Slovenians, an unfinished project. Despite the democratic state system and the collapse of communism as a long-term socio-political and economic system, the author emphasizes two challenges of contemporary society in Slovenia. The first is the presence of communist ideology in the thinking and action of individuals, and the second challenge is the insufficient implementation of transitional justice. The aforementioned aspects of the analysis are based first of all on the very conceptual contradiction and conception of both communism and Christianity. Christianity and communism are fundamentally different. Particular emphasis is placed on aspects of the perception of man as a free and rational being in both conceptual frameworks. Communism, by communist revolution, stands against man, against human dignity and against human freedom, thereby placing Christianity in a defensive posture. In doing so, the Church, which as one of the most prominent institutions has not been taken over and controlled by the Communist Revolution, becomes a defender of human life and human rights, while at the same time it stands against the Communist Revolution. Christianity, as well as the Church, uses various methods of defense and rebellion that are not always completely in line with Christian teaching. The methods of defense were the Christian stance in relation to war, to fellow human beings, to the occupier and to the revolutionary forces, physical defense, cooperation with both occupation and revolutionary forces, cultural, media and political activities. Nevertheless, revolutionary violence escalated, especially in the last years of World War II and the first years after the revolution. The situations in which individuals in Slovenia were placed were not straightforward or straightforward. It was not merely a choice between a revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary party, but the circumstances were more complex rather than straightforward because of the occupying forces. People were threatened with disapproval, persecution or violence from all sides. The Communist Party monopolized resistance to the occupation forces. The rudiments of any other, independent organization of resistance could have been punished. Quite a few Christians, for the sake of patriotism or inability to evade mobilization, became part of the liberation movement, regardless of the ideological basis of the movement or the organization that organized the movement. The church was not, however, a much-desired partner in the resistance, as evidenced by Kardelj's instruction: "Shoot the priests in the troops." (Griesser-Pečar 1996, 109) Not only the instruction, but also the deliberate degradation of priests through imprisonment, detention, deportation and execution, are witnesses to the Communist Party's attitude towards Church dignitaries. Revolutionary violence has left unprecedented consequences not only in that time but also in the present, with the author's exploration of these consequences also playing a significant role in personal stories, personal and social responsibility, and the intergenerational transmission of traumas that they preclude a real transition from a totalitarian to a democratic system. Transition and transitional justice is thus a mechanism that seeks to fully complete the transition on a personal and social level, and to establish trust in state institutions, the functioning of state structures. Although the situation in Slovenia points to some of the positive effects of transitional justice, such as denationalization, the opening of archives, it still lacks the enforcement of justice on a personal level ; for example, with regard to aspects of media pluralization, orderly economic initiatives, dialogue between different social groups, including the entry of religious communities into public debate, building confidence in state institutions, etc. The view of the communist revolution in Slovenia through the prism of Girard the scapegoat offers a unique framework that connects the understanding of the communist revolution and the communist system with the contemporary position of Slovene society. On the one hand, Girard's mechanism of the scapegoat can be understood as supplemented in the communist revolution, and on the other, the mechanism seeks to supplement in the sense of the full implementation of transitional justice.

Health Rights Are Civil Rights tells the story of the important place of health in struggles for social change in Los Angeles in the 1960s and 1970s. Jenna M. Loyd describes how Black freedom, antiwar, welfare rights, and women's movement activists formed alliances to battle oppressive health systems and structural violence, working to establish the principle that health is a right

The new government in Israel is politically further to the right than any other before it. The success of the radical right parties and their inclusion in the government are the results of a long-term transformation of Israel's political landscape. One characteristic of this development is the genesis of a right-wing majority, accompanied by a shift to the right of the mainstream, and the political legitimisation of the most radical segment of Israeli society. The common denominator of this government is its anti-liberal impetus, which amounts to a reorganisation of the state. The government intends to weaken democratic mechanisms, especially the system of checks and balances, the status of the Supreme Court, and that of fundamental rights. Instead, majoritarian principles are to be strengthened, placing few limits on government majorities. This disruptive approach also applies to the conflict with the Palestinians. Here, victory is sought: The integration of the West Bank into the legal territory of the state of Israel is to be made irreversible. (author's abstract)