Suchergebnisse

The 12th Amdendment to the Constitution requires that candidates for President and Vice President receive a majority of electoral votes to be elected. If no candidate receives a majority, the President is elected by the House of Representatives (which occurred once, in 1825), and the Vice President is elected by the Senate (which also occurred once, in 1837). This process is known as contingent election. This report contains information on the 12th Amendment Constitutional History, previous contingent elections, the 20th Amendment and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, and related information.

Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.

This paper discusses political and economic aspects of Turkish accession. Under present rules, Turkey would have the greatest number of council votes within twenty years, and receive the largest budget transfer. Free migration may increase the Turkish immigrant population in Germany from 2 to 3.5 million in thirty years. Most of the economic effects will be felt by Turkey, particularly in agriculture. The main obstacles to accession are not economic, but political. Historical experience prevents Turkey from eliminating the decisive political role of the military, giving Kurds and other minorities cultural rights and upholding basic human rights.

The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties fabor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaings at groups where most votes are gained by informating about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties' policies.

The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaigns at groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties' policies.

As regards political commitment, Halévy's seminal study (1995) has made Bentham known as a member of the 'Radicals' who, at the end of the 18th century in England, defended the equal vote, the secret ballot, and the principle of 'No taxation without consent'. He is undoubtedly less known for proposing an almost complete plan of a utilitarian democracy, which he conceived in 1822 at the request of the Portuguese Cortes. Bentham worked on this project for ten years, trying to have it implemented in Greece, Tripoli, Portugal, and South America. He died in 1832, leaving the Constitutional Code unfinished (.).

The 14 Oct 2001 election marked a watershed in the Argentine political system for at least two reasons. First, the government did not actively support any candidate standing in the election. Secondly, it was the first time that a considerable proportion of the electorate declined to be represented by any of the political parties; instead, they either abstained or spoiled their ballot paper. In addition, the 2001 election marked the first time that the entire Senate was directly elected by a popular vote, following an amendment to the constitution in 1994. 2 Tables, 3 References. Adapted from the source document.

As regards political commitment, Halévy's seminal study (1995) has made Bentham known as a member of the 'Radicals' who, at the end of the 18th century in England, defended the equal vote, the secret ballot, and the principle of 'No taxation without consent'. He is undoubtedly less known for proposing an almost complete plan of a utilitarian democracy, which he conceived in 1822 at the request of the Portuguese Cortes. Bentham worked on this project for ten years, trying to have it implemented in Greece, Tripoli, Portugal, and South America. He died in 1832, leaving the Constitutional Code unfinished (.).

Examines the merits of the "election by thirds" model, drawing on questionnaire data from councilors in northeastern England & Cumbria along with interviews with 12 councilors. The election by thirds method is briefly described before considering the local voter turnout in such elections. The model's impact on councilor campaigning is assessed in terms of what councilors themselves think of their role. The implications of electing councils by thirds for local authority political control are looked at, along with what such a model means for decision making & proportional representation. 1 Table, 26 References. J. Zendejas

This paper considers an endogenous growth model with productive government spending in which overlapping generations of agents vote sequentially on policy. With sequential majority voting, there is a multiplicity of politico-economic equilibria originating from self-fulfilling policy expectations. Some of these equilibria are Pareto-inefficient & there are endogenous cycles. A constitutional rule providing partial commitment significantly shrinks the set of politico-economic equilibria, removing all inefficiencies & cycles. However, a likely outcome is that government size is too high relative to the growth-maximizing size. 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.

Motivation factors that induce citizens to cast their votes in elections are a complex phenomenon that demands a multidisciplinary approach for its wide understanding. In this essay several theories & approaches are described to take into account from a holistic perspective the complexity of factors that fall upon citizens' motivation to get involved in politics, & specifically, in electoral processes. The author concludes that elections are complex processes in which voters' motivation is induced by a diversity of factors & circumstances. Therefore, no single theory can explain voters' abstention & citizens' involvement. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Addresses the ascendant political power of European Muslims. This rising influence is attributed to demographics of the last 50 years & new citizenship laws & is evident in the Muslim swing vote in Germany & emerging organizational capacity in France. The impact of the September 11 (2001) terrorist attacks on the emergent European Muslim street is noted, & the relationship between European Muslims & Europe's growing anti-Semitism (ie, anti-Israeli sentiment) is cited. The outcome -- a multicultural Europe -- is seen as worth the strain that such ethnic-lobby political developments will bring to bear on transatlantic relations. J. Zendejas

"Consider a committee that in the past has made a promise not to confiscate the profits from a foreign investor. After the investment has taken place, there is a material benefit if the committee decides to default on the earlier promise. But there are also some small moral costs for those who vote in favor of default. We show that in such situations small committees are more likely to default than large committees. Thus, constituencies can decide about degrees of commitment by choosing committee sizes appropriately. Experimental data confirms our predictions." (author's abstract)

Elections and Democratization in Ukraine represents a valuable contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of party systems development in postcommunist politics. Unlike many volumes that rely on largely anecdotal evidence and narrative, this book is extremely well organized and systematic. There is a clear theoretical structure, and systematic evidence is employed to test specific hypotheses. Using some of the classic works on the development of party systems and relations between parties and voters to provide a theoretical framework, the author derives a set of hypotheses about characteristics that might affect voter choices over time.