Suchergebnisse

The security and intelligence system of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije – KPJ) and the Partisan movement was institutionalised through intelligence centres (obavještajni centri – OC, late 1942), the Department for People's Protection (Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda – OZNA, May 1944), and the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbjednosti – UDBA, March 1946) and gradually created a system of recording and categorising enemies. The author uses key documents regarding the establishment of the security and intelligence system, instructions given by its leadership, and reports of security and intelligence bodies from Croatia in order to reconstruct the way in which records of armed enemies and political opponents were made and according to which criteria such people were categorised. At the beginning of the war, this matter wasn't given much consideration, but with the gradual strengthening of the Partisan units i.e. the People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (Narodno-oslobodilačka vojska i partizanski odredi Jugoslavije – NOV i POJ), later the Yugoslav Army (Jugoslavenska armija – JA) and their establishment of control over larger areas, and even more so at the end of the war and in its immediate aftermath as well as after the establishment of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia (Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija – DFJ) and later the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija – FNRJ), the need for making such records became a pressing matter. Therefore, during the early phase of building this security and intelligence system, its main focus was on recording and categorising wartime enemies. Security and intelligence operatives reported on the state of affairs in the occupied territories, the number of enemy soldiers and their armament, and enemy military plans. However, the category of "class" i.e. political and ideological enemy was soon introduced, according to which the population's stance towards the Partisan movement became a subject of interest. Therefore, political opponents such as members and supporters of "bourgeois" political parties, the clergy, and people who possessed a certain amount of property, especially owners of various types of shops, stores, and enterprises were all considered potential enemies. Records were kept on Ustashas, Crusaders, Chetniks, Gestapo agents, members of the Croatian Peasant Party, priests, convicts, émigrés, informants working for Western intelligence services (particularly the British Intelligence Service), and also those who had familial ties to such people or were considered to be their friends. In addition to active enemies and political opponents, they also monitored all other citizens. Therefore, as the end of the war was approaching, the KPJ and OZNA strove to secure their dictatorship and a one-party system in which there would be no room for opposition activity. With the establishment of the UDBA and the forming of separate departments and offices for various groups of armed, political, and ideological opponents, the security system was finally complete. Whether they were active or passive, living or dead, acting in the country or abroad, records were kept on all enemies and political opponents as well as their family members and friends. Unfortunately, these claims can be substantiated only with fragmentary data since full lists for Croatia or some of its larger or smaller territorial units such as districts (okrugs) or provinces (oblasts) are unavailable, at least for the 1940s and early 1950s. However, lists and reports of security and intelligence services regarding the number and types of enemies are available for certain smaller areas, such as districts or cities, or at least for some categories of enemies, such as those sentenced to death by the courts or without trial, active enemies of the people, former convicts, suspicious persons, and émigrés. They prove that records were kept on almost all types of enemies. The same conclusion applies to the monitoring of all other citizens, since all those working in state institutions and mass organisations – such as women's and youth organisations – were monitored, as were critically-minded individuals. The main goal of the communist authorities and their security and intelligence services was to have a complete insight into enemy activities, rival political forces, and possible discontent among their own citizens so as to nip any opposing political activity in the bud. ; U članku se prikazuje kako je partizanski pokret na čelu s Komunističkom partijom Jugoslavije pomoću svoje sigurnosno-obavještajne službe u vrijeme rata i nakon preuzimanja vlasti prikupljao podatke o neprijatelju i kategorizirao ih prema različitim kriterijima, od vojnih do političkih. Na početku rata tim se pitanjima nije posvećivala posebna pozornost, no jačanjem partizanskih jedinica, tj. Narodnooslobodilačke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije, poslije Jugoslavenske armije, te stavljanjem većih područja pod njihovu kontrolu jačala je potreba sustavnoga vođenja takve evidencije, napose potkraj i nakon završetka rata uspostavljanjem Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije, a nakon izbora ujesen 1945. Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije. Autor prikazuje kako se razvijao sistem izrade popisa i kategorizacija neprijatelja na temelju ključnih dokumenata o utemeljenju sigurnosno-obavještajnoga sustava, uputa vodstva sigurnosno-obavještajnoga sustava i izvješća sigurnosno-obavještajnih tijela na primjeru Hrvatske, napose od osnivanja obavještajnih centara potkraj 1942., osnivanja Odjeljenja za zaštitu naroda u svibnju 1944., njegove reorganizacije i osnivanja Uprave državne bezbjednosti u ožujku 1946. sve do, koliko to dostupni dokumenti dopuštaju, 1950-ih.

The fall of the dictatorship duvalierist, on February 7, 1986, mark a true turning point in the political evolution of the country. The new situation which results from it is generally analyzed or included/understood under the angle of the explanation rising from the paradigm of the transitions. This framework of analysis appeared in all points misfit to give an account of the recorded upheavals. Consequently, the search for an alternative explanation has been suddenly posed. This research tries to explore this way. And it raises a fundamental questioning which apprehends the Haitian crisis under the angle of the exhaustion of the political order imposed at the time of the first American occupation for the period 1915-1934. The challenge of this reorganization of the political field had more requested the role and the action of two new actors who durably emerged in the political life of the country as from the Eighties: popular movements and political parties. The interaction which is established between these two actors had acquired at the same time a complex and problematic dimension. On the one hand, they (actors) had not been able to develop a clear conscience of their role in the process of political transformation in progress. In addition, it was established between the two actors a radical antagonism which ended up compromising the possibility of construction of the capacities national policies in order to support a positive development of the known as process. The return to the American direct domination, with the military intervention of 1994, will devote impossibility of finding an exit with the crisis with the internal plan. This intervention will confirm the reality of the exhaustion of the political order of 1934 whole while causing new contradictions. It in particular contributed to precipitate the removal of the army, while proceeding in a quasi-total way to the confiscation of the sovereignty of the country. During the decade 1986-1996 which remains hinge in the process of political change in Haiti, it was not possible thus to lead to a redefinition of the political order failing. But the stake of its renewal remains essential. In spite of their weaknesses and the controversies at the base of their relation, the popular movements and the political parties remain still the two principal forms of political representation or class action suit who can help to advance in this direction. The major difficulty is to manage to define the originality of the articulation between these two actors which could be appropriate well in the current context marked at the same time by the backward flow of the movements and the low level of rooting of the form partisane. ; La chute de la dictature duvaliériste, le 7 février 1986, marque un véritable tournant dans l'évolution politique du pays. La situation nouvelle qui en résulte est généralement analysée ou comprise sous l'angle de l'explication découlant du paradigme des transitions. Ce cadre d'analyse s'est révélé en tous points inadapté pour rendre compte des bouleversements enregistrés. Dès lors, la recherche d'une explication alternative vient à se poser. Cette recherche tente d'explorer cette voie. Et elle soulève un questionnement fondamental qui appréhende la crise haïtienne sous l'angle de l'épuisement de l'ordre politique imposé lors de la première occupation américaine pendant la période 1915-1934. Le défi de cette restructuration du champ politique avait sollicité davantage le rôle et l'action de deux nouveaux acteurs qui ont durablement émergé dans la vie politique du pays à partir des années quatre-vingt : les mouvements populaires et les partis politiques. L'interaction qui s'établit entre ces deux acteurs avait acquis à la fois une dimension complexe et problématique. D'une part, ils (les acteurs) n'avaient pas pu développer une claire conscience de leur rôle dans le processus de transformation politique en cours. D'autre part, il s'est établi entre les deux acteurs un radical antagonisme qui a fini par compromettre la possibilité de construction des capacités politiques nationales en vue de favoriser une évolution positive dudit processus. Le retour à la domination directe américaine, avec l'intervention militaire de 1994, consacrera l'impossibilité de trouver une issue à la crise au plan interne. Cette intervention confirmera la réalité de l'épuisement de l'ordre politique de 1934 tout en provoquant des contradictions nouvelles. Elle a notamment contribué à précipiter la suppression de l'armée, tout en procédant de manière quasi-totale à la confiscation de la souveraineté du pays. Pendant la décennie 1986-1996 qui reste charnière dans le processus de changement politique en Haïti, il n'a pas été possible donc d'aboutir à une redéfinition de l'ordre politique agonisant. Mais l'enjeu de son renouvellement reste indispensable. Malgré leurs faiblesses et les controverses à la base de leur relation, les mouvements populaires et les partis politiques demeurent encore les deux principales formes de représentation politique ou d'action collective qui puissent aider d'avancer dans cette direction. La difficulté majeure est d'arriver à définir l'originalité de l'articulation entre ces deux acteurs qui pourrait bien convenir dans le contexte actuel marqué à la fois par le reflux des mouvements et le faible niveau d'enracinement de la forme partisane.

Book reviewed in this article:THE HOVERING GIANT: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America. By Cole BlasierRATIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: Contributions to the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences. Edited by S.I. Benn and G.W. MortimorePOLITICAL OBLIGATION. By Richard E. FlathmanELECTORAL BEHAVIOR A Comparative Handbook. Edited by Richard RoseABORIGINES IN COLONIAL SOCIETY, 1788–1850: From 'Noble Savage' to 'Rural Pest'. Edited by Jean WoolmingtonBLACK VIEWPOINTS: The Aboriginal Experience. Edited by Colin Tatz assisted by Keith McConnochieKANT AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY. By William A. GalstonTHE MAKING OF INDIAN POLICY 1853–1865 Relations of the Court af Directors, the India Board, the India Office and the Government of India. By Prashanto K. ChatterjiTOLERATION. By Preston KingTHE GERMAN PUBLIC MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A Social History of German Political Sentiments, Aspirations and Ideas. By Frederick HertzINSIDE THE MONSTER: Writings on the United States and American Imperialism. By José Martí. Edited and with an introduction and notes by Philip S. FonerPUBLIC POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN AUSTRALIA A Reader. Edited by R.N. Spann and G.R. CurnowPROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY Religion in Early Australia: The Problem of Church and State. Edited with an introduction by Jean WoolmingtonW. DILTHEY: SELECTED WRITINGS. Edited, translated and introduced by H.P. RickmanTHE LAW IN CRISIS Bridges of Understanding. By C.G. WeeramantryBROADCASTING IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA. By Ian K. MackayNEW DIMENSIONS OF WORLD POLITICS. Edited by Geoffrey L. Goodwin and Andrew LinklaterTHE CABINET OFFICE TO 1945. By S.S. WilsonFREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. By Judith N. ShklarTHE SOCIAL PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU. By John CharvetJEAN BODlN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY. By Julian H. FranklinBLACK ARMADA. By Rupert LockwoodSIR MATTHEW NATHAN British Colonial Governor and Civil Servant. By Anthony P. HaydonTHE ART OF ANTICIPATION: Values and Methods in Forecasting. Edited by Solomon Encel, Pauline K. Marstrand and William PagePROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL FORECASTING. Edited by Christopher Freeman, Marie Jahoda and Ian MilesTHE TRANSFER OF POWER, 1942–7, vol. VI, THE POST‐WAR PHASE New Moves by the Labour Government, 1 August 1945–22 March 1946. Edited by Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel MoonU.S. POLICY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. By Yuan‐Li WuFOIJNDATIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. By Peter B. HarrisINTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE. Third edition. By Carlton Clymer Rodee, Totton James Anderson, Carl Quimby Christol and Thomas H. GreeneTHE STRANGE NEUTRALITY, SOVIET‐JAPANESE RELATIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941–1945. By G.A. LensenLAND TENURE IN PRE‐REVOLUTIONARY CHINA Kiangsu Province in the 1920s and 1930s. By Robert AshA CRITICAL GUIDE TO THE KWANGTUNG PROVINCIAL ARCHIVES DEPOSITED AT THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE OF LONDON. By David PongSOCIETY AND POLITICS IN GERMANY 1500–1750. By G BeneckeIN THE ANGLO‐ARAB LABYRINTH: The McMahon‐Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914–1939. By Elie KedourieTHE ARABS IN ISRAEL. By Sabri JiryisTHE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, FROM COMINTERN TO COMINFORM. By F. ClaudinWOMEN AS CITIZENS A Comparative Review. By Josephine F. MilburnWHITE ON THE MEDIA. By Brian WhiteMATHEMATICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICS. Edited by H.R. Alker, Jr., K.W. Deutsch and A.H. StoetzelSOCIALIST OWNERSHIP AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. By Wlodzimierz Brus, translated by R.A. ClarkePUBLIC, TRADE UNION AND COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE IN GERMANY: The Commonweal Idea. By Walter Hesselbach, translated from the German by Karl KuhneSOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1962–1973 The Paradox of Super Power. By Robin EdmondsA HANDBOOK TO ELECTIONS IN UTTAR PRADESH 1920–1951. By P.D. Reeves, B.D. Graham and J.M. GoodmanUNTO GOD AND CAESAR Religious issues in the Emerging Commonwealth 1891–1906. By Richard ElyLEADERSHIP IN FIJI. By Rusiate NayacakalouLOCAL POLITICS AND THE RISE OF PARTY: The London Municipal Society and the Conservative Intervention in Local Elections 1894–1963. By Ken YoungSOLDIERS AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Civil‐Military Relations in Comparative Perspective. By J. Stephen HoadleyA BLANKET A YEAR. Bv Leonard Broom and F. Lancaster JonesABORKINAL HEALTH. By Peter M. MoodieKASHMIR IN TRANSITION 1885–1893. By Dilip Kumar GhoseA RESEARCH GUIDE TO AUSTRALIAN POLITICS AND COGNATE SUBJECTS (ARGAP). By Henry Mayer with Margaret Bettison and Judy KeeneMINDFUL MILITANTS The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia, 1920–1972. By T. SheridanTHE FUTURE OF AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM. By Gordon Greenwood. Second editionMELBOURNE STUDIES IN EDUCATION 1976. Edited by Stephen Murray‐SmithROYAL COMMISSIONS AND DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES IN BRITAIN A Case‐study in Institutional Adaptiveness and Public Participation in Government. By T.J. CartwrightLEGISLATIVE STAFFING: A Comparative Perspective. Edited by James J. Heaphey and Alan P. BalutisTHE SILENT DICTATORSHIP The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918. By Martin KitchenTRIAL OF FAITH Religion and Politics in Tocqueville's Thought. By Doris S. GoldsteinVOTING FOR THE QUEENSLAND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 1890–1964. By Colin A. Hughes and B.D. GrahamVOTING FOR THE VICTORIAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 1890–1964 (1975).VOTING FOR THE NEW SOUTH WALES LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 1890–1964 (1975).VOTING FOR THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN, WESTERN AUSTRALIAN AND TASMANIAN LOWER HOUSES 1890–1964 (1976).OUR PARTNERSHIP. By Beatrice Webb. Edited by Barbara Drake and Margaret I. Cole with an introduction by George FeaverA CONSTITUTION FOR THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF GREAT BRITAIN. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. With an introduction by Samuel H. BeerMETHODS OF SOCIAL STUDY. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. With an introduction by T.H. MarshallTHE CORRESPONDENCE OF G.E. MORRISON, vol. I, 1895–1912. Edited by Lo Hui‐min

В течение трех поколений россияне жили в обществе деспотическом, не знавшем ни гуманности, ни справедливости, ни цивилизованных социальных отношений. Властвующая элита была выращена по преимуществу из социальных аутсайдеров, презиравших свой народ и бессмысленно разорявших страну своей некомпетентностью и безответственностью. Описание состава и характерных черт номенклатуры — правящего слоя "коммунистического" СССР, объяснение исторических предпосылок существования этого слоя владык и хозяев — таково содержание первой части статьи. Вторая часть посвящена превращению вчерашних партийных и советских работников в номенклатурную буржуазию, формированию новой демократической политической и экономической элиты. ; The paper calls attention to a new developmental paradigma in order to bridge the gap between civilization's and general formation's approaches. It is necessary to reject the more recent traditional stereotype about the historical development of mankind as a linearian process (from primitive society to capitalist and socialist ones). It has to be noticed that there are many different socio-economical forms existing in the concrete historical-cultural context. According to that scientific position authors make carefull distinctions between two lines in the historical development with specific for each of them typological variety. The first of them got started from antic polis, and societies which were along this line based on private property, free enterprise and democracy. Societies of another type have appeared firstly under the epoch of asian despoties; and based on the state property, community life, and overall power state control over societal resources. Considerable interest has been shown in describing the historical past of Russia and X)ssible developmental alternatives and tendencies. Duality in the developmental mentation is seen as one of the most characteristic features of Russia. The Bolshevist regime has undertaken first attempt to liquidate national origins of ''Europian developmental intentions" with it's greater degree of democracy and private initiative. Having said that recent seven decades were portrayed, from one hand, as the maintenance and modification of the aspects of "asian historical memory", and at the same time it was the process of the gradual and permanent transformation and total spread of the European patterns, life styles and standards of the West by the channels of technology and everyday communication.lt was a real movement towards market economy and civil society as an acceptable surviving strategy. That is why August putsch was the last step for liberating from tyranny. It seems so obvious for authors that Russian population has a sufficient potential for real democratic development and reforms, vital for both social and economic reasons which seek to encourage a greater degree of involvement, self-reliance and self-government. Authors present some of the findings of a recent research project which examined over principal points of the framework of socio-political system, and determined it as elacratical. Etacracy is considered both as original socio-economic formation placed on the civilizational "East West" dichotomy and as one of the political mode of modernization (industrialization) for non-European cultural area. Within the frame of reference authors clarify essential features of ctacratic society as domination of ''power-property" relations; state conlrolover ownership's rclaHons; slate monopoly and control of the means of production; centralized system of distribution; technological stagnation (dependence only on external stimuli); organized systematical selection of the most obedient and devoted to the system people; the superiority of goods-producing interests over consumers' needs; the degree of closeness to the resources of centralized distribution; ethnic affiliation as a fixed status; absence of civil society. Authors determine the appropriate criterion variables for ctacratic society. Authors present some findings of a recent research accessed the strategy of the soviet nomenklatura in cool and realistic terms. They consider nomenklatura as a specific organized hierarchical formation and etacracy as a political and economical ruling group controlling over property. Authors actively use the data of the researches and statistical information to porlrey the historical development of the Soviet political elite in terms of occupational status and mobility, standards of living, career orientations of individual at different levels of the nomenklatura's hierarchy with regard to forces producing, maintaining and modifying the basis, the form and the extent of political power and prestige. The authors suggest an empirical description of the portraiture of (he main political figures and political members of Political Bureau, Russian Parliament, Soviet Government in the age of perestroika, the transformation of the totalitarian dictatorship of the party apparatus into an authoritarian presidential regime, and then to the first democratic Government created a chance to reshape our policy and build a framework for democratic development. Authors draw attention to the crucial point in our history — replacement of the ruling monolitc elite by the "distributive" elites manage their control independently in economic sphere, political, military and intellectual spheres. There is a ''distribution" of social support between different social forces. It is necessary to make clear the extent of social support of the former political elite (the Army and the Government ministries, the older officers, inefficient, centralized, and bureaucratic management). And oppositely — to define growing prospects for ever greater support of the followers of a new socio-economic and political order as real base for middle-class' institutionalization. To study the nature, the mechanisms and consequences of social activity and nev modifications of nomenklatura is only one possible and acceptable scientific task. Greatly neglected group of new economic elite requires intensive exploration to gain an accurate notion of the origins, social mobility and perspectives of development and to build up it's typology.

Der Aufstieg des IS hat realpolitischen Forderungen Auftrieb gegeben, zusammen mit Baschar al-Assad gegen die Terrormiliz vorzugehen. Ein Plan, der allenfalls geeignet ist, noch verheerendere Konflikte zu schaffen. Und : die Geschichte lehrt, dass Demokratien nur bestehen, wenn sie den Anspruch nicht aufgeben, ihre Werte weltweit zu verankern. (IP)

Brazil is a land of contrasts; at the same time that it is emerging as a global economic power, it is also one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. When "Lula" Da Silva and his Workers' Party ("PT") won the 2002 election, they intended to pay a historical debt to the poor. Lula envisioned a country with inclusive growth, where redistribution and poverty reduction were seen as prerequisites for economic growth, and not as competing policy objectives (Leubolt, 2013: 76). In doing so, his government not only changed the content of social policies, but also the very policy-making process. Lula's Fome Zero strategy takes a comprehensive approach to reducing hunger in Brazil. Fome Zero is an umbrella framework that includes programs aimed at increasing access to food, strengthening family agriculture, fostering income generating activities, and supporting partnership promotion and civil society mobilization.This brief presents an analysis of the Fome Zero policy targeting family agriculture, the Food Purchase Program (Programa de Aquisicao de Alimentos, "PAA"). In Brazil 30% of rural enterprises are family farms. They produce 38% of the agricultural value and employ over 70% of rural workers (Rocha, 2009: 58). On the other hand, in 2003 rural poverty was as high as 41%. Accordingly, PAA seeks to tackle rural poverty and food insecurity by guaranteeing demand in local markets for small producers through local government purchases of agricultural products. The first section of this brief presents the context in which PAA was conceived, followed by a summary of the implementation process. The following section presents an evaluation of the policy results. Finally, the analysis concludes with lessons learned and proposed changes.As previously mentioned, the PT election can be seen as the catalyst that propitiated the introduction of PAA. However, the formulation of social policies in Brazil started after the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1985. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution set in motion the decentralization process that empowered municipalities. Then, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) focused on strengthening democratic institutions and economic growth. In addition, in the early 1990s municipalities across different states devised conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes that benefited the poor. Moreover, during the FHC administration (1995-2002) the federal government launched CCTs at the national level (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentacao).The PT created a positive environment that enabled the formulation of Fome Zero, with elements that legitimized such social policies as PAA. First, with the transition to democracy social protection policies began to be seen as investments to further development and not as drainage of public resources. Second, the provision of social services had experienced a switch from a universalist model to one that prioritizes targeting vulnerable populations, i.e. CCTs. The third factor was the current economic growth, since the government would not have been able to establish redistributive programs without it. The fourth element was the country's poor social indicators. Despite experiencing growth, Brazil had high social exclusion and inequality because the rapid economic development was elusive to the poor. Finally, the fifth source of legitimacy was the PT election. Lula based his presidential campaign on a discourse of inclusive growth. He promised to eradicate poverty and to redistribute wealth in the country, while reaffirming his commitment to continue with the orthodox liberal monetary policies introduced in previous administrations.Rural poverty and food insecurity were the problems that drove the creation of the PAA policy. The PT designed the framework to address these issues through Fome Zero and the National Food and Nutritional Security Policy ("PNSAN"). However, it deliberately democratized and decentralized the policy debate. In a nutshell, Fome Zero is the articulation of a web of social protection policies and ministries and agencies and its, and PAA's, success relied on creating partnerships with key stakeholders (local governments, businesses and civil society organizations). The federal government created the Social Development Ministry ("MDS") to manage Fome Zero and its subsidiary policies. During the policy formulation process, the MDS organized meetings, workshops and symposia with a multiplicity of stakeholders. These encounters granted non-governmental organizations the possibility to exert influence in the policy process. Social movements also played a key role in the formulation of the National Law for Food and Nutrition Security ("LOSAN"). Furthermore, this law granted civil society participation through the newly created National Council for Food and Nutrition Security ("CONSEA"), which is present at the national, regional and local levels.It was important that the new policy aimed at reducing rural poverty avoid compromising the pro-export production model that had transformed Brazil into one of the world's largest food exporters. Policy-makers considered several traditional options, three of which were discarded for various reasons. An extensive agrarian reform redistributing land to the landless and small farmers would have reduced food outputs. A second alternative, to take no action, would assume that market forces would provide opportunities for poor peasants. The third scenario was to formulate several policies, scattered across different ministries without coordination. The selected policy option implemented by the PT followed a multi-sectoral approach. It sought to increase poor families' income through CCTs, (Bolsa Familia), aimed at feeding the vulnerable population via school meals, community kitchens and popular restaurants, and at strengthening family agriculture through credit and food purchase via PRONAF and PAA. Ultimately, this integral overarching policy focuses on guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food supply.Successful implementation of such a policy demanded a new policy model that articulates the different dimensions of the policy, while also facilitating the participation of multiple stakeholders. In short, CONSEA, MDS and the Inter-Ministerial Chamber on Food and Nutritional Security ("CAISAN") established the policy system. In such policy system, the national, state and municipal executive powers have the ability to adapt the policy to their local context. The system is crafted after receiving feedback from within the political structure, as well as from the civil society. The following diagram illustrates how the food security policy process works.Created by Law 10.969 in 2003, PAA is administered by MDS and the Ministry of Agricultural Development ("MDA"). PAA guidelines are defined by the Grupo Gestor ("Managing Group"), which is comprised of six ministries: MDS; MDA; Economy; Planning and Budgeting; Agriculture; and Education. The execution has two stages; first, at the national level in partnership with the National Supply Agency (CONAB), and second, decentralized execution involving the participation of state and municipal governments. These latter partnerships are crucial for PAA because the MDS and MDA budget are directed exclusively towards agricultural products procurement, while it is the local governments who ensure the system is operable to allow for the purchases.PAA includes four programs: Purchase for Immediate Donation, Incentives for Milk Consumption and Production, Direct Purchase and Stock Formation. The first two programs aim at buying produce and milk to redistribute among the vulnerable population. Between 2003 and 2010 they represented 39% and 37% of PAA budget, respectively. The objectives of Direct Purchase and Stock formation are to facilitate resources for the promotion of public and individual's stock formation that can guarantee food availability and fair prices for family farmers.PAA intends to benefit two groups of people: food producers and food consumers. The food producers are family farmers including fish farmers, fishermen, extractors, indigenous farmers, quilombolaand family farmers settled during the land reform. The food consumers group comprises people and families under social vulnerability, with imminent risk of nutritional and food insecurity, people assisted by national food and nutrition security programs, and children in public schools.The follow paragraph summarizes the main policy outputs. By the end of 2011 the program had reached over 204,000 small farmers, which is only 3.28% of the rural farmer population. PAA's target for 2013 is to buy products from 445,000 farmers. PAA is present in 2,300 municipalities across the country and targets the country's poorest regions. For instance, the Northeastern region receives 50% of PAA budget. In terms of resources, the MDS and MDA budget has risen from $52 million in 2003 to $585 million in 2013. In terms of food production, food purchases more than tripled between 2003 and 2010, from 135,800 to 426,400 tons. On average, PAA serves 25,000 institutions that feed over 15 million people.PAA has produced both intended and unintended outcomes. First, the program has increased rural farmers' income through food purchases. Now, local farmers produce and sell to local schools and hospitals. Moreover, PAA pays an extra 30% above the regular price for organic products, boosting local economies as a result. Second, producers not covered by PAA are indirect beneficiaries because they also enjoy higher local prices. Third, food stocks have also helped control price fluctuations. Fourth, there is greater diversity of products since PPA purchases more than 330 different items. Fifth, PAA has played an important role in the strengthening of associations and cooperatives. It also provides the stimulus to establish small agro-industries so that associations can process and add value to their production output.Two unintended outcomes attributable to PAA are an increase in price for some staple foods and the expansion of neo-patrimonial institutions, such as political corruption, patronage and clientelism at the local level. Thus, we can assume that the policy "winners" are MDS, CONAB, CONSEA, civil society organizations, farmers, vulnerable population benefited by PAA, local level authorities and local institutions (i.e. schools). On the other hand, three policy "losers" are those corporations in charge of selling food products to the government, farmers who cannot meet the PAA criteria, and low- and middle-income urban populations who must pay higher prices. Although negatively impacted by PAA, these groups do not threaten the viability of the policy. Corporations and big businesses still sell food products to the government because PAA cannot meet the food demand. Despite the fact that they cannot sell to PAA, farmers have a suitable environment that provides easy access to credit and encourages production. Finally, even though prices increased, so did the salaries of the middle-income population.PAA is an innovative policy because of its participatory model during the formulation process, which allows it to enjoy support from its beneficiaries and civil society organizations. Also, PAA's administration is notable since, given its multi-sectoral approach, six different ministries form the managing unit. Finally, the regular control and oversight done by social movements and the impending need to improve coordination among ministries make policy evaluation a necessary priority for PAA's success.In a short amount of time, PAA has already undergone three evaluation rounds (2005, 2008 and 2010). Each evaluation improves the policy and guarantees more popular support. For instance, after the last evaluation the government enacted Law 12.512/2011 and Decree 7.775/2012, which aims at facilitating coordination among the implementing bodies. It also raised the maximum farmer benefits from $1,250 in 2003, to $2,400 in 2006, to $4,100 in 2012. In addition, it encourages organic production by paying 30% above regular price. More importantly, the last policy redesign includes a gender component by establishing that at least 5% of PAA purchases must come from women's associations. Finally, it guarantees a quota of 30% of institutional purchases (schools and hospitals, among others) for small farmers.However, despite the iterative evaluation and redesign process, there is still room for improvement in the policy. Most importantly, PAA does not reach the poorest of the poor. Although the registration process is very efficient because it is based on another social program (PRONAF), the poorest farmers lack land titles, thus cannot be part of PRONAF or PAA. The policy could be improved with provisions enabling the inclusion of this group.PAA is helping with the national goals of poverty alleviation, however redefining its goals and incorporating strategic planning in rural development could improve PAA. More specifically, PAA should reconsider its strategy towards associativism and cooperativism. The policy could enhance further rural development by supporting associations and cooperatives in becoming artisanal industries that add value to their products.In conclusion, PAA intends to solve a social problem by addressing both the supply and demand sides. On one hand, PPA's objective is to eliminate hunger by guaranteeing food availability, improving food access and increasing food supply. On the other hand, PAA reduces rural poverty by providing opportunities to small farmers with market access and better prices. The policy has demonstrated positive results and has been constantly improved through iterative evaluations. With further strategic planning on how to help associations becoming the leaders of rural development the policy could achieve optimal positive impact.Sobre el autorMA International DevelopmentSchool of International ServiceAmerican UniversityLicenciado en Estudios InternacionalesUniversidad ORT - Uruguay

After a prolonged period of speculation, conjecture, and anticipation, the contours of a Blue-White coalition poised to challenge the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election began to crystallize late last month.
In a joint press conference following private negotiations, Eric Chu, the chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, the 2024 presidential candidate and chairman of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) unveiled a united front committing to championing the "third wave of democratic reform" in Taiwan, a clear repudiation of the entrenched winner-takes-all "democratic dictatorship" political culture. Encouragingly for coalition supporters, the KMT and TPP have also confirmed their commitment to collaborate in the legislative elections, with a shared objective of breaking the DPP's legislative majority since 2016.
This alliance signifies a robust intent to not only overhaul Taiwan's electoral system but more importantly, also dismantle the nearly decade-long dominance of the DPP over Taiwan's politics.
The journey toward forming the Blue-White Coalition has been tumultuous, marked by clear ideological and political disparities between the KMT and the TPP. Although the glue of a strong shared discontent with the governance of DPP has been holding the KMT and TPP together in the prolonged negotiation of joining forces, the delicate dance of ambition and pragmatism underscores the different realities faced by both parties.
The storied over-a-century-old KMT desires to retake the presidency, reverse its decline of a decade, and channel its deep-rooted legacy to rekindle its past preeminence. Meanwhile, the four-year-young TPP is striving to expand its influence and establish itself as a revolutionary "third force" that enthralls the younger electorate with pledges to disrupt the entrenched KMT-DPP dominance, thereby necessitating some level of strategic neutrality from close cooperation with KMT.
For the young TPP, being able to gain the current popularity is already a remarkable victory; for the KMT, anything short of securing the presidential palace next January would be a failure. As a result, despite both Eric Chu and the KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih have been lobbying for Ko to accept a vice-presidential slot beside Hou, forming a joint president ticket that is led by KMT, with polling continuing to place Ko and Hou neck and neck, Ko is loath to settle for second. For a star politician that is trending upward like Ko, assuming the vice presidency might be valued less than holding on to the "third force" value, which might eventually promise a better chance to win the presidency in future elections.
The situation has led observers to continue casting doubts on the likelihood of a Hou-Ko joint ticket, despite the recent breakthrough of negotiations.
Terry Gou, founder of the world's largest contract electronics maker Foxconn, has been pursuing his campaign despite being marginalized a bit by the recent progress of the Blue-White coalition. Gou's recent submission of over a million petition signatures — triple the threshold of 289,667 signatures for an independent presidential candidacy — signals some positive momentum that Gou possessed.
However, faced with a storm of scrutiny consisting of Foxconn's politically charged tax probe by Beijing — a move seen as China's strategic ploy to express disapproval of Gou's campaign — and the bribery allegations tied to his petitioning process, Terry Gou's resolve to stay in this presidential race is being tested. This situation adds layers of complexity yet flexibility to the potential Blue-White coalition. The difficulty for the KMT and TPP to align in the presidential ticket could pivot the political chessboard toward alternative alliances, such as a Terry Gou endorsement of Ko or Hou after a possible withdrawal from the race. While such scenarios could certainly present a challenge to the DPP candidate Lai Ching-te's presidential bid, the polls suggest they would not be as formidable as a united KMT-TPP ticket with Hou-Ko or Ko-Hou, which according to polls, would achieve an easy victory.
If unable to negotiate a joint ticket before the imminent November 24 candidate registration deadline, KMT, TPP, and Terry Gou would likely not be able to thwart Lai's presidential bid, as he continues to outpace each contender.
In light of these unfolding developments in Taiwan, it becomes imperative for Washington to fully grasp the ramifications of a potential Taiwanese Blue-White coalition government on the delicate dynamics of the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle. A thorough analysis and strategic foresight are required to determine the most appropriate U.S. policy approach in the event of a coalition government materializing in 2024.
Given the intricate situations in Ukraine and Israel demanding Washington's attention, the prospect of a Blue-White coalition government in Taiwan could provide a welcome respite to Washington, as both parties have demonstrated a clear willingness to jointly improve cross-strait dialogues after the election.
Interestingly, Bonnie Glaser and Joel Wuthnow, eminent U.S. experts on cross-strait relations and China's military affairs, have recently argued that Xi Jinping is not prepared to attack Taiwan due to the political and economic hardships that Xi is facing. Taking cues from their expert analyses, a transition to a Blue-White government in Taiwan in 2024 could indeed also provide a breather for Xi, as it would mitigate the need for Xi to grapple with the challenging decision of military engagement, especially in light of the potential for his adopting a more confrontational stance toward Beijing by Lai Ching-te, a self-claimed "political worker of Taiwan Independence."
Amid the current global turmoil, the emergence of a Blue-White coalition in Taiwan could present a unique opportunity for both Washington and Beijing to steer clear of conflict in the Taiwan Strait at least for the next four years.
However, the most prominent challenge for a possible Blue-White coalition government to regional security lies precisely in the transition period that it would require. The lack of a historical precedent in Taiwan raises questions about the stability of such coalition governance. Besides, if the KMT and TPP cannot even align smoothly in the election period, how can they cooperate well in a coalition government?
In the delicate transition phase, the nascent coalition would need to navigate internal tensions and differing policy priorities, potentially leading to a period of weakened governance. This fragility could inadvertently create openings for Beijing to amplify its influence and infiltration into Taiwanese society, and may well leverage its close ties with the KMT or Ko Wen-je to exploit any discernible fractures that might emerge within the coalition.
In light of these unfolding events, it becomes imperative for Washington to deepen its engagement and understanding of both Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih to come to a more reliable judgment on the prospective mutual trust and ideological alignment of a potential Blue-White coalition. The recent visit by Laura Rosenberger, Chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, to Taiwan, where she engaged with leading candidates Lai, Ko, and Hou, underscores this necessity. It is reasonable to believe that the potential of a Blue-White coalition would be a topic of discussion in her confidential conversations with Ko and Hou.
Sustaining and intensifying such diplomatic interactions is crucial, as it will reinforce its preparedness for the challenges brought by a Blue-White coalition government. In terms of the ongoing electoral campaign, prudence dictates that Washington should continue to adopt a stance of measured restraint and uphold a balanced posture. This is essential as both potential outcomes — a continuation of the DPP government or the advent of a KMT-TPP coalition — present their distinct sets of pros and cons from the vantage point of U.S. interests in the region.

Alexis de Tocqueville was the first author to correctly underline some of the main factors that stimulated, or better yet triggered, a series of events that led to the social and politically structure based radical changes implemented by the French Revolution. Tocqueville properly highlighted which social and political aspects of the Old Regime not only survived, but were strengthen and vigorously adopted by the Revolution and its begotten system. In this sense, he was able to demystify the French Revolution from its characteristically tabula rasa, or national foundational-stone, kind of event given by later post-revolution French governments. The French Revolution transformed many things from its roots, but so many remained unchanged or were even reinforced. Tocqueville's The Old Regime and the French Revolution masterfully embodies Lampedusa's famous dixit in Il Gattopardo: "The more things change the more they remain the same". On the other hand, Tocqueville's work suffers from a few shortcomings. First, he tries so emphatically to demonstrate the continuances between the Ancient Regime and the post-revolution system that he almost completely undermines the social and political changes brought up by the Revolution. Secondly, he does not pay any kind of attention to exogenous or international system factors. Tocqueville, actually, disregards them as having any role in the revolution's origins. This paper will briefly comment on Tocqueville's factors that triggered the French Revolution and briefly comment on the variables that he did not consider.It is rather interesting to see that Tocqueville defines the French Revolution as a religious revolution but with no anti-religious goals. He defines the revolution in such terms in order to emphasize its universal aspiration. The French Revolution originated in France but dealt with issues that were common to all humanity. The revolution tried, not only, to free the Frenchmen but all men. Tocqueville refers to the Revolution's philosophical foundations: the Enlightenment. During the second half of the 18th century, France was its cradle. The Enlightenment's ideas achieved for universal freedom from despotic rule. They were notorious among the kings' court, the nobility and the rapidly growing upper bourgeoisie and, finally, were the intellectual product of aristocratic individuals. In this way, Tocqueville points out how the French nobility was going to be one of the main factors of the French Revolution in two distinct ways. First, the Enlightenment's political and social ideas, which were the core of the political ideology that would embody the Revolution and inspire the policies enacted after July 1789, were a conception of aristocratic minds. The nobility, in a way, conceived the ideas that would later on politically, socially and morally justify and legitimize their downfall. Secondly, according to Tocqueville it was the French aristocracy who first rebelled against the absolutist monarchical power. The nobles did not only conceive the ideas that would destroy them, they also actually started a series of events that would culminate in a Revolution that they did not envisage and that would ultimately decimate them. Tocqueville accurately recognizes that it was the French aristocracy that petitioned the calling of the General Estates in 1787 because they were trying to impede the Monarchy's last possible financial resort at its hand: the taxation of the nobility. Tocqueville actually downgrades the fiscal constraints to which the French State was subject at the end of the 18th century. He argues that the State's bankruptcy was not an issue because it was not the first time that a similar situation happened to the French Crown and because between 1780 and 1789 France was a more economically prosperous country than during the Seven Years War and the American Independence War. The issue was not that the Crown did not have any money; it was that the State decided to end with the centuries' long aristocracy's exception of taxation; which resulted in nobility's rebellion. Tocqueville describes how the French nobility had lost its feudal role and, instead, it primarily dedicated to civil management, most importantly court and fiscal administration; to rent their lands to small peasants; and, to partake in the King's court. All of them were exempted from taxation just because they owned a noble title. Tocqueville underlines the pivotal role that the nobility played in being civic servants. Even if many members of Absolutist regime's bureaucracy were bourgeois, the courts, fiscal agencies and other institutions, like the provincial parliaments and the municipal councils, were almost exclusively integrated by noblemen. The central power of the State and its immense bureaucracy is one of the continuities that Tocqueville sees between the old and the new regime; particularly, the idea of a bureaucratic machine managed by elites. As Tocqueville, and much later Perry Anderson, notice, the French aristocracy had an enormous control over the Absolutist system; the Monarchy could only enact its desired policies when they did not harm the nobility's interests(1). If any decision taken by the Crown was detrimental to their interests then they would have obstructed its implementation in an institutional way: the aristocratic packed courts and provincial parliaments would have delayed or refused to execute any unfavorable provision (2). The French aristocracy, then, obstructed the French Monarchy's taxation plan and pressured the King to call the General Estates in 1787. The upper bourgeoisie, on the other hand, favored the Crown's taxation plan but wanted to take advantage of the General Estates calling in order to gain more leverage in the tax reform's decision process (3). Either way, it was the French nobility's rebellious attitude against the King that would prompt the next series of events. Much has been said about this aristocratic political defiance; Tocqueville does not regard nobility's actions as a way to transform Absolutist France into a British kind of constitutional monarchy where the aristocracy would obtain political dominance, with regards to the Crown and the upper bourgeoisie, through an income-based or landownership-based representative parliament (4). He just perceives these actions as the last available desperate option to a soon to be old socio-economic system's class. French aristocracy had become a burden to France. If they did not turn themselves into a productive force, like the growing bourgeoisie, they would remain a useless, parasitic and institutionally over-represented class in the eyes of France's main economic sector: the peasants. As stated before, Tocqueville does not give too much of a relevant role to the bourgeoisie in the origins of the French Revolution. Both the upper and lower middle class would have a greater role after the 14th of July 1789. Instead, he sees the roots of the Revolution in the French aristocracy, as indicated above, and in the French peasantry. Tocqueville is able to empirically prove that the feudal agrarian system was almost dead in 18th century France. Seigniorial-peasantry relationships just amounted to land-renting, hunting and pasture privileges and harvest's percentage rendering (5). However, peasants were drowning in taxes. More than 75% of their returns were destined to the French central State, to the regional or provincial departments and to the municipalities (6). The last two were mainly aristocratic conformed institutions. Additionally, peasants were forced to give in to the central State's or departmental authorities a substantial percentage of their harvest for the urban populations. Furthermore, if it is considered that during the 1780s a series of famines and bad harvests produced a serious of food shortages, where commodity's high prices could not compensate the limited quantity of offered goods, worsening the peasantry conditions. Then, it is no surprise that there was a growing discontent among the peasants against the Crown failed foreign policies endeavors, that they were supporting with their work and their children, and against the aristocracy's unproductive and untaxed life style that they had to provide for (7). Here, Tocqueville discerns continuity between the old and the new regime: France after the revolution will still be mostly peasant and they will still be severely burdened with taxes and wars but a new kind of political system will replace Monarchy and a new class will replace the aristocracy. All those circumstances were the catalyst for a sequence of peasant's rebellions, starting in 1788, that overwhelmed the Monarchy's police authority (8). Ironically, the Crown was unable to contain the rising revolts because its repressive power depended on army garrisons that were headed by the aristocracy, whom, at first, refrained from suppressing in order to pressure the King with no taxation. The fateful combination of the rebellion of the dominant classes against the regime's authority plus the total breaking of the State's repressive power permitted an all-out uprising of the lower classes. Peasants and middle classmen were able to take the reins of the revolution and change the French socio-political system according to their interests. Regardless of Tocqueville's successful achievement in identifying the origins of the French Revolution, (the aristocracy refusal to be taxed and the peasantry's discontent on the nobility's untaxed privileges) it has to be said that no exogenous factors are taken into consideration. Tocqueville did not agree with the idea that the American Independence War depletion of France's reserves had provoked the civil unrest that later triggered the revolution. Even if the causal correlation between the American Revolution and the French one is indirect, international systemic variables did matter in the revolution's inception. Without strong international competition from a rising industrialist country like Great Britain and a series of military defeats, the French Monarchy would have not had to resort to tax the aristocracy and the regime's repressive mechanisms would have worked and effectively stopped the peasant's uprisings (9). Finally, Tocqueville sees the bourgeoisie a class that masterfully took advantage of a revolution that they did not originated. Even if the role of the bourgeoisie may have been greatly exaggerated in the French Revolution's narrations, it still had a pivotal role in confronting the aristocratic courts and parliaments; in replacing the nobility as civic servants; and, in obstructing the aristocracy's crave for an exclusive political role in State's decisions. Without the upper and lower middle class, nobility may have gained total control of the Absolutist system (10). Lastly, it has to be said that there are moments where Tocqueville affirms that political and social freedom were greater during the Ancient Regime than afterwards. These statements have to take into account Tocqueville's own historical context and personal life at that moment. He had self-exiled from politics after Louis Bonaparte coup d'état in December 1852 and was completely aware that Napoleon's III regime was a new kind of authoritarian system with more repressive and despotic rule than the pre-revolutionary Absolutist regimes. Nevertheless, Tocqueville's work stands out among the best and most descriptive analysis of the French Revolution's origins. His emphasis on underlining the continuances between the old regime and the new one and the almost complete lack of attention paid to the important and radical social and political changes brought by the Revolution have to attributed to the fact that The Old Regime and the French Revolution was the first part of his uncompleted work on the revolution; which had it been continued and concluded would have certainly highlighted the system-changing ideas enacted after July 1789.1) See Anderson, Perry, Linages of the Absolutist Sate, New Left Books, London, 1974. It is rather interesting to compare Tocqueville take on the French State compared with his views on the United States. He argues that one of the main differences between of how the Frenchmen and the American perceived the State was that the first ones saw it as place to look for working positions an mode of living, while the latter had a completely opposite idea.(2) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 56-60.(3) See Furet, Francois and Richet, Denis, The French Revolution, Macmillan, New York, 1970.(4) See Cobban, Alfred, Old Regime and Revolution, 1715-1799, Penguin, Baltimore, 1957, pp.155.(5) See Moore Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 40-108. (6) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 119.(7) See Moore Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 40-108. (8) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 121.(9) See Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 60-65.(10) See Moore Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966, pp. 40-108. Moore's famous theory: weak landlords but strong bourgeoisie give rise to democratic system like the French on.*Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.

Una de las facetas legales y políticas específicas de la disputa entre España y Gran Bretaña sobre Gibraltar son las zonas marítimas a su alrededor. La disputa se extiende a las aguas alrededor de la Roca, sus zonas marítimas y la jurisdicción sobre ellas, ya que, con la excepción de las aguas del puerto, España rechaza la existencia de aguas jurisdiccionales británicas alrededor de la Roca, mientras que el Reino Unido siempre las ha reclamado y ejercido jurisdicción de facto sobre ellas. España niega la existencia de aguas pertenecientes a Gibraltar, pero, en la práctica, permite el ejercicio de la jurisdicción británica dentro de una extensión establecida unilateralmente por el Reino Unido, sin distinguir entre las aguas de la Roca y las del istmo. El Reino Unido afirma una supuesta soberanía sobre las aguas alrededor de la Roca, pero su posición inicial de que las aguas que rodean el istmo son británicas es legalmente débil. Dos factores principales explican la evidente falta de coordinación con respecto al régimen legal que rige las aguas alrededor de la Roca. El primero es estructural: está inextricablemente vinculado a los temas centrales de la disputa de soberanía, ya que las aguas son legal y judicialmente inseparables de las otras disputas sobre la cesión de la ciudad, puerto, peñón e istmo, así como de la doctrina de la ONU. en descolonización. El otro factor es temporal: la falta de canales institucionales u otros canales de diálogo para alentar a las partes a abordar cuestiones prácticas de coexistencia y jurisdicción en las aguas. Esto explica la imposibilidad de llegar a un entendimiento sobre las aguas e incluso para alcanzar un modus vivendi simple y provisional sobre el régimen que rige la navegación en ellas. Con el Brexit, sin embargo, se han abierto otras perspectivas de futuro para eventuales acuerdos y coordinación en las aguas, a través del Protocolo sobre Gibraltar del Acuerdo de Retirada de Reino Unido de la UE y los Memorandos de cooperación. La posición de la "costa seca" española no es tan legalmente sólida con respecto a las aguas como a otros aspectos de la disputa, y además debilita la reclamación de España en su conjunto. Esta teoría es de alguna manera incompatible con la práctica española y, además, parece ser bastante joven, ya que se estableció en la década de 1960 durante la dictadura y posteriormente continuó en la democracia española. En este artículo se afirma que el problema de las aguas en torno a Gibraltar es el de la duda histórica sobre la extensión de las aguas del puerto en el frontal oeste del Peñón y el istmo: determinar el alcance hoy de las aguas del puerto y rada de Gibraltar, una vez admitido en 1968 por Reino Unido su no aplicación a las aguas más al norte denominadas "Puerto Canning". Asegurar una mayor coherencia entre la teoría y la práctica españolas en relación con la posición de España en las aguas de la bahía fortalecería la consistencia y la credibilidad de su reclamación sobre las aguas en la disputa de Gibraltar, que parece haber surgido en respuesta a la teoría de la 'costa seca' aplicada por el Reino Unido a España en ese momento Con este planteamiento, España podría considerar reformular la teoría de la costa seca, con una interpretación restrictiva del Tratado de Utrecht que considere no cedida la montaña completa, en particular la cara de levante del Peñón. De esta forma podría ofrecerse una base jurídica diferente a la teoría de la 'costa seca', con una mayor coherencia, ya que la españolidad no derivaría de la no cesión de aguas en Utrecht, sino de que el territorio del este no se cedió –como tampoco se cedió el istmo- por lo que la costa del este de la montaña y sus aguas son españolas. Esta reformulación de la 'costa seca' consistiría en la práctica en la afirmación de costa española en el istmo y este del Peñón, con consecuencias similares a las de la tesis española tradicional: negar espacios marítimos al Gibraltar británico fuera de los espacios en el interior de la Bahía. De esta forma, la reformulación que proponemos daría coherencia a la posición histórica tradicional española, que interpreta el Art X como una cesión que "no reconoce otros derechos y situaciones relativos a los espacios marítimos de Gibraltar que no estén comprendidos en el Tratado de Utrecht". Con esta lectura restrictiva del Tratado de Utrecht, se salvaguardaría en el futuro para los intereses españoles una hipotética expansión británica de espacios marítimos al este de Gibraltar. También el articulo considera la situación en descolonización de Gibraltar y la aplicabilidad la III Resolución de la III Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre Derecho del Mar. Igualmente se subraya la vinculación de la controversia en las aguas con la necesidad de tratamiento democrático dentro de España y con Reino Unido de los intereses esenciales británicos, que son los estratégicos, militares, de inteligencia y seguridad. Esta cuestión es probablemente la esencia última de todo el problema, y tiene un déficit democrático estructural, pues hay que contemplar involucrar a las Cortes españolas en el debate real sobre las bases militares británicas, ya que la situación de privilegio militar y estratégico de los británicos no puede mantenerse a costa de la seguridad de los españoles. En suma, con la propuesta que se realiza se pretende una argumentación coherente con la posición tradicional española sobre las aguas de la «Costa Seca», mediante una revisión interpretativa del Tratado de Utrecht y de la práctica española. ; One of the specific legal and political facets of the dispute between Spain and Great Britain over Gibraltar is the maritime areas around it. The dispute extends to the waters surrounding the Rock, its maritime zones and the jurisdiction over them, since, with the exception of the waters of the port, Spain rejects the existence of British jurisdictional waters around the Rock, while the UK has always claimed them and exercised de facto jurisdiction over them. Spain denies the existence of waters belonging to Gibraltar but, in practice, allows the exercise of British jurisdiction within an extension unilaterally established by the United Kingdom, without distinguishing between the waters of the Rock and those of the isthmus. The UK asserts an alleged sovereignty over the waters around the Rock, but its initial position that the waters surrounding the isthmus are British is legally weak. Two main factors explain the evident lack of coordination regarding the legal regime that governs the waters around the Rock. The first is structural: it is inextricably linked to the central issues of the sovereignty dispute, since the waters are legally inseparable from the other disputes over the transfer of the city, port, rock and isthmus, as well as from the UN doctrine of decolonization. The other factor is temporary: the lack of institutional channels or other channels of dialogue to encourage the parties to address practical issues of coexistence and jurisdiction in waters. This explains the impossibility of reaching an understanding about the waters and even to reach a simple and provisional modus vivendi on the regime that governs navigation in them. With Brexit, however, other future prospects have been opened for possible agreements and coordination in the waters, through the Protocol on Gibraltar of the United Kingdom's Withdrawal Agreement from the EU and the Memoranda of cooperation. The position of the Spanish "dry coast" is not as legally solid with respect to the waters as with other aspects of the dispute, and furthermore weakens the claim of Spain as a whole. This theory is somewhat incompatible with Spanish practice and, furthermore, it seems to be quite young, since it was established in the 1960s during the dictatorship and subsequently continued in Spanish democracy. This article affirms that the problem of the waters around Gibraltar is that of the historical doubt about the extent of the waters of the port on the western front of the Rock and the Isthmus: determining the scope of the waters of the port and roadstead today of Gibraltar, once admitted in 1968 by the United Kingdom its non-application to the northernmost waters called "Puerto Canning". Ensuring greater coherence between Spanish theory and practice in relation to Spain's position in the waters of the bay would strengthen the consistency and credibility of its claim on the waters in the dispute in Gibraltar, which seems to have arisen in response to the theory of the 'dry coast' applied by the United Kingdom to Spain at that time. With this approach, Spain could consider reformulating the theory of the dry coast, with a restrictive interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht that considers the entire mountain, in particular the east face of the Rock, not to be ceded. In this way, a different legal basis could be offered to the 'dry coast' theory, with greater coherence, since the Spanish title would not derive from the non-cession of waters in Utrecht, but from the fact that the eastern territory was not ceded –nor was the isthmus given up– so the eastern coast of the mountain and its waters are Spanish. This reformulation of the 'dry coast' would consist in practice of the affirmation of the Spanish coast in the isthmus and east of the Rock, with consequences similar to those of the traditional Spanish thesis: denying maritime spaces to British Gibraltar outside the spaces in the interior of the Bay. In this way, the reformulation that is proposed would give coherence to the traditional Spanish historical position, which interprets Art X as a transfer that "does not recognize other rights and situations related to the maritime zones of Gibraltar that are not included in the Treaty of Utrecht". With this restrictive reading of the Treaty of Utrecht, a hypothetical British expansion of maritime spaces east of Gibraltar would be safeguarded in the future for Spanish interests. The article also considers the situation in decolonization of Gibraltar and the applicability of the III Resolution of the III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, the link of the controversy in the waters with the need for democratic treatment within Spain and with the United Kingdom of the essential British interests, which are strategic, military, intelligence and security, is underlined. This question is probably the ultimate essence of the whole problem, and it has a structural democratic deficit, since it is necessary to contemplate involving the Spanish Cortes in the real debate on the British military bases, since the situation of British military and strategic privilege it cannot be maintained at the expense of the security of Spain and its citizens. In short, the proposal made is intended to make an argument consistent with the traditional Spanish position on the waters of the "Dry Coast", through an interpretative review of the Treaty of Utrecht and of the Spanish practice.

GIBRALTAR, SPANISH COAST? A REFORMULATION OF THE THEORY OF THE 'DRY COAST' ABOUT THE PORT AND THE WATERS AROUND THE ROCK One of the specific legal and political facets of the dispute between Spain and Great Britain over Gibraltar is the maritime areas around it. The dispute extends to the waters surrounding the Rock, its maritime zones and the jurisdiction over them, since, with the exception of the waters of the port, Spain rejects the existence of British jurisdictional waters around the Rock, while the UK has always claimed them and exercised de facto jurisdiction over them. Spain denies the existence of waters belonging to Gibraltar but, in practice, allows the exercise of British jurisdiction within an extension unilaterally established by the United Kingdom, without distinguishing between the waters of the Rock and those of the isthmus. The UK asserts an alleged sovereignty over the waters around the Rock, but its initial position that the waters surrounding the isthmus are British is legally weak. Two main factors explain the evident lack of coordination regarding the legal regime that governs the waters around the Rock. The first is structural: it is inextricably linked to the central issues of the sovereignty dispute, since the waters are legally inseparable from the other disputes over the transfer of the city, port, rock and isthmus, as well as from the UN doctrine of decolonization. The other factor is temporary: the lack of institutional channels or other channels of dialogue to encourage the parties to address practical issues of coexistence and jurisdiction in waters. This explains the impossibility of reaching an understanding about the waters and even to reach a simple and provisional modus vivendi on the regime that governs navigation in them. With Brexit, however, other future prospects have been opened for possible agreements and coordination in the waters, through the Protocol on Gibraltar of the United Kingdom's Withdrawal Agreement from the EU and the Memoranda of cooperation. The position of the Spanish "dry coast" is not as legally solid with respect to the waters as with other aspects of the dispute, and furthermore weakens the claim of Spain as a whole. This theory is somewhat incompatible with Spanish practice and, furthermore, it seems to be quite young, since it was established in the 1960s during the dictatorship and subsequently continued in Spanish democracy. This article affirms that the problem of the waters around Gibraltar is that of the historical doubt about the extent of the waters of the port on the western front of the Rock and the Isthmus: determining the scope of the waters of the port and roadstead today of Gibraltar, once admitted in 1968 by the United Kingdom its non-application to the northernmost waters called "Puerto Canning". Ensuring greater coherence between Spanish theory and practice in relation to Spain's position in the waters of the bay would strengthen the consistency and credibility of its claim on the waters in the dispute in Gibraltar, which seems to have arisen in response to the theory of the 'dry coast' applied by the United Kingdom to Spain at that time. With this approach, Spain could consider reformulating the theory of the dry coast, with a restrictive interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht that considers the entire mountain, in particular the east face of the Rock, not to be ceded. In this way, a different legal basis could be offered to the 'dry coast' theory, with greater coherence, since the Spanish title would not derive from the non-cession of waters in Utrecht, but from the fact that the eastern territory was not ceded –nor was the isthmus given up– so the eastern coast of the mountain and its waters are Spanish. This reformulation of the 'dry coast' would consist in practice of the affirmation of the Spanish coast in the isthmus and east of the Rock, with consequences similar to those of the traditional Spanish thesis: denying maritime spaces to British Gibraltar outside the spaces in the interior of the Bay. In this way, the reformulation that is proposed would give coherence to the traditional Spanish historical position, which interprets Art X as a transfer that "does not recognize other rights and situations related to the maritime zones of Gibraltar that are not included in the Treaty of Utrecht". With this restrictive reading of the Treaty of Utrecht, a hypothetical British expansion of maritime spaces east of Gibraltar would be safeguarded in the future for Spanish interests. The article also considers the situation in decolonization of Gibraltar and the applicability of the III Resolution of the III United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, the link of the controversy in the waters with the need for democratic treatment within Spain and with the United Kingdom of the essential British interests, which are strategic, military, intelligence and security, is underlined. This question is probably the ultimate essence of the whole problem, and it has a structural democratic deficit, since it is necessary to contemplate involving the Spanish Cortes in the real debate on the British military bases, since the situation of British military and strategic privilege it cannot be maintained at the expense of the security of Spain and its citizens. In short, the proposal made is intended to make an argument consistent with the traditional Spanish position on the waters of the "Dry Coast", through an interpretative review of the Treaty of Utrecht and of the Spanish practice. ; Una de las facetas legales y políticas específicas de la disputa entre España y Gran Bretaña sobre Gibraltar son las zonas marítimas a su alrededor. La disputa se extiende a las aguas alrededor de la Roca, sus zonas marítimas y la jurisdicción sobre ellas, ya que, con la excepción de las aguas del puerto, España rechaza la existencia de aguas jurisdiccionales británicas alrededor de la Roca, mientras que el Reino Unido siempre las ha reclamado y ejercido jurisdicción de facto sobre ellas. España niega la existencia de aguas pertenecientes a Gibraltar, pero, en la práctica, permite el ejercicio de la jurisdicción británica dentro de una extensión establecida unilateralmente por el Reino Unido, sin distinguir entre las aguas de la Roca y las del istmo. El Reino Unido afirma una supuesta soberanía sobre las aguas alrededor de la Roca, pero su posición inicial de que las aguas que rodean el istmo son británicas es legalmente débil. Dos factores principales explican la evidente falta de coordinación con respecto al régimen legal que rige las aguas alrededor de la Roca. El primero es estructural: está inextricablemente vinculado a los temas centrales de la disputa de soberanía, ya que las aguas son legal y judicialmente inseparables de las otras disputas sobre la cesión de la ciudad, puerto, peñón e istmo, así como de la doctrina de la ONU. en descolonización. El otro factor es temporal: la falta de canales institucionales u otros canales de diálogo para alentar a las partes a abordar cuestiones prácticas de coexistencia y jurisdicción en las aguas. Esto explica la imposibilidad de llegar a un entendimiento sobre las aguas e incluso para alcanzar un modus vivendi simple y provisional sobre el régimen que rige la navegación en ellas. Con el Brexit, sin embargo, se han abierto otras perspectivas de futuro para eventuales acuerdos y coordinación en las aguas, a través del Protocolo sobre Gibraltar del Acuerdo de Retirada de Reino Unido de la UE y los Memorandos de cooperación. La posición de la «costa seca» española no es tan legalmente sólida con respecto a las aguas como a otros aspectos de la disputa, y además debilita la reclamación de España en su conjunto. Esta teoría es de alguna manera incompatible con la práctica española y, además, parece ser bastante joven, ya que se estableció en la década de 1960 durante la dictadura y posteriormente continuó en la democracia española. En este artículo se afirma que el problema de las aguas en torno a Gibraltar es el de la duda histórica sobre la extensión de las aguas del puerto en el frontal oeste del Peñón y el istmo: determinar el alcance hoy de las aguas del puerto y rada de Gibraltar, una vez admitido en 1968 por Reino Unido su no aplicación a las aguas más al norte denominadas «Puerto Canning». Asegurar una mayor coherencia entre la teoría y la práctica españolas en relación con la posición de España en las aguas de la bahía fortalecería la consistencia y la credibilidad de su reclamación sobre las aguas en la disputa de Gibraltar, que parece haber surgido en respuesta a la teoría de la 'costa seca' aplicada por el Reino Unido a España en ese momento. Con este planteamiento, España podría considerar reformular la teoría de la costa seca, con una interpretación restrictiva del Tratado de Utrecht que considere no cedida la montaña completa, en particular la cara de levante del Peñón. De esta forma podría ofrecerse una base jurídica diferente a la teoría de la 'costa seca', con una mayor coherencia, ya que la españolidad no derivaría de la no cesión de aguas en Utrecht, sino de que el territorio del este no se cedió –como tampoco se cedió el istmo- por lo que la costa del este de la montaña y sus aguas son españolas. Esta reformulación de la 'costa seca' consistiría en la práctica en la afirmación de costa española en el istmo y este del Peñón, con consecuencias similares a las de la tesis española tradicional: negar espacios marítimos al Gibraltar británico fuera de los espacios en el interior de la Bahía. De esta forma, la reformulación que proponemos daría coherencia a la posición histórica tradicional española, que interpreta el Art X como una cesión que «no reconoce otros derechos y situaciones relativos a los espacios marítimos de Gibraltar que no estén comprendidos en el Tratado de Utrecht». Con esta lectura restrictiva del Tratado de Utrecht, se salvaguardaría en el futuro para los intereses españoles una hipotética expansión británica de espacios marítimos al este de Gibraltar. También el articulo considera la situación en descolonización de Gibraltar y la aplicabilidad la III Resolución de la III Conferencia de Naciones Unidas sobre Derecho del Mar. Igualmente se subraya la vinculación de la controversia en las aguas con la necesidad de tratamiento democrático dentro de España y con Reino Unido de los intereses esenciales británicos, que son los estratégicos, militares, de inteligencia y seguridad. Esta cuestión es probablemente la esencia última de todo el problema, y tiene un déficit democrático estructural, pues hay que contemplar involucrar a las Cortes españolas en el debate real sobre las bases militares británicas, ya que la situación de privilegio militar y estratégico de los británicos no puede mantenerse a costa de la seguridad de los españoles. En suma, con la propuesta que se realiza se pretende una argumentación coherente con la posición tradicional española sobre las aguas de la «Costa Seca», mediante una revisión interpretativa del Tratado de Utrecht y de la práctica española.

ÖZETSovyetlerden 15 bağımsız cumhuriyetin ayrılışından sonra Rusya Federasyonu içinde demokrasi ve milli özgürlük uğrunda mücadele devam etmiştir.Bu mücadelenin ayrılmaz parçası olan Azerbaycan Cumhuriyetinde gelişen demokratik olaylar sonucu bağımsızlık ilan edilmiş, çağdaş ülke için değişim yoluna girilmiştir. Tarih boyu demokrasi millet ve halkların, toplumsal kuvve ve grupların keskin mücadelelerinin esas çizgisi olmuş ve olmaktadır. Bu mücadele yolunda bir çok fikir ve yöntemler geliştirilmiştir. Ama Marksist teori demokrasinin mahiyetini yanlış ve hatalı açıklamış, onu sınıfsal bir anlayış olarak belirlemiştir. Tarihi tecrübe bu iddiaların gayri hayatiliğini , insan doğasına aykırı olduğunu kanıtlamıştır. Çünkü demokrasiye sınıfsal yaklaşım bu sınıfın iktidarına, bir partinin diktatörlüğüne , gittikçe bozulan bürokratik bir sistemin yaranmasına neden oldu. Oysa demokrasi genel bir kavramdı, ülkeye, sınıfa, millete has demokrasi olamazdı. Demokrasinin uluslar üstü değerleri, prensipleri, şartları ve uygulanacak aşamaları vardı ve demokrasi her şeyden önce millet ve halkların özgürlüğünü hayata geçirmek yöntemiydi. Sovyetler Birliği yukarıdan aşağıya doğru dikey ve yatay yönlerde her şeyi, tüm toplumu, onun tüm halkalarını, sinir hücrelerini kapsıyordu. Fakat iktidarın milyonları korku altında tutması her zaman mümkün olamaz bu yüzden değişik yöntemlere başvuruluyor, özellikle utopik bir ideoloji ile beyinler yıkanıyordu. Ülkede hem Anayasa hem seçim hem çok sayıda kamu kurumları vardı. Fakat bunların faaliyetleri merkezin karar ve direktifleri ile baştan sona kadar parti strüktürleri tarafından idare ediliyordu. Neticede toplum aşırı merkezileşmiş, otoriter karakter kazanmıştı. Sadece yerel organların değil, Anayasalı federe cumhuriyetlerin yasama, yürütme organlarının da hakları kısıtlı ve kontrole tabi idi. İnsanlar ekonomik yönden tamamen devletten asılı durumda, yaratıcılıktan yoksun yukarının emirlerini uygulayan birer pasif fertlere çevrilmişlerdi. Fakat insanlar durumun farkında olmadan yüzyıllarca yaşayamazlardı. Zengin doğal servetleri olan bir memlekette çok kötü durumda yaşamak insanların akıllarında soru işaretleri doğurmuyor değildi. İşte bu yüzden 70'li yıllarda Sovyetler Birliği çökmeye başlamıştı. Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti açısından olaylara baktığımızda Sovyetlerin kuruluşunun Rusya için getirmiş bulunduğu artı değerlerin burada kesinlikle olmadığını görüyoruz. Çünkü SSCB'ye katılan ülkenin esas doğal zenginliği olan petrol dünya pazarlarında çok ucuz fiyata satılarak kazanılan değerler Moskova'ya akmış, Hazar denizi derin ekolojik problemleri olan göle çevrilmiş, 1920 işgalinden sonra 48 bin insan öldürülmüş 80 bin kişi Iran da kalan Azerbaycan topraklarına göç etmiş, 1948-1953 yıllarında 140 binden fazla kişi, 1988'den itibaren ise tüm Azeri nüfus Ermenistan'dan zorla kovulmuş , ülke ekonomisi merkezden gelen talimatlara uyulmak zorunda kalındığı için derin yaralar almış, 1930'lı yıllarda toplumun aydın kısmı öldürülmüş veya sürgün edilmiş ; ülke içinde bir bölgeye özerklik verilerek ve 70 yıl içinde nüfus dağılımı maksatlı olarak değiştirilerek bağımsızlık mücadelesi önünde bir engel haline getirilmiştir. Bunlara ülkenin Ruslaştırma politikası yüzünden alfabenin değiştirildiğini, tarihinin tamamen saptırıldığını, geleneklerini zorla unutturulmaya çalışıldığını eklersek manevi olarak de bir milleti yok etmek için yapılabilecek her şeyin gerçekleştirildiğini anlamış oluruz.Maalesef ki Sovyetler dağıldıktan sonra bu topraklarda kurulmuş bağımsız devletlerde ve aynı şekilde Azerbaycan'da totalitar düşünce ve idare sistemi halen devam etmektedir.Fakat bu ülkelerde devam eden değişimler her hangi bir kesin sistemden bahsetmenin erken olduğunu kanıtlıyor.SUMMARYAfter 15 republics separated from the Soviet Union, struggle had went on in Russian Federation to reach democracy and freedom. As a result of some democratic phenomenon assured in The Republic of Azerbaijan which was the most important part of the fight from the beginning, independence had been declared and this was the first step for a contemporary country .To reach liberation was important after that long period of slavery and dictatorship but also to understand the idea of democracy and take lessons from the history was essential and vital. Democracy had always been the base of the nations' contention in the history. But Marxism had explained democracy in a wrong way and showed it as the intelligence of the social groups. But history proved that this idea is against the nature of human being. Cause democracy was a general concept and would not have belonged to a country, a social group or a nation. USSR was dominating all nations in the Union. Any objection used to be removed even through against law actions. Also Federative Republics' rights were limited and controlled. But it was not always possible to dominate people with creating fear over them. And people had started to ask themselves the reason of their poor life's although they lived in a country which is very rich in terms of natural sources. As a result; Soviet Union had started to collapse in the years of 70.If we look at the reason of Union's collapse, we first face with the system of common prietorship which is the vital part of the economy. This system had prepared the base of the collapse causing people lose their idea of ownership and pushing them to stealing, lying and bribery.Single political party was protected by the military authoritarian police system. The gap between the government and the citizen was becoming biger and biger every day.In the social area; everybody was considered equal as the result of social equality which was ruining social justice principles In the field of ideology; Marxism and Leninism were accepted and taught as the sole theory representing community phenomenon.If we examine Azerbaijan's situation in the Union we can say that Soviet Union had not affected this country in a positive way. The basic natural source of Azerbaijan was petroleum which was sold in the world market very cheap and the profit was running to Moskow directly. After the occupation of Azerbaijan in 1920 ,48 thousand of people were killed, 80 thousand had migrated to the land of Azerbaijan which was left to Iran. After 1988 all Azerbaijani population was driven away from Armenia. In 70 years allocation of the population had been changed on purpose to prevent any possible independence fight against the Union.Unfortunately after the Union collapsed , totalitarian opinion and government system is still going on in the Republics that separated from the Union like being in Azerbaijan.During the Soviet period Human Rights was called as the bourgeois theory and never been taught in the Universities. Not until the end of 80's human rights were included in the socialist mechanism. As a result, in Azerbaijan , short past of country's independence is still being used as the reason of limiting people's rights. Although freedom of press was arranged by the constitution in 1995, there are still blank lines and pages in the newspapers.War and interruption of the economic relations as a result of Union's collapse are still used as the defence of the above examples of misrule.

"You've got to leave the country, Jamal. You've got to get out before they arrest you too," I told my friend, Jamal Khashoggi, just a few months before his fateful decision to leave his homeland in 2017. Little did we know that rather than find safety in Washington D.C., Mohamed bin Salman and his henchmen would trick him into visiting the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, where they brutally tortured and murdered him. Little did we expect that five years after his shocking murder, the Biden administration would be potentially rewarding MBS with an unprecedented security guarantee for his monarchical dictatorship.As a human rights advocate, this was not the first time I had urged someone to flee from an Arab regime, but the others were prominent activists long in conflict with their governments. Khashoggi was a long-time government insider, acting as spokesman for the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C., where we first met, before returning to serve as a journalist and editor in the Saudi media. We remained in touch over the years, and I saw his evolution during the Arab Uprisings of 2011, when he came to the firm conclusion that only democracy and the rule of law would secure stability and peace for the Middle East.With the rise of King Salman and his son, Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), then merely the deputy crown prince, in 2015, repression in the country escalated dramatically. By 2017, they carried out mass arrests of the Kingdom's leading reformers, religious leaders, journalists, and activists, even before the roundup and shakedown of hundreds of the country's business and royal family leaders. After Khashoggi penned an article critiquing then-President Trump, MBS ordered him to stop writing and remain quiet.Khashoggi faced a terrible choice: remain in the country effectively as a prisoner or flee. Initially, he refused to leave, sending me pictures of his grandchildren to explain why leaving the country would be too great a pain for him to bear. I argued and tried to persuade him: he could just take a temporary break, until things calmed down. Perhaps the King and MBS would relent in their repression, confident their rule was secure. Perhaps they would release those they had imprisoned, many of them Khashoggi's friends. But remaining in the country at that moment would be too great a danger. So Khashoggi finally relented and came to the United States, hoping that he would, indeed, one day return.Khashoggi soon found himself with a global audience, and able to express his true voice in his writings for the Washington Post, where his columns provided the only independent Saudi counterpoint to the unfolding disasters under the country's new rules, not just domestically but in MBS's catastrophic war in Yemen. MBS and his cronies tried hard to persuade him to come back, promising to lavishly fund a center for him back in Riyadh. We laughed at the ham-handed pleading texts from Saud al-Qahtani, MBS's top henchman, who would later go on to be the principal engineer of Khashoggi's murder.By 2018, Khashoggi knew he could never return so long as King Salman and MBS remained in power. He grieved his loss but understood that his principles required that he speak out, remarking, "I have left my home, my family, and my job, and I am raising my voice. To do otherwise would betray those who languish in prison. I can speak when so many cannot."He told me about his plans to launch a new organization in Washington D.C., Democracy for the Arab World Now, because he understood the outsized role that the United States played in protecting and enabling the region's dictatorships. He dreamed of a group that would challenge continued U.S. support for them. In June of 2018, he showed me his new business card as the Executive Director of DAWN. On October 2, 2018, MBS executed his plan to murder Khashoggi, hoping to silence him once and for all.Following the global uproar over Khashoggi's murder, the United States and Western governments around the world strongly condemned the murder, suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia and promised to hold the perpetrators accountable. Businesses ended their ties to the Kingdom, canceling contracts and returning Saudi government investments. Many believed that Khashoggi's death would not be in vain, because at last, it would trigger a recalibration of Western protection for the violent, sociopathic Saudi leadership. Such was the change in mood Khashoggi's death triggered that Congress voted on three occasions to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and President Biden campaigned on a pledge to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for the murder, to make them "pay the price, and make them the pariah that they are," arguing that there was "very little social redeeming value in the present government in Saudi Arabia."Five years since Khashoggi's murder, however, the United States and other Western governments are falling over themselves to woo Saudi Arabia and MBS. The twin sirens of Saudi's billions in buying power — including the world's largest arms purchases — and control over oil prices are too great to resist, and MBS has understood that the best way to bring the West to heel is to threaten closer ties to China. In a remarkable turn of fate, the once globally reviled MBS finds himself lauded with awards in Pakistan, feted in Paris by President Macron, and invited for a state visit in London. Most dangerous of all, President Biden is now reportedly offering MBS the ultimate prize: a treaty-level security guarantee that commits American troops to protecting his dictatorship, purportedly as his reward for normalizing with Israel.What's so painful and disturbing about these developments isn't just the failure of Western governments to stay true to their promises to hold MBS accountable for the murder of Khashoggi, or the murder of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis, who continue to endure a Saudi blockade of their country. It's their willingness to sell our values for short-term economic and political returns, whatever the costs to those who face increasing attacks by not just the Saudi government, but copy-cats like India. With expanded Saudi acquisitions of Western businesses, cultural and sporting institutions, and even hundreds of former political and military officials, the message MBS is sending is that he can buy our democracies too.Perhaps Western political leaders will come to their senses and understand the cost of acquiescing to tyrants like MBS is simply too high, not just tainting and humiliating our nations as we knowingly capitulate to a tyrant's demands, but undermining the true our competitive edge — our freedoms and our rights. But the onus will rest, as it always must in our democracies, on the citizens of our countries to demand that we do better, for the people of the Middle East and the people of our own region.

An American envoy and a Bahraini academic posed for the camera at a Washington hotel in October 2020, grinning ear to ear. They held a copy of an agreement between the U.S. State Department and the King Hamad Global Center for Peaceful Coexistence to combat antisemitism in Bahrain. Ellie Cohanim, then the U.S. assistant special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, called it "a model for a society that actively espouses religious freedom, tolerance and diversity of peoples."Thousands of miles away, in Bahrain itself, Sheikh Zuhair Jasim Abbas was sitting in a solitary confinement cell. His family had not heard from him since July. They would not again for several more months. According to a UN panel, the Shi'a Muslim cleric was allegedly beaten, starved, sleep-deprived, chained, attacked with water hoses, forbidden from using the bathroom, threatened with execution, and prevented from practicing his religious rituals.The Abraham Accords, the diplomatic agreements between Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have been hailed as a victory for religious tolerance. The image of Muslims and Jews dancing together has convinced American policymakers from both parties that peace is breaking out across the Middle East. The Biden administration is reportedly offering the Saudi government a huge bribe — perhaps even a commitment to go to war on the kingdom's behalf — to get Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords as well.New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman seems to sum up the Biden administration's logic: that a Saudi-Israeli agreement would "open the way for peace between Israel and the whole Muslim world" and "dramatically reduce the Muslim-Jewish antipathy born over a century ago with the start of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict."But the Abraham Accords are attached to a social order that is deeply unequal, divided along ethnic and religious lines. While Israel allows foreign Muslims to visit Jerusalem, it rules over millions of Palestinians against their will. (That conflict is more about nationalism in the here and now than "Muslim-Jewish antipathy.") And while some monarchies in the Persian Gulf are beginning to embrace foreigners of different religions, those same states — especially Bahrain — treat their native Shi'a Muslims as a potential fifth column.For the past few years, some of the Gulf monarchies have been engaged in a project to replace Israel with Iran as the main enemy of the Arab masses. On one hand, these countries have repressed pro-Palestine activism and promoted an image of Palestinians as parasitic ingrates. On the other hand, they have encouraged fears of Iranian power, often conflating Iran with Shi'a Muslims as a whole. Israel has encouraged both prejudices as part of its outreach to Middle Eastern publics. Rather than a victory for religious tolerance, the Abraham Accords are the culmination of an attempt by Israel and its new Gulf allies to rearrange their official enemy lists.In 2018, as Israel was beginning direct talks with Emirati and Bahraini diplomats, Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee turned into a fountain of anti-Shi'a incitement. Quoting medieval Sunni scholars, Adraee claimed on video that Shi'a Muslims are "fundamentally hypocrites and liars who invent falsehoods to ruin Islam." A few months later, he complained that Iran is "transforming citizens into Shi'a" across the Arab world.After the Abraham Accords were signed, Adraee ranted that Sunni Palestinians who prayed alongside Shi'a were leaving the fold of Sunni Islam: "How do these 'believers' justify praying behind those who stab the back of the Sunni world?" The spirit of Muslim-Jewish reconciliation, with its emphasis on interfaith photo ops, clearly does not apply to Sunni-Shi'a relations.It's worth noting that, although Iran is the largest Shi'a-majority state, most Shi'a Muslims live outside of Iran, in India, Pakistan, and the Arab world. And religious Shi'a have been at the forefront of resisting the Iranian theocracy, both inside and outside Iran. However, casting all Shi'a as Iranian agents serves a political purpose. Unrest in areas like eastern Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, where the majority of the population is Shi'a, can be dismissed as foreign terrorism, rather than a case of Arab citizens demanding equal rights. In the words of one Saudi commentator, Arabs who embrace Shi'a identity politics "have sadly become Persian."While trying to terrify Sunnis about the Iranian menace, the Israeli government has also worked to turn Iranians against Palestinians. Last year, when a few Iranian protesters were filmed stomping on a Palestinian symbol, the Israeli foreign ministry loudly promoted that image. The ministry's Persian-language account is filled with sarcastic jokes about the "oppressed Palestinians," along with claims that "they teach hatred and violence" to their children.As the Abraham Accords were finalized, the Gulf states that moved closer to Israel also began to take more of an anti-Palestinian line. Americans celebrated, and rightfully so, when Saudi television or the Emirati school system presented a more sympathetic view of Jews. At the same time, however, Saudi and Emirati media figures got louder about what they considered Palestinian "treachery." In the words of a Saudi soap opera character, the average Palestinian is an ingrate who "doesn't appreciate you standing by him, who curses you day and night — more than the Israelis." Given the heavy censorship that Saudi and Emirati media are subject to, this change in tone must have reflected official policy. Just as political concerns led Gulf states to tone down anti-Jewish prejudice, different political concerns could lead them to tone down other prejudices. At times when Israeli authorities aggressively asserted their sovereignty over Islamic holy sites — especially under the ultra-nationalist Israeli government elected in 2022 — the Gulf has returned to a more pro-Palestine tone. After Saudi Arabia mended ties with Iran earlier this year, Saudi authorities loosened restrictions on Shi'a pilgrims, and prominent Saudi propagandist Hussain al-Ghawi embraced Shi'a as his Muslim brothers. Ironically, American media did not celebrate the Saudi-Iranian pact as the dawn of religious harmony, but instead raised the alarm that Washington was losing its influence in the region.The American cultural understanding of the Middle East is centered on Israel, and anti-Palestinian racism is normalized in U.S. politics. On the other hand, Washington views Sunni-Shi'a sectarianism as a geopolitical game. During the occupation of Iraq and the decades of war that followed, U.S. policymakers treated "Sunni" and "Shi'a" like pieces on a chessboard, debating which side to favor at any given time. Instead of seeing this sectarianism as a terrible policy failure, U.S. politicians blamed Muslims' own attachment to "tribalism" and "conflicts that date back millennia," as former President Barack Obama put it.And so the Abraham Accords help flatter American elites. Israel and its Gulf allies can make a big show of overcoming Muslim-Jewish tensions — which Americans see as the central moral question of the Middle East — with U.S. support. The other prejudices involved in maintaining the system simply don't register on Americans' radar.Other states are starting to appeal to the West through the same strategy. Azerbaijan is fighting a brutal ethnic conflict against Armenia. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government has made a big show of hosting foreign Christian and Jewish delegations. Those guests often go on to praise Azerbaijan as an oasis of Muslim tolerance — rather than a secular nationalist dictatorship whose ethnic hatred of Armenians outweighs any religious concern.It's noble to want American diplomats to resolve conflicts and promote harmony between religions. But the Abraham Accords are intentionally misleading in that regard. Under the guise of peacemaking, the alliance helps authoritarian governments maintain divisions, albeit among communities that U.S. elites don't care about. The real path to peace comes through justice and mutual respect, not simply rearranging enemy lists.

How a new breed of dictators holds power by manipulating information and faking democracyHitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world. In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such "spin dictators," describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Peru's Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today's authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining "fear dictators" such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.Offering incisive portraits of today's authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump