The budget is an inherently complex and obtuse document. This is because it is often very large, constituted of numerous moving parts, and underpinned by many economic assumptions and political predilections. These elements make budgets difficult to grasp without the help of economic expertise, which is why "budget offices" are created to facilitate a greater understanding of what is an erstwhile intimidating and inaccessible document.
The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.
Includes index. ; Foreword by the editor. -- pt. I. The budget idea and the national budget: Budget making and the work of government by H.J. Ford. Evolution of the budget idea in the United States by F.A. Cleveland. The budget and the legislature by R.E. Miles. -- pt. II. State budgets: The proper function of the state budget by S.G. Lowrie. The budgetary provisions of the New York constitution by C.A. Beard. California's state budget by J.F. Neylan. The Illinois budget by F.F. Bell. Budget methods in Illinois by J.A. Fairlie. State budget making in Ohio by W.O. Hefferman. Financial administration of the commonwealth of Massachusetts by E.T. Maling. -- pt. III. Public budgets and efficiency in the public budgets: Taxation and the municipal budget by M.E. Loomis. Sources of revenue by H.S. Swan. Accounting basis of bugetary procedure by W.B. Hadley. Unit costs in recreational facilities by P.H. Belsser. Some suggestions for preparing a budget exhibit by J.H. Braddock. Budgetary procedure under the manager form of city government by A.M. Mandel. The budget as an administrative program by H. Bruere. -- pt. IV, Development of budgets and budgetary procedure in typical cities; the German municipal budget and its relation to the general government by K.F. Geiser. The budget procedure of English and French cities by D.C. Baldwin. The movement for improved financing and accounting practice in Toronto by H.L. Brittain. County budgets and their construction by O.G. Cartwright. Budget making in Cleveland by M. Fesler. Budget making in Chicago by C.E. Merriam. -- Bibliography: selected list of references in national, state, county, and municipal budgets in the United States by H.A. Rider. -- Book department. -- Index. -- Cumulatic index. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Der Beitrag beschreibt die Struktur des Budgets der USA und das Verfahren, das den Haushalt in seine gesetzliche Form bringt, mittels Definition und Erläuterung einiger zentraler Begriffe. Analytisch werden die Begrifflichkeiten in drei Teile geschieden, die wiederum einen Aspekt des Haushalts bzw. des zu seiner Erstellung führenden Verfahrens betreffen: Das sind erstens die verfassungsrechtlichen und gesetzlichen Grundlagen des heute existierenden Haushaltssystems, zweitens Begriffe, die konkret die Struktur des Budgets beschreiben, sowie drittens die verfahrenstechnischen Regelungen, die fast ausschließlich den Budgetprozess im Kongress betreffen. Ein Kennzeichen des Systems ist, dass die mit dem Haushalt befassten Ausschüsse bei der Ausarbeitung des Budgets des kommenden Jahres mit den Behörden stets Anhörungen unter Bezugnahme auf den laufenden Haushaltsvollzug durchführen. Insofern findet immer eine mitlaufende Kontrolle der Exekutive durch den Kongress statt, die zumeist jedoch eher auf die inhaltliche Überprüfung der Programme denn auf die formale Richtigkeit abzielt. Die abschließende Rechnungslegung unterliegt gemäß den Bestimmungen des Haushaltsrechts der Kontrolle der appropriation committees des Kongresses. (ICA2)
Das internationale Konzept Gender Budget wurde entwickelt als Strategie zur Herstellung von Geschlechtergerechtigkeit in und mit öffentlichen Haushalten. Seine Wurzeln liegen in der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik ebenso wie in der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung. Als finanzpolitische Komponente des universalen Programmes Gender Main-streaming erzielte es seinen öffentlichen Durchbruch seit der 4. Weltfrauen-konferenz 1995 in Peking. Die Europäische Union hat sich das Gedankengut zu eigen gemacht, in ihren Verträgen und Richtlinien juristisch festgeschrieben und somit den Mitgliedsstaaten zur Realisierung aufgetragen. In Deutschland erfolgt die Implementierung bisher eher punktuell und dilatorisch, so dass das Konzept auch Jahre nach seiner Entstehung nur wenige praktische Beispiele hervorgebracht hat. Hierunter befinden sich auf der operativen Ebene bereits einige Öffentliche Bibliotheken. Diesen mangelt es nicht an Erfahrung mit Reformprozessen – vom Wandel des Medienmarktes bis hin zu den Verwaltungsreformen. Bibliotheken erheben traditionell umfangreiches Datenmaterial und sind geübt im Umgang mit den Erfordernissen von Frauenarbeitsplätzen. Auf dieser Grundlage erweisen sich die Öffentlichen Bibliotheken als geeigneter Gegenstand für die Untersuchung von Bedeutung und prospektiven Auswirkungen des neuen Konzeptes. Nutzerschaft und Personal werden einer Gender-Analyse unterzogen und die Ansatzpunkte für künftige Gender Budgets explizit herausgearbeitet. Deutlich sichtbar wird hierdurch der Handlungsbedarf, der zu geschlechtergerechten Reformen führen soll. Der methodische Gender Budgeting-Prozess bedarf der Initiierung durch Politik und Verwaltungsspitze, um als Top-down-Prozess mit der erforderlichen Nachdrücklich-keit wirksam zu werden. Und er benötigt umfassenderes Datenmaterial aus allen Verwaltungsabteilungen zur Herstellung von Transparenz und zur gendergerechten Verteilung der Finanzmittel innerhalb des kommunalen Haushaltes. ; The international concept of gender budget has been developed as a strategy to create gender equality for and with public funds. It is rooted in the international development policy as well as in gender studies. As a financial policy component of the universal programme of gender main-streaming it has had its public break-through since the 4th international women's conference in Beijing in 1995. The European Union has adopted the ideas and stipulated them in its contracts and guidelines and, thus, entrusted the member states to put them into practise. In Germany, the implementation has been effected so far only in some places and in a dilatory way so that the concept has produced only few practical examples even years after its creation. Among these, there are already some public libraries on the level of operation. They are not lacking in experience with reform processes – from the change of the media market to the administrative reforms. Libraries traditionally gather comprehensive data material and are used to handling requirements regarding women's workplaces. On this basis, the public libraries are a suitable subject as to the examination of the significance and prospective impacts of the concept. The users and the personnel are subject to a gender analysis and the starting points for future gender budgets are elaborated explicitly. Thereby, the need for action which shall lead to reforms regarding gender equality becomes clearly visible. The methodical gender budgeting process must be initiated by politics and the administrative management in order to become effective as a top-down process with the necessary emphasis. Moreover, it requires more extensive data material from all the administrative departments in order to create transparency and to allocate the funds of the communal budget in consideration of gender equality.
Local budget analysts may have a policy or control orientation during budget execution. Policy-oriented analysts execute the budget but also follow an active work plan, conducting policy analysis, program evaluation, & management improvement studies. In contrast, control-oriented analysts simply execute the budget. Previous research has found that the views of budget directors influence a budget office's orientation toward policy or control. This article finds that orientation is better explained by how the budget office is structured; the views of the elected board & city manager; budget staff size & experience; & analysts' nonpolicy-oriented responsibilities. To engage budget analysts more usefully during budget execution, city managers are advised to require a formal work plan, avoid assigning nonpolicy duties to analysts, appoint budget directors to direct the activities of budget offices, & locate budget analysts in finance departments. 3 Tables, 8 References. Adapted from the source document.
ANALYSTS OFTEN CONCLUDE THAT BUDGET REFORM HAS MINIMAL IMPACTS ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES. YET STATE BUDGET DIRECTORS CONTINUE TO ADOPT NEW BUDGET TECHNIQUES. IT APPERARS EITHER THAT BUDGET DIRECTORS ARE NAIVE ABOUT BUDGET REFORM IMPACT OR THAT ANALYSTS HAVE UNDERSTATE ITS BENEFITS. TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE, THIS STUDY ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE THE STATE BUDGET OFFICER'S PERCEPTIONS OF BUDGET PROCESS REFORM.
The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.