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Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- I. David Wong's Pluralistic Moral Relativism -- 1. The Strategy and Style of Wong's Approach: Working Out a Defensible Relativism -- 2. The Three Main Theses of Wong's Pluralistic Relativism -- 3. Wong's Defense of Pluralistic Relativism -- 4. Wong's Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy -- II. Central Issues between Wong and His Critics -- 1. A Morality of Humanity Over and Above Moralities of Social Groups? -- 2. Can a Metaethics that Is Naturalistic, Pluralistic, and Relativistic Accommodate a Normative Morality that Is Non-Naturalistic, Monistic, or Universalistic Morality? -- 3. The Principle of Humanity vs. the Principle of Charity: Interpretation of Confucianism -- 4. Naturalism and the Naturalistic Fallacy -- 5. Naturalism, Relativism, and Realism -- 6. Speaker Relativism or Patient Relativism? -- Notes -- References -- Part I: Critical Essays -- 2. Human Morality, Naturalism, and Accommodation -- I. Wong's Pluralistic Relativism -- II. The Universal Element in Morality -- III. Relativism -- IV. Accommodation -- V. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 3. Naturalism and Pluralistic Relativism -- I. Introduction -- II. Individuating Moralities -- III. From Moral Ambivalence to Pluralistic Relativism? -- IV. Value Monism and Universalism Revisited -- V. Should Wong Allow Non-Naturalistic Moralities to be Adequate? -- VI. Moralities as Practiced Versus Ideal Moralities -- VII. A Problem for Wong's Reciprocity Constraint -- VIII. Wong's Use of Xunzi: A Separate Naturalistic Project? -- Acknowledgment -- Notes -- References -- 4. Principle of Humanity vs. Principle of Charity -- I. The Argument -- II. The Rival Principles of Humanity and Charity in Radical Translation -- III. The Role of Comparative Philosophy in the Argument -- IV. Xunzi and Sage Authority.

This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and asks what theories of concepts apply to moral concepts. By combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience, it considers what mental states not only influence, but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are shown to be a hybrid that express both cognitive and conative states.In part through analysis of new empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Park reveals that the referents of individuals' moral judgments and concepts vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he contends for moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location but only relative to groups.This powerfully argued text will be of interest to researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in cognitive science, moral theory, philosophy of psychology, and moral psychology more broadly. Those interested in ethics, applied social psychology, and moral development will also benefit from the volume

The research describes the core sociological approaches to the theoretical interpretation of interrelated key issues of modern sociology of morality — the sources of the significance of multiple regulatory orders, the relations of morality and power, the role of morality as a universal intermediary in potential conflicts among regulatory systems (in particular, between state and non-state laws, professional ethics, religion, corporate codes of conduct, etc.). Based on the critical scrutiny of classical and modern approaches to the sources of norms and relations between multiple regulatory systems, in particular law and morality, the author outlines perspective directions of the theoretical interpretation of the relationship between morality and law. Using the reconstructed reasoning against the thesis of moral relativism in the social sciences recently offered by S. Lukes, the research studies the possibility of describing "moral" and "conventional" as analytically different dimensions of social norms, as well as the prospects of using the concept of "participating reactive mindsets" as a theoretical interpretation of the general source of moral emotions and judgments.

Moral relativism is a tragedy and cognitive relativism is a farce – so Gellner argues. First the tragedy: moral relativism is consistent and compelling given moral diversity and contention worldwide. Then the farce: cognitive relativism is self-contradictory and logically false; it is also absurd in view of hard science, which gets testable, cumulative, applicable results that yield high tech; and it is insidious – where logical consistency and empirical accuracy are a dead letter, mummery rules.