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In this paper we argue that emotional response to information encountered in campaigns has implications for the likelihood of remembering that information at the time of the vote. Most voting models are built on what voters remember—whether it is the placement of candidates on issues, or opened ended responses to prompts. That recall of memory is biased is well‐known, but the extent to which those biases are driven by affective response to candidate information has not been studied. Using dynamic process tracing, we examine voters' emotional responses, information search, and candidate evaluations during a simulated presidential primary campaign. By manipulating anxiety and the amount of incongruent information that voters encounter, we can detect the direct influence of affect in information processing. We find evidence that voters are more likely to remember information that generates any affective reaction as opposed to information for which the subjects report no emotional response. However, we find little evidence that anxiety has a special role, compared to enthusiasm or anger, in increasing the likelihood that an individual item is remembered. This challenges a primary contention of the theory of Affective Intelligence that anxiety leads to more memories for campaign information.

It has long been believed that social emotions such as guilt and jealousy are only expressed in humans. In the case of jealousy, its adaptive value has been linked to the prevention of sexual infidelity or fairness. So why would dogs feel jealousy? I suggest that understanding how social emotions have been bred into dogs can help us understand our own emotions, including their functionality — and potentially their mechanisms.

A project on comparing the emotional properties of the left and right political Twitter sphere of Austria and Germany. https://github.com/DavidSiegl/Emotion-Analysis-Project

This research aims to offer an original reconstruction of Aristotle's psychology of music that explains his views on the relation between instrumental music and emotions. I argue that, contrary to the relevant scholarship, for Aristotle instrumental music cannot convey emotions to the listener. What instrumental music does, I claim, is to cause an objectless mood or disposition (διάθεσις) that "prepares the way" (προοδοποιεῖν) for the emotions. Most interpreters of Politics VIII (1340a12-29) argue that for Aristotle a piece of instrumental music would be able to represent emotions and the listener would be moved to the same emotion by a sort of sympathetic contagion. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle's account of emotions. For Aristotle a necessary condition for the emotions is that those experiencing them "judge" (κρίνειν) a situation based on their beliefs. If it is accepted that there is such a thing as an emotional contagion through music, then the cognitive theory of emotion presented by Aristotle is at risk since no such a judgment would be required. The thesis is presented in three chapters. In chapter one the cognitive elements that give rise to emotions are analysed. The nature of the term παθή is explored as well as the difference between its use as a 'general affection' and its use as the mental process that we now call 'emotion.' In this latter sense the emotions are mental states directed to an object on which a judgment is made and that are accompanied by pain or pleasure. The nature of the emotional judgment is investigated and the possibility of its existence in non-rational animals is explored. It is concluded that, even if we accept emotions in animals, intentionality and predication of an object are necessary conditions for the existence of emotions. In the second chapter, I discuss two instances where it seems Aristotle makes an exception to the judgment as necessary condition for the emotions. First, emotions aroused by the perception of signs of emotions, like the mere voice of the orator (Rhet. 1408a16-26) and the spectacle in the theatre (Poet. 1453b1-10) and second, emotions aroused by bodily changes (De an. 403a25). I argue that in Aristotle's view in both cases the factors at work (voice, sight, bodily condition) only facilitate the arousal of emotions, but the actual arousal requires an additional narrative context that supplies grounds for the judgment that in turn gives rise to the emotion in question. In the first case the orator's voice and the theatre's spectacle work just as a condiment (ἥδυσμα) that helps to intensify (συναπεργάζεσθαι) the object of judgment (Pol. 1340b17; Poet. 1449b25; 1450b16; Rhet. 1386a31). Our emotional response has as its object their story, not the elements that decorate it. In the second case, the bodily changes are the material constituents of emotions; facilitate the generation of emotions: hotness around the heart, for example, makes the subject prone to anger; but the emotion of anger appears only after a particular situation is evaluated by the mind. In the third chapter, I turn to the specific case of music. From an exegesis of Pol. 1340a12-29, I argue that the emotions ostensibly transmitted by music (μουσική) to the listener are due to the lyrics of the songs (μέλη), not to the instrumental music itself. Therefore the question about the nature of the emotional effect of pure instrumental music remains open. My answer to this question is based on the analysis of the causal mechanism by means of which instrumental music affects the listener. Aristotle's physiology reveals the physical impact of sound on the sense of hearing, and from there to the heart, the first sensorium. Bodily changes in the organ create an objectless disposition (διάθεσις) in the listener by relaxing or agitating his body, without providing any content for the mind besides the perception of the sound. Exciting or relaxing the heart by means of music would leave the listener in the disposition of readiness to react emotionally, but the emotion would appear only once an intentional object, i.e., the content of the emotion, is presented and evaluated by the mind. Finally, I show the relevance of my interpretation of these dispositions to understanding the role of emotions in the education of character in the Politics. Aristotle proposes to use only a certain type of music in his educational curriculum, not one too relaxed or too tense, but a middle between them that puts the students in a stable and noble disposition that would, in turn, lead them to be guided by reason instead of their emotions.

Emotions and Health, 1200-1700 examines theological and medical approaches to the 'passions' as alterations affecting both mind and body. It focuses on sorrow, fear and anger, on constructions of the melancholic subject, and on the effects of music on health.

AbstractWhat makes a diplomatic or military signal credible? In strategic settings where deception is possible, rational actors' interpretations rely on their beliefs, intuition, and imagination—they rely on emotion. Two properties of emotion—as an assimilation mechanism and its use as evidence—are key to addressing four strategic problems. First, emotion explains why actors worry needlessly about their reputations. Second, emotion is important to understanding costly signals. Third, emotion explains radical changes in preferences. Fourth, emotion sharpens understanding of strategic problems without being self-invalidating: common knowledge of emotion's effects do not always change those effects. Understanding how rational actors think requires turning to emotion. Evidence from the Korean War captures strengths and weaknesses of competing perspectives.

Adolescents learn about emotions through interacting with parents and friends, though there is limited longitudinal research on this topic. This study examined longitudinal patterns in parent and friend emotion socialization and adolescent emotion regulation. Eighty‐seven adolescents reported on parent and friend emotion socialization. Parents reported on adolescent emotion regulation. Parents' responses were stable over time and across gender. Friends of girls reciprocated negative emotions more and were less punitive over time, whereas friends of boys increased in comforting and decreased in neglect of negative emotions. Parents and friends evidenced unique effects on adolescent emotion regulation, and the effect of friend socialization responses differed for girls and boys. Future research should examine combinatory influences of multiple socializers on adolescent adjustment.