Suchergebnisse

Readers will be aware of the philosophy journal poll I have been hosting here. The poll was comprehensive in that it covered over 140 philosophy journals, most of them suggestions by readers. These journals cover the full spectrum of the discipline. There have been more than 36,000 votes cast already and I believe we can draw some initial findings. Journals are each assigned a score: this is the percent (%) chance that voters will select this journal as their favourite if asked to choose between this journal and a second journal chosen at random.

The first finding is that there appears to be a top tier of philosophy journals -- this is not controversial -- that is relatively small -- this latter part may be more controversial.

From the poll, the top tier of philosophy journals appears to consist of the following publications:

1. Journal of Philosophy 87

2. Philosophical Review 84
3. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 83
3. Nous 83 
5. Mind 82 
6. Ethics 80

I say that these appear to be the top tier as each were no. 1 or 2 at some point during the voting (unlike other journals). Each would be selected at least 80% of the time if paired with a second journal chosen at random.

A further finding is that the second tier of journals -- which we might classify as chosen at least 60-79% of the time when paired with a second journal chosen at random -- is perhaps surprsingly large. This second tier might consist of the following journals:

7. Philosophical Studies 79
8. Synthese 77
8. Philosophy & Public Affairs 77
10. Analysis 76
10. Philosophical Quarterly 76
10. American Philosophical Quarterly 76
10. Philosophers' Imprint 76
10. Monist 76
10. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 76
16. Journal of the History of Philosophy 75
16. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75
16. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 75
16. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75
20. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74
21. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73
21. European Journal of Philosophy 73
23. Erkenntnis 72
24. Philosophy of Science 71
25. Philosophy 70
25. History of Philosophy Quarterly 70
25. Ratio 70
28. Journal of Moral Philosophy 69
29. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 68
30. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 67
31. Philosophical Papers 67
32. Journal of Philosophical Logic 67
33. Journal of Philosophical Research 66
33. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 66
33. Utilitas 66
33. Mind and Language 66
33. Journal of Ethics 66
38. Southern Journal of Philosophy 65
39. Review of Metaphysics 64
39. Philosophical Investigations 64
39. Kant-Studien 64
42. Metaphilosophy 62
42. Philosophy Compass 62
42. Journal of Political Philosophy 62
42. Philosophical Topics 62
42. Philosophia 62
47. Hume Studies 61
47. Linguistics and Philosophy 61
49. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 60

The next third tier of journals are those chosen about 50% of the time (from 40-60%)  where paired with a second journal chosen at random:

50. Phronesis 59 
51. Journal of the History of Ideas 58

51. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58
53. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 57
53. Philosophical Forum 57
53. Inquiry 57
56. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 56
57. Political Theory 55
57. Social Theory & Practice 55
57. Philosophical Explorations 55
57. Journal of Social Philosophy 55
57. Economics & Philosophy 55
62. Law & Philosophy 54
62. dialectica 54
62. Public Affairs Quarterly 54
62. Acta Analytica 54
66. Social Philosophy & Policy 53
66. Theoria 53
66. Journal of Applied Philosophy 53
69. Faith and Philosophy 52
70. Political Studies 51
71. Journal of Value Inquiry 51
72. Harvard Law Review 50
73. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 49
73. Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly 49
73. Philosophical Psychology 49
76. Bioethics 48
76. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 48
78. Politics, Philosophy, Economics 47
78. Kantian Studies 47
79. History of Political Thought 44
80. Legal Theory 43
81. Hypatia 42
82. Philosophical Writings 41
82. southwest philosophy review 41
84. Apeiron 40
84. European Journal of Political Theory 40
84. American Journal of Bioethics 40

The remaining results for other journals are as follows:

87. Environmental Ethics 39
87. Logique et Analyse 39
87. Philosophy Today 39
90. Ratio Juris 38
90. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38
90. Business Ethics Quarterly 38
93. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 37
93. Ethical Perspectives 37
93. Public Reason 37
96. Hegel-Studien 36
97. Philosophy & Social Criticism 35
97. Res Publica 35
97. Philosophy in Review 35
97. Philo 35

101. Neuroethics 34
101. Ethics and Justice 34
103. Philosophy and Theology 33
104. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 32
105. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 32
106. Review of Politics 31
106. Jurisprudence 31
106. Research in Phenomenology 31
109. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30
109. Review Journal of Political Philosophy 30
109. Philosophy East and West 30
112. South African Journal of Philosophy 29
112. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 29
114. Teaching Philosophy 28
114. Review Journal of Philosophy & Social Science 28
114. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 28
117. Journal of Global Ethics 27
117. APA Newsletters 27
119. Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society 26
120. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 25
121. Adam Smith Review 23
121. Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 23
121. Imprints: Egalitarian Theory and Practice 23
124, Theory and Research in Education 22
125. Polish Journal of Philosophy 21
125. Epoche 21
125. Fichte Studien 21
125. Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 21
125. Asian Philosophy 21
130. Think 20
131. Archives de Philosophie du Droit 18
131. Collingwood & British Idealism Studies 18
131. Owl of Minerva 18
131. New Criminal Law Review 18
135. Journal of Indian Philosophy 17
136. Continental Philosophy Review 17
136. The European Legacy 17
138. Education, Citizenship, and Social Justice 15
139. Reason Papers 14
139. Associations 14
139. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion 14
142. Studia Philosophica Estonica 13
143. Derrida Today 5

Some further reflections. While there are several exceptions, it would be interesting to analyze any correlation between the age of a journal and its position in the rankings. There are several surprises on the list, this list does not correspond to my own opinions (I would have ranked many journals differently), and I do not believe that there is much difference between journals ranked closely together.

I also purposively put some selections in to see how they might play out. For example, I added Harvard Law Review out of curiosity and I was surprised to see of all journals exclusively publishing law and legal philosophy journals it appears to come second to the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies and above other choices. (I was surprised legal philosophy journals did not score much better.) I added several journals edited by political scientists, such as Political Studies, and was surprised to see they did not score as highly as I had thought. Roughly speaking, journals with a wider remit performed much better than journals with a more specific audience. I also added at least one journal, Ethics and Justice, that I believe is no longer in print. (Can readers correct me on this? I hope I am in error.) It scored 34% and came in at 101st.

What I will do shortly is create a new poll that will only have the top 50 philosophy journals from this poll roughly speaking. Expect to see this new link widely advertised shortly.

In the meantime, what do readers think we can take away from the results thus far? Have I missed anything?

Plekhanov/Labriola As a bit of an experiment, coupling my interest in André Tosel and my work on translation, I have decided to try my hand at a few translations of the former when I get the time. These are totally unauthorized, and rough drafts posted for edification and entertainment purposes only. I started on this piece because it is short, and because it works on an area that I need to learn more about, the history of Marxist-Spinozism before Matheron or Althusser. However, the more I worked on this piece, the more I thought that this split between Plekhanov and Labriola, still exists, in the divide between neo-enlightenment Spinozists and what some might call post-modern, but I prefer to call Marxist Spinozists. The Marxist Uses of Spinoza: Lessons of Method The history of the role of Spinoza's thought in the formation and the development of the work of Marx remains to be written, as is that of the history of the diverse Marxist usage (from different Marxisms) of Spinozist philosophical elements. This double history would reveal the work of Marx, and its contradictions, as much it would open up the work of Spinoza himself. Marxisms have reflected their aporias and their hopes onto Spinoza without necessarily truly thinking them through. In other words this is a domain of misunderstandings and equivocations. In order to undertake this history it would be useful to draw some lessons from the encounter of Marx and Marxist thought with Spinoza. First remark. The encounters of Spinoza by Marxists are discontinuous and contradictory. This discontinuity is initially characterized by the lack of a definitive encounter between Marx himself and Spinoza. Marx is formed through the reading of Spinoza, of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and the correspondence. Not to learn the lessons of materialism, but an ethico-political lesson. Spinoza is considered as philosopher of freedom and autonomy, modern incarnation of Prometheus and continuation of Epicurus, all at once. Marx, in is progression from Kantian-Fichtean idealism to the speculative communism of the 1844 Manuscripts, develops three theses which are the practical theses of philosophical materialism, without the epistemological and ontological theses of this materialist tradition.  Thesis One: Philosophy has a fundamental interest in the liberty of humanity, understood as autonomy and as the end of all heteronomies. Thesis Two: Philosophy is critical of all transcendental authorities of all principle of domination which justify and represent their domination through this principle.  Thesis Three: Philosophy is eminently a science, knowledge, but knowledge of life, of the simple life of spirit of bodies rendered by their power. All particular sciences and knowledge must be thought from the point of view of science of life and its forms, as forms of life.  When Marx elaborates the materialist conception of history he revolutionizes materialism but he does this without ever connecting it to the spinozist theory of nature, of the relations of extension and thought, of bodies and mind. He integrates and modifies the strong ontological and epistemological thesis of materialism, but these theses are taken more from Hobbes and other materialists of the eighteenth century than from Spinoza.
Let us state these theses which are capable of a Spinozist formulation, without however assuming such a formulation.  Thesis Four: Nature is the original reality and it is organized as matter at different objective levels. Thought cannot be separated from matter. Thesis Five: Nature in its diverse senses is intelligible. It emerges only from itself, excluding all creation. The human order is not a kingdom within a kingdom and susceptible of being understood.  Thesis Six: All knowledge presupposes the reality of its object outside of thought. The appropriation by the knowledge of its own object of knowledge presupposes the reference to a real object. It is necessary to pay attention to the debates in Marxism of the Second International in order to see how the question of "Spinoza precursor of Marxist materialism appears." Emerging in the years of the crisis of revisionism the debate engages above all the German and Russian theorists of social democracy: Bernstein, Kautsky, and Plekhanov. It is in part based on the Anti-Dühring of Friedrich Engels and puts into play the complex questions of the relationship between the materialist theory of history with the sciences of nature with the political problem of the alliance of the intellectual groups in the perspective of socialist transition. This debate between 1896-1900 is inscribed in a theoretical problematic, such of Marxist orthodoxy that will find a new actualization with the problems proper to Soviet philosophy between 1917 and 1931, when it is a matter of specifying what would be called "Marxism-Leninism." If the question of materialism assumes the continuity between the Spinoza of the Second International and that of the Third, nothing would be more erroneous than to let oneself be taken in by the apparent continuity of an imaginary history of philosophy. These occurrences are in effect specific, they constitute theoretical and political conjunctures which must be grasped in a way that takes into account the strategic dimensions of the class struggle whether or not it is led by Marxist parties, the problem of alliances, that of the intellectual division of labor. Marxist philosophy, as it is officially constituted, is part of the practice of parties, and the reference to Spinoza is overdetermined by the political and theoretical stakes that have to be elucidated in each specific situation. Here we touch on the second lesson of method: it is necessary to historically specify the conjunctures where Spinoza intervenes and where and how there is a specific usage of this prestigious and troubling reference. This method makes it possible to determine what falls under ideological legitimation, and what is inserted at the level of the practical politics of the party, of the state, of the level of specialized intellectuals. Spinoza does not only appear only in the emergence of Marxist orthodoxy. He intervenes, in a subterranean manner, in the elaboration of theorists where the considerable theoretical importance has never been associated with an actual political importance. This can be found in the crisis over revisionism in the last century, such that Antonio Labriola in his Essays on the Materialist Conception of History (1895-1898) attests to the presence of a different Spinoza than that of his contemporary Plekhanov and a fortiori than that which was celebrated in Soviet Philosophy in 1927 and 1932.
Spinoza intervenes as a critic of the same orthodoxy which returns as elements of an older materialism in another theoretical configuration that has solicited different aspects of his philosophy: no longer the parallelism between extension and thought, not a determinist ontology but the mode considered to be at once conceptual and experimental, the same geometrico-genetic method, in that it now excludes the guarantees of teleological philosophies of history. A contradictory intervention which is not without analogies to another occurrence, the most recent, that of Spinoza in the work of Louis Althusser which can be considered as a systematic deconstruction of the Marxist orthodoxy of the Second and Third International. Between Labriola (1898) and Althusser (1965), if we except the Soviet Spinoza, there is little except Ernst Bloch's remarks that no one has yet taken into account for a history of materialism oriented in the direction of a utopian ontology. This appearance of a Spinoza critical of stated and intended Marxist orthodoxies gives a third lesson of method: the diverse contradictory Marxist uses of Spinoza are situated between two poles, the first is that of an orthodoxy elaborated by the intellectuals of the social democratic and communist parties at the end of an a party/state conception of a finalist world and at the other is from thinkers situated in a problematic relation to the party, who look in Spinoza for other ways to make sense of the world and other practices then the becoming state of the worker parties. This opposition can appear to be schematic. It can be developed into provisional and schematic path of investigation. Such an investigation takes one central question: What is it in the philosophy of Spinoza that authorizes these discontinuous usages, determined by their conjunctures, and perhaps violently opposed?  Confronting therefore these different usages of Spinoza that can be considered historically significant in the course of history, that is to say in terms of their specific conjunctures. This can be seen with the orthodox use of Spinoza by Plekhanov and the critical usage of Spinoza by Labriola at the heart of the second international. Plekhanov gave himself the task of elaborating the originality of Marx's philosophy and defending it in the face of revisionists who, with Bernstein, contest the self-sufficiency of Marx's philosophy, dividing into an evolutionary sociology and a Kantian inspired ethics. For Plekhanov there is very much a Marxist philosophy. It is inscribed in the materialist current which it revitalizes by giving it a historical dialectical dimension. Spinoza is the direct ancestor of Marx in that it is through the monism of the former that one can unify the science of nature and the science of history of the latter. Marx has revitalized substance as historical-social matter, metabolism of humanity with nature, and has inherited his realist theory of knowledge, thought is nothing other than a moment or function of matter. There is a Spinozism of Marx that is the realization of historical Spinozism as a the affirmation of the materialist conception of the world, one predicated on the knowability of matter in terms of its organization at diverse levels. Only this conception of the world can give the workers' movement its organization and which would permit it to avoid the disorganization that revisionism introduces, neo-Kantian idealism cannot organize the class struggle without harmful compromises.  Spinoza is one part of orthodox Marxism returned to during this period. This Spinoza can authorize the theses of Friedrich Engels, in some sense simplifying the complexity of the Anti-Dühring. Concerned to think together the development of the sciences of nature, the materialist conception of history, and developing a philosophy capable of correct reflection and the movement of the specialization of sciences and the political struggle of classes (alliance with the intellectual stratum), Engles had proposed the idea of a materialist dialectic that oscillates between an ontological conception and a methodological conception of this dialectic. These two conceptions are apparently unified in the idea of "the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and human history (at least up to now), these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents." This parallelism between (laws of) movement of the external world and (the laws of) thought has a Spinozist connotation which reinforces the idea of liberty as the comprehension of necessary laws. However, it remains above all intended to make possible a representation of the dialectic under materialism, without examining its own difficulties. Plekhanov is not interested in these difficulties in elaborating a general materialist conception that Marx completes and fulfills through the mediation of Hegel. Antonio Labriola, who wrote "Origin and Nature of the Passions According to Spinoza's Ethics" at a young age (1866), refuses this ontologization or methodolization of the dialectic in order to develop the idea of a philosophy of praxis as a philosophy immanent to a new conception of history, reflecting the constitution of history as a complex unifying ground and surface. In this sense, the Plekhanov project, apparently Spinozist, of thinking the continuity of nature and society at the heart of a substantial and homogenous causality loses its sense. The process of social life must be desubstantialized at with it the philosophy that is presented as a hyperphilosophy or super science organized as "theosophic or metaphysic of the totality of the world, as if by an act of a transcendent knowledge we can arrive at a vision of substance and all of the phenomena and processes under it." Antonino Labriola as much as he refuses to make man an 'kingdom in a kingdom' refuses the naturalization of history and the transformation of Marxism into a naturalist ontology where social practice becomes a species of being in general. Labriola denounces a matter found on things as a form of metaphysical superstition. Spinoza is evoked as a hero in the struggle against the imagination and ignorance that resurfaces in Marxist orthodoxy under the form of universal materialism. It is necessary above all to think of the diverse levels of the "animation" of matter, and therefore the specificity of the "artificial terrain" which constitutes practice. What Spinoza knew how to do for the theory of passions must be done for praxis: each one, the relations of affects and and those that constitute praxis, are not ruled by a subject and for this reason must be studied through a genetic method. Labriola speaks of a genetic method that also defines the method of Marx in Capital. The genetic method takes its distance from the dialectic and its teleological philosophy of history and established guarantees.  For Labriola the turn to Spinoza is less about the strengthening of a materialist monism than it is about the possibility of reinterpreting Marx's Capital as a geometry of capitalist social being. The geometrical method is an instrument of internal purification destined to eliminate the finalism of productive causes and biological predetermination from Marxist orthodoxy. The philosophy of praxis manifests the basic critical and formal tendency of monism: everything is conceivable as a the causal genesis of a complex totality. The materialist dialectic is neither a universal method nor a logic of being, but constitutes the critical movement internal to knowledge which acts on the practice of philosophy and makes it a "conceptual form of explication" parallel to contemporary science. The reference to Spinoza intervenes in the critique of a Marxist orthodoxy which is supposed to include in a dogmatic manner Spinoza's own materialism. Marx and Spinoza are considered as two practitioners of philosophy who refuse the closure of knowledge in favor of the immanent self-reflection of knowledge. The lesson of Spinoza is not to find the unity of knowledge under a principle but to demystify the fetishes which substitute imaginary principles for the movement of practice.  One could develop a similar analysis of the confrontation of the Soviet Spinoza of the Third International to the Spinoza of Louis Althusser.  The Soviet Spinoza is an impoverished and petrified version of the Spinoza of Plekhanov. With respect to Althusser, Spinoza's critique is referenced constantly and augmented, infinitely better elaborated than in Labriola, since it acts this time not as a critique of metaphysical fetishism, even materialist, but of the metaphysics of the juridical subject characteristic of occidental rationalism.  The contributions of R. Zapata and J.-P. Cottent have clarified these points, but it seems opportune to underly the paradox of this history: it is possible to tie together the diverse uses of Spinoza, one against the other. If Spinoza is enrolled in the constitution of a "conception of the world" which intends to complete a current of philosophy and which cannot at any time criticize its presuppositions, it is also possible, as with Althusser, to think the structure of ideological interpellation that constitutes the ideological subject and invalidates philosophy considered as a theory of knowledge. If Spinoza makes possible a conception of the world in which the State Party is supposed to be the subject of history accomplishing its ultimate ends, it also makes it possible for Althusser to try to reconstruct Marxist theory on the ruins of the triple myth of origin, subject, and the end. The Labriolian critique of imaginatio and ignorantia is radically interiorized in the destruction of Marxisms of the Second and Third International. The recourse to structural causality supposed to have been developed in the theory of modes and substance serves as an incomplete program to develop the theoretical revolution of Marx.  However, it goes further still: there are two Spinoza's in Althusser himself. The Spinoza critical of any theory of knowledge ultimately occludes the Spinoza of structural causality: the denunciation of the triple myth of origin, subject, and end is lead to the liquidation of the rational modernism present in Marx. However the pars destruens always prevails over the pars construens. The idea of structural causality (such that of substance as the absent cause over the modes and affects) is accompanied with the affirmation of an unknown radicality of Marxist science, but the critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity in the teleology of Marxism that accompanies it announces the crises of Marxist liberation in the last interventions of Althusser. Everything comes to pass as if Althusser deconstructs a dogmatic Spinoza in the name of another Spinoza, more secret and more enigmatic. Spinoza is always divided from Spinozism which claims to define himOriginally published in Bloch, Olivier, Editor,  Spinoza au XXe siècle, Paris, PUF, 1993. 

A powerful personal narrative of recovery and an illuminating philosophical exploration of traumaOn July 4, 1990, while on a morning walk in southern France, Susan Brison was attacked from behind, severely beaten, sexually assaulted, strangled to unconsciousness, and left for dead. She survived, but her world was destroyed. Her training as a philosopher could not help her make sense of things, and many of her fundamental assumptions about the nature of the self and the world it inhabits were shattered.At once a personal narrative of recovery and a philosophical exploration of trauma, this bravely and beautifully written book examines the undoing and remaking of a self in the aftermath of violence. It explores, from an interdisciplinary perspective, memory and truth, identity and self, autonomy and community. It offers imaginative access to the experience of a rape survivor as well as a reflective critique of a society in which women routinely fear and suffer sexual violence.As Brison observes, trauma disrupts memory, severs past from present, and incapacitates the ability to envision a future. Yet the act of bearing witness, she argues, facilitates recovery by integrating the experience into the survivor's life's story. She also argues for the importance, as well as the hazards, of using first-person narratives in understanding not only trauma, but also larger philosophical questions about what we can know and how we should live

What follows is not a review of the entirety of Pierre Macherey and the Case of Literary Production, something that is hard to do with collections of essays in general, trying to find some common theme or thread, but would be easy to do in this case, because not only are the essays excellent on their own they also unify around an important thread of saving Macherey's work in general and his first book on literary production from obscurity. This has also been one of the projects of this blog, and one can follow the links to reviews (or at least posts) on his books on daily life, the university, utopia, norms, Spinoza, and literary production. What I would like to do instead is pick up one of the central threads running through this collection. This thread has to do with the connection between symptomatic reading and capitalism. The term symptom carries with it a heavy Freudian influence, and with that there is the suggestion that the symptoms in question are some kind of slip reveal if not the unconscious then some other omni-historical reality, perhaps the limit of any ideology. In his essay, "Reading Althusser" Macherey makes the case that the symptom that Althusser read through Marx reading political economy had a particular structure and reality. As Macherey writes:"Symptomatic reading seeks to show between the lines not the hidden presence of a content--the essence hidden beneath appearance, which requires only that it be brought into the open and placed before our eyes--but a lack waiting for the means that would permit it to be filled, means which materially are lacking."And more specifically in the next paragraph. "Marx's discovery is that capitalism exploits an ambiguity related to that on which the notion of "power" is based; it is made possible by the ambiguity proper to a reality that may exist both potentially and actuality at the same time, and from which it has found the means to draw the maximum profit, in the two forms of extraction of absolute surplus value (an extension of the working day) and of relative surplus value (an increase in the productivity of labor power). When Marx speaks of the relation between essence and appearance, he speaks without knowing it, because, in fact he does not speak of it, all the while speaking without speaking of the relation between the potentiality and actuality, which is the secret of the function of labor power and of its exploitation by the capitalist who pretends to buy labor, and to pay what it is worth, as Ricardo insisted, while in fact he has rented the right to make use of it a certain place and time, transforming it from the potentiality to the actuality of labor power."Symptomatic reading concerns the fundamental orientation of Marx's project. It is the lynchpin around which the whole critique of political economy rests. The difference between labor, as that which is sold and bought, and labor power, gets at the fundamental relation between potential and actuality in capitalism. Labor is treated as any other commodity, it exists on a market that fluctuates with rises and fall of supply and demand, but unlike any other commodity it is not a thing, but a potential, a capacity. How much it produces, how much work it does (or really he, she, or they do) is not set, not determined by its price on the market, but is determined by how much work the capitalist can get from it by extending the time worked (absolute surplus value) or the intensity (relative surplus value). This is why, in the one section of Les Sujet des Normes that has been translated Macherey argues that capitalism should be understood as a kind of materialist metaphysics because it puts to work, in a practical way, the distinction between potentiality and actuality. This metaphysical division is also a quotidian division between the worker as an owner of labor power, as a wage earner, interpellated as such, and worker as part of the valorization process, as part of productive process and subordinated to it. In some striking passages from the essay on Reading Althusser Macherey, in a passage that to some extent annuls the gap that would separate "Althusserian" Marxism from "Autonomist Marxism" (quotes are necessary for both of those terms), Macherey argues that this division masks a fundamental relation of domination (my apologies for the picture of the text). The symptom of capital is thus wage labor, or the difference between wage labor as potential, as labor power and actuality, a difference which is also the difference between the labor market and the "other scene of production. "As much as it is possible to read other "sciences," other discourses, symptomatically it would have to do other fundamental points of schism or division, political economy can be read symptomatically to the extent that it treats labor power as a labor, treating a potential as actuality, and a relation as a given. Philosophy can read symptomatically to the extent that it, in its bourgeois variation, effaces this as well, treating the market as the paradigm of equality rather than the basis for a new form of domination. Macherey offers a striking, and a strikingly political reading of the concept of symptomatic reading. Capitalism as a mode of production rests on the paradoxical status of labor power as a commodity, and political economy, or economics, as a discipline is constituted in effacing this fact, as are other disciplines to the extent that they are under the sway of that new queen of the disciplines. What does it mean, however, to think of this as a symptom? Or, put differently where else might these symptoms manifest themselves? If capital is founded on the unique status of labor as a commodity where might we find symptoms of the repression of this fact? I would say that the capitalist class, at least the small business owner, seems to also maintain that wages have a unique status. Whenever wages go up, or there is at least a possibility of a wage increase, restaurants and other businesses will claim that this threatens their very existence. The same business owners are generally silent about other increases of the cost of doing business such as rent or utilities. (Although the current inflation has changed this a bit.) These costs are absorbed or are silently translated into increased prices. An increase of wages is treated less as just a new cost and more of a threat to the very idea of a profitable business. To give an example, during the time when the pandemic was still acknowledged the city of Portland, ME, where I live, the city imposed a hazard pay increase that raised the minimum wage for workers to $19.50.  Several restaurants increased their prices accordingly and even stated on their website menus that the price increase was a direct increase of the increase cost of wages. One could contest the necessity of this, after all it is possible to bear these increases by just taking in less money for the owners. However, I am less interested in the economics of this than the status of wages as a symptom. Higher wages are often talked about as a make or break cost, as not just another cost but almost as an existential threat to capital as such. In his contribution to the same volume Nick Nesbitt writes, "Marx seems to be telling his reader that the abstraction that is value must be thought not only as a concept but also vividly imagined, in the form of a animated manifestation in the concrete materiality that is the human symbolic order." This seems to be another way of thinking of a symptom, as much as the actual exploitation of labor must be effaced and concealed behind the image of the labor market, as a market of "Freedom, equality, and Bentham," this exploitation still appears, albeit in an inverted form, every time wages increase, or more to the point, workers seem to resist the discipline and subordination that is required of them. That every increase of wages, or every attempt to address and acknowledge the working conditions appears as a a threat to the economic and symbolic structure of capital is itself a symptom of the exploitation that the system depends upon. 

La teóloga Mary Daly es conocida en España como feminista radical postcristiana. Se la califica de esta manera aunque prácticamente no se hayan estudiado ni traducido sus obras al castellano ni siquiera en los ámbitos de la filosofía de género (al abandonar la perspectiva del feminismo radical) o desde la teología (al ser categorizada la autora como postcristiana). Su propuesta de filosofía como cuerpo epistemológico propio (no como la filosofía del genitivo) permite el asentamiento de una ética que no depende directamente de Aristóteles o Kant (padres de la filosofía y moral clásica y moderna), aunque articule sus mejores intuiciones y métodos. Destacamos sobre todo la aportación de Daly al debate sobre la justicia clásica y moderna desde el nexo entre la ontología, la lingüística y la ética, donde muestra la imbricación de la teoría y praxis a través de la imagen de Némesis: una figura y un concepto prestado de la mitología griega. Némesis será clave para ofrecer una propuesta inclusiva de la visión feminista de la justicia de la representación y de la justicia del cuidado. Lo que se pretende conseguir en este trabajo es mostrar como la ética de Némesis sería el modelo de justicia en clave feminista, a partir de la narrativa de esta autora. Además, se muestra la visión del feminismo de la autora siguiendo un criterio filosofía y ética transversal propia, no fragmentada y común de las feministas. Se pretende resaltar la aportación innovadora de la autora al tratado ético feminista investigando de qué manera la estética irrumpe en la ética y por qué es tan importante para la reflexión feminista y para una recepción de la narrativa de Daly. Se muestra de qué forma Daly articula la ética y la estética en torno a la virtud de la justicia y como logra presentar la imagen de la diosa Némesis y su pertinencia para la renovación de la comprensión feminista de la justicia revisando las corrientes de esta categoría desde la ética tradicional. Se revisa también las corrientes de la ética feminista actual, en concreto la justicia de representación de Nancy Fraser, la justicia del cuidado de Carol Gilligan y el ecofeminismo, para mostrar sus afinidades y diferencias con respecto a la propuesta de Daly, situando a la autora en el contexto de la problemática y debate moderno y actual de la ética feminista valorando su aportación a la misma.Con la metodología bibliográfica se presenta con más detenimiento el aspecto ético que la autora estudia en profundidad dentro de su propio método interdisciplinar. Consideramos también que el método narrativo permite conectar la ética feminista con las éticas narrativas, es decir, mostrar cómo se plasman las historias orales y escritas o cómo se expresan por los individuos y grupos para definir su universo moral. La forma de contar historia muestra la forma de ser del que trasmite en cuanto agente moral y persona. Confiriendo a los autores y a los relatores la credibilidad epistemológica se moldean y mantienen las identidades. Entre las conclusiones más importantes, se han mostrado: o Las condiciones de posibilidad de estructurar una ética de la justicia feminista, a partir de la narrativa de Daly, en comparación con los fundamentos de la ética moderna: conectar la reflexión teológica clásica sobre la virtud de la justicia con la preocupación feminista por los nuevos lenguajes que representen las praxis liberadoras; utilizar un método ético que se basa en la ontología y semántica críticas de la justicia tradicional y con los marcos modernos de la misma. o La pertinencia del símbolo/figura y concepto Némesis para designar la orientación trasversal de la ética feminista como el cuerpo epistemológico propio, no fragmentado y común de las feministas. o El estado de cuestión con respecto a las corrientes de la ética feminista actual con atención también a los enfoques ecofeministas, para clarificar las categorías de comparación con las demás autoras, subrayar los aspectos novedosos del concepto de la justicia de Daly como Némesis con respecto, tanto a la visión clásica de la justicia, como desde el debate ético feminista actual entorno a la justicia de representación y del cuidado en el contexto de la igualdad y diferencia. o La aportación de la propuesta de Daly a las perspectivas feministas de la justicia que hacen de la ética de Daly una alternativa feminista al concepto tradicional de la justicia y proporcionan un marco global para fundamentar distintas corrientes de la ética feminista.Mary Daly presents the feminist ethics of justice based on the image of Nemesis. This paper makes an analysis of her books outlining a great progress that it implies for feminism and shows its contrasts and similarities with traditional and feminist´s ethics. Her innovation in ethics field bases on Nemesis as a model of justice that connects metaphysics and linguistics and concerns its Aristotelian roots on the contrary as the ethics of care and ethics of representation which base of modern ethics. Her philosophy presents its own epistemological body (unlike the philosophy of the genitive) and it allows the establishment of an ethics that does not depend directly on Aristotle or Kant (parents of classical and modern philosophy and morals), although it articulates their best intuitions and methods. The work aims to recover the memory of this thinker and her writings discovering her as the first woman doctor in theology in Europe and the United States, a pioneer and a writer who carries out a fruitful dialogue between philosophy and classical and feminist theology, with an innovative contribution to the ethical theory represented by Nemesis as an alternative image to the traditional virtue of justice. The aim is to highlight the author's innovative contribution to the feminist ethical treatise by investigating how aesthetics break into ethics and why it is so important for the feminist reflection and for a reception of Daly´s narrative. The objective achieved is also to show how Daly articulates ethics and aesthetics around the virtue of justice and how he manages to present the image of the goddess Nemesis and its relevance for the renewal of the feminist understanding of justice by reviewing the currents of this category from traditional ethics. Finally, we intend to review the currents of actual feminist ethics, specifically Nancy Fraser´s representation justice, Carol Gilligan´s justice of care and ecofeminism, to show their affinities and differences with respect to Daly´s proposal, situating the author in the context of the modern and current problematic and debate of feminist ethics, valuing her contribution to it. The bibliographical and interdisciplinary methodology is applied. Showing the sources of Daly`s thought and her influences and the narrative contexts, the ethical consequences of the use of the Nemesis metaphor, we will see how Daly´s ethical model is able to transform both a distorted tradition (history) and a moral content that allows liberating moral praxis.Our approach to Daly´s justice of the Nemesis is interdisciplinary and narrative. These methodology has been chosen to facilitate the understanding of the ethical principles of her work and to link the concept of Nemesis with different theoretical and practical areas: theology, ontology, semantics, politics and history, the existential, humanistic and experiential field of women, the ecological concern and utopia. Throughout the investigation we have shown: o The conditions of possibility of structuring an ethics of feminist justice, based on Daly´s narrative, in comparison with the foundations of modern ethics: connection of the classical theological reflection on the virtue of justice with a feminist concern for new languages that represent liberating praxis; use of an ethical method based on the critical ontology and semantics of traditional justice and its modern frameworks. o The relevance of the symbol/figure of Nemesis to designate the transversal orientation of feminist ethics as non-fragmented and common epistemological body of science. o The state of the question of the current feminist ethics with attention to the ecofeminist approaches, in odder to clarify the categories of comparison with the other authors, highlight the new aspects of Daly´s concept of justice as Nemesis with respect, both to the classic vision of justice, and from the current feminist ethical debate around the justice of representation and care in the context of equality and difference. o The contribution of Daly´s proposal to the feminist perspectives of justice that make Daly´s ethics a feminist alternative to the traditional concept of justice and provide a global framework to ground different currents of feminist ethics

[ES]El punto de partida de esta investigación es la metáfora judicial que ilustra y articula el texto y el programa metodológico de la Kritik der reinen Vernunft de Kant. El uso de terminología jurídica y de imágenes procesales para iluminar los nuevos conceptos introducidos por la filosofía kantiana es tanto más significativo cuanto que el mundo jurídico-procesal delinea el horizonte de autocomprensión (jurídico) filosófica del criticismo. Así, según KRV A 751-752/B 779-780 la "crítica de la razón pura" representa el establecimiento de un orden de legalidad que pone fin a la multitud de disputas propias del "estado de naturaleza" de la metafísica dogmática, a la vez que semejante orden de legalidad filosófica ha de fundarse en la "sentencia" que resulta del tratamiento procesal de todos los conflictos especulativos. Desentrañar esta metafórica judicial y su proyección sociohistórica constituye precisamente el objetivo de una interpretación jurídico-procesal de la "crítica de la razón pura". El alcance de esta interpretación depende de un planteamiento metodológico que ponga en juego las diversas dimensiones desde las que cabe abordar el lazo metafórico entre lo crítico y lo jurídico. De ahí que en la Introducción se discutan los presupuestos de hermenéutica textual que inspiran esta lectura del criticismo: la metaforología (H. Blumenberg) como disciplina auxiliar de la historia de la filosofía, que sirve aquí a la elucidación pragmática de la propuesta de una "crítica de la razón pura" desde el contexto de la historia y filosofía del derecho ilustradas; la historia social implicada en la historia del concepto (R. Koselleck), y que se caracteriza en este caso por la politización de la Ilustración tardía; y finalmente la política de la verdad (M. Foucault) como desvelamiento de las prácticas sociales y, concretamente, de las prácticas judiciales que están en el trasfondo de las formas de conciencia y de subjetividad. En consonancia con estos principios de hermenéutica textual la lectura jurídico-procesal del criticismo se afronta desenvolviendo los distintos niveles de desarrollo de la metáfora judicial. No obstante, y sin omitir los enfoques "estructural" y "sistemático", en los que hasta ahora se ha centrado la tradición historiográfica sobre el tema, pero siempre entretejido con ellos, es el objetivo prioritario de este trabajo el despliegue del enfoque sociohistórico, desmontando el discurso filosófico de la metáfora desde la historia del derecho, especialmente en la Prusia de Federico II, para calibrar la conexión o distancia entre la reforma kantiana del pensamiento metafísico y la reforma prusiana de la legislación civil y procesal. De ahí que la pregunta que cual hilo conductor preside toda la investigación, pueda formularse así: ¿hasta qué punto la reforma legislativa y procesal prusiana de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII podía ser la justa contrapartida desde la que se iluminase el proyecto crítico de la reforma de la metafísica? Guiado por esta cuestión, el trabajo se divide en dos partes, la primera de las cuales trata de despejar los supuestos históricos y filosóficos generales que sustentan la metáfora judicial del criticismo en toda su densidad y plenitud significativa; la segunda parte, en cambio, examina directamente el texto kantiano de la Antitética cosmológica como escenario por antonomasia de un proceso civil en el que se resuelve un conflicto, pero al mismo tiempo se legitima y funda un tribunal. Por lo que a la Primera Parte se refiere, el esclarecimiento sociohistórico de la crítica de la razón desde la historia y filosofía del derecho características de la época federiciana tiene en cuenta la teoría, legislación y praxis jurídicas del momento. 1) El iusnaturalismo de la escuela wolffiana (racionalismo) y tardowolffiana (empirismo histórico) era la teoría dominante en los círculos universitarios y en la burocracia estatal. El cap. 1 analiza por ello los focos de convergencia y sobre todo de alejamiento entre el criticismo jurídico y la tradición iusnaturalista wolffiana al hilo de la correspondencia entre Kant y E.F. Klein. Asimismo, el cap. 2 expone la formación de la filosofía crítica del derecho como un progresivo abandono del iusnaturalismo wolffiano y de su concepción eudemonista del Estado del bienestar, basándose en la polémica de Kant con el Ius naturae (1763) de G.Achenwall desde la segunda mitad de los años sesenta. 2) La codificación fue la empresa legislativa que dio lugar al Derecho Territorial Prusiano de 1794 (Allgemeines Landrecht), un código que acabó siendo la plasmación jurídico-positiva de aquel iusnaturalismo wolffiano, que sancionaba la sociedad estamental y el absolutismo político. Buena parte del cap. 1 y en especial el primer apartado del capítulo sexto están consagrados a este asunto. 3) La reforma procesal, llevada a cabo especialmente en la década de los ochenta con la Orden Procesal de 1781 y la definitiva Allgemeine erichtsordnung de 1793-1796 (de ella se ocupa el cap. 3b y parte del cap.4), se presentaba como un programa de liquidación o superación de la praxis jurídica vigente, determinada ante todo por el derecho romano-canónico y la complejidad formal del así denominado "proceso común". La Segunda Parte, que lleva por título "Legislación y juicio de un tribunal", pretende poner de relieve los dos aspectos jurídicos de la Antinomia pero también su indisoluble unidad. Se trata de concebir el relato cosmológico como obra de legislación y a la vez como procedimiento de resolución judicial de la desavenencia de la razón pura consigo misma. Para esclarecer la conexión de ambas funciones, se contempla, por un lado, el conflicto antinómico como el camino de descubrimiento del "idealismo trascendental" (cap. 5) y, por otro lado, se interpreta en función de dos usos jurídicos de la época: la Gesetzkommission creada en 1781 por Federico II para resolver cuestiones jurídicas dudosas o polémicas planteadas por casos concretos de la praxis judicial, y el acto de conciliación o Güteversuch, tan encarecido por los reformadores prusianos. Según la primera, la Antitética aparece como el escenario de un ius controversum, cuya resolución en un proceso reflexivo de interpretación judicial conduce al orden de legalidad (nomothetica rationis humanae) que legitima las pretensiones opuestas sobre el "mundo sensible" (cap. 6). Conforme al segundo, el valor legislativo de la antinomia (en cuanto fuente de la "nomotética") viene allanado por la representación procesal del conflicto cosmológico como una especie de arreglo amistoso entre las partes contendientes, que hace posible instituir un "estado civil", un orden legal en la filosofía (cap.7). ; [EN]This work offers a juridical-procedural interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason based on the judicial metaphor that inspired it and which remits philosophical discourse to the scene of jurisprudence and situates the course of development of metaphysics within the historical horizon of society's juridical-political development. Using a methodology of textual hermeneutics bsed on the articulation of Hans Blumenberg's "metaphorology", the "social history" implied in R. Koselleck's "history of the concept" and M. Foucault's "politics of Truth", this work aims at interpreting the philosophical text of the judicial metaphor of the critique from the perspective of the history of eighteenth century Prussian law. The exposition consists of two parts: Part I attempts to show the general historical and philosophical assumptions that sustain the judicial metaphor of the critique of pure reason, while Part II analyzes the cosmological Antithetique as the locus par excellence of a civil lawsuit that settles speculative litigation at the same time that it establishes the tribunal of the critique. Among these general assumptions are the jus naturalis rationalism of the Wolffian school as the dominant juridical theory at the time of Frederick II, and particularly in the bureaucratic atmosphere of the legislators C. G. Svarez and E.F. Klein, from whose eudaemonist concept of the state Kant distanced himself critically; the codification of Prussian territorial law (Allgemeines Landrecht, 1794) which sanctioned a stratified society and political absolutism from Wolffian jus naturalist doctrines; and finally, the procedural reform that led to the Allgemeine Gerichstordung of 1793-1796, the aim of which was to put an end to the complicated formalism of "common procedure". The procedural analysis of the cosmological Antithetique tends to show the indisoluble unity between the "legislation" of pure reason (nomothetica) and the "procedure" of judicial resolution of the transcendental disagreement in the Kantian Antinomy, based on two juridical uses of that time: the "Law Commision", created to decide in doubtful or polemical cases of judicial praxis and the "act of conciliation" between the contending parties before or even during the institution of proceedings.

Abstract In this thesis I tackle the question of what the normative logic of political realism is. Thus, I have two goals to accomplish. First, and foremost, I want to offer an account of what it means to be a political realist. Secondly, I want to inquire why one should be a political realist. As, for the first question, what are the defining features of a realistic political philosopher? Given that realists tend to defend a variety of positions and that they are not often systematic in their arguments, this question is not as simple as it might seem. Thus, in the first three methodological chapters I develop a possible systematic account for political realism. While I am evidently sympathetic with the tradition of political realism, my aim here is merely reconstructive. However, such rational reconstruction aims to fix a significant flaw in this tradition: a lack of clarity and structure. In the first chapter, I argue that realists rely on a specific account of reality, in the second that from this account they derive a particular view of possibility and necessity and in the third one that the most important necessities in politics are the recurrence of conflicts and the need for order. My aim here is to provide a rational reconstruction of political realism by outlining a possible consistent interpretation of its basic commitments. More specifically, Chapter 1 focuses on the notion of reality adopted by political realists. I open the chapter by introducing a preliminary discussion of the commitments a realistic political philosophy seems bound to subscribe. I then argue that a metaphysical view matching these commitments is one that links reality with causality. This view, which I call 'effectual realism', is partially drawn from Alexander's dictum and the 'ad lapidem' argument in metaphysics, and claims that something is real if and only if it causally interacts with the world in some way. I close this chapter by observing that this view of reality is a form of metaphysical realism, because it satisfies three conditions: reality is knowable, independent from desires and independent from beliefs. These conditions, I conclude, fit very well with the idea common throughout the literature of political realism, that reality is something that resists our actions. From this causal account of reality, Chapter 2 draws a causal account of possibility and necessity. While political idealists focus on conceivability or compatibility with the world as criteria for possibility, a more realistic criterion would be one that links possibility and causality. I call this relation of realistic possibility 'trackability': a state of affairs is trackable if and only if there is some causal chain to move there from the actual world. I debate the implications of this view, and conclude that it allows to account for the contextual importance of the starting point, the inclination to prudence, and the focus on action. From this conception, I can derive a symmetric notion of necessity, whereby something is necessary, if there is no causal chain to avoid it. By the same argument, something is impossible, if no causal chain allows us to realize it. These two arguments can be neatly derived from effectual realism and the additional assumption that we are not omnipotent. Given that reality is independent from our beliefs and desires, and assuming that our power is limited, some states of affairs will lay beyond our ability to change. Among these necessary states of affairs, I argue in Chapter 3 that there are two, which are particularly relevant in the political sphere: the inevitability of conflict and the need for order. Conflicts, in my definition, emerge among actors with different views when one wants to impose his will against the resistance of others. Given that there is no causal chain to consistently avoid neither the different views nor the will to prevail, conflict appears a necessary feature in the sense specified in the previous chapter. The second necessary element is the need for order. As men need to feed, whether or not they want to, so they need a cooperative order, whether or not they want to. This is a weaker necessity compared to that of conflict, because it holds only conditionally. While conflicts are always inevitable and therefore necessary, order is necessary only provided that we want to survive. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that these two necessities of politics can be used as a criterion to determine whether a political theory is realistic or not. Clearly not every political realist would recognize himself in this reconstruction. 'Isms' are always more discordant than their adversaries believe them to be, and political realists are particularly diverse in their reflections. Thus, any unified account is likely to leave some disagreeing. This is inevitable, and thus one cannot realistically be blamed for it. Nevertheless, I think it is important to try to develop a consistent positive view of political realism. To summarize, in the first three chapters I defended the following conception of political realism: 1. Realism  Reality 2. Reality  Possibility and Necessity 3. Political Necessity  Conflict and Order Being realist means, in this view, paying attention to reality. Paying attention to reality means identifying accurately what is possible and what is necessary. Thus, being realist means that we should acknowledge that conflict and order are the two cardinal necessities of politics. The fourth and last chapter is intended to tackle the question of why one ought to be a realist and, thus, to turn the results of the first three chapters from reconstructive into normative claims. Political realism, I argue here, offers a set of hypothetical imperatives based on the conditional assumption that one wants to realize one's own preferences. This, I maintain, provides the driving force behind normative political realism. In fact, if it is true that one wants to realize one's own preferences, then, contrary to idealism, one ought not to choose between end-states, but among courses of action. I suggest that a more realistic account of rationality is one that tempers the value of a desired state of affairs with the costs or benefits of the best available means to reach it, their likelihood of success, and the unintended consequences of one's action. If this is how a realistically rational deliberation works, than the distinctive features of political realism I reconstructed in the first three chapters are shown to have an important normative force, as they are revealed to be the path realists point at in order for political actors to realize their preferences. In short, if you want to realize your preferences, you ought to be a realist. Differently from what I do in the previous chapters, here I try to put forward a justificatory argument for political realism. Notwithstanding this difference between the first three chapters and the last one, they all combine to provide a possible answer to my research question. If we put together the first three chapters with the conditional assumption that you want to realize your preferences, we get the following hypothetical imperatives: 1) You ought to be rational, and for realists this means that when you deliberate what is best you should not limit yourself to consider the value or disvalue of the ideal that you want to realize. Along with this, you ought to ponder the costs of the best means available to you, their likelihood of success, and the cost of their consequences. 2) You ought to acknowledge reality. This means that any descriptive theory of the world is normative for the agent, insofar as it sets the background conditions of his action. Reality determines the means he has at his disposal, his likelihood of success in reaching what he desires, and the consequences of his action. It thus gives him reasons to do something instead of something else. 3) You ought to pinpoint possibilities and necessities accurately. Reality sets the conditions of what is possible and what is necessary. Necessary states of affairs are of paramount importance for action, and political realism rightly emphasizes them. A necessary state of affairs is a state of affairs whose avoidance is impossible and thus any desire that requires that this be abandoned is unrealistic. This does not mean that there is nothing we can do in such cases. Rather, realists claim that necessities give us reasons to contain their negative consequences instead than eliminate them at their root, and to reallocate our efforts in alternative goals which can actually be reached. 4) You ought to acknowledge that the recurrence of conflicts and the need for order are necessary features of the political sphere. This is the substantive and defining claim of political realism. Any desire that requires one to be done with conflict or the need for order is unrealistic, whatever one wants. Moreover, any political theory that pays insufficient attention to this fact is bound to be of inadequate guidance in political matters. Any actor who does not satisfy these requirements risks being irrational insofar as he would be self-undermines his own preferences, whatever they are. Thus, we end up with the following claims: 0. If you want to realize your preferences, then you ought to: 1. Evaluate courses of action instead of states of affairs 2. Pay attention to reality 3. Individuate its possibilities and necessities 4. In politics, consider specifically the inevitability of conflict and the need for order In synthesis, political realism as an affirmative, analytical, normative theory would be, in my opinion, committed to these claims.

Curriculum material is generally considered the subject matter of information, talents, dispositions, understandings, and principles that make up research programs in the field. At a more complex level, the curricula need to contain historical and socio-political strengths, traditions, cultural views, and goals with wide differences in sovereignty, adaptation, and local understanding that encompass a diversity of cultures, laws, metaphysics, and political discourse This study aims to develop a curriculum with local content as a new approach in early childhood science learning. The Local Content Curriculum (LCC) is compiled and developed to preserve the uniqueness of local culture, natural environment, and community crafts for early childhood teachers so that they can introduce local content to early childhood. Research and model development combines the design of the Dick-Carey and Dabbagh models with qualitative and quantitative descriptive analysis. 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In the last year or so there have been two books published on Althusser and Spinoza. Juan Domingo Sánchez Estop's Althusser et Spinoza: Detours et Retours and now Jean Matthys Althusser lecteur de Spinoza: Genèse et enjeux d'une éthico-politique de la théorie. This is perhaps not surprising, after all Althusser confessed to being a Spinozist famously in 1972, but I would argue that there are still some surprises to be found in terms of this combination. First, and most fundamentally, it is surprising to see two full length studies on Althusser and Spinoza since as much as the name and concepts of Spinoza played fundamental or pivotal roles in Althusser's thought, underlying his own concepts of structural, or immanent, causality, symptomatic reading, and ideology, Althusser wrote very little on Spinoza. I have often thought that the Althusser Spinoza connection exists more in its effects, in what it made possible in the writing of  Macherey and Balibar, to name just two proximate effects, rather than in Althusser's thought. Estop and Matthys both contest such an interpretation, arguing for a Spinozism that is more immanent and more consistent in Althusser's works than the few times he is mentioned by name. That is not the only surprise. As I mentioned in my review of Estop's book, it is perhaps surprising that Althusser once stated in an interview that "the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is the Capital of Spinoza, because Spinoza is preoccupied above all with history and politics." One would think that Althusser, who drew from the Ethics in terms of his theory of ideology and immanent causality, would focus more on the Ethics and Capital, two works that are systematic and complete. However, Althusser's invocation of the TTP suggests that it is less Spinoza's system than his particular intervention in a specific conjuncture that matters. To this point Matthys adds another somewhat surprising, even paradoxical consideration, that Spinoza is less a foundation of Althusser's thought than the critical destruction of any such foundation. As Matthys writes, "With respect to Althusser the principle political virtue of spinozism is found paradoxically in its radical critique of any foundation, of any purity of knowledge, and of any originary and transcendental position which supposed to guarantee political action in its course, its end and means, and to reassure its subjects of a form of self-identity in action, supported by an instance of definitive and overwhelming truth. The paradox is doubled in that, if is precisely in not founding, in not delimiting a priori a philosophical guarantee of a true politics that spinozism can produce its properly political effects, it only seems to be able to free political practice from its imaginary guarantees by investing in the most literally "dogmatic" position in the kampflatz which is the fortress of metaphysics."For Althusser Spinoza is a question of theory of its conditions and limits. Matthys argues that this not only makes it possible to read a trajectory through Althusser's thought in which the question of theoretical practice is central, but it also distinguishes Althusser from the two primary orientations to Spinoza today, a rationalist and structuralist orientation in Lordon and a vitalist and ontological orientation that can be found in Deleuze and Negri. Althusser (and to some extent Macherey and Balibar) would represent a third orientation. It might be easy to call this orientation epistemological, since it would seem to be primarily concerned with knowledge, and the division between ideology and science, but I think that misses the way in which the question of knowledge is thoroughly implicated with that of practice in the works of Althusser. Matthys uses the phrase the "ethico-political of theory" to express this third orientation. With respect to the former, the trajectory of Althusser's thought, the formulation "without origin or end" is familiar to any reader of Althusser, and he made this idea central to his understanding of not only Marx's idea of history, as a process without origin or end, but his understanding of philosophy. Origin and end remained for Althusser fundamentally theological questions taken up by philosophy, but fundamentally alien to it. As Althusser writes in Philosophy for Nonphilosophers, "Philosophy inherited this question of questions, the question of the Origin of the World, which is the question of the World, humanity and God." This is a latter text, written in the late sixties and early seventies, but published posthumously. Matthys demonstrates that the question of the origin can be found at the origin of Althusser's thought, from his early text on Hegel onward. Althusser is not so much searching for an origin, a foundation, in the sense of an archimedean point, but trying to think without origin and guarantee. Spinoza in some sense resolves the question of origin by splitting it into two. We begin at once with imagination, with our immediate knowledge, which is necessarily distorted and inadequate. This immediate knowledge is necessary ideological. However, as Matthys argues, the illusions of ideology are also allusions, they always allude to the very social conditions that they conceal and efface, which is to say that there is the condition of knowledge in our misrecognition. Or as Spinoza puts it, habemus enim ideam veram, we have a true idea. For Althusser this true idea is tied to practice, which is to say that truth must be produced from ideological conditions. We are always at once in our imaginary and ideological apprehension of the world and in our practical engagement with it. The question of knowledge is how to turn the latter against the former, to locate the orientation of a practical dimension in ideology. As Spinoza describes such a production in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, "But just as men, in the beginning, were able to make the easiest things with the tools they were born with (however laboriously and imperfectly), and once these had been made, made other, more difficult things with less labor and more perfectly, and so, proceeding gradually from the simplest works to tools, and from tools to other works and tools, reached the point where they accomplished so many and so difficult things with little labor, in the same way the intellect, by its inborn power, makes intellectual tools for itself, by which it acquires other powers ... until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom." (This is a passage that is essential to Macherey's reading, I also write about it here)This probably won't be the cover but speaking of Spinozaand tools, Spinoza and Marx. I thought I would throw in a plug for my forthcoming book. As Matthys argues this idea of knowledge as a kind of production is what connects Marx and Spinoza. As Matthys writes, "That to read, to know, is always to produce: this is the first lesson that Althusser retains from Spinoza, projecting it to Marx and applying it to his own reading of Marx." Althusser's "symptomatic reading" is situated in between the theory of reading put forward by Spinoza in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Marx's practice of reading political economy. Matthys juxtaposes this practice of producing knowledge, a practice that always begins with its specific and determined position, with ideology that begins with the subject. Reading, the production of knowledge, what Althusser calls science, is infinitely productive, capable of new knowledge because it begins from its finite position; in contrast to this ideology is infinitely repetitive and limited because it believes that it can immediately grasp everything. Two things are most striking about Matthys book. First, even though it is exhaustive in its survey of Althusser's writing, begin with the thesis on Hegel from 1947, it is unapologetically a book about what could be considered "peak" Althusser, the period between 1965-1972 when the concepts of symptomatic reading, structural causality, theoretical practice, and ideological interpellation where developed. This is the period in which Althusser is most influenced by Spinoza, thinking through in his own way, the Spinoza/Marx conjunction. This is also the period that came under the most criticism, as ahistorical, functionalist, determinist, etc., or, in terms of Althusser's own self-criticism, as theoreticist. Theoreticism as Althusser defined is reducing all  of the demarcations between Marxism and political economy, as well as between Marx and the young Marx to a distinction between "truth and error," overlooking the social, historical, and political dimensions of Marx's transformation. This brings us to the second aspect of Matthys book, Matthys argues that what Althusser dismissed as too rational and theoretical has, at its core, a hidden ethico-political dimension. This is perhaps surprising. What does the critic of humanism have to say about ethics, that human, all too human of disciplines. Althusser's interest in Spinoza never seemed to touch on the title of his most important book. As André Tosel argued in his Du Matérialisme de Spinoza, "the Althusser of Spinoza has lost all ethico-political dimensions." It is hard to see immediately what the ethical dimension to Althusser's theoretical interventions are, and it is hard not to agree with Tosel. Tosel proves to be quite important to the final section of the book, however, not in terms of his criticism but in terms of important points of overlap between Althusser and Tosel. (Matthys is also the also the author of a great series of essays on Tosel). In some sense it is Tosel who provides the concepts to make sense of the ethical dimension of Althusser's theoretical interventions. As I have argued, here, and elsewhere, Tosel argues for a "finite communism," that is in sharp contrast to capital's dreams of endless accumulation as well as Marxist ideas of a thoroughly rational mastery of the productive forces.  Matthys argues that Althusser can be understood as a thinker of finitude. That the very idea of theoretical practice was to think the limited efficacy of theory as practice, to situate  it within other practices. As Matthys writes, "Practice in the Althusserian sense would be from this point of view analogous to the Spinozist mode, in the sense that it cannot be conceived by itself, but it can only exist, produce effect and be known in that it is articulated differently with different instances of the field." Finitude is understood here not as some particular relation to death, an all too human definition, but to be finite is to exist in and through relations with other finite things. Similarly, Althusser's famous statement about the lonely hour of the last instance is a statement about the finitude of Marxism as a theory. It will always be necessary to think the causality of the structure through its effects, to recognize the overdetermination of any essence or any essential contradiction. As Matthys writes,"Thinker of the limit, certainly, but if one prefers: a thinker of finitude. Because if Althusser tries to think the limit between marxism and its outside, between science and ideology, between materialism and idealism, it means that this line of demarcation necessarily through the heart of Marxism itself." Althusser's demarcations are not divisions accomplished once and for all, as in the epistemic break, but are produced again and again, and that finitude, that incomplete status, is precisely what makes them productive, creating new knowledge. I feel like I could go on and on about this book, but blogposts are definitely finite and limited in what they can do, so it seems necessary to conclude. The merits of Matthys book are multiple. To begin with the last, Matthys puts two of the most important Marxist philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century, Althusser and Tosel, in dialogue, using one to expand the insights of the other. Second, it is a thorough study of the "Spinoza effect" in Althusser's thought, how much Althusser was transformed by his engagement with Spinoza. Spinoza cannot be reduced to the few citations in Lire le Capital and Elements of Self-Criticism, but is immanent in its effects throughout Althusser. Matthys, like Estop referred to above, as well as Morfino, Montag, Sharp, Stolze, etc. recognizes that Althusser is as much a Spinozist as a Marxist. Thus, all of Althusser's deviations of the sixties, deviations labelled "theoreticism," "structuralism," "functionalism," have to be understood as not just fidelity to Marx and Spinoza, but ultimately as conditions for new theoretical production. 

Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Editoriale Performative Thinking in Humanities Un Quaderno periodico Editoriale in cui si spiega che il Quaderno Think Tank PTH – Performative Thinking in Humanities diventerà una pubblicazione annuale dedicata alla disseminazione dei saperi filosofici e umanistici attraverso le arti audiovisive e musicali. Filosofia, Musica, Teatro, Impegno, Politica Fabrizio Masucci Museo Cappella Sansevero fabriziomasucci@museosansevero.it Un melologo filosofico per Raimondo di Sangro principe di Sansevero Prefazione del Presidente del Museo Cappella Sansevero al libretto e alla partitura del melologo. Velo, Cristo velato, Museo Cappella Sansevero, Teatro della Filosofia, Disseminazione Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Il pensiero velato Una meditazione notturna del principe di Sansevero melologo in quattro quadri per voce recitante, voci registrate e percussioni libretto Basato sulle opere di Raimondo di Sangro e su altri testi dell'epoca concepiti nella cerchia dei cosiddetti Liberi pensatori, il libretto mette a fuoco la personalità del principe di Sansevero nel momento in cui scrive la Supplica (1753) da inviare a Benedetto XIV per chiedergli di derubricare la sua Lettera apologetica (1751) dall'Index librorum prohibitorum. Raimondo di Sangro viene presentato come un ostinato difensore della libertà di pensiero e della tolleranza. Il suo interesse per il sistema di segni del popolo peruviano (quipu) denuncia in lui un'attenzione per la scrittura, intesa come l'unico strumento concesso all'uomo per lasciare traccia di sé e guadagnare quindi una immortalità (non personale) nella fama. Pensiero critico, Tolleranza, Censura, Scrittura, Sperimentazione Rosalba Quindici Hochschule der Künste Bern rosalbaquindici@yahoo.it Il pensiero velato Una meditazione notturna del principe di Sansevero melologo in quattro quadri per voce recitante, voci registrate e percussioni score Partitura musicale del melologo. Musica contemporanea, Ricerca timbrica, Percussioni, Scrittura, Sperimentazione Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Pandemia 2020 / scena deserta Breve storia di un progetto nato e mutato dall'emergenza sanitaria Il breve saggio racconta le fasi di lavorazione necessarie a produrre il video Pandemia 2020 / scena deserta, che evoca il tema dei teatri chiusi per la l'epidemia di Covid-19 ed è dedicato ad attori e musicisti in difficoltà perché rimasti senza lavoro. L'esplodere dell'emergenza sanitaria ha costretto i partecipanti a modificare il progetto mentre era in corso di svolgimento. Teatro, Video, Scenografia, Musica, Sceneggiatura Nera Prota Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli nera.prota@yahoo.com Pensare con le mani nell'era digitale Manualità tra Information Technologies (IT) e creatività umana Nelle Accademie di Belle Arti, sempre più spesso l'information technology è proposta come un sostituto o un surrogato dello sviluppo individuale della manualità. Coloro i quali, per qualsiasi motivo, si sentono a disagio nell'usare la loro manualità, possono trovare un'apparente via di uscita nell'uso dei software. Tuttavia, questo trend rinforza la perdita di manualità impedendo alle persone di costruire un loro personale linguaggio artistico. L'aiuto delle macchine nella produzione artistica incontra un'esigenza di mercato, consolidando l'idea fittizia che la creatività umana possa essere espressa attraverso processi standardizzati. Certamente, ciò è funzionale all'interesse del mercato. Per esempio, uno dei software più usati in ambito artistico progettuale è il CAD (Computer-aided design). Il nome del software immediatamente svela la relazione asimmetrica con l'utente. In molti casi, software come il CAD possono interagire direttamente con altre macchine complesse (ossia macchine a controllo numerico) per intraprendere attività di larga scala ed estrema precisione. In questo saggio, l'autrice ricerca il confine tra la produzione industriale e la creatività umana in ambito artistico, sfatando in questo modo alcune ambiguità sul ruolo che la tecnologia ricopre nella società. Design, Virtuale, Arte, Tecnologia, Didattica Benedetta Tramontano Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli bene_98@hotmail.it Ricerca stilistica e scelte personali Tecla: un'evocazione visuale in tre bozzetti di una città invisibile di Italo Calvino Nel contributo si descrivono le modalità seguite nel dare una raffigurazione fantastica – dunque soggettivo-prospettica – di una delle città invisibili di Italo Calvino: Tecla, la metropoli-cantiere. L'Autrice ha deliberatamente scelto il disegno e la colorazione a mano libera, rifiutandosi di utilizzare software di disegno digitale. Acquerello, china, bozzetto, colore, disegno digitale Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.it Giancarlo Turaccio Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Salerno "Antonio Martucci" giancarlo.turaccio@gmail.com Un ascolto iniziatico Conversazione tra un filosofo e un compositore sulla musica acusmatica Un ricercatore di filosofia e un docente di composizione dialogano sulla musica acusmatica, ossia quella proposta (anche in concerto) in assenza della sua fonte sonora. La discussione ricostruisce brevemente la storia del concetto e mette in evidenza l'importanza dell'ascolto "puro", fondato sulla relazione diretta fra l'orecchio e l'oggetto sonoro. Pitagorici, Pierre Schaeffer, Walter Benjamin, Oggetto sonoro, Spazializzazione del suono Gianvincenzo Cresta Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Avellino "Domenico Cimarosa" gianvincenzo.cresta@conservatoriocimarosa.org Ricordo di Bruno Maderna (1920-1973) a cento anni dalla nascita Del canto immobile Qualche riflessione su Per Caterina di Bruno Maderna per violino e pianoforte Spesso nell'indagine storico analitica su un compositore si cerca una sintesi e ci si focalizza su alcune opere ritenendole maggiormente rappresentative. È una via possibile che però delimita l'identità del compositore, piegandolo a una narrazione semplificata, mentre invece il cammino creativo di un artista è un complesso caleidoscopio. Per Caterina di Bruno Maderna è un breve brano per violino e pianoforte composto nel 1963, il cui esito, pur ponendosi in rottura rispetto ad altre sue opere e agli stilemi stilistici degli anni '50 e '60, si colloca con naturalezza nell'arco creativo dell'autore. È un brano emblematico del suo modo di vivere la musica come fenomeno unitario, senza steccati stilistici e categorizzazioni. La retorica è per Maderna un mezzo e non un'estetica e la musica un'esperienza complessa che mescola al sonoro il percettivo, il motorio e l'emozionale. Afferma Maderna: «la musica non può essere che un fatto espressivo, un suono suscita reazioni e i suoni non sono che mezzi». Identità, Canto, Antico, Modernità, Libertà Tommaso Rossi Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Benevento "Nicola Sala" info@tommasorossi.it Una grande Aulodìa Flauto e oboe nella "melodia arcaica" di Bruno Maderna Nella variegata e copiosa produzione musicale di Bruno Maderna la scelta di dedicare una particolare attenzione al flauto e all'oboe – i due più acuti rappresentanti della famiglia dei "legni" – sembra andare oltre il pur comprensibile interesse del compositore per l'indagine timbrica di due affascinanti strumenti, ma è legato a ragioni più profonde, che risiedono in aspetti fondanti della poetica musicale del compositore. Il flauto e l'oboe sono "gli" strumenti della mitologia classica, e il loro suono particolare rimanda immediatamente alla Grecia antica, alla civiltà che il popolo greco ha creato e al culto della bellezza che ne è scaturito, influenzando il corso della storia dell'Occidente. Maderna guarda, attraverso il suono di questi strumenti, a questo mondo – oggi perduto – con il preciso desiderio di riproporre utopicamente, in una modernità segnata dalla violenza delle macchine e nel contesto di una società disumanizzata, un ideale superiore ma irraggiungibile di armonia. Attraverso l'analisi di molti dei lavori scritti da Maderna, che hanno per protagonisti il flauto e l'oboe, l'autore ricostruisce alcuni aspetti dell'estetica maderniana. Hyperion, Musica su due dimensioni, Grande Aulodia, Don Perlimplìn, Terzo concerto per oboe Rossella Gaglione Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II rossellagaglione@hotmail.com Discorsi tra Eco e Narciso A proposito di un recente libro di Dario Giugliano Che rapporto c'è tra ίδιοςe κοινός? E come possono la filosofia (nello specifico la metafisica) e la letteratura coniugare questi due termini? Quanto è difficile, e allo stesso tempo necessario, comunicare con l'Altro, cioè trasferire la propria voce singolare all'interno del sistema segnico condiviso affinché possa essere compresa? Che cos'è l'esperienza? Cosa si intende per idiotismo? Com'è possibile leggere il mito di Eco e Narciso? Questi e altri interrogativi sono alla base del testo di Giugliano che – grazie anche al confronto con vari pensatori (tra cui Platone, Novalis e Nietzsche) – offre numerosi e interessanti spunti di riflessione. Idiotismo, comunicazione, esperienza, Filosofia, linguaggio ; Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Editorial Performative Thinking in Humanities A Periodical Book Editorial explaining that the Book Think Tank PTH – Performing Thinking in Humanities will become an annual publication dedicated to the dissemination of philosophical and humanistic knowledge through the visual and musical arts. Philosophy, Music, Theater, Commitment, Politics Fabrizio Masucci Museo Cappella Sansevero fabriziomasucci@museosansevero.it A Philosophical Melologue for Raimondo di Sangro principe di Sansevero Preface by the President of the Sansevero Chapel Museum to the libretto and score of the melologue. Veil, Veiled Christ, Sansevero Chapel Museum, Philosophy Theater, Dissemination Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com The Veiled Thought A Nocturnal Meditation by the Prince of Sansevero melologue in four scenes for narrating voice, recorded voices and percussion libretto Based on the works of Raimondo di Sangro and on other texts of the circle of the Free Thinkers, the libretto focuses on the personality of the Prince of Sansevero when he writes the Supplica (1753) for Benedict XIV. In it he ask him to delete his Lettera apologetica (1751) from the Index librorum prohibitorum. Raimondo di Sangro is presented as an obstinate defender of freedom of free thought and tolerance. His interest in the system of signs of the Peruvian people (quipu) denounces in him an attention to writing, which – understood as a trace of an existence – can guarantee immortality in fame. Critical Thinking, Tolerance, Censorship, Writing, Experimentation Rosalba Quindici Hochschule der Künste Bern rosalbaquindici@yahoo.it The Veiled Thought A Nocturnal Meditation by the Prince of Sansevero melologue in four scenes for narrating voice, recorded voices and percussion partitura musicale Score of the melologue. Contemporary music, Timbric Research, Percussion, Writing, Experimentation Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.com Pandemic 2020 / Deserted Scene A Brief History of a Project that the Pandemic has changed The short essay describes the processing steps to produce the video Pandemic 2020 / deserted scene, which evokes the theme of closed theaters because of the Covid-19 epidemic and is dedicated to actors and musicians in difficulty, because without work. The explosion of the health emergency forced the participants to modify the project while it was in progress. Theater, Video, Scenography, Music, Screenplay Nera Prota Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli nera.prota@yahoo.com Thinking with Hands in the Digital Age Crafting Art Amidst Information Technology (IT) and Human Creativity In Art Academies, IT is increasingly proposed as a substitute or a surrogate to developing individual crafting abilities. Those that, for any reasons, feel uncomfortable using their hands can easily find in computer applications an apparent way-out. However, this trend reinforces hands disability preventing individuals to build their own personal artistic language. Machine support in art crafting meets a growing market demand ushering in the fictitious idea that human creativity can be achieved through standardized processes. This is of course functional to market interests. For example, one of the most popular software is used in art design is CAD (Computer-Aided Design). The name itself highlights the asymmetric relation with the user. In many cases software like CAD can directly interact with other complex machines (i.e., numeric control machines) to undertake large-scale, precision tasks. In this essay, the Author will search the boundary between industrial production and human creativity, thus debunking some ambiguity about the role of technology in society. Design, Virtual, Art, Technology, Didactics Benedetta Tramontano Accademia di Belle Arti di Napoli bene_98@hotmail.it Stylistic Research and Personal Choices Tecla: A Visual Evocation in Three Sketches of an Invisible City by Italo Calvino The contribution describes the methods followed in giving a fantastic – therefore subjective-perspective – representation of one of Italo Calvino's invisible cities: Tecla, the building site-city. The Author has deliberately chosen freehand drawing and coloring, refusing to use digital drawing software. Watercolor, Ink, Sketch, Color, Digital Drawing Rosario Diana Istituto per la Storia del Pensiero Filosofico e Scientifico Moderno Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (ISPF-CNR) rosariodiana61@gmail.it Giancarlo Turaccio Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Salerno "Antonio Martucci" giancarlo.turaccio@gmail.com An Initiatory Listening Conversation between a Philosopher and a Composer about Acousmatic Music A philosophy researcher and a professor of composition talk about acousmatic music, which is proposed (even live) in the absence of her sound source. The discussion briefly reconstructs the history of the concept and highlights the importance of "pure" listening, which is based on the direct relationship between the ear and the sound object. Pythagoreans, Pierre Schaeffer, Walter Benjamin, Sound Object, Spatialization of Sound Gianvincenzo Cresta Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Avellino "Domenico Cimarosa" gianvincenzo.cresta@conservatoriocimarosa.org Memory of Bruno Maderna (1920-1973) One Hundred Years After his Birth On Steady Song Some Reflections on Per Caterina by Bruno Maderna for Violin and Piano In the analytic historical survey of a composer we usually look for a synthesis and we focus on some works that are considered more representative. It is a possible way but that can restrict the identity of the composer, bending it to a simplified narrative whereas the creative journey of an artist is a complex kaleidoscope. Per Caterina by Bruno Maderna is a short piece for violin and piano composed in 1963, and despite being in contrast with his other works and stylistic styles of the '50s and '60s, it is naturally placed in the creative arc of the author. It is an emblematic piece of his way of experiencing music as a unitary event, without stylistic fences and categorizations. Rhetoric is for Maderna a means and not an aesthetic and music is a complex experience that mixes sound with the perception, the motor and the emotional. Maderna says: «Music can only be an expressive fact, a sound that elicits reactions and sounds are only a means». Identity, Song, Ancient, Modernity, Freedom Tommaso Rossi Conservatorio Statale di Musica di Benevento "Nicola Sala" info@tommasorossi.it Una grande Aulodìa The Flute and the Oboe in Bruno Maderna's "Arcaic Melody" In Bruno Maderna's varied and copious musical production, the choice to devote particular attention to the flute and the oboe – the two highest pitched members of the "woodwind" family – seems to go beyond the composer's understandable interest in the timbre investigation of two fascinating instruments, but it is linked to deeper reasons, which reside in fundamental aspects of the composer's musical poetics. The flute and the oboe are "the" instruments of classical mythology. Their particular sound immediately recalls ancient Greece, the civilization that the Greeks founded, with its inherent cult of beauty, which influenced the whole history of Western civilization. Through the sound of these instruments, Maderna looks at this world – now lost ­­– with the precise desire to re-propose utopically–in a modernity marked by the violence of machines and in the context of a dehumanized society–a superior but unattainable ideal of harmony. Through the analysis of many of his works, which feature the flute and the oboe, the author reconstructs some aspects of Maderna's aesthetics. Hyperion, Musica su due dimensioni, Grande Aulodia, Don Perlimplìn, Terzo concerto per oboe Rossella Gaglione Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II rossellagaglione@hotmail.com Talkbetween Echo and Narcissus About a Recent Book by Dario Giugliano What is the relationship between ίδιος and κοινός? And how can philosophy (specifically metaphysics) and literature combine these two terms? How difficult is, and at the same time necessary, communicate with Other, that is to transfer one's singular voice in the shared sign system for this voice can be understood? What is experience? What is idiotism? What about the myth of Echo and Narcissus? These questions and other ones are the basis of Giugliano's text which – thanks also to the comparison with various thinkers (including Plato, Novalis and Nietzsche) – offers numerous interesting food for thought. Idiotism, Communication, Experience, Philosophy, Language

"Wenn über das Grundsätzliche keine Einigkeit besteht, ist es sinnlos, miteinander Pläne zu schmieden." – Konfuzius (551-479 v.Chr.).Der grundsätzliche universelle Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte besagt, dass die Menschenrechte jedem Menschen auf der Welt zustehen. Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte aus dem Jahr 1948 drückt das folgendermaßen aus: "Jeder hat Anspruch auf alle in dieser Erklärung verkündeten Rechte und Freiheiten, ohne irgendeinen Unterschied, etwa nach Rasse, Hautfarbe, Geschlecht, Sprache, Religion, politischer oder sonstiger Anschauung, nationaler oder sozialer Herkunft, Vermögen, Geburt oder sonstigem Stand […]" (UN-Vollversammlung 1948, Artikel 2). Jedoch ist dieser universelle Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte in der Realität häufig noch ein Ideal. Mit der Deklaration von Bangkok, die einige südostasiatische Staaten Anfang der 1990er Jahre unterzeichneten, wurde er sogar explizit in Frage gestellt. Was ist die Sichtweise dieser südostasiatischen Staaten auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte und wie begründen sie diese? Wie könnten Perspektiven für einen interkulturellen Menschenrechtsdialog aussehen? 
In diesem Beitrag werden die Menschenrechte durch eine Definition und einen Abschnitt zur Geschichte kurz vorgestellt. Anschließend wird die Debatte um Universalität und (Kultur-)Relativismus erläutert, welche überleitet zur "asiatischen Perspektive" auf die Menschenrechte und zu den "asiatischen Werten". Abschließend werden die Kritik und Perspektiven für einen interkulturellen Dialog aufgegriffen.Menschenrechte – eine Definition

Zerstörung, Elend, menschliches Leid und der Völkermord an den europäischen Juden führten in "dramatischer Weise die Notwendigkeit eines wirksamen Schutzes grundlegender Menschenrechte durch verbindliche internationale Normen und kollektive Mechanismen" vor Augen (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S. 179).


Die Idee, dass jedem Menschen, "unabhängig seines Geschlechts, Alters, seiner Religion oder seiner ethnischen, nationalen, regionalen oder sozialen Herkunft, angeborene und unveräußerliche Rechte zu eigen sind, die sich aus seinem Menschsein ableiten", verfestigte sich und führte am 10. Dezember 1948 zur Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S. 179).

Erstmals wurde in einem internationalen Dokument festgehalten, dass jedem Menschen wegen "grundlegender Aspekte der menschlichen Person" grundlegende Rechte zugesprochen werden. Diese Rechte sind unveräußerlich und vorstaatlich, was bedeutet, dass der Staat sie nicht vergeben kann, denn jeder Mensch hat sie aufgrund der "biologischen Zugehörigkeit zur menschlichen Gattung" inne (Human Rights 2018). Dem Staat obliegt es, diese Rechte zu schützen.

Menschenrechte besitzen demnach vier Merkmale: Sie sind universell (alle Menschen sind Träger dieser Rechte), egalitär (eine ungleiche Verteilung dieser Rechte ist ausgeschlossen), individuell (der Träger der Menschenrechte ist ein individueller Mensch, keine Gruppe) und kategorial (wer der menschlichen Gattung angehört, besitzt sie automatisch) (vgl. Lohmann 2010, S. 36).

Die Erklärung der Menschenrechte aus dem Jahr 1948 ist keine rechtlich bindende Resolution. Doch auch wenn sie rechtlich nicht bindend ist, hat sie "moralische Wichtigkeit bekommen" (Human Rights 2012). Sie wird dem Gewohnheitsrecht zugeordnet, was bedeutet, dass sie sowohl allgemein anerkannt als auch angewendet und deswegen als verbindlich angesehen wird (vgl.: Human Rights 2012). Sie ist das "weltweit am meisten verbreitete und am meisten übersetzte internationale Dokument" (Gareis/Varwick 2014, S. 179) und dient als Grundlage für zahlreiche Abkommen (vgl. Maier 1997, S. 39).

Juristisch können die Menschenrechte wie folgt definiert werden: "Internationale Menschenrechte sind die durch das internationale Recht garantierten Rechtsansprüche von Personen gegen den Staat oder staatsähnliche Gebilde, die dem Schutz grundlegender Aspekte der menschlichen Person und ihrer Würde in Friedenszeiten und im Krieg dienen" (Human Rights 2012).

Seit 1948 haben sich die Menschenrechte weiterentwickelt, und es hat sich etabliert, von den Menschenrechten in drei Generationen zu sprechen. Zur ersten Generation gehören "die klassischen bürgerlichen und politischen Freiheits- und Beteiligungsrechte" wie das Recht auf Leben, Freiheit und Sicherheit oder das Verbot von Folter (Krennerich 2009). Die zweite Generation der Menschenrechte umfasst wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Menschenrechte, so beispielsweise das Recht auf Bildung, Teilhabe, aber auch auf Freizeit und Erholung. Die dritte Generation der Menschenrechte "bezeichnen allgemeine, noch kaum in Vertragswerken konkretisierte Rechte wie etwa das Recht auf Entwicklung, Frieden oder saubere Umwelt" (Krennerich 2009). Alle drei Generationen "sollten gleichberechtigt nebeneinander bestehen" (Barthel, zitiert nach Hamm 1999, S. 23).

Der Gedanke der angeborenen Rechte, die ein Mensch qua Menschsein besitzt, ist jedoch älter als die Erklärung der Menschenrechte aus dem Jahr 1948 und die Vereinten Nationen selbst. 

Eine kurze Geschichte der Menschenrechte


Der Ursprung der Menschenrechte geht auf das antike Griechenland zurück. Der "revolutionäre Gedanke der Stoiker, der beschreibt, dass alle Menschen gleich sind", wurde durch die im 18. Jahrhundert entstandene Naturrechtslehre weiter gefestigt (vgl.: Müller 2017, 03:06-03:20). Die "überlieferten konkreten Freiheiten der Ständegesellschaft wurden dort in eine allgemeine Freiheit des Menschen umgedacht" (Maier 1997, S. 11). Wegweisend war, dass diese Rechte nun allen Menschen zugesprochen wurden und diese Rechte Ansprüche an den Staat stellten (vgl. Maier, 1997 S. 11f). Denn "[er sollte] nicht tun dürfen, was ihm beliebt, [und] in substantielle Bezirke individueller Freiheit nicht […] eingreifen dürfen" (Maier 1997, S. 12). Als vorstaatliche Rechte kann der Staat diese nur akzeptieren, nicht aber verleihen.

Die Idee der unveräußerlichen Menschenrechte kulminierte schließlich in der Unabhängigkeitserklärung der 13 britischen Kolonien 1776 in Nordamerika (zentrales Dokument: Virginia Bill of Rights) und fand schließlich 1789 in der Französischen Revolution (zentrales Dokument: Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen) in Europa ihren Durchbruch. Diese Dokumente legten den Grundstein für die modernen Menschenrechte, die nun als Grundrechte in zahlreichen Verfassungen verankert sind. Schließlich, im Jahr 1966, wurden die ersten völkerrechtlich bindenden Menschenrechtsabkommen durch die Vereinten Nationen verabschiedet (vgl.: Wagner 2016).

Besonders eindrücklich zeigt die Geschichte der Menschenrechte, dass ihre Idee auf "konkrete Unrechtserfahrungen der Menschen des Okzidents zurückgehen" (Tetzlaff 1998, S. 60). Darauf, nämlich dass die Menschenrechte 'im Westen' ihren Ursprung haben und individualistisch geprägt seien, bezieht sich im Wesentlichen die Kritik an ihnen. Diese Kritik zieht auch in Zweifel, ob die Menschenrechte universell sind. (Kultur-)Relativismus vs. Universalismus

Verfechter des Universalismus verstehen die Menschenrechte als unveräußerliche, angeborene Rechte eines jeden Menschen. "Niemand kann, mit Bezug auf welche Eigenschaft auch immer, von der Trägerschaft ausgeschlossen werden" (Lohmann 2010, S. 37). Ausgeschlossen ist hierbei auch die "ungleiche Verteilung" der Rechte (vgl. Lohmann 2010, S. 37). So muss der Staat seinen Pflichten nachkommen und für die Einhaltung, Wahrung und Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte sorgen. 

Jedoch werden die Menschenrechte, wie sie 1948 verabschiedet wurden, in ihrem universellen Gültigkeitsanspruch von vielen Ländern und Kulturen auf der Welt nicht akzeptiert. Der (Kultur-) Relativismus in seiner extremen Form sieht die Menschenrechte als nicht vollständig übertragbar und "nur relativ zu einem bestimmten Kultursystem 'begründbar'" (Lohmann 2009). Manche Staaten gehen sogar so weit und verstehen die Menschenrechte als ein westliches Produkt, das "dem Osten" aufoktroyiert wurde. Auch seien die Menschenrechte nicht, wie der universalistische Anspruch behauptet, unabhängig von Zeit, Raum und kulturellem Hintergrund gültig. Sie seien aus der europäisch-nordamerikanischen Aufklärung entstanden, abendländisch geprägt und somit nicht in dieser Form in anderen Kulturkreisen anwendbar. Zudem sei ihre "weltweite Propagierung Ausdruck einer Mentalität der Einmischung, welche die Tradition des Kolonialismus mit anderen Mitteln fortsetze" (Hilpert 2019, S. 230). Tatsächlich sei "das Menschenrechtsverständnis in erster Linie abhängig von dem Menschenbild in einer spezifischen Kultur […], wonach es keinen Standard gibt, der unabhängig von bestimmten sozialen Lebensformen wäre" (Pohl 2002, S. 7).

Von (Kultur-)Relativisten konkret kritisiert werden häufig die "individuelle Selbstbestimmung, die körperliche Unversehrtheit, das Vorrangverhältnis zwischen Individuum zur Gemeinschaft, die Gleichheit von Männern und Frauen, die religiöse Toleranz und die Einschätzung demokratischer Mitbestimmung" (Lohmann 2010, S. 41).

Zum anderen wird bemängelt, dass bei der Verabschiedung der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Jahr 1948 die westlichen Länder dominierten, während die meisten Länder des Globalen Südens noch unter kolonialer Herrschaft standen. Viele Staaten werfen dem Westen sogar "moralischen Chauvinismus" (Pollis/Schwab 2006, S. 68), "Ideologismus" und eine "quasi-religiöse" Auslegung der Menschenrechte vor (Pohl 2002, S. 7).

Genau an diese Dichotomie, Universalismus und (Kultur-)Relativismus, knüpfte die 1993 vorgelegte Deklaration von Bangkok an, welche von vielen (süd-)ostasiatischen Ländern unterzeichnet wurde. Bevor die Wiener Menschenrechtskonferenz im Jahr 1993 begann, zweifelten diese Länder die Universalität der Menschenrechte an und legten eine "asiatische Perspektive" auf die Menschenrechte und sogenannte "asiatische Werte" vor. 

Die asiatische Perspektive auf die (Universalität der) Menschenrechte und 'asiatische Werte'

Die ,asiatische Sicht' auf die Menschenrechte und die 'asiatischen Werte' werden im Grunde kulturrelativistisch begründet. Im folgenden Abschnitt werden die 'asiatischen Werte' zeitgeschichtlich eingeordnet und näher erläutert. 

Die zeitgeschichtliche Einordnung der 'asiatischen Werte'

Die Kontroverse, dass sich die Menschenrechte in (Südost-)Asien anders entwickelt hätten, spitzte sich Anfang der 1990er Jahre zu und erlangte mit der Verabschiedung der Deklaration von Bangkok weltumspannende Beachtung. Die Gründe für den Ausbruch dieser Debatte sind vielfältig. Zum einen genoss 'der Westen', vor allem die Europäische Union und die Vereinigten Staaten, zu dieser Zeit beispielloses politisches und ökonomisches Selbstbewusstsein. Der Ost-West-Konflikt war beendet, die Demokratie und der Kapitalismus schienen 'die' Erfolgsmodelle zu sein, die "das Ende der Geschichte" einläuteten (Fukuyama 1992). Die Globalisierung schritt unaufhaltsam voran, während der Kommunismus in vielen osteuropäischen Ländern in sich zusammenbrach. Zudem gewann die Idee des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus mehr und mehr an Bedeutung.

In dieser Zeit gingen die Vereinigten Staaten und viele Mitgliedsstaaten der EU auf die Forderung vieler Menschenrechtsorganisationen ein, die Menschenrechte und die Demokratie in anderen Ländern zu verbreiten. Die Regierung unter Präsident Bill Clinton ging sogar so weit und erklärte sowohl die Verbreitung der Menschenrechte als auch der Demokratie zu einer der drei Säulen der US-amerikanischen Außenpolitik (vgl.: Barr 2000, S. 313). Allerdings missbilligte insbesondere China den menschenrechtlichen Druck vieler westlicher Staaten, der durch das Massaker von Tiananmen im Jahr 1989 und Chinas Tibet-Politik stetig zunahm.

Hinzu kam, dass viele ostasiatische Staaten, allen voran China, Malaysia, Japan, Hongkong, Taiwan, Singapur und Südkorea, als 'ostasiatische Wirtschaftswunder' bezeichnet wurden (vgl.: Ernst 2009). Diese wirtschaftliche Prosperität ließ ein "neues Selbstbewusstsein und eine neue politische Elite entstehen, die vom 'Westen' das Recht auf einen eigenen entwicklungspolitischen Weg einforderte und die Vormachtstellung der alten Industriestaaten Europas und Nordamerikas herausforderte" (Ernst 2009). Darüber hinaus sahen sie in der Rolle des starken Staates eine wichtige "Erklärungsvariable" für den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg (Heinz 1995, S. 11).

Die Bestimmtheit, mit der die Europäische Union und die Vereinigten Staaten um die Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte in Asien rangen, wurde von (ost-)asiatischen Ländern als Versuch verstanden, ,Asien' ,dem Westen' unterwürfig zu halten. Zudem wurde die Kritik als "Einmischung, irrelevant und kulturfremd abgewehrt" (Heinz 1995, S. 12).Schließlich, im Vorfeld der Wiener Menschenrechtskonferenz im Jahr 1993, "bestritten [unter anderem] die Regierungen Indonesiens, Singapurs und Chinas die Universalität der Menschenrechte" (Heinz 1995, S. 16). Stattdessen müssten die jeweiligen wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Bedingungen betrachtet werden, weil sie nur anhand derer verwirklicht werden könnten (vgl.: Heinz 1995, S. 15f). Deshalb wurden sogenannte 'asiatische Werte' vorgestellt. 
Was sind 'asiatische Werte'?

'Asiatische Werte' beschreiben eine (kultur-)relative Sicht auf die Menschenrechte, die in den frühen 1990er Jahren von asiatischen Politiker*innen und Wissenschaftler*innen vorgestellt und von 34 Staaten verabschiedet wurden. Sie umfassen im Groben die Bereiche Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur (vgl.: Tai 2005, S. 34). Federführend bei der Debatte waren Lee Kuan Yew, der damalige Premierminister von Singapur, und Mahathir bin Mohamad, der damalige Premierminister von Malaysia. Sie, die 'asiatischen Werte', sollen eine Anpassung zum aus asiatischer Sicht "westlichen Modell der Menschenrechte" darstellen (Henders 2017). Die regionale Bezeichnung 'Asien/asiatisch' bezieht sich in diesem Zusammenhang eher auf (Süd-) Ostasien beziehungsweise pazifisch-Asien als auf den Nahen oder Mittleren Osten. Das bedeutet auch, dass sich die 'asiatischen Werte' hauptsächlich auf die "konfuzianische Kultur" stützen und weniger vom Islam oder dem Hinduismus geprägt sind (Ernst 2009).

Allerdings lehnen die ostasiatischen Länder die Menschenrechte nicht grundsätzlich ab. Schließlich haben einige dieser Länder, darunter China, die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte 1948 verabschiedet und bekräftigten 1993 in Wien nochmals ihren Einsatz für Prinzipien, die in der Erklärung enthalten sind (vgl.: Tay 1996, S. 751). Sie plädierten mit der Deklaration von Bangkok stattdessen für nationale und regionale Unterschiede in der Schwerpunktsetzung und auch in der praktischen Umsetzung der Menschenrechte (vgl.: Tay 1996 S. 751f).

Befürworter der 'asiatischen Werte' bestanden zudem darauf, dass sie nicht nur durch den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg, den die ostasiatischen Staaten in den Jahrzehnten vor der Wiener Menschenrechtskonvention 1993 erlebt hatten, legitimiert würden, sondern auch maßgeblich für diesen Erfolg verantwortlich seien. Darüber hinaus müsse die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung bei ökonomisch aufstrebenden Ländern über allem stehen; bürgerliche und politische Rechte sollten den ökonomischen und sozialen Rechten deswegen untergeordnet sein (vgl.: Henders 2017).

Bisher wurde keine offizielle "umfassende, verbindliche Liste" vorgestellt (Heinz 1995, S. 25), aber häufig genannte 'asiatische Werte', die bei der Wiener Menschenrechtskonvention 1993 vorgelegt wurden, waren: "Disziplin, harte Arbeit, eine starke Führungskraft" (Tai 2005, S. 34ff), "Sparsamkeit, akademischer Erfolg, die Balance zwischen individuellen und gemeinschaftlichen Bedürfnissen, Respekt vor Autorität" (Henders 2017) und ein starker, stabiler Staat (Barr 2000, S. 310). Darüber hinaus wird "nationales Teamwork", die Erhaltung einer "moralisch sauberen Umwelt" (das Magazin 'Playboy' wird in Singapur beispielsweise nicht verkauft) und keine absolute Pressefreiheit für zentral erachtet (Heinz 1995, S. 26). 

Die asiatische Perspektive auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte

Im Diskurs um die ,asiatische Perspektive' haben sich mehrere häufig genannte Argumente herausgebildet. Einige davon sollen näher beschrieben werden, nämlich die Behauptungen, dass Rechte kulturspezifisch seien, die Gemeinschaft in Asien über dem Individuum stehe, dass Rechte ausschließlich den jeweiligen Staaten oblägen und dass soziale und ökonomische Rechte über zivilen und politischen Rechten ständen. 

Rechte sind kulturspezifisch

Die Idee der Menschenrechte entstand bereits in der Antike auf dem europäischen Kontinent und entwickelte sich schließlich unter bestimmten sozialen, ökonomischen, kulturellen und politischen Bedingungen ebendort und in Nordamerika (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 19). Die Umstände, die die Umsetzung der Menschenrechte voranbrachten, könnten aber nicht auf diese Art auf Südostasien übertragen werden. So beschreibt China in seinem 1991 veröffentlichten Weißbuch, dass sich aufgrund des eigenen historischen Hintergrunds, des Sozialsystems und der jeweiligen ökonomischen Entwicklung die Länder in ihrem Verständnis und ihrer Auslegung der Menschenrechte unterscheiden würden (vgl.: Weißbuch 1991, Vorwort). Das ist eine Haltung, welche auch 1993 auf der Menschenrechtskonferenz in Wien nochmals bekräftigt wurde (vgl.: Li 1996, S.19). 

Die Gemeinschaft steht über dem Individuum

Die südostasiatischen Länder insistierten, dass die Bedeutung der Gemeinschaft in asiatischen Ländern nicht mit dem Primat des Individuums vereinbar sei, worauf die Vorstellung der Menschenrechte beruht (Li 1996, S. 19). Zudem stünden Pflichten über Rechten (vgl.: Nghia 2009, S. 21). Dies seien auch die entscheidenden Faktoren, die 'Asien' fundamental vom 'Westen' unterschieden. Die Menschenrechte seien von Natur aus individualistisch geprägt, was nach (süd-)ostasiatischer Auffassung eine Bedrohung für den (süd-)ostasiatischen sozial-gemeinschaftlichen Gesellschaftsmechanismus darstellen könnte. Als Begründung für diese Behauptung führten die (süd-)ostasiatischen Staaten den Zusammenbruch vieler Familien, die Drogenabhängigkeit und die hohe Zahl an Obdachlosen im 'Westen' an (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20). 

Soziale und ökonomische Rechte stehen über zivilen und politischen Rechten

Zentral bei der ,asiatischen Auslegung' der Menschenrechte waren die Priorisierung der Gemeinschaft gegenüber der Individuen und die Suche nach dem Konsens im Gegensatz zum Konflikt. Dominanz und Autorität würden nicht limitiert oder gar als suspekt betrachtet, sondern gälten im Gegenteil als vertrauens- und förderungswürdig (vgl.: Tay 1996, S. 753ff). Die asiatische Auslegung, so wurde argumentiert, lege den Fokus auf ökonomische und soziale Rechte, die durch ein starkes wirtschaftliches Wachstum und Wohlstand legitimiert würden, worauf Asiat*innen Wert legten und was ihnen wichtig sei. So proklamiert das Weißbuch der chinesischen Regierung aus dem Jahr 1991, dass "sich sattessen und warm kleiden die fundamentalen Bedürfnisse der chinesischen Bevölkerung seien, die lange unter Hunger und Kälte leiden mussten" (Weißbuch 1991, Kapitel I). Wohlstand könne nur effizient erreicht werden, wenn die Regierenden autorisiert seien, die politischen Rechte ihrer Bürger*innen zu limitieren, um wirtschaftlichen Wohlstand zu garantieren (Li 1996, S. 20).
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung müsse deswegen bei ökonomisch aufstrebenden Ländern über allem stehen; zivile und politische Rechte sollten den ökonomischen und sozialen Rechten untergeordnet sein (vgl.: Henders, 2017). Implizit schwingt bei dieser Behauptung mit, dass erst alle basalen Bedürfnisse und eine stabile politische Ordnung sichergestellt werden müssten, um politische und bürgerliche Rechte zu implementieren (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20f). Befürworter der Idee der asiatischen Perspektive erachten es somit für wichtig, den Staat als Oberhoheit zu sehen (vgl.: Henders 2017). 

Rechte sind die Angelegenheit der jeweiligen Staaten

Das Recht eines Staates zur Selbstbestimmung schließe den Zuständigkeitsbereich der Menschenrechte mit ein. So seien Menschenrechte innenpolitische Angelegenheiten, in die sich andere Staaten oder Organisationen nicht einzumischen hätten (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20). "Die Bestrebung des Westens, auch bei Entwicklungsländern einen universellen Geltungsanspruch der Menschenrechte durchzusetzen, sei versteckter kultureller Imperialismus und ein Versuch, die Entwicklung [wirtschaftlich aufstrebender Länder] zu behindern" (Li 1996, S. 20). 

Kritik an der asiatischen Perspektive  Generell wurde bemängelt, dass nicht einfach über 'asiatische' Werte geredet werden könne, weil es die einzelnen asiatischen Länder simplifiziere, stereotypisiere und sie um ihre Vielfalt bringe (vgl.: Henders 2017). Des Weiteren seien die genannten Werte nicht alleinig in Asien zu finden, sondern hätten auch in anderen Teilen der Welt Gültigkeit (vgl.: Tai 2005, S. 35). Tatsächlich, so wurde argumentiert, gebe es  keine ,asiatischen Werte', denn der Begriff sei mit "seiner Allgemeinheit und Undifferenziertheit ein Konstrukt, das ganz bestimmten Zielen dienen soll" (Schreiner 1996, S. 57). Außerdem seien nur mächtige Politiker*innen leitender Teil der Debatte gewesen; die Argumente seien weder in die Gesellschaft getragen noch philosophisch (fort-)geführt worden.
Die einzelnen 'asiatischen' Argumente gegen die Universalität der Menschenrechte wurden jedoch auch einzeln kritisiert. Einige Kritiker*innen stellten die Ansicht der Kulturspezifizität in Frage. Das Argument impliziere, dass soziale Normen, die in anderen Ländern und Kulturkreisen ihren Ursprung hatten, in der asiatischen Kultur keine Anwendung finden sollten oder könnten. Kapitalistische Märkte und die Konsumkultur, welche ebenfalls außerhalb der asiatischen Länder entstanden sind, konnten jedoch sehr wohl von asiatischen Kulturen aufgenommen werden (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 20). Die schwerfällige Akzeptanz und Umsetzung der Universalität der Menschenrechte könne somit nicht ausschließlich auf ihre kulturelle Herkunft zurückgeführt werden.

Die zweite Behauptung, dass Asiat*innen die Gemeinschaft über das Individuum stellten, würde als kulturelles Argument missbraucht werden, um aufzuzeigen, dass unveräußerliche Rechte eines Einzelnen sich nicht mit der Idee von asiatischen Gesellschaften verstünden. Kritiker*innen der ,asiatischen Perspektive' sahen hier die Gefahr der generellen Verdammung der Rechte des Einzelnen. Dabei würden individuelle Freiheiten den asiatischen Gemeinschaftswerten nicht generell oppositionell gegenüberstehen. Vielmehr seien grundlegende Rechte, wie eine Versammlungs- und Meinungsfreiheit sowie Toleranz, wichtig für eine Gemeinschaft (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 21).

Beim dritten Argument, welches die südostasiatischen Länder vorlegten, kritisierten viele Verfechter*innen der Universalität der Menschenrechte, dass die nationale ökonomische Entwicklung nicht gleichzusetzen sei mit der ökonomischen Absicherung (sozio-)ökonomisch benachteiligter Gruppen einer Gesellschaft. Nationales ökonomisches Wachstum garantiere schließlich nicht automatisch Rechte für ökonomisch benachteiligte Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft. Stattdessen würden sich politisch-zivile und sozial-ökonomische Rechte bedingen und nur effektiv wirken, wenn alle vier Ebenen garantiert werden könnten (vgl.: Li 1996, S. 22).

Abschließend wurde kritisiert, dass die vorgebrachten Argumente, insbesondere die Forderung der Nichteinmischung in innerstaatliche Angelegenheiten, als Vorwand für einen illiberalen und autoritären Regierungsstil verwendet werden würden. Zudem sollten diese Argumente die Schwäche des wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmodells der asiatischen Länder verschleiern (vgl.: Henders 2017). Das sind beides Kritikpunkte, die während der asiatischen Wirtschaftskrise 1997/1998 weitgehend bestätigt wurden und zur Verabschiedung der asiatischen Erklärung der Menschenrechte im Jahr 1998 führten. 

Was ist mit 'asiatischen Werten' passiert?

Der Dialog über die in der Deklaration von Bangkok vorgestellten 'asiatischen Werte' begleitete staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure sowie Wissenschaftler*innen bis in die 1990er Jahre hinein. Als im Jahr 1997 eine Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise Asien ereilte, wurde es jedoch nicht nur still um die 'asiatischen Werte', sie wurden nun sogar "als Ursache der Krise gedeutet" (Ernst 2009). Insbesondere die staatliche Intervention und die starken Familienwerte wurden als Verursacher genannt (vgl.: Ernst 2009). Um den wirtschaftlichen Anschluss an den industriellen 'Westen' nicht zu verlieren, waren Menschenrechtsorganisationen in Südostasien bemüht, den Menschenrechtsschutz bottom-up durchzusetzen. Die Asiatische Menschenrechtscharta, die die 'asiatischen Werte' ablehnt, wurde 1998 von Menschenrechtsorganisationen in Kwangju, Südkorea, verabschiedet. Sie ist auch ein Versuch, asiatische Regierungen bei Menschenrechtsverstößen zukünftig in die Verantwortung nehmen zu können. 

Seit dem Ausbruch der asiatischen Wirtschaftskrise ist die Debatte um 'asiatische Werte' nahezu versiegt. Gleichwohl werden interkulturelle Dialoge über die Menschenrechte weiter geführt. 
Zwischen Kulturrelativismus und Universalismus – Perspektiven für einen Dialog

Eine globale Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte bleibt nach wie vor ein Ideal, ebenso wie deren uneingeschränkte Einhaltung. Die ostasiatischen Länder sind nur ein Beispiel von vielen, denn Kritik an der Universalität der Menschenrechte kommt auch aus anderen Ländern und von anderen Religionen. Dabei hat die Forderung nach weltweiter Umsetzung der Menschenrechte nicht an Dringlichkeit verloren. Wie kann aber ein Dialog über die Menschenrechte oder gar ein Konsens vorangebracht werden?

Bei dieser Problematik ist es wichtig zu bedenken, dass die Menschenrechte kein starres System sind, sondern auch nach ihrer Verabschiedung im Jahr 1948 weiterentwickelt wurden. Zudem hat die Idee der Menschenrechte zwar primär in der Zeit der europäisch-amerikanischen Aufklärung ihre Wurzeln, konnte ihre volle Durchsetzungskraft jedoch erst in der Moderne entfalten (vgl.: Bielefeldt 1999, S. 59f). Insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Argument der Nichtumsetzbarkeit der Menschenrechte in kulturell anders geprägten Regionen "wäre es verfehlt, den Begriff der 'Aufklärung' auf eine bestimmte Epoche der europäischen Geschichte zu verkürzen" (Bielefeldt 1999, S. 60). Schließlich muss es auch für andere Kulturen möglich sein, "humane Anliegen der eigenen Tradition in moderner Gestalt in den Menschenrechten wiederzuerkennen" (Bielefeldt 1999, S. 61).  

Aufgrund dessen sprechen sich viele Wissenschaftler*innen für eine Adaption der Menschenrechte aus. Die US-amerikanische Politikwissenschaftlerin Alison Dundes Renteln, beispielsweise, "möchte am Begriff universaler Menschenrechte durchaus festhalten, ihn zugleich aber auf interkultureller Basis inhaltlich neu bestimmen […], indem sie nach einem weltweit gemeinsamen Nenner in den Wertorientierungen unterschiedlicher Kulturen sucht" (Bielefeldt 1999, S. 45f). Der kanadische Philosoph Charles Taylor spricht sich für einen "ungezwungenen Konsens" aus, der anderen kulturellen Normen Verständnis entgegenbringt (Taylor 1999, S. 124). Der Dialog über die Menschenrechte zwischen Asien und 'dem Westen' solle sich global ausweiten und eine Auseinandersetzung über eine Übereinstimmung an Normen, die menschliches Verhalten und politisches Handeln leiten sollten, starten. Dieser Grundkonsens auf der Basis der Menschenrechte soll bindend sein, darf sich aber in seiner Begründung unterscheiden (vgl.: Carnegie Council 1996). Der deutsche Philosoph Georg Lohmann vertritt wiederum die Position, dass der "Universalismus" nicht zwingend eine "Einheitskultur darstellt oder in einer solchen resultiert" (Lohmann 2009). Für ihn sind Universalismus und Relativismus auch keine Gegensätze; er sieht im Partikularismus das Gegenteil zum Universalismus. Deshalb ist er der Ansicht, dass ein "verwirklichter und rechtlich wie politisch konkretisierter universeller Menschenrechtsschutz die Möglichkeiten einer kulturellen Vielfalt der Menschen erweitern wird" (Lohmann 2009). Kulturelle Vielfalt ist hier aber nicht mit Willkür gleichzusetzen. Unterscheiden muss man zwischen "Besonderheiten, die mit dem Universalismus der Menschenrechte kompatibel sind und solchen, die ihm widersprechen" (Lohmann 2009). "Strikter" soll der Universalismus bei negativen Pflichten agieren, so zum Beispiel beim Verbot von Folter (Lohmann 2009). Bei positiven Pflichten, wie beispielsweise bei Leistungsrechten, kann der Universalismus lockerer angewendet werden und mehrere, kulturell unterschiedliche Auslegungen zulassen (vgl.: Lohmann 2009). Ein interkultureller Dialog und die Suche nach einem Konsens bedeuten jedoch nicht, dass "die Menschenrechte [völlig neu überdacht und] bereits bestehende international vereinbarte Standards und Konventionen […] abgetan werden sollen. Das wäre gefährlich" (Utrecht 1995, S. 11). Für eine strikte Durchsetzung ideal, so konkludiert Lohmann, "wäre ein gut etabliertes Rechtssystem, in dem die Menschenrechte individuell eingeklagt und mit Hilfe staatlicher Gewalten auch durchgesetzt werden können" (Lohmann 2013, S. 19). 
Fazit

Viele (süd-)ostasiatische Länder brachten im Jahr 1993 mit der Deklaration von Bangkok kulturrelativistische Argumente hervor, mit denen sie ihre Sichtweise auf die Universalität der Menschenrechte aufzeigten und rechtfertigten. Eine zentrale Begründung war hier, dass das "individualistische Rechtsverständnis" der Menschenrechte nicht mit dem asiatischen Gemeinschaftsverständnis vereinbar sei (Tetzlaff 2002, S. 5). Ebenso waren die Kulturspezifität von Rechten und das Primat des wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands Teil der Begründung. Auseinandersetzungen darüber fanden bis weit in die 1990er Jahre hinein viel Gehör und Gegenrede.
Erst mit der asiatischen Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise 1997/1998 wurde es still um die 'asiatischen Werte'.
Was von der Debatte allerdings bleibt, ist die Diskussion über den Universalismus und den (Kultur-) Relativismus, für die der Menschenrechtsrat (MRR) der Vereinten Nationen in Genf eine Plattform bietet. 

Bei allen Vorschlägen und Denkanstößen, die eine kulturelle Sensibilität und Variabilität ermöglichen sollen, ist der interkulturelle Dialog zentral. Fraglich bleibt jedoch, wie gut sich eine Diskussion über Normen auf der Basis der Menschenrechte und deren anschließende Durchsetzung in autoritär geführten Staaten durchsetzen lässt (vgl.: Carnegie Council 1996). Denn schließlich sagte schon Konfuzius (551 v. Chr. bis 479 v. Chr.), dass es sinnlos sei, miteinander Pläne zu schmieden, wenn über das Grundsätzliche keine Einigkeit bestehe. 

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Siddharth Mallavarapu on International
Asymmetries, Ethnocentrism, and a View on IR from India












How is the rise of the BRICs in the international
political and economic system reflected in our understanding of that system?
One key insight is that the discipline of International Relations that has
emanated from the northern hemisphere is far less 'international' than is
widely thought. Scholars from the 'Global South' increasingly raise important
challenges to the provincialism of IR theory with a universal pretense.
Siddharth Mallavarapu's work has consistently engaged with such questions. In
this Talk, Mallavarapu, amongst
others, elaborates on IR's ethnocentrism, the multitude of voices in the Global
South, and why he rather speaks of a 'voice from India' rather than an 'Indian
IR theory'.




Print version of this Talk (pdf)






What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in
current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



One of the things I constantly contend with in my work
is to think of ways of how we can widen our notion of the international. IR has been too closely linked to the fortunes of
the major powers, and this has been to our detriment, because it has
impoverished our sense of international. I think the spirit of what I contend
with is best captured by what Ngugi wa Thiong'o in his book Globalectics:
Theory and Politics of Knowing concerns himself with, namely '…the
organization of literary space and the politics of knowing'. My interest is to
grapple with the manner in which the discipline of International Relations in
its dominant mainstream idiom orchestrates and administers intellectual space
and the implications this carries for the broader politics of knowledge. Simply
put, the principal challenge is to confront various species of ethnocentrism –
particularly Anglo-American accents of parochialism in the mainstream account
of International Relations.



I am also keenly sensitive to some disciplinary biases
and prejudices, which I think sometimes take on tacit forms and sometimes more
explicit forms, and in which provincial experiences are passed off as universal
experiences. The whole question of 'benchmarking' is problematic, in that a
benchmark is set by one, and others are expected to measure up to that
benchmark. Then there is the question of certain theories, for example the idea
that hegemony is desirable from the perspective of international stability –
think of the Hegemonic Stability Theory in the 1970s, or the Democratic Peace Theory that assumes that liberal democracy is an unsurpassed
political form from the perspective of peace. Then there is human rights
advocacy of a particular kind, and the whole idea of the 'Long Peace' applied
to the Cold War years. In reality, this was far from a 'long peace' for many
countries in the Third World during the same era.



I am also interested right now in the issue of the
evolution of IR theory, and was really intrigued by the September 2013 issue of
the EuropeanJournal of International Relations, with its focus on 'the End of International Relations Theory': I find
this fascinating, because just at a time when there are new players or re-emerging and re-surfacing
players in the international system, there is a move to delegitimize IR Theory
itself. So I am curious about the conjuncture and the set of sociologies of
knowledge that inform particular terms and turns in the discipline.



My response to this challenge
is to consciously work towards inserting other voices, traditions and
sensibilities in the discipline to problematize its straightforward and
simplistic understanding of large chunks of the world. My work is informed by
what international relations praxis looks
like in other places and how it is locally interpreted in those contexts. There
are gaps in mainstream narratives and I am interested in finding ways to create
space for a more substantive engagement with other perspectives by broadening
the disciplinary context. This is not merely a matter of inclusive elegance but
a matter of life and death because poor knowledge as evident from the
historical record generates disastrous political judgments that have already
resulted in considerable loss of human life, often worst impacting the former
colonies.



The global south holds a particular attraction for me
in this context, especially given its often problematic representations in
mainstream IR discourse. The underlying premise here is that the discipline of
IR will stand to be enriched by drawing on a much wider repertoire of human
experiences than it currently does. The normative imperative is to nudge us all
in the direction of being more circumspect before we pronounce or pass quick
and often harsh political assessments about sights, sounds, smells and
political ecologies we are unfamiliar with. IR as a discipline needs to reflect
the considerable diversity.  



My doctoral research on the role of the International Court
of Justice advisory opinion rendered in July 1996 on the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons provided an opportunity to probe this diversity
further. While advancing a case for categorical illegality of nuclear use under
all circumstances, Judge Christopher Gregory Weeramantry discusses at length the multicultural bases of
international humanitarian law. In doing so, he combines knowledge of world
religions, postcolonial histories and canonical international law to frame his
erudite opinion, which displays a thoughtful engagement with often neglected or
obscured sensibilities.



These examples can be exponentially multiplied. Such a
sentiment is most succinctly captured by Chinua Achebe in Home and
Exile where he argues that '…my hope for the twenty-first [century] is that
it will see the first fruits of the balance of stories among the world's
peoples'. It most critically calls for '…the process of 're-storying' peoples
who had been knocked silent by the trauma of all kinds of dispossession'. I would treat this as an important charter or
intellectual map for anybody embarking on the study of International Relations
today. I would also like to add that this storytelling would inevitably
encounter the categories and many avatars
of race, class, gender and nationality crisscrossing and intersecting in all
sorts of possible combinations generating a whole host of political outcomes as
well.  



The skewed politics of knowledge is most evident when
it comes to theory with a big 'T' in particular. Most theories of International
Relations emanate from the Anglo-American metropole and little from elsewhere.
This is not because of an absence of theoretical reflection in other milieus but
due rather to a not so accidental privileging of some parts of experiential
reality over others. IR has been too caught up with the major powers. I could
think of conscious efforts to theorize both in the past and in the present
elements of reality hidden from conventional vantage points. One recent illustration
of social and political theorizing from the context I am more familiar with is an
account by Gopal Guru and Sundar Sarukkai titled The Cracked Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory. There
are on-going theoretical engagements in Africa, the Arab world, Asia and South
America reflecting an intellectual ferment both within and outside of these
societies. International Relations as a discipline has to find ways of
explicitly engaging these texts and relating it to prevailing currents in world
politics rather than carry on an elaborate pretence of their non-existence. I
am more troubled by claims of an 'end of International Relations theory' just
at a moment when the world is opening up to new political possibilities
stemming from the projected growth in international influence of parts of Asia,
Africa, the Arab world and South America. IR has to move beyond its obsession
of focusing on the major powers and seriously democratize its content. The
terms 'global' or 'international' cannot be a monopoly or even an oligopoly.
Such a view has severely impoverished our understanding of the contemporary world.





How did you
arrive at where you currently are in IR?



I cannot really claim that this was a neatly planned
trajectory. I stumbled upon the discipline by chance not design. My initial
curiosity about the world of social cognition emerged from a slice of my medical
history. When I was at school in my early teens, I developed a condition referred
to as Leucoderma or Vitiligo which involved skin depigmentation. I enjoyed
writing from an early stage and recall recording my observations of the world
around me in a piece titled Etiology
Unknown borrowing language from the doctor's diagnosis. I recall an urgency
to comprehend and make sense of what I perceived then as a fast changing world
where old certitudes were dissolving on a daily basis. I felt an outsider at
some remove from my earlier self and it gave me on retrospect a distinct
vantage point to witness the world around me. It was impacting who I thought I
was and thereby compelled me to confront issues of identity – individual and
social. An extremely supportive family made all the difference during these
years.



The turmoil and confusion in those years led me to
develop a deeper interest in understanding more loosely why people reacted in
particular sorts of ways to what was in medical terms merely a cosmetic change.
It also led me to informally forge community whenever I saw anybody else experiencing
similar states of being. I also internalized one of the first ingredients of
good social science – the capacity to be empathetic and put ourselves in others
shoes. I learnt that the discipline of Sociology among the available choices in
my milieu came closest to allowing me to pursue these concerns more
systematically further. I applied to a Sociology master's programme after my
undergraduate years at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, but I had also
applied simultaneously to the International Relations programme since in my
understanding it after all concerned the wider world – an extension of scale
but similar I imagined in terms of the canvas of concerns. The numbers in India
are large, the competition is stiff: I made it to the IR programme but did not
make it to the Sociology programme.



Having got there, I had some outstanding influences,
and I soon realized that one could also think about issues of identity (then
cast by me in terms of simple binaries – home and the external world, the
relationship of inside and outside, victors and the vanquished) in the
discipline of IR. I decided to stick the course and delve into these questions
more deeply while keeping up with a broader interest in the social sciences.



I could list a few influences that were critical at
various stages of my academic biography: at high school, an economics teacher S.
Venkata Lakshmi was very encouraging and positive and confirmed my intuitive
sense that I would enjoy the social sciences. Subsequently at college I had in
Father Ambrose Pinto a fine teacher of Political Science. He would take us on
small field excursions to observe first hand issues such as caste conflicts in
a neighbouring village, and all that helped me develop a sharper sense of the
political which moved away from the textbook and was strongly anchored in the local
context.



At the graduate level of study, Kanti Bajpai who later also became my mentor and advisor in the doctoral programme
exercised an enormous influence as a role model. I was convinced that a life of
the mind is worth aspiring and working towards once I came into contact with
him in the classroom. He also exposed me to all the basic building blocks of an
academic life – reading, writing, researching, teaching and publishing,
demonstrating at all times both patience and unparalleled generosity. We have
collaborated on two edited volumes on International
Relations in India and I continue to greatly value an enduring friendship.



For over a decade, I have also had the good fortune of
coming into contact with B.S. Chimni who is an exemplary scholar in the Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) tradition. It has been a great joy bouncing off ideas and discussing
at length various facets of International Relations, International Law and
Political Theory together over the years. I have learnt much from this rich and
continued association. In 2012 we worked jointly on an edited book titled International Relations: Perspectives for
the Global South.



I have also learnt (and continue to do so) from my
students both at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and at the South Asian
University (SAU). At JNU, I made my beginnings and continue to take some pride
in being intellectually home spun at one of the foundational and premier
crucibles of International Relations scholarship in India. I have also
thoroughly enjoyed my interactions over the years with the students drawn from
diverse backgrounds. At SAU, I have in the space of a short period been exposed
to some fine students from across the South Asian region. I have often been
impressed by their understanding of politics and on occasion have marvelled at
their demonstration of a maturity beyond their years. There is much I learn
from them particularly from their insider narratives of the unique political
experiences and trajectories of their specific countries.



Himadeep Muppidi has also been a remarkable influence
in terms of clarifying my thinking about the workings of the global IR episteme.
His receptivity to hitherto neglected intellectual inheritances from outside
the mainstream and most evidently his capacity to write with soul, passion and
character while retaining a deep suspicion of the 'objectivity' fetish in the
social sciences has alerted me to a whole new metaphysics and aesthetic of
interpreting IR. The thread that runs through all these interests and
influences is firstly the issue of context, and secondly the question of agency
–what it meant to be marginal in some sense, how could one think about
theorizing questions relating to dispossession, relating to a certain degree of
marginality– and also the broader issue of the politics of knowledge itself: of
how certain attitudes and concepts seem to obscure or deface certain
conditions, which seem to be quite prevalent.



I have also found excellent academic conversationalists
with sometimes differing perspectives who help sharpen my arguments
considerably. I would like to make special mention of Thomas Fues and the fascinating
global governance school that he offers intellectual stewardship to in Bonn. In
the years to come, I look forward to further intellectual collaborations with
scholars from Brazil and South Africa and other parts of South America and
Africa as well as the Arab world.





What would a
student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global
way?



The key without a doubt is curiosity. I do my best to
feed that curiosity as a teacher. I also think Gerardo Munck and Richard
Snyder's counsel and interviews in their book, Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative Politics are a useful
resource for students wanting to study International Relations. I also feel
strongly that classics need to be read and engaged with, by bringing them into
play in our contemporary dilemmas. I find that many of the questions we ask
today are not necessarily entirely new questions: there is a history to them
and there has been some careful thought given to them in the past, so it is
important to partake of this inheritance.



Then there is language: it is vital for students to
break out of one particular region or one particular set of concerns which flow
from a limited context, and in this way to become willing to engage with other
contexts. In this sense, language learning potentially opens up other worlds. I also believe that some exposure to quantitative methods is important:
you need to be able
to both contextualize and interpret data with some degree of confidence and not
overlook them when approaching texts. Not
everybody may choose it but we need to make the distinction between The Signal and the Noise as Nate Silverreminds us. I have found Marc Trachtenberg's The Craft of International History (chapter 1 in PDF here) a very useful text in providing
some very practical advice in fine tuning our research designs to weave the
past into our present. D.D. Kosambi's essay on 'combining methods' (PDF here) still
provides important clues to thinking creatively about method.



I also think it is important for students to avoid the
temptations of insularity and also pose questions in a fashion that allows them
to explore the workings of these questions in diverse settings. They should be open to a
diversity of methods from different disciplines such as ethnography, and
develop a deeper historical sensitivity, all these are crucial to shaping up as
a good scholar.



In sum, the importance of classics, fieldwork and
language acquisition cannot be emphasized sufficiently. Classics bring us back
to refined thought concerning enduring questions, language opens up other
worlds, and field work compels one to at least temporarily inhabit the trenches,
dirty your hands and acquire an earthy sense of the issues at hand.





Given the
importance you attach to the learning of language, among other things, and the
linguistic diversity that characterises India, do you often perceive language
to be a barrier to understanding?



I think language works in two ways. On the one hand,
each language has a specific manner of framing issues and a specific set of
sensibilities associated with it which in some respects is quite unique.
However, languages also lend themselves to different cross-cultural
interpretations and adaptations. Kristina S. Ten in an evocative piece titled 'Vehicles for Story: Chinua Achebe and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o on Defining African Literature,Preserving Culture and Self' maps some key lines of an enduring debate. Thiong'o
has a particularly strong position on this question of language: he says he no
longer wants to write in the English language, but instead in his native Gikuyu,
as well as Swahili. He argues that language has to do with memory, has to do
with what he calls a soul, and he maintains that language hierarchies are very
real and that we must contribute to enriching our own pools of language to
begin with, if we are to contribute to a much wider, global repertoire of
languages. In contrast, Chinua Achebe whom I mentioned earlier, very often wrote
in English and held the position that it was important to be accessible to more
people and to reach diverse audiences who would not necessarily be from his
home country. He said it was possible to use a language like English and permeate
it with local texture, wisdom and pulse – something he has exemplified in his
own work. I consider his writings a testimony to how well that can be done.



So there is a bit of a divide in terms of how one can
look at this question of language, but teaching in India I know that there are
students who may be very bright but who are constrained by the fact that they
have not had the same access to English schools, and therefore are restricted
to the vernacular. These students may have some very good ideas, but they feel disadvantaged
by the fact that their command of the English language is not sufficient to
guarantee close attention to what they wish to say. Some work hard to overcome
these challenges and meet with considerable success. While I think it is
wonderful to learn another language, it does not need to entail a diffidence or
neglect of one's own native language or any other vernacular language. My
impression is that if unimaginatively pursued something is lost in the process
and students end up feeling diffident and apologetic about their native language
which is entirely undesirable. I believe therefore that while one should enthusiastically
embrace new languages, the challenge is to accomplish this without unconsciously
obscuring one's native tongue. Having said that, all of us in India are keen to
go to English language schools. Vernacular languages have often lost out in the
process. So there is something to be said about this concern about language. We
have to tread carefully and remain attentive to how language hierarchies are
positioned and deployed for advancing particular species of knowledge claims.





From the
language issues flow conceptual questions: Asia is a Western construct, and
South Asia an extension of that. You reluctantly use this term, South Asia, in
what you call shorthand, and similarly terms "nation" and "state". How can we
break away from these concepts if we don't have a new vocabulary?



This really flows from the fact that IR is still very
much an ethnocentric construct. We are also suggesting in the same breath that
there is a particular form in which most concepts and categories tend to be
employed. I think IR language is imbued at least partly with the vocabulary of
the hegemon or of the dominant powers, so that it shares with the area studies' legacy the political connotations that are still very much with us. One
way that I try to break away from this when I introduce students to these
concepts and categories is by focusing on the lineage and the broader
intellectual history and etymology of concepts which come into play in IR.
Students are in any case acutely aware of the fact that there is a strong area
studies tradition which has mapped the world in a particular way which was not an
innocent discursive formation by any stretch of imagination. They also
recognize that this is not the only framing possible. The challenge for us is
of course to introduce new concepts and categories. I noticed for instance that
South Asia has become 'Southern Asia' for some strategic commentators (StevenA. Hoffmann among others) because 'Southern Asia' also includes China. However,
when it is done from the perspective of strategy there are other interests intertwined
such as specific geopolitical assessments.



What I try to do, rather, is to draw on the deeper
histories within the region itself, in order to arrive at concepts and
conceptions which are more germane to our context. I don't think I've succeeded
in this project as yet, but one of the reasons why I think it's important to
historicise these elements and even categories is to open up the possibility of
thinking about different imaginaries and along with that different categories.
I don't want to call it an alternative vocabulary, because I think that some
sensibilities have been given short shrift in history, and some provincial
experiences have more successfully masqueraded as universal experiences. Therefore,
part of the challenge is to call that bluff, while another part of the
challenge is to reconstruct and offer fresh perspectives. These may even be
questions about traditional issues such as order or justice, questions of
political authority, political rule or legitimacy. These are questions which
are of concern to all societies though individual responses may not echo the
language and slants of conventional IR theory. However, they may throw up some
sophisticated formulations on these very issues. A part of the challenge for
the IR scholar, then, is to recover and bring these ideas into the sinews of the
mainstream IR academia.



It is equally important to avoid any sort of nativism,
or to suggest that this is necessarily 'the best' approach, but to widen the
inventory before moving on to stimulating a real conversation between divergent
conceptions. We must avoid falling into the trap of what Ulrich Beck among
others has referred to as 'methodological nationalism'. I am by no means
suggesting that there is 'an Indian theory' of IR, but what I am curious about
is how the world is viewed from this particular location. That is quite
different from suggesting that there is a national project or a national school
of IR. I think that distinction needs to be made more subtly and needs to come
through more clearly, but one of the projects I am currently involved in is the
chronicling of a disciplinary history of IR in India and what that tells us
about Indians and their readings of the world outside their home. In that
process, I ask what the key issues that animated particularly an earlier
generation of scholars - how did they present these ideas and why did they
avoid using certain forms of presentation and framing? What were some of the
conspicuous presences and nonappearances in their work? Exploring these sorts
of issues will lead us forward by, firstly, bringing to bear all these pieces
of work which I feel have been ignored or have not received their due, and secondly,
by showing that there is a fair amount of diversity of thinking even in the
earlier generations of IR scholarship. The intent is to avoid a monolithic
conception of IR that emerges from India. I will have to make this point much
more clearly and emphatically in the future, and hope that my focus on
disciplinary history will contribute to some critical ground clearing. Similar
inventories of IR scholarship need to be assembled in different locations from
Africa, South America, other parts of Asia and the Arab world.



Many of these projects then also link up to very
practical questions. One of the issues that is of interest to me in this
context is that of South-South cooperation, such as for instance the IBSA Dialogue Forum, or the grouping known as BRICS, or the broader forum of
the G-20. There is evidence that the traditional structures and ways of doing
things are increasingly suspect and being viewed with suspicion by some actors
within the international system. It is therefore more important now to reopen
some of these questions and to think afresh about such things as institutional
design: what does it mean to be talking about "democratising international
relations"? How can we think of more inclusive and legitimate institutions? How
can we think about ways in which we can cooperate for the provision of global
public goods, but in a manner which is historically more legitimate and fair?
How can we address previous asymmetries that are not necessarily going to just
disappear? How do we deal with old power structures and their residual
influences in terms of the Westphalian state system? What legacy has been
enshrined for instance in the Bretton Woods institutions and what has that
legacy meant? What happened to non-alignment? Vijay Prashad chronicles
vividly the promise and unfulfilled promise of the non-aligned movement in
his fascinating account titled The Darker
Nations: A People's History of the Third World. How the past plays out in
terms of contemporary global governance questions and arrangements is fundamental
to my research interests. I have recently intervened on the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) doctrine and its practice. I have been rather critical arguing that it
cannot be disassociated from a longer history of interventionism by the major
powers in the global south however benign its dressing. A thread that runs
through my work is to demonstrate how historical asymmetry continues to manifest
in terms of how the contemporary international system is structured. And I ask if
we are to arrive at a more legitimate, inclusive and effective international
system, then what are the mechanisms and steps which we need to work towards?





What do you
imagine that process might look like? Do we need to return to a 'world of
villages' (the 1300s) before we can reinvent IR, the national and the global?
Do we need micro histories before we can reassemble a bigger history or is a
subtle shift possible?



There are two levels on which this can happen: on one
level the changes that seem to work are incremental changes and not
lock-stock-and-barrel fundamental changes. In terms of scale, different
scholars do different things. Some scholars are interested in micro histories,
others are interested in macro histories and asking the big questions.



I imagine both these projects are important and there
should be more scholars from the global south as well who ask the big macro questions.
What has happened for too long is that we have relegated this responsibility to
the traditional post Second World War major powers and they have treated it as
natural to offer us macro-historical narratives and pictures. I think scholars
from the global south need now to attend to both tasks: to write good micro
histories as well as reframe the larger questions of macro history. I would add
that normative concerns such as the content and feasibility of global justice needs
also to be an integral part of contemporary international relations
scholarship. For instance, it would be fair to ask that in a world of plenty,
why do so many people go hungry?



So if you were to ask me about my dreams and my hopes,
I still think that the 1955 Bandung Conference and subsequent nonalignment visions
remain unfinished business. I hope that within the span of the current
generation there is greater egalitarianism accomplished in the international
system and ultimately a balance not just in terms of what Achebe called the stories
of the world, but also in terms of actual institutional designs and political outcomes.
This should translate into much better provision of various public goods to global
citizenry with special attention to those who have been historically
disadvantaged. For assorted reasons there have been deep asymmetries within the
international system which have persisted and resulted in diminishing the life
chances and collective self-esteem of various peoples in the global south. There
is an urgent need to both acknowledge and remedy the situation in the world we
live in.





In your
experience, what is the role of the IR scholar in India in relation to the
foreign policy establishment and the policy makers?



It is quite hard to find traction of one's ideas in
terms of any influence of scholars or groups of scholars on the social or
political establishment. Overall I would say that academia has for  a long time not been taken seriously by the
foreign policy establishment, and that has more to do with the institutional
structure where there is a pecking order and the bureaucracy sees itself as
being better informed. Even in academic conference settings, one could periodically
expect a practitioner of foreign policy to argue that they know best having
been present at a particular negotiation or at the outbreak, duration and
conclusion of any recent episode in diplomatic history. This does not in reality
translate into the best knowledge because there is the possibility that besides
the immediate detail, the absence of a larger historical context or even
unaccounted variables in terms of the contemporary political forces at work
during that moment could be blind spots in the narrative. It is fair to say
therefore that the influence of academia on the Indian foreign policy
establishment by and large has tended to be minimal. However, one could make
the argument today that there are some early stirrings of changes in the offing.




Quite evidently, the Indian Foreign Service is far too
miniscule for a country of India's size and desired influence in the
international system. There is a perceived need from within the foreign policy
establishment to draw on expertise from elsewhere and on occasion they do turn
to the academia to invite counsel on specific issues. From the perspective of
the IR academic, it is perhaps equally important to be not too close to the
corridors of power as it could alter the incentive structure to the detriment
of independent opinion making for securing short or long term political
patronage.





Siddharth Mallavarapu is currently Associate
Professor and Chairperson at the Department of International Relations at the South
Asian University in New Delhi. He is on deputation from the School of
International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He completed his doctoral
thesis on the politics of norm creation in the context of an Advisory Opinion
rendered by the International Court of Justice in 1996 on nuclear weapon threat
or use. This culminated in his first book, Banning
the Bomb: The Politics of Norm Creation. His principal areas of academic
focus include international relations theory, intellectual histories of the
global south, disciplinary histories of IR, global governance debates and more
recently the implications of recent developments in the field of cognition on
the social sciences. Mallavarapu retains a special interest in issues related
to the politics of knowledge and examines the claims advanced in the discipline
of International Relations through this perspective. His immediate teaching
commitments include a graduate course on 'Cognition and World Politics' and a
doctoral level course on 'Advanced Research Methods'. He has co-edited (with
Kanti Bajpai) two books on recent Indian contributions to International
Relations theory. In 2012 along with B.S. Chimni, he co-edited International Relations: Perspectives for
the Global South.





Related links

Faculty Profile



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Read
Mallavarapu's Dissent of Judge
Weeramantry (2006 book chapter) here (pdf)
Read
Mallavarapu's Indian
Thinking in International Relations here (pdf)
Read
Mallavarapu's Because
of America here (pdf)
Read
Mallavarapu's Nuclear
Detonations: Contemplating Catastrophe here (pdf)


Print version of this Talk (pdf)

FEBRUARY, 1907 YOL. XIY. HO. 8 GETTYSBURG COLLEGE GETTYSBURG, PA. v*itm****%im**#wxn*mfriim***+*. PRESS Of W. fl. BAMMOND. '1 ■] >/,.-.• H ,( it-* PHra .»»»n . .■» ki .•»•»■»• cI /^/^ I \C"N The National Organization ot ^^.U^±-J^r^^r^J^JJ~-Jt^>^ Brain Brokers. Commonwealth Trust Bldg., Phila., Pa. Offices in Twelve Other Cities. Come and Have a Good Shave.,. or HAIR-CUT at Harry B. Seta's BARBER SHOP 35 Baltimore St. BARBERS' SUPPLIES A SPECIALTY. Also, choice line of fine Cigars. R. A. WONDERS Comer Cigar ParlorSv A full line of Cigars, Tobacco, Pipes, etc. Scott's Corner, opp. Eagle Hotel] GETTYSBURG, PA. Pool Parlors in Connection. IP YOU CALL ON C. A. Bloeher, deuueleiv Centre Square, He can serve you in anything you may want in REPAIRING or JEWELRY. - M'v.i.7'1.?' ?'•;■ ;-v/-i '{■■'■! ' ;?4 " > " . WE RECOMMEND THESE FIRMS. Established 1867 by Allen Walton Allen K. Walton, Pres. and Treas. Root. J. Walton, Superintendent. Hummelstown Brown Stone Gompanji, and Manufacturers of BUILDING STONE, SAWED FLAGGING, and TILE, ■' [■.■!■■■ ■!■■ ■ ^i*--11:—: l;- '"I 1 i ft ni'»■ dKMi^aai^MHIIUiHmBWHaBK^BB THE MERCURY. 213 There is a natural and proper desire which we all share to more or less extent—that is, the desire for the esteem of others. A lack of this feeling is indicative of a defective character and results in carelessness and boorishness. Yet that this senti-ment is often magnified into over sensitiveness to others opin-ions is evident in many departments of college work. In the class room it is responsible for much of the hesitancy to an-swer general questions, and how many fear to ask questions lest they are ridiculed tor stupidity or criticized for trying to impress the teacher, or as college vernacular has it, " work the Profs." Thus one of the most effective ways of keeping up a live interest in a recitation is lost. The suppression of the im-pulse to ask and answer questions leads to inattention and study-ing for words at the expense of thought. " Every problem solved is the origin of the other problems to be solved. When men have no questions to ask, not only have their lips become para-lyzed but the brain has become atrophied." Another and very similar phase is the reluctance to seek, privately, the help, advice, or friendship of a professor, lest it be interpreted by college mates as courting favors. Thus the opportunity for enjoying helpful personal relations with a teacher goes by unimproved. This same feeling may sometimes prompt a generosity, which is simply the outcome of the fear of being considered mean and stingy, and which seriously handicaps the one with a meagre allowance. Modesty, that rare virtue, may dwindle into lack of inde-pendence until originality is crushed and personality weakened. There are many times in a student's college days when there is need to stand firm for his opinions and rights, and not yield weakly to college bossism nor allow his enthusiasm to be dampened by depreciating remarks of others. It seems to me that this lack of independence is the fault of much of the present neglect of opportunity for development offered by the literary societies. The Freshman starts enthusiastically to work ; carefully and willingly he prepares his first debates and essays, but bye and bye, he allows his own convictions to be influenced by the lethargy and carelessness of others, who look ■ 214 THE MERCURY. on in good natured amusement at his enthusiasm. He takes for a model upper classmen who pronounce literary a farce— their loyalty consisting in attendance when others put forth some special effort for their entertainment. On the other hand independence may be developed into arrogance and egotism, which is as fatal to the acquisition of friends or of knowledge. When one imagines his own opin-ions infallible, the ministrations of text-book and teacher tall upon stony ground. Ambition is essential to the attainment of the college ideal. Yet when one centers his determination on high marks and honors, looking upon stooped shoulders, ruined eyesight and pale cheeks as marks of heroic self-mastery—as honorable scars, when he cuts himself off from many of the rarest pleas-ures of college life, when he, self centered, refuses to take part or support with his enthusiasm, the general college organiza-tion, there is evidently a sad loss of perspective. If the ambi-tion is directed along athletic or other lines, the distortion of view is evinced in the determination to be the star, demanding everyone to play into his hands, disregarding the rights of others and the best interests of the college. Society offering opportunity for culture and polish, a most effective background for college life, is very often brought into too great prominence, crowding out true sociality, tending to-ward snobbishness, in the adherence to false standards in the choice of friends—standards which too often have little refer-ence to intellectuality or true moral worth ; interfering with working hours, either in actually subtracting from the regular periods for study and recitation or physically disabling for the best work. Lessons are hurriedly prepared ; gradually forced by accumulating work, dishonest means for preparation are resorted to, thus defeating the very end of class work. Per-haps the most subtle danger of the society enthusiast is the idea which creeps in, that the " smart set " and the "fast set" are synonomous, and a feeling of gratification to be classed among them. Money, time, health and character are recklessly squandered. Under such conditions a college course can scarce but prove a failure. . ," . . biht J THE MERCURY. 215 Quite apart from all this is the confusion and indistinctness of view which is the natural result of the sudden transition from the dim light of acceptance of fact, without questioning the full searchlight of philosophy, ethical metaphysics and science. The great foundation principle—the freedom of the will and existence of God must be tested and answered by each individual himself. Faith is changed to honest doubt. All is confusion. To stop here means skepticism, the most dangerous mental bias. The reaction must be balanced by deeper study and thought, and the softening influence of intel-lectual men. In a brief way I have tried to suggest some of the mistakes ±0 which we as students are subject—to one this and to another that. None of us are impervious. Should then, conscience, a friend, or professor, lay a detaining hand upon our shoulder with the intreaty, " O, student, come away from your work, or from your play, and consider awhile," do not shake him off in angef or impatience, and continue in the old way, lest when college days are over we look back with that wish so often heard—" O, that I could begin over, how differently I would do!" For it is possible to produca a masterpiece. Neither is talent, nor the most expensive art materials the chief requisite, but the power to see things as they really are. The words of Dr. Flurringare as a clarion calling us to our best efforts—"To the true man of alert intelligence, pure heart, and strong will, the college represents a new birth and a new life. College is simply another name for opportunity. Opportunity, widest, deepest, highest, richest." ■■•■^■■IB 2\6 THE MERCURY. BOY PRISONERS IN PHILADELPHIA. A PAPER READ AT SEMINARY BY F., '04. *HK name of Judge Lindsey, of Denver, is on the lips of people all over our country today. The current maga-zines are filled with praises for him and with accounts of his work. This " Boys' Judge " and " Friend of the Boys," this reformer and statesman, has endeared himself to many hearts. His efforts in his public career have been largely along lines hitherto unventured and untried, and his convictions have not lacked courage. One field in which he has specialised and in which he has become an expert authority is that of the prob-lems of boys in the city. Judge Lindsey is perfectly familiar with boy life; he understands the " gang " and its habits; he sympathizes with the boys in their temptations and struggles , and, as their judge in the Juvenile Courts, he has proved him-self a true friend, as well as a revolutionizer in the methods of treatment of young prisoners. If you have been following up the work of Judge Lindsey, what I shall try to tell you in this paper may be somewhat repetitious. But, entirely independent of this " Prince of Reformers " and regardless of the work be-ing done in any other city, I shall venture to describe the life of the boy prisoners in Philadelphia, as I cull it from personal experience. Have you ever noticed the large, brown-stone building, ap-parently an old-fashioned residence, at the corner of 15th and Arch Streets? Only a few doors away from our Lutheran Pub-lication House and a block from the Broad Street Station, stands this grim House of Detention. The passer-by frequently may notice heads at the first-floor windows—close-clipped heads and mischievous-looking faces, and his first thought likely is : " This must be a house for idiots " (at least that was my own first thought). One goes up the stone steps, rings the door-bell, and quickly an officer appears inside and unlocks the door. General interior impressions set one's imagination in motion, and he almost involuntarily feels that once this broad hallway and wide staircase, as well as the spacious adjoining T MamMfKUmim-iB au^nja^i ,»»—.—■ »■ - THE MERCURY. 217 rooms must have been the scene of wealth and splendor and perhaps even of gayety. But present changed conditions so impress themselves upon the visitor's senses that he at once comes to a realization of the plainness and the soberness of the situation as it is today. On one side of the hall is the office and court-room, and in the rear of this a large dining-room. Across the hallway, the full depth of the building, extends a large " living-room." Up stairs are the bed-rooms, and the like. Just back of the house is a paved court, or yard, of con-siderable size. This, in brief, is the Philadelphia House of De-tention for boys arrested in the city. The management of the institution now seems to be partly, if not largely, in the hands of the municipal Department of Public Safety and partly in the control of a philanthropic or-ganization ot women, who have at heart the welfare of the youth of the city. Outside is the system of probation officers to look after the boys dismissed on probation. Within the House are the necessary officers, in uniform, and clerks, besides the matron and her lady assistants. These officers are men of ex-perience and of sympathy, as well as of some discipline. One of them, I recall, had held a position of responsibility in a Re-formatory for young men for years. A more motherly, kinder-hearted, yet strict, woman than the matron, one could not wish to see. Her whole soul is absorbed in the elevation and im-provement of the boys under her care. Doubtless she is the first real " mother" many of the boys ever have known. Every morning, also, the magistrate and his officers, hold a session of Juvenile Court right there in the office of the House of Detention. The house physician makes his visits, as do the representatives of the Health Department, and various Chris-tian workers bent on the educational, the moral, and the spirit-ual, improvement of the incarcerated youth. With this glimpse at its management, let us pass on to a con-sideration of the purpose and plan of the House, or of its workings. Formerly, boy culprits were ordinarily classed as criminals, and were shut up with the mass of older prisoners in the common jail. Obviously and naturally such a method ■■■^■■■■■■i 220 THE MERCURY. thoughts. It crbps out in various ways. All are more or less rude and rough, though they treat a visitor respectfully and civilly. They seem glad when anyone comes to talk to them, or to read. Whether it is a result of curiosity, or an evidence of an inborn inclination to petty theft, the boys occasionally would look at, and touch with their fingers, any pin I happened to be wearing, or my watch. As a rule, they were attentive and seemed eager to learn. With some of the little fellows, I was really greatly pleased. All seemed to long for freedom, though a few evidently looked upon the Reformatory as a matter of fact and a punishment to be expected. Some asked me to take messages to, or to get things for them from, their homes. This, of course, it was necessary to refuse to do. The average visitor, I guess, is greatly surprised at the long list of crimes and charges for which mere boys are arrested and tried. Some of the offences along the line of immorality are almost as incredible as they are shocking. Truely we have little idea " how the otlier half lives." The matron keeps a diary of the hearings, and it was interesting to glance over it, as well as over the official records. Here are some of the charges: Street running; running away from home; incorrigi-bility; petty theft; stealing of junk and iron from railroads and foundries; stealing clothing; fighting, in which one boy may have cut another with a knife ; immorality; indecency; criminal assault, and rape ! To me, the most shocking cases were ones like these, and, although I hardly see how it could be a physical possibility, the charges nevertheless stood against the boys: A boy of seven years accused ot rape upon a little girl three years old; a crowd of boys had enticed the child to a vacant lot, and then had their horrible, devilish sport with her. Boys ot twelve and fifteen years had immoral relations with girls of eight and ten years of age. It is awful enough to think of, and far worse to occur. Just one case, of little Eddie Stewart, may serve as an in-teresting illustration. This boy, a bright faced, honest looking lad, ten years old,.was arrested because he had taken bed-clothing from his home and sold it, and was then found, out on i-lt-M'B in,*miti*. THE MERCURY. 221 the streets. From the testimony and investigations, it proved that he came from a rather poor family. The boy had lost his mother two years after his birth. At the time of the mother's death, a daughter, aged seven years, became the only " mother " in the home. The father was a drunkard, and seemed to care but little whether his boy was clothed and fed, or not. Imagine that boy's bringing-up, with a sister only five years older than himself to look after him ! Are you surprised that the boy ran .away from home, because no one wanted him? Since he was without a mother really, do you wonder that his moral sense •was little developed, and that his freedom gave a bad bent to his growing character? It is scarcely surprising that the boy even stole, and lived the life of the street. And yet that boy had many admirable traits about him. He changed wonder-fully under the care of the matron, and would do anything for her. He seemed to need, and to want, a mother. Eddie Stewart had the making of a man in him. The matron soon recognized this, and was making every effort to secure him a home with a good family in the country. He needed to be removed from his old associations, away from the city, where he could start afresh, forget his past days, and develop a manly ■character. The matron had been trying to get the boy a home, -and had spoken to him about it. He longed to get out from his imprisonment. When we saw him, he at once thought we were the friends who should take him to the country : ". Am I going now ?" and it was truly hard and sad to have to tell him that we could not take him. The child was sorely disappointed, but he still had before him the bright vision of a home in the country. One leaves that institution, the House of Detention, with a feeling of sadness and pity, a sense of concern for those " men in the making," and a keen sense ct his responsibility to hu-manity. It is such a noble work for a class of people who arouse one's sympathy more than one's censure. If, out in our ministry any of us should get to a city in which such reform work is conducted, would it not be good, if we were to take an interest in the boy prisoners ? Think of the possibilities for good anmi ImmMMMtitu 222 THE MERCURY. which lie in those young lives. Think of the hard time which they have had in life. Think of the true, worthy men to be developed from this class of boys. Think of the eternity of bliss to which you may save them, if you will but come into touch with them, and try to put Jesus Christ into their hearts I Isn't it worth while? THE LAMENT OF DANAE. (From the Greek of Simonides of Ceos). QPHNOI CHARLES WILLIAM HEATHCOTE, '05. When Perseus and Danae in the well carved chest layr And the seething tempest blew it over the bay, And as thus over her tear stained cheeks came fear, She threw her loving arm around Perseus dear. " Oh my dear child," said she, " Indeed such is our woe,. As thou sleepest here safe from every foe, For thou slumberest undisturbed in thy heart, While thou art borne along in the brazen bark, Oh my child around thee hovers the murky night, For indeed the dark shades keep the stars from sight. And the rough billows around us thou heedest not, For thou sleepest soundly as on a dewny cot." " If this fear were real to thee, Thou wouldst listen to me, But thus," I say, " Sleep on child, E'en though the deep sea is wild. May help, father Zeus from thee, Come to my dear child and me, If I pray too bold a prayer, Be merciful to my child, my dear." THE MERCURY. 223 CAPE COD CALLS. Provincetown by the Sea. RBV. GEORGE C. HENRY, '76. I HAVE always regarded it as a particularly "happy gale" which " blew us from " Boston across the wide bay to this old, quaint town on the sands of Cape Cod ; for every knot of the'way from "The Hub" to here was pleasant. Down from the dock out into one of the finest harbors in the world we went a steaming on .that summer morning. The very air was filled with historic associations, and object after object added to the effect. How else indeed, when such names as " Warren," « Independence," " Revere," " Hull," " Winthrop," distinguish the islands? Over the Harbor Bar, out into the waters of Mas-sachusetts Bay, the sea shimmering in the golden sunshine, by Minot's Ledge Lighthouse three miles from the nearest shore, where two of Uncle Sam's servants faithfully " keep the lower lights a-burning," " tho' storms be many and waters deep," and waves dash tumultuously over the very top. And now the open sea is to our left while to our right about seven miles away runs the Massachusetts coast-line. The historian's blood flows a bit here ; for yonder is Plymouth and its " Rock." Farther down we are looking toward Marshfield which at once suggests the colossal Commoner, Daniel Webster ; for there on his farm his body has been sleeping since that October day in 1852 and the waves have been chanting his requiem. Provincetown, that's the name; and everybody that gets to Boston should go over there to the tip end of. Cape Cod ; for we should love all our history ; and one fact to know even be-fore you get there is that it was here that the pilgrims first landed Nov. 11, 1620 o. s. Owing to the much sand, they found it not to their liking as an abiding place, and, accordingly they " got cleare of a sandie poynt" and " by God's mercy struck into the Harbour (Plymouth) which was greater than Cape Cod, compast with goodly land, and in the Bay two fine islands uninhabited, with okes, pines, etc., a most hopeful place, ■P iiufei ■' ' 224 THE MEKCUKY. innumerable store of fowl, etc., etc.," so runs the old record, "Mount's Relation." Up along the main street, Commercial, is the Town Hall, an indispensible accompaniment of a New England village, and b:fore it is a massive upright piece of granite with a copy of the original covenant first formed in the Mayflower's cabin, in bronze letters. On the very day they set foot on these shores, an act fraught with century-long consequences, this covenant was drawn up by these stern men who had not come three thousand miles to these shores to play housekeeping. It be-gins, as did everything with them, " In the name of God, Amen," and then " by these presents" they "solemnly and mutually in the presence of God and of one another covenant and combine " themselves •' together into a civil body politike for etc., etc." It is to this that their forty-seven men, high-souled and cour-ageous did set their hands. The list begins with John Carver; and seventh on the list after John Carver and following Miles Standish and John Alden, is Samuel Fuller, ancester of my old venerable, and lately deceased friend " Uncle" Thomas Fuller, in whose humble but inviting abode out along the South Mountain the printed line of lineal descent from this mighty progenitor was carefully framed and proudly shown by "Aunt Nancy " to every visitor. An old town, indeed. Its compact town-seal has engraved on the encircled scroll: "Compact Nov. 11, 1620. Birthplace of American Liberty." Immediately be-low comes " Precinct of Cape Cod, 1714." Beneath that: "In-corporated 1727." A busy port was this town in its day. The long wharves and bobbing docks jutting out into the harbor could tell many a tale of whalers and codders who in days long past sailed away to northern seas to be gone, perchance, for years, or, it may be, to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland codding out of sight of land from May until November, "For men must work and women must weep, And there's little to earn and manj to keep." Sometimes, however, these merchantmen of the sea made fine hauls. " Cap'n" Lewis told us of a friend of his in "ante-bellum" days, who after an eighteen months absence one voy-age, brought home 1,300 barrels of whale oil each barrel con- »■»•' HHHMv i ^,*^ EXCHANGES. Shakespeare seems to be the favorite theme of the essayists this month. Judging from the number and the quality of the articles on him and his works, great interest is taken in Shakes-pearean study in our colleges. We will first let The Philoma-thean Monthly decide the question, " was Shakespeare a greater poet than Milton ? " The writer at the outset confesses her be. lief in the superiority of the former and at once sets about in a 242 THE MERCURY. I series of contrasts to vindicate her belief. Shakespeare knew human nature better than Milton did; he sympathized in the joys and sorrows of others while Milton found refuge within himself; Milton's thoughts ran in a single deep channel, Shakes-peare's in many; the latter is practical and interesting, the former idealistic and complicated. Milton gives us man as he would have made him, Shakespeare portrays him as he is. The conclusion is strongly in favor of Shakespeare, more so than some critics would allow, " In passion he is far superior; in perception he is more quick and intelligent; in sympathy he is infinitely greater; in intellect he is more intuitive and clear; in ideality he is undoubtedly more serene and vivid, and in the universal mind he is more united, harmonious and complete." Having thus so decisively established Shakespeare's place' as a poet, we will now have him set before us as a " Tragic Artist." The Petkiomenite does this in the December and Jan-uary numbers. We learn that in the short space of seven years he gave to the world such masterpieces as have never been equaled. Our judgment of him as a tragic artist must be based upon the six plays, " Timon of Athens," " Romeo and Juliet," "Othello," "King Lear," Hamlet," and "Macbeth." This last named is typical and illustrates his superior skill in all tragic lines. His genius is beyond comparison. " His uni-versality, his breadth of sympathy, and his humor, run so smoothly and so gracefully, that the reader gives scarcely a thought to the form. His pictures are the height of attractive-ness, he charms the eye, and stimulates the imagination. It is an education in itself to study him." Shakespeare is also a humorist. The Fotum of November and December contains an excellent article on the humor in Shakespeare. Here we find " humor in all its varied forms. * * There never was a man * * who has conceivd the ludicrous with such a genuine taste and represented it with so true an art. * * * In his conception of humor he stands alone, there is no second." The Touchstone also speaks of humor in Shakespeare. In our quotations above it is painfully noticeable that each writer «' THE MERCURY. 243 resorts to a series of superlative terms to set forth the great-ness of their subject. This resort to superlative terms may very often be taken as a sign of weakness in the writer's analy-sis. It is a fact of observation that in critical and analytical essays the conclusions are superlative in direct proportion to the weakness and superficiality of the writers study of the subject. But here in Touchstone is a purely analytical study of Shakespeare's humor without any weakening superlative laud-ation. The reason for the humor is set forth. " It (the comic scene) goes back tor its source to the early English mystery and morality plays. In these there is a frequent juxtaposition of the serious and the comic. * * The comic element was added as a means of holding the attention of the audience. * * * The English drama is the product of the English people, not something fashioned according to set laws. To the English no great gulf separates the serious and the comic, and much of the splendor of their literature lies in the wise inter-mixture of high seriousness, as Matthew Arnold calls it, and humor." And now we have some characters analyzed. The Sorosis comes forth with two articles, " Portia" and " Lady Mac-beth." In Portia we find " one of the loveliest of women portraits to be found anywhere in literature. Fine in char-acter as in face, noble in heart as in name, ' The poor rude world hath not her fellow.' Thoughtful yet full of laughter, dignified yet gay and gracious, quick of intellect and swift in judgment yet never severe and merciless, a kind and indulgent mistress, a true friend, a loving wife—could one want more to make * * his ideal of a perfect woman?" " Lady Mac beth," is she ' fiend' or woman ? To many critics she is the former, but she is a woman—a woman possessing a wonder-fully developed will power which enabled her successfully to accomplish anything she ardently willed to do. Her sin lies in her worshipful devotion to her husband, a man utterly devoid of even a single noble trait, save perhaps his love for her. * * * Her fate seems a pitiless one and we must pity her—a woman of splendid possibilities, who succumbed WWflS\m^MmiM\it^aB^v^MMlt 244 THE MERCURY. to the ambition of another and was ruined." " Brutus " in The Juniata Echo is set forth as a successful moralist but im-practical and unsuccessful as a diplomat. " At fault even in his intense patriotism; impractical, but to his high ideals ever true." The College Student brings Caliban before us as " the most unique creation of the world's greatest dramatist." He is purely the result of imagination, and for this reason can be compared only with others of like nature. He is not like the witches in " Macbeth," and he resembles neither the demons of Milton nor the monsters of Dante. All these lack the variety of qualities and those distinct qualities which make up the mind of Caliban. His moral nature presents an interesting problem. " The moral phases of his moral being are grand in their very lack of consistency with human ideas. In a word, although from a purely human standpoint he has no code of morals, he seems to be governed by some vague, indefinite law which throws a better light on his whole character." His great ele-vating characteristic is his poetic instinct. " He always speaks in poetry, which, when we remember that Shakespeare's lesser lights never spoke in poetry, shows him to be of no mean posi-tion in the drama. * * * The pure beauty of his lofty poetical instinct standing in bold relief against the dark back-ground of his sinful and wayward mind seems to place him in a light in which the background itself is lost." In other words poetical instinct covers a multitude of sins. PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISER'S i. FURNITURE Mattresses, Bed Springs, Iron Beds, Picture Frames, Repair Work done promptly. Under-taking a specialty. * Telephone No. 97. s. 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Daniel Deudney on Mixed Ontology, Planetary Geopolitics, and Republican Greenpeace



This is the second in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 






World politics increasingly abrasions with the limits of state-centric thinking, faced as the world is with a set of issues that affect not only us collectively as mankind, but also the planet itself. While much of IR theorizing seems to shirk such realizations, the work of Daniel Deudney has consistently engaged with the complex problems engendered by the entanglements of nuclear weapons, the planetary environment, space exploration, and the kind of political associations that might help us to grapple with our fragile condition as humanity-in-the world. In this elaborate Talk, Deudney—amongst others—lays out his understanding of the fundamental forces that drive both planetary political progress and problems; discusses the kind of ontological position needed to appreciate these problems; and argues for the merits of a republican greenpeace model to political organization.





Print version of this Talk (pdf)







What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



The study of politics is the study of human politics and the human situation has been—and is being—radically altered by changes in the human relationships with the natural and material worlds. In my view, this means IR and related intellectual disciplines should focus on better understanding the emergence of the 'global' and the 'planetary,' their implications for the overall human world and its innumerable sub-worlds, and their relations with the realization of basic human needs. The global and the planetary certainly don't comprise all of the human situation, but the fact that the human situation has become global and planetary touches every other facet of the human situation, sometimes in fundamental ways. The simple story is that the human world is now 'global and planetary' due to the explosive transformation over the last several centuries of science-based technology occurring within the geophysical and biophysical features of planet Earth. The natural Earth and its relationship with humans have been massively altered by the vast amplifications in dispersed human agency produced by the emergence and spread of machine-based civilization. The overall result of these changes has been the emergence of a global- and planetary-scale material and social reality that is in some ways similar, but in other important ways radically different, from earlier times. Practices and structures inherited from the pre-global human worlds have not adequately been adjusted to take the new human planetary situation into account and their persistence casts a long and partially dark shadow over the human prospect.



A global and planetary focus is also justified—urgently—by the fact that the overall human prospect on this planet, and the fate of much additional life on this planet, is increasingly dependent on the development and employment of new social arrangements for interacting with these novel configurations of material and natural possibilities and limits. Human agency is now situated, and is making vastly fateful choices—for better or worse—in a sprawling, vastly complex aggregation of human-machine-nature assemblies which is our world. The 'fate of the earth' now partly hinges on human choices, and helping to make sure these choices are appropriate ones should be the paramount objective of political scientific and theoretical efforts. However, no one discipline or approach is sufficient to grapple successfully with this topic. All disciplines are necessary. But there are good reasons to believe that 'IR' and related disciplines have a particularly important possible practical role to play. (I am also among those who prefer 'global studies' as a label for the enterprise of answering questions that cut across and significantly subsume both the 'international' and the 'domestic.')



My approach to grappling with this topic is situated—like the work of now vast numbers of other IR theorists and researchers of many disciplines—in the study of 'globalization.' The now widely held starting point for this intellectual effort is the realization that globalization has been the dominant pattern or phenomenon, the story of stories, over at least the last five centuries. Globalization has been occurring in military, ecological, cultural, and economic affairs. And I emphasize—like many, but not all, analysts of globalization—that the processes of globalization are essentially dependent on new machines, apparatuses, and technologies which humans have fabricated and deployed. Our world is global because of the astounding capabilities of machine civilization. This startling transformation of human choice by technological advance is centrally about politics because it is centrally about changes in power. Part of this power story has been about changes in the scope and forms of domination. Globalization has been, to state the point mildly, 'uneven,' marked by amplifications of violence and domination and predation on larger and wider scales. Another part of the story of the power transformation has been the creation of a world marked by high degrees of interdependence, interaction, speed, and complexity. These processes of globalization and the transformation of machine capabilities are not stopping or slowing down but are accelerating. Thus, I argue that 'bounding power'—the growth, at times by breathtaking leaps, of human capabilities to do things—is now a fundamental feature of the human world, and understanding its implications should, in my view, be a central activity for IR scholars.



In addressing the topic of machine civilization and its globalization on Earth, my thinking has been centered first around the developing of 'geopolitical' lines argument to construct a theory of 'planetary geopolitics'. 'Geopolitics' is the study of geography, ecology, technology, and the earth, and space and place, and their interaction with politics. The starting point for geopolitical analysis is accurate mapping. Not too many IR scholars think of themselves as doing 'geography' in any form. In part this results from of the unfortunate segregation of 'geography' into a separate academic discipline, very little of which is concerned with politics. Many also mistake the overall project of 'geopolitics' with the ideas, and egregious mistakes and political limitations, of many self-described 'geopoliticans' who are typically arch-realists, strong nationalists, and imperialists. Everyone pays general lip service to the importance of technology, but little interaction occurs between IR and 'technology studies' and most IR scholars are happy to treat such matters as 'technical' or non-political in character. Despite this general theoretical neglect, many geographic and technological factors routinely pop into arguments in political science and political theory, and play important roles in them.



Thinking about the global and planetary through the lens of a fuller geopolitics is appealing to me because it is the human relationship with the material world and the Earth that has been changed with the human world's globalization. Furthermore, much of the actual agendas of movements for peace, arms control, and sustainability are essentially about alternative ways of ordering the material world and our relations with it. Given this, I find an approach that thinks systematically about the relations between patterns of materiality and different political forms is particularly well-suited to provide insights of practical value for these efforts.



The other key focus of my research has been around extending a variety of broadly 'republican' political insights for a cluster of contemporary practical projects for peace, arms control, and environmental stewardship ('greenpeace'). Even more than 'geopolitics,' 'republicanism' is a term with too many associations and meanings. By republics I mean political associations based on popular sovereignty and marked by mutual limitations, that is, by 'bounding power'—the restraint of power, particularly violent power—in the interests of the people generally. Assuming that security from the application of violence to bodies is a primary (but not sole) task of political association, how do republican political arrangements achieve this end? I argue that the character and scope of power restraint arrangements that actually serve the fundamental security interests of its popular sovereign varies in significant ways in different material contexts.



Republicanism is first and foremost a domestic form, centered upon the successive spatial expansion of domestic-like realms, and the pursuit of a constant political project of maximally feasible ordered freedom in changed spatial and material circumstances. I find thinking about our global and planetary human situation from the perspective of republicanism appealing because the human global and planetary situation has traits—most notably high levels of interdependence, interaction, practical speed, and complexity—that make it resemble our historical experience of 'domestic' and 'municipal' realms. Thinking with a geopolitically grounded republicanism offers insights about global governance very different from the insights generated within the political conceptual universe of hierarchical, imperial, and state-centered political forms. Thus planetary geopolitics and republicanism offers a perspective on what it means to 'Think Globally and Act Locally.' If we think of, or rather recognize, the planet as our locality, and then act as if the Earth is our locality, then we are likely to end up doing various approximations of the best-practice republican forms that we have successfully developed in our historically smaller domestic localities.





How did you arrive at where you currently are in IR?



Like anybody else, the formative events in my intellectual development have been shaped by the thick particularities of time and place. 'The boy is the father of the man,' as it is said. The first and most direction-setting stage in the formation of my 'green peace' research interests was when I was in 'grade school,' roughly the years from age 6-13. During these years my family lived in an extraordinary place, St Simons Island, a largely undeveloped barrier island off the coast of southern Georgia. This was an extremely cool place to be a kid. It had extensive beaches, and marshes, as well as amazing trees of gargantuan proportions. My friends and I spent much time exploring, fishing, camping out, climbing trees, and building tree houses. Many of these nature-immersion activities were spontaneous, others were in Boy Scouts. This extraordinary natural environment and the attachments I formed to it, shaped my strong tendency to see the fates of humans and nature as inescapably intertwined. But the Boy Scouts also instilled me with a sense of 'virtue ethics'. A line from the Boy Scout Handbook captures this well: 'Take a walk around your neighborhood. Make a list of what is right and wrong about it. Make a plan to fix what is not right.' This is a demotic version of Weber's political 'ethic of responsibility.' This is very different from the ethics of self-realization and self-expression that have recently gained such ground in America and elsewhere. It is now very 'politically incorrect' to think favorably of the Boy Scouts, but I believe that if the Scouting experience was universally accessible, the world would be a much improved place.



My kid-in-nature life may sound very Tom Sawyer, but it was also very Tom Swift. My friends and I spent much of our waking time reading about the technological future, and imaginatively play-acting in future worlds. This imaginative world was richly fertilized by science fiction comic books, television shows, movies, and books. Me and my friends—juvenile technological futurists and techno-nerds in a decidedly anti-intellectual culture—were avid readers of Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Ray Bradbury, and Robert Heinlein, and each new issue of Analog was eagerly awaited. While we knew we were Americans, my friends and I had strong inclinations to think of ourselves most essentially as 'earthlings.' We fervently discussed extraterrestrial life and UFOs, and we eagerly awaited the day, soon to occur, we were sure, in which we made 'first contact.' We wanted to become, if not astronauts, then designers and builders of spaceships. We built tree houses, but we filled them with discarded electronics and they became starships. We rode bicycles, but we lugged about attaché cases filled with toy ray guns, transistor radios, firecrackers, and homemade incendiary devices. We built and fired off rockets, painstaking assembled plastic kit models of famous airplanes and ships, and then we would blow them apart with our explosives. The future belonged to technology, and we fancied ourselves its avant garde.



Yet the prospect of nuclear Armageddon seemed very real. We did 'duck and cover' drills at school, and sat for two terrifying weeks through the Cuban Missile Crisis. My friends and I had copies of the Atomic Energy Commission manuals on 'nuclear effects,' complete with a slide-rule like gadget that enabled us to calculate just what would happen if near-by military bases were obliterated by nuclear explosions. Few doubted that we were, in the words of a pop song, 'on the eve of destruction.' These years were also the dawning of 'the space age' in which humans were finally leaving the Earth and starting what promised to be an epic trek, utterly transformative in its effects, to the stars. My father worked for a number of these years for a large aerospace military-industrial firm, then working for NASA to build the very large rockets needed to launch men and machines to the moon and back. My friends and I debated fantastical topics, such as the pros and cons of emigrating to Mars, and how rapidly a crisis-driven exodus from the earth could be organized.



Two events that later occurred in the area where I spent my childhood served as culminating catalytic events for my greenpeace thinking. First, some years after my family moved away, the industrial facility to mix rocket fuel that had been built by the company my father worked for, and that he had helped put into operation, was struck by an extremely violent 'industrial accident,' which reduced, in one titanic flash, multi-story concrete and steel buildings filled with specialized heavy industrial machinery (and everyone in them) into a grey powdery gravel ash, no piece of which was larger than a fist. Second, during the late 1970s, the US Navy acquired a large tract of largely undeveloped marsh and land behind another barrier island (Cumberland), an area 10-15 miles from where I had lived, a place where I had camped, fished, and hunted deer. The Navy dredged and filled what was one of the most biologically fertile temperate zone estuaries on the planet. There they built the east coast base for the new fleet of Trident nuclear ballistic missile submarines, the single most potent violence machine ever built, thus turning what was for me the wildest part of my wild-encircled childhood home into one of the largest nuclear weapons complexes on earth. These events catalyzed for me the realization that there was a great struggle going on, for the Earth and for the future, and I knew firmly which side I was on.



My approach to thinking about problems was also strongly shaped by high school debate, where I learned the importance of 'looking at questions from both sides,' and from this stems my tendency to look at questions as debates between competing answers, and to focus on decisively engaging, defeating, and replacing the strongest and most influential opposing positions. As an undergraduate at Yale College, I started doing Political Theory. I am sure that I was a very vexing student in some ways, because (the debater again) I asked Marxist questions to my liberal and conservative professors, and liberal and conservative ones to my Marxist professors. Late in my sophomore year, I had my epiphany, my direction-defining moment, that my vocation would be an attempt to do the political theory of the global and the technological. Since then, the only decisions have been ones of priority and execution within this project.



Wanting to learn something about cutting-edge global and technological and issues, I next went to Washington D.C. for seven years. I worked on Capitol Hill for three and a half years as a policy aide, working on energy and conservation and renewable energy and nuclear power. I spent the other three and a half years as a Senior Researcher at the Worldwatch Institute, a small environmental and global issues think tank that was founded and headed by Lester Brown, a well-known and far-sighted globalist. I co-authored a book about renewable energy and transitions to global sustainability and wrote a study on space and space weapons. At the time I published Whole Earth Security: a Geopolitics of Peace (1983), in which my basic notions of planetary geopolitics and republicanism were first laid out. During these seven years in Washington, I also was a part-time student, earning a Master's degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy at George Washington University.



In all, these Washington experiences have been extremely valuable for my thinking. Many political scientists view public service as a low or corrupting activity, but this is, I think, very wrong-headed. The reason that the democratic world works as well as it does is because of the distributive social intelligence. But social intelligence is neither as distributed nor as intelligent as it needs to be to deal with many pressing problems. My experience as a Congressional aide taught me that most of the problems that confront my democracy are rooted in various limits and corruptions of the people. I have come to have little patience with those who say, for example, rising inequality is inherent in capital C capitalism, when the more proximate explanation is that the Reagan Republican Party was so successful in gutting the progressive tax system previously in place in the United States. Similarly, I see little value in claims, to take a very contemporary example, that 'the NSA is out of control' when this agency is doing more or less what the elected officials, responding to public pressures to provide 'national security' loudly demanded. In democracies, the people are ultimately responsible.



As I was immersed in the world of arms control and environmental activism I was impressed by the truth of Keynes's oft quoted line, about the great practical influence of the ideas of some long-dead 'academic scribbler.' This is true in varying degrees in every issue area, but in some much more than others. This reinforced my sense that great potential practical consequence of successfully innovating in the various conceptual frameworks that underpinned so many important activities. For nuclear weapons, it became clear to me that the problem was rooted in the statist and realist frames that people so automatically brought to a security question of this magnitude.



Despite the many appeals of a career in DC politics and policy, this was all for me an extended research field-trip, and so I left Washington to do a PhD—a move that mystified many of my NGO and activist friends, and seemed like utter folly to my political friends. At Princeton University, I concentrated on IR, Political Theory, and Military History and Politics, taking courses with Robert Gilpin, Richard Falk, Barry Posen, Sheldon Wolin and others. In my dissertation—entitled Global Orders: Geopolitical and Materialist Theories of the Global-Industrial Era, 1890-1945—I explored IR and related thinking about the impacts of the industrial revolution as a debate between different world order alternatives, and made arguments about the superiority of liberalist, internationalist, and globalist arguments—most notably from H.G. Wells and John Dewey—to the strong realist and imperialist ideas most commonly associated with the geopolitical writers of this period.



I also continued engaging in activist policy affiliated to the Program on Nuclear Policy Alternatives at the Center for Energy andEnvironmental Studies (CEES), which was then headed by Frank von Hippel, a physicist turned 'public interest scientist', and a towering figure in the global nuclear arms control movement. I was a Post Doc at CEES during the Gorbachev era and I went on several amazing and eye-opening trips to the Soviet Union. Continuing my space activism, I was able to organize workshops in Moscow and Washington on large-scale space cooperation, gathering together many of the key space players on both sides. While Princeton was fabulously stimulating intellectually, it was also a stressful pressure-cooker, and I maintained my sanity by making short trips, two of three weekends, over six years, to Manhattan, where I spent the days working in the main reading room of the New York Public Library and the nights partying and relaxing in a world completely detached from academic life.



When it comes to my intellectual development in terms of reading theory, the positive project I wanted to pursue was partially defined by approaches I came to reject. Perhaps most centrally, I came to reject an approach that was very intellectually powerful, even intoxicating, and which retains great sway over many, that of metaphysical politics. The politics of the metaphysicians played a central role in my coming to reject the politics of metaphysics. The fact that some metaphysical ideas and the some of the deep thinkers who advanced them, such as Heidegger, and many Marxists, were so intimately connected with really disastrous politics seemed a really damning fact for me, particularly given that these thinkers insisted so strongly on the link between their metaphysics and their politics. I was initially drawn to Nietzsche's writing (what twenty-year old isn't) but his model of the philosopher founder or law-giver—that is, of a spiritually gifted but alienated guy (and it always is a guy) with a particularly strong but frustrated 'will to power' going into the wilderness, having a deep spiritual revelation, and then returning to the mundane corrupt world with new 'tablets of value,' along with a plan to take over and run things right—seemed more comic than politically relevant, unless the prophet is armed, in which case it becomes a frightful menace. The concluding scene in Herman Hesse's Magister Ludi (sometimes translated as The Glass Bead Game) summarized by overall view of the 'high theory' project. After years of intense training by the greatest teachers the most spiritually and intellectually gifted youths finally graduate. To celebrate, they go to lake, dive in, and, having not learned how to swim, drown.



I was more attracted to Aristotle, Hume, Montesquieu, Dewey and other political theorists with less lofty and comprehensive views of what theory might accomplish; weary of actions; based on dogmatic or totalistic thinking; an eye to the messy and compromised world; with a political commitment to liberty and the interests of the many; a preference for peace over war; an aversion to despotism and empire; and an affinity for tolerance and plurality. I also liked some of those thinkers because of their emphasis on material contexts. Montesquieu seeks to analyze the interaction of material contexts and republican political forms; Madison and his contemporaries attempt to extend the spatial scope of republican political association by recombining in novel ways various earlier power restraint arrangements. I was tremendously influenced by Dewey, studying intensively his slender volume The Public and its Problems (1927)—which I think is the most important book in twentieth century political thought. By the 'public' Dewey means essentially a stakeholder group, and his main point is that the material transformations produced by the industrial revolution has created new publics, and that the political task is to conceptualize and realize forms of community and government appropriate to solving the problems that confront these new publics.



One can say my overall project became to apply and extend their concepts to the contemporary planetary situation. Concomitantly reading IR literature on nuclear weapons, I was struck by fact that the central role that material realities played in these arguments was very ad hoc, and that many of the leading arguments on nuclear politics were very unconvincing. It was clear that while Waltz (Theory Talk #40) had brilliantly developed some key ideas about anarchy made by Hobbes and Rousseau, he had also left something really important out. These sorts of deficiencies led me to develop the arguments contained in Bounding Power. I think it is highly unlikely that I would have had these doubts, or come to make the arguments I made without having worked in political theory and in policy.



I read many works that greatly influenced my thinking in this area, among them works by Lewis Mumford, Langdon Winner's Autonomous Technology, James Lovelock's Gaia, Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents (read a related article here, pdf), Jonathan Schell's Fate of the Earth and The Abolition, William Ophul's Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity... I was particularly stuck by a line in Buckminster Fuller's Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth (pdf), that we live in a 'spaceship' like closed highly interconnected system, but lack an 'operating manual' to guide intelligently our actions. It was also during this period that I read key works by H.G. Wells, most notably his book, Anticipations, and his essay The Idea of a League of Nations, both of which greatly influenced my thinking.



This aside, the greatest contribution to my thinking has come from conversations sustained over many years with some really extraordinary individuals. To mention those that I have been arguing with, and learning from, for at least ten years, there is John O'Looney, Wesley Warren, Bob Gooding-Williams, Alyn McAuly, Henry Nau, Richard Falk, Michael Doyle (Theory Talk #1), Richard Mathew, Paul Wapner, Bron Taylor, Ron Deibert, John Ikenberry, Bill Wohlforth, Frank von Hippel, Ethan Nadelmann, Fritz Kratochwil, Barry Buzan (Theory Talk #35), Ole Waever, John Agnew (Theory Talk #4), Barry Posen, Alex Wendt (Theory Talk #3), James der Derian, David Hendrickson, Nadivah Greenberg, Tim Luke, Campbell Craig, Bill Connolly, Steven David, Jane Bennett, Daniel Levine (TheoryTalk #58), and Jairus Grove. My only regret is that I have not spoken even more with them, and with the much larger number of people I have learned from on a less sustained basis along the way.

                                    



What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?



I have thought a great deal about what sort of answers to this question can be generally valuable. For me, the most important insight is that success in intellectual life and academia is determined by more or less the same combination of factors that determines success more generally. This list is obvious: character, talent, perseverance and hard work, good judgment, good 'people skills,' and luck. Not everyone has a talent to do this kind of work, but the number of people who do have the talent to do this kind of work is much larger than the number of people who are successful in doing it. I think in academia as elsewhere, the people most likely to really succeed are those whose attitude toward the activity is vocational. A vocation is something one is called to do by an inner voice that one cannot resist. People with vocations never really work in one sense, because they are doing something that they would be doing even if they were not paid or required. Of course, in another sense people with vocations never stop working, being so consumed with their path that everything else matters very little. People with jobs and professions largely stop working when they when the lottery, but people with vocations are empowered to work more and better. When your vocation overlaps with your job, you should wake up and say 'wow, I cannot believe I am being paid to do this!' Rather obviously, the great danger in the life paths of people with vocations is imbalance and burn-out. To avoid these perils it is beneficial to sustain strong personal relationships, know when and how to 'take off' effectively, and sustain the ability to see things as an unfolding comedy and to laugh.



Academic life also involves living and working in a profession. Compared to the oppressions that so many thinkers and researchers have historically suffered from, contemporary professional academic life is a utopia. But academic life has several aspects unfortunate aspects, and coping successfully with them is vital. Academic life is full of 'odd balls' and the loose structure of universities and organization, combined with the tenure system, licenses an often florid display of dubious behavior. A fair number of academics have really primitive and incompetent social skills. Others are thin skinned-ego maniacs. Some are pompous hypocrites. Some are ruthlessly self-aggrandizing and underhanded. Some are relentless shirkers and free-riders. Also, academic life is, particularly relative to the costs of obtaining the years of education necessary to obtain it, not very well paid. Corruptions of clique, ideological factionalism, and nepotism occur. If not kept in proper perspective, and approached in appropriate ways, academic department life can become stupidly consuming of time, energy, and most dangerously, intellectual attention. The basic step for healthy departmental life is to approach it as a professional role.



The other big dimension of academic life is teaching. Teaching is one of the two 'deliverables' that academic organizations provide in return for the vast resources they consume. Shirking on teaching is a dereliction of responsibility, but also is the foregoing of a great opportunity. Teaching is actually one of the most assuredly consequential things academics do. The key to great teaching is, I think, very simple: inspire and convey enthusiasm. Once inspired, students learn. Once students take questions as their own, they become avid seekers of answers. Teachers of things political also have a responsibility to remain even-handed in what they teach, to make sure that they do not teach just or mainly their views, to make sure that the best and strongest versions of opposing sides are heard. Teaching seeks to produce informed and critically thinking students, not converts. Beyond the key roles of inspiration and even-handedness, the rest is the standard package of tasks relevant in any professional role: good preparation, good organization, hard work, and clarity of presentation.





Your main book, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (2007), is a mix of intellectual history, political theory and IR theory, and is targeted largely at realism. How does a reading and interpretation of a large number of old books tell us something new about realism, and the contemporary global?



Bounding Power attempts to dispel some very large claims made by realists about their self-proclaimed 'tradition,' a lineage of thought in which they place many of the leading Western thinkers about political order, such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and the 'global geopoliticans' from the years around the beginning of the twentieth century. In the book I argue that the actual main axis of western thinking about political order (and its absence) is largely the work of 'republican' thinkers from the small number of 'republics', and that many of the key ideas that realists call realist and liberals call liberal are actually fragments of a larger, more encompassing set of arguments that were primarily in the idioms of republicanism. This entails dispelling the widely held view that the liberal and proto-liberal republican thought and practice are marked by 'idealism'—and therefore both inferior in their grasp of the problem of security-from violence and valuable only when confined to the 'domestic.' I demonstrate that this line of republican security thinkers had a robust set of claims both about material contextual factors, about the 'geopolitics of freedom', and a fuller understanding of security-from-violence. The book shows how perhaps the most important insights of this earlier cluster of arguments has oddly been dropped by both realists (particularly neorealists) and liberal international theorists. And, finally, it is an attempt to provide an understanding that posits the project of exiting anarchy on a global scale as something essentially unprecedented, and as something that the best of our inherited theory leaves us unable to say much about.



The main argument is contained in my formulation of what I think are the actual the two main sets of issues of Western structural-materialist security theory, two problematiques formulated in republican and naturalist-materialist conceptual vocabularies. The first problematique concerns the relationship between material context, the scope of tolerable anarchy, and necessary-for-security government. The second problematic concerns the relative security-viability of two main different forms of government—hierarchical and republican.



This formulation of the first problematic concerning anarchy differs from the main line of contemporary Realist argument in that it poses the question as one about the spatial scope of tolerable anarchy. The primary variable in my reconstruction of the material-contextual component of these arguments is what I term violence interdependence (absent, weak, strong, and intense). The main substantive claim of Western structural-materialist security theory is that situations of anarchy combined with intense violence interdependence are incompatible with security and require substantive government. Situations of strong and weak violence interdependence constitute a tolerable (if at times 'nasty and brutish') second ('state-of-war') anarchy not requiring substantive government. Early formulations of 'state of nature' arguments, explicitly or implicitly hinge upon this material contextual variable, and the overall narrative structure of the development of republican security theory and practice has concerned natural geographic variations and technologically caused changes in the material context, and thus the scope of security tolerable/intolerable anarchy and needed substantive government. This argument was present in early realist versions of anarchy arguments, but has been dropped by neorealists. Conversely, contemporary liberal international theorists analyze interdependence, but have little to say about violence. The result is that the realists talk about violence and security, and the liberals talk about interdependence not relating to violence, producing the great lacuna of contemporary theory: analysis of violence interdependence.



The second main problematique, concerning the relative security viability of hierarchical and republican forms, has also largely been lost sight of, in large measure by the realist insistence that governments are by definition hierarchical, and the liberal avoidance of system structural theory in favor of process, ideational, and economic variables. (For neoliberals, cooperation is seen as (possibly) occurring in anarchy, without altering or replacing anarchy.) The main claim here is that republican and proto-liberal theorists have a more complete grasp of the security political problem than realists because of their realization that both the extremes of hierarchy and anarchy are incompatible with security. In order to register this lost component of structural theory I refer to republican forms at both the unit and the system-level as being characterized by an ordering principle which I refer to as negarchy. Such political arrangements are characterized by the simultaneous negation of both hierarchy and anarchy. The vocabulary of political structures should thus be conceived as a triad-triangle of anarchy, hierarchy, and negarchy, rather than a spectrum stretching from pure anarchy to pure hierarchy. Using this framework, Bounding Power traces various formulations of the key arguments of security republicans from the Greeks through the nuclear era as arguments about the simultaneous avoidance of hierarchy and anarchy on expanding spatial scales driven by variations and changes in the material context. If we recognize the main axis of our thinking in this way, we can stand on a view of our past that is remarkable in its potential relevance to thinking and dealing with the contemporary 'global village' like a human situation.





Nuclear weapons play a key role in the argument of Bounding Power about the present, as well as elsewhere in your work. But are nuclear weapons are still important as hey were during the Cold War to understand global politics?



Since their arrival on the world scene in the middle years of the twentieth century, there has been pretty much universal agreement that nuclear weapons are in some fundamental way 'revolutionary' in their implications for security-from-violence and world politics. The fact that the Cold War is over does not alter, and even stems from, this fact. Despite this wide agreement on the importance of nuclear weapons, theorists, policy makers, and popular arms control/disarmament movements have fundamental disagreements about which political forms are compatible with the avoidance of nuclear war. I have attempted to provide a somewhat new answer to this 'nuclear-political question', and to explain why strong forms of interstate arms control are necessary for security in the nuclear age. I argue that achieving the necessary levels of arms control entails somehow exiting interstate anarchy—not toward a world government as a world state, but toward a world order that is a type of compound republican union (marked by, to put it in terms of above discussion, a nearly completely negarchical structure).



This argument attempts to close what I term the 'arms control gap', the discrepancy between the value arms control is assigned by academic theorists of nuclear weapons and their importance in the actual provision of security in the nuclear era. During the Cold War, thinking among IR theorists about nuclear weapons tended to fall into three broad schools—war strategists, deterrence statists, and arms controllers. Where the first two only seem to differ about the amount of nuclear weapons necessary for states seeking security (the first think many, the second less), the third advocates that states do what they have very rarely done before the nuclear age, reciprocal restraints on arms.



But this Cold War triad of arguments is significantly incomplete as a list of the important schools of thought about the nuclear-political question. There are four additional schools, and a combination of their arguments constitutes, I argue, a superior answer to the nuclear-political question. First are the nuclear one worlders, a view that flourished during the late 1940s and early 1950s, and held that the simple answer to the nuclear political question is to establish a world government, as some sort of state. Second are the populist anti-nuclearists, who indict state apparatuses of acting contrary to the global public's security interests. Third are the deep arms controllers, such as Jonathan Schell, who argue that nuclear weapons need to be abolished. Fourth are the theorists of omniviolence, who theorize situations produced by the leakage of nuclear weapons into the hands of non-state actors who cannot be readily deterred from using nuclear weapons. What all of these schools have in common is that they open up the state and make arguments about how various forms of political freedom—and the institutions that make it possible—are at issue in answering the nuclear-political question.

                                                                                                                

Yet one key feature all seven schools share is that they all make arguments about how particular combinations and configurations of material realities provide the basis for thinking that their answer to the nuclear-political question is correct. Unfortunately, their understandings of how material factors shape, or should shape, actual political arrangements is very ad hoc. Yet the material factors—starting with sheer physical destructiveness—are so pivotal that they merit a more central role in theories of nuclear power. I think we need to have a model that allows us to grasp how variations in material contexts condition the functionality of 'modes of protection', that is, distinct and recurring security practices (and their attendant political structures).



For instance, one mode of protection—what I term the real-state mode of protection—attempts to achieve security through the concentration, mobilization, and employment of violence capability. This is the overall, universal, context-independent strategy of realists. Bringing into view material factors, I argue, shows that this mode of protection is functional not universally but specifically—and only—in material contexts that are marked by violence-poverty and slowness. This mode of protection is dysfunctional in nuclear material contexts marked by violence abundance and high violence velocities. In contrast, a republican federal mode of protection is a bundle of practices that aim for the demobilization and deceleration of violence capacity, and that the practices associated with this mode of protection are security functional in the nuclear material context.



What emerges from such an approach to ideas about the relation between nuclear power and security from violence is that the epistemological foundations for any of the major positions about nuclear weapons are actually much weaker than we should be comfortable with. People often say the two most important questions about the nuclear age are: what is the probability that nuclear weapons will be used? And then, what will happen when they are used? The sobering truth is that we really do not have good grounds for confidently answering either of those two questions. But every choice made about nuclear weapons depends on risk calculations that depend on how we answer these questions.





You have also written extensively on space, a topic that has not recently attracted much attention from many IR scholars. How does your thinking on this relate to your overall thinking about the global and planetary situation?

                                                                                                          

The first human steps into outer space during the middle years of the twentieth century have been among the most spectacular and potentially consequential events in the globalization of machine civilization on Earth. Over the course of what many call 'the space age,' thinking about space activities, space futures, and the consequences of space activities has been dominated by an elaborately developed body of 'space expansionist' thought that makes ambitious and captivating claims about both the feasibility and the desirability of human expansion into outer space. Such views of space permeate popular culture, and at times appear to be quite influential in actual space policy. Space expansionists hold that outer space is a limitless frontier and that humans should make concerted efforts to explore and colonize and extend their military activities into space. They claim the pursuit of their ambitious projects will have many positive, even transformative, effects upon the human situation on Earth, by escaping global closure, protecting the earth's habitability, preserving political plurality, and enhancing species survival. Claims about the Earth, its historical patterns and its contemporary problems, permeate space expansionist thinking.



While the feasibility, both technological and economic, of space expansionist projects has been extensively assessed, arguments for their desirability have not been accorded anything approaching a systematic assessment. In part, such arguments about the desirability of space expansion are difficult to assess because they incorporate claims that are very diverse in character, including claims about the Earth (past, present, and future), about the ways in which material contexts made up of space 'geography' and technologies produce or heavily favor particular political outcomes, and about basic worldview assumptions regarding nature, science, technology, and life.



By breaking these space expansionist arguments down into their parts, and systematically assessing their plausibility, a very different picture of the space prospect emerges. I think there are strong reasons to think that the consequences of the human pursuit of space expansion have been, and could be, very undesirable, even catastrophic. The actual militarization of that core space technology ('the rocket') and the construction of a planetary-scope 'delivery' and support system for nuclear war-fighting has been the most important consequence of actual space activities, but these developments have been curiously been left out of accounts of the space age and assessments of its impacts. Similarly, much of actually existing 'nuclear arms control' has centered on restraining and dismantling space weapons, not nuclear weapons. Thus the most consequential space activity—the acceleration of nuclear delivery capabilities—has been curiously rendered almost invisible in accounts of space and assessments of its impacts. This is an 'unknown known' of the 'space age'. Looking ahead, the creation of large orbital infrastructures will either presuppose or produce world government, potentially of a very hierarchical sort.  There are also good reasons to think that space colonies are more likely to be micro-totalitarian than free. And extensive human movement off the planet could in a variety of ways increase the vulnerability of life on Earth, and even jeopardize the survival of the human species.



Finally, I think much of space expansionist (and popular) thinking about space and the consequences of humans space activities has been marked by basic errors in practical geography. Most notably, there is the widespread failure to realize that the expansion of human activities into Earth's orbital space has enhanced global closure, because the effective distances in Earth's space make it very small. And because of the formidable natural barriers to human space activity, space is a planetary 'lid, not a 'frontier'. So one can say that the most important practical discovery of the 'space age' has been an improved understanding of the Earth. These lines of thinking, I find, would suggest the outlines of a more modest and Earth-centered space program, appropriate for the current Earth age. Overall, the fact that we can't readily expand into space is part of why we are in a new 'earth age' rather than a 'space age'.





You've argued against making the environment into a national security issue twenty years ago. Do the same now, considering that making the environment a bigger priority by making it into a national security issue might be the only way to prevent total environmental destruction?



When I started writing about the relationships between environment and security twenty years ago, not a great deal of work had been done on this topic. But several leading environmental thinkers were making the case that framing environmental issues as security issues, or what came to be called 'securitizing the environment', was not only a good strategy to get action on environmental problems, but also was useful analytically to think about these two domains. Unlike the subsequent criticisms of 'environmental security' made by Realists and scholars of conventional 'security studies', my criticism starts with the environmentalist premise that environmental deterioration is a paramount problem for contemporary humanity as a whole.



Those who want to 'securitize the environment' are attempting to do what William James a century ago proposed as a general strategy for social problem solving. Can we find, in James' language, 'a moral equivalent of war?' (Note the unfortunately acronym: MEOW). War and the threat of war, James observed, often lead to rapid and extensive mobilizations of effort. Can we somehow transfer these vast social energies to deal with other sets of problems? This is an enduring hope, particularly in the United States, where we have a 'war on drugs', a 'war on cancer', and a 'war on poverty'. But doing this for the environment, by 'securitizing the environment,' is unlikely to be very successful. And I fear that bringing 'security' orientations, institutions, and mindsets into environmental problem-solving will also bring in statist, nationalist, and militarist approaches. This will make environmental problem-solving more difficult, not easier, and have many baneful side-effects.



Another key point I think is important, is that the environment—and the various values and ends associated with habitat and the protection of habitat—are actually much more powerful and encompassing than those of security and violence. Instead of 'securitizing the environment' it is more promising is to 'environmentalize security'. Not many people think about the linkages between the environment and security-from-violence in this way, but I think there is a major case of it 'hiding in plain sight' in the trajectory of how the state-system and nuclear weapons have interacted.



When nuclear weapons were invented and first used in the 1940s, scientists were ignorant about many aspects of their effects. As scientists learned about these effects, and as this knowledge became public, many people started thinking and acting in different ways about nuclear choices. The fact that a ground burst of a nuclear weapon would produce substantial radioactive 'fall-out' was not appreciated until the first hydrogen bomb tests in the early 1950s. It was only then that scientists started to study what happened to radioactive materials dispersed widely in the environment. Evidence began to accumulate that some radioactive isotopes would be 'bio-focused', or concentrated by biological process. Public interest scientists began effectively publicizing this information, and mothers were alerted to the fact that their children's teeth were become radioactive. This new scientific knowledge about the environmental effects of nuclear explosions, and the public mobilizations it produced, played a key role in the first substantial nuclear arms control treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, in the ocean, and in space. Thus, the old ways of providing security were circumscribed by new knowledge and new stakeholders of environmental health effects. The environment was not securitized, security was partially environmentalized.



Thus, while some accounts by arms control theorists emphasize the importance of 'social learning' in altering US-Soviet relations, an important part of this learning was not about the nature of social and political interactions, but about the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons. The learning that was most important in motivating so many actors (both within states and in mass publics) to seek changes in politics was 'natural learning,' or more specifically learning about the interaction of natural and technological systems.



An even more consequential case of the environmentalization of security occurred in the 1970's and 1980's. A key text here is Jonathan Schell's book, The Fate of the Earth. Schell's book, combining very high-quality journalism with first rate political theoretical reflections, lays out in measured terms the new discoveries of ecologists and atmospheric scientists about the broader planetary consequences of an extensive nuclear war. Not only would hundreds of millions of people be immediately killed and much of the planet's built infrastructure destroyed, but the planet earth's natural systems would be so altered that the extinction of complex life forms, among them homo sapiens, might result. The detonation of numerous nuclear weapons and the resultant burning of cities would probably dramatically alter the earth's atmosphere, depleting the ozone layer that protects life from lethal solar radiations, and filling the atmosphere with sufficient dust to cause a 'nuclear winter.' At stake in nuclear war, scientists had learned, was not just the fate of nations, but of the earth as a life support system. Conventional accounts of the nuclear age and of the end of the Cold War are loath to admit it, but it I believe it is clear that spreading awareness of these new natural-technological possibilities played a significant role in ending the Cold War and the central role that nuclear arms control occupies in the settlement of the Cold War. Again, traditional ways of achieving security-from-violence were altered by new knowledges about their environmental consequences—security practices and arrangements were partly environmentalized.



Even more radically, I think we can also turn this into a positive project. As I wrote two decades ago, environmental restoration would probably generate political externalities that would dampen tendencies towards violence. In other words, if we address the problem of the environment, then we will be drawn to do various things that will make various types of violent conflict less likely.





Your work is permeated by references to 'material factors'. This makes it different from branches of contemporary IR—like constructivism or postmodernism—which seem to be underpinned by a profound commitment to focus solely one side of the Cartesian divide. What is your take on the pervasiveness and implications of this 'social bias'?



Postmodernism and constructivism are really the most extreme manifestations of a broad trend over the last two centuries toward what I refer to as 'social-social science' and the decline—but hardly the end—of 'natural-social science'. Much of western thought prior to this turn was 'naturalist' and thus tended to downplay both human agency and ideas. At the beginning of the nineteenth century—partly because of the influence of German idealism, partly because of the great liberationist projects that promised to give better consequence to the activities and aspirations of the larger body of human populations (previously sunk in various forms of seemingly natural bondages), and partly because of the great expansion of human choice brought about by the science-based technologies of the Industrial Revolution—there was a widespread tendency to move towards 'social-social science,' the project of attempting to explain the human world solely by reference to the human world, to explain social outcomes with reference to social causes. While this was the dominant tendency, and a vastly productive one in many ways, it existed alongside and in interaction with what is really a modernized version of the earlier 'natural-social science.' Much of my work has sought to 'bring back in' and extend these 'natural-social' lines of argument—found in figures such as Dewey and H.G. Wells—into our thinking about the planetary situation.



In many parts of both European and American IR and related areas, Postmodern and constructivist theories have significantly contributed to IR theorists by enhancing our appreciation of ideas, language, and identities in politics. As a response to the limits and blindnesses of certain types of rationalist, structuralist, and functional theories, this renewed interest in the ideational is an important advance. Unfortunately, both postmodernism and constructivism have been marked by a strong tendency to go too far in their emphasis of the ideational. Postmodernism and constructivism have also helped make theorists much more conscious of the implicit—and often severely limiting—ontological assumptions that underlay, inform, and bound their investigations. This is also a major contribution to the study of world politics in all its aspects.



Unfortunately, this turn to ontology has also had intellectually limiting effects by going too far, in the search for a pure or nearly pure social ontology. With the growth in these two approaches, there has indeed been a decided decline in theorizing about the material. But elsewhere in the diverse world of theorizing about IR and the global, theorizing about the material never came anything close to disappearing or being eclipsed. For anyone thinking about the relationships between politics and nuclear weapons, space, and the environment, theorizing about the material has remained at the center, and it would be difficult to even conceive of how theorizing about the material could largely disappear. The recent 're-discovery of the material' associated with various self-styled 'new materialists' is a welcome, if belated, re-discovery for postmodernists and constructivists. For most of the rest of us, the material had never been largely dropped out.



A very visible example of the ways in which the decline in appropriate attention to the material, an excessive turn to the ideational, and the quest for a nearly pure social ontology, can lead theorizing astray is the core argument in Alexander Wendt's main book, Social Theory of International Politics, one of the widely recognized landmarks of constructivist IR theory. The first part of the book advances a very carefully wrought and sophisticated argument for a nearly pure ideational social ontology. The material is explicitly displaced into a residue or rump of unimportance. But then, to the reader's surprise, the material, in the form of 'common fate' produced by nuclear weapons, and climate change, reappears and is deployed to play a really crucial role in understanding contemporary change in world politics. 



My solution is to employ a mixed ontology. By this I mean that I think several ontologically incommensurate and very different realities are inescapable parts the human world. These 'unlikes' are inescapable parts of any argument, and must somehow be combined. There are a vast number of ways in which they can be combined, and on close examination, virtually all arguments in the social sciences are actually employing some version of a mixed ontology, however implicitly and under-acknowledged.



But not all combinations are equally useful in addressing all questions. In my version of mixed ontology—which I call 'practical naturalism'—human social agency is understood to be occurring 'between two natures': on the one hand the largely fixed nature of humans, and on the other the changing nature composed of the material world, a shifting amalgam of actual non-human material nature of geography and ecology, along with human artifacts and infrastructures. Within this frame, I posit as rooted in human biological nature, a set of 'natural needs,' most notably for security-from-violence and habitat services. Then I pose questions of functionality, by which I mean: which combinations of material practices, political structures, ideas and identities are needed to achieve these ends in different material contexts? Answering this question requires the formulation of various 'historical materialist' propositions, which in turn entails the systematic formulation of typologies and variation in both the practices, structures and ideas, and in material contexts. These arguments are not centered on explaining what has or what will happen. Instead they are practical in the sense that they are attempting to answer the question of 'what is to be done' given the fixed ends and given changing material contexts. I think this is what advocates of arms control and environmental sustainability are actually doing when they claim that one set of material practices and their attendant political structures, identities and ideas must be replaced with another if basic human needs are to going to continue to be meet in the contemporary planetary material situation created by the globalization of machine civilization on earth.

                                  

Since this set of arguments is framed within a mixed ontology, ideas and identities are a vital part of the research agenda. Much of the energy of postmodern and many varieties of critical theory have focused on 'deconstructing' various identities and ideas. This critical activity has produced and continues to produce many insights of theorizing about politics. But I think there is an un-tapped potential for theorists who are interested in ideas and identities, and who want their work to make a positive contribution to practical problem-solving in the contemporary planetary human situation in what might be termed a 'constructive constructivism'. This concerns a large practical theory agenda—and an urgent one at that, given the rapid increase in planetary problems—revolving around the task of figuring out which ideas and identities are appropriate for the planetary world, and in figuring out how they can be rapidly disseminated. Furthermore, thinking about how to achieve consciousness change of this sort is not something ancillary to the greenpeace project but vital to it. My thinking on how this should and might be done centers the construction of a new social narrative, centered not on humanity but on the earth.





Is it easy to plug your mixed ontology and interests beyond the narrow confines of IR or even the walls of the ivory tower into processes of collective knowledge proliferation in IR—a discipline increasingly characterized by compartimentalization and specialization?



The great plurality of approaches in IR today is indispensible and a welcome change. The professionalization of IR and the organization of intellectual life has some corruptions and pitfalls that are best avoided. The explosion of 'isms' and of different perspectives has been valuable and necessary in many ways, but it has also helped to foster and empower sectarian tendencies that confound the advance of knowledge. Some of the adherents of some sects and isms boast openly of establishing 'citation cartels' to favor themselves and their friends. Some theorists also have an unfortunate tendency to assume that because they have adopted a label that what they actually do is the actually the realization of the label. Thus we have 'realists' with limited grasp on realities, 'critical theorists' who repeat rather than criticize the views of other 'critical theorists,' and anti-neoliberals who are ruthless Ayn Rand-like self aggrandizers. The only way to fully address these tendencies is to talk to people you disagree with, and find and communicate with people in other disciplines.



Another consequence of this sectarianism is visible in the erosion of scholarly standards of citation. The system of academic incentives is configured to reward publication, and the publication of ideas that are new. This has a curiously perverse impact on the achievement of cumulativity. One seemingly easy and attractive path to saying something new is to say something old in new language, to say something said in another sect or field in the language of your sect or field, or easiest of all, simply ignore what other people have said if it is too much like what you are trying to say. George Santyana is wide quoted in saying that 'those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it.' For academics it can unfortunately be said, 'those who can successfully forget what past academics said are free to say it again, and thus advance toward tenure.' When rampant sectarianism and decline in standards of citation is combined with a broader cultural tendency to valorize self-expression and authenticity, academic work can become an exercise in abstract self expressionism.



Confining one's intellectual life within one 'ism' or sect is sure to be self-limiting. Many of the most important and interesting questions arise between and across the sects and schools. Also, there are great opportunities in learning from people who do not fully share your assumptions and approaches. Seriously engaging the work and ideas of scholars in other sects can be very very valuable. Scholars in different sects and schools are also often really taking positions that are not so different as their labels would suggest. Perhaps because my research agenda fits uncomfortably within any of the established schools and isms, I have found particularly great value in seeking out and talking on a sustained basis with people with very different approaches.





My final question is about normativity and the way that normativity is perceived: In Europe and the United States, liberal Internationalism is increasingly considered as hollowed out, as a discursive cover for a tendency to attempt to control and regulate the world—or as an unguided idealistic missile. Doesn't adapting to a post-hegemonic world require dropping such ambitions?



American foreign policy has never been entirely liberal internationalist. Many other ideas and ideologies and approaches have often played important roles in shaping US foreign policy. But the United States, for a variety of reasons, has pursued liberal internationalist foreign policy agendas more extensively, and successfully, than any other major state in the modern state system, and the world, I think, has been made better off in very important ways by these efforts.



The net impact of the United States and of American grand strategy and particularly those parts of American brand strategy that have been more liberal internationalist in their character, has been enormously positive for the world. It has produced not a utopia by any means, but has brought about an era with more peace and security, prosperity, and freedom for more people than ever before in history.



Both American foreign policy and liberal internationalism have been subject to strong attacks from a variety of perspectives. Recently some have characterized liberal internationalism as a type of American imperialism, or as a cloak for US imperialism. Virtually every aspect of American foreign policy has been contested within the United States. Liberal internationalists have been strong enemies of imperialism and military adventurism, whether American or from other states. This started with the Whig's opposition to the War with Mexico and the Progressive's opposition to the Spanish-American War, and continued with liberal opposition to the War in Vietnam.



The claim that liberal internationalism leads to or supports American imperialism has also been recently voiced by many American realists, perhaps most notably John Mearsheimer (Theory Talk #49). He and others argue that liberal internationalism played a significant role in bringing about the War on Iraq waged by the W. Bush administration. This was indeed one of the great debacles of US foreign policy. But the War in Iraq was actually a war waged by American realists for reasons grounded in realist foreign policy thinking. It is true, as Mearsheimer emphasizes, that many academic realists criticized the Bush administration's plans and efforts in the invasion in Iraq. Some self-described American liberal internationalists in the policy world supported the war, but almost all academic American liberal internationalists were strongly opposed, and much of the public opposition to the war was on grounds related to liberal internationalist ideas.



It is patently inaccurate to say that main actors in the US government that instigated the War on Iraq were liberal internationalists. The main initiators of the war were Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Whatever can be said about those two individuals, they are not liberal internationalists. They initiated the war because they thought that the Saddam Hussein regime was a threat to American interests—basically related to oil. The Saddam regime was seen as a threat to American-centered regional hegemony in the Middle East, an order whose its paramount purpose has been the protection of oil, and the protection of the regional American allies that posses oil. Saddam Hussein was furthermore a demonstrated regional revisionist likely to seek nuclear weapons, which would greatly compromise American military abilities in the region. Everything else the Bush Administration's public propaganda machine said to justify the war was essentially window dressing for this agenda. Far from being motivated by a liberal internationalist agenda the key figures in the Bush Administration viewed the collateral damage to international institutions produced by the war as a further benefit, not a cost, of the war. It is particularly ironic that John Mearsheimer would be a critic of this war, which seems in many ways a 'text book' application of a central claim of his 'offensive realism,' that powerful states can be expected, in the pursuit of their security and interests, to seek to become and remain regional hegemons.



Of course, liberal internationalism, quite aside from dealing with these gross mischaracterizations propagated by realists, must also look to the future. The liberal internationalism that is needed for today and tomorrow is going to be in some ways different from the liberal internationalism of the twentieth century. This is a large topic that many people, but not enough, are thinking about. In a recent working paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, John Ikenberry and I have laid out some ways in which we think American liberal internationalism should proceed. The starting point is the recognition that the United States is not as 'exceptional' in its precocious liberal-democratic character, not as 'indispensible' for the protection of the balance of power or the advance of freedom, or as easily 'hegemonic' as it has been historically. But the world is now also much more democratic than ever before, with democracies old and new, north and south, former colonizers and former colonies, and in every civilizational flavor. The democracies also face an array of difficult domestic problems, are thickly enmeshed with one another in many ways, and have a vital role to play in solving global problems. We suggest that the next liberal internationalism in American foreign policy should focus on American learning from the successes of other democracies in solving problems, focus on 'leading by example of successful problem-solving' and less with 'carrots and sticks,' make sustained efforts to moderate the inequalities and externalities produced by de-regulated capitalism, devote more attention to building community among the democracies, and make sustained efforts to 'recast global bargains' and the distribution of authority in global institutions to better incorporate the interests of 'rising powers.'





Daniel Deudney is Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He has published widely in political theory and international relations, on substantive issues such as nuclear weapons, the environment as a security issue, liberal and realist international relations theory, and geopolitics.





Related links



Deudney's Faculty Profile at Johns Hopkins
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Democratic Internationalism: An American Grand Strategy for a Post-exceptionalist Era (Council on Foreign Relations Working Paper, 2012) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney et al's Global Shift: How the West Should Respond to the Rise of China (2011 Transatlantic Academy report) here (pdf) 
Read the introduction of Deudney's Bounding Power (2007) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's Bringing Nature Back In: Geopolitical Theory from the Greeks to the Global Era (1999 book chapter) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney & Ikenberry's Who Won the Cold War? (Foreign Policy, 1992) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security (Millennium, 1990) here (pdf) 
Read Deudney's Rivers of Energy: The Hydropower Potential (WorldWatch Institute Paper, 1981) here (pdf) 









Print version of this Talk (pdf)

Issue 9.2 of the Review for Religious, 1950. ; MARGH° 15, 1950 Diocesan or PonHfical ? 'Joseph F. Galle. 'Virtue of Faith . John M~hews Oh'Controversy . ~. Gera[~Kelly Works:of God Manifest . .Dominic Hughes (;)uesHons and Answers Book Reviews Communications Report to Rome VOLUME IX NUMBER 2 Ri::VII::W FOR RI:::LI IOUS VOLUME IX MARCH, 1950 NUMBER 2 CONTENTS DIOCESAN OR PONTIFICAL ?--Joseph F. Gallen, S.J . 57 THE VIRTUE OF FAITH IN THE SPIRITUAL LIFE-- John Matthews, S.J . 69 OUR CONTRIBUTORS . 72 ON CONTROVERSY~ (An Editorial)--Gerald Kelly, S.J . 73 SEARCHLIGHTING ~URSELVES . 77 WORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST--Dominic Hughes, O.P. . 78 FATHER ELLARD'S REPLY . 91 COMMUNICATIONS . 95 SUMMER SESSION . 96 BOOK REVIEWS-- The Mother of the Savior and Our Interior Life; Ignatlan Methods of Prayer; Little Catechism of Prayer . ~ . 97 BOOK NOTICES . " . 100 BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS . 101 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS-- 7. Abandoned Wife Entering Religion . 104 8. Extending Postulancy, Novitiate, etc . 105 9. Postulancy outside Novitiate . 106 I0. Dowry When Transferring to Contemplative Order . 106 11. Sick Religious and Daily Communion . 107 12. Genuflections in,Chapel . 108 REPORT TO ROME . 108 THOUGHTS ON ST. JOSEPH . 112 IN MEMORIAM (Alf'red F. Schneider, S.J.) . 1 12 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, March, 1950. Vol. IX, No. 2. Published bi-monthly: January, March, May, July, September, and November at the College Press, 606 Harrison Street, Topeka, Kansas, by St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas, with ecclesiastical approbation. Entered as second class matter January 15, 1942, at the Post Office, Topeka, Kansas, under the act of March 3, 1879. Editorial Board: Adam C. Ellis, S.J., G. Augustine Ellard, S.J., Gerald Kelly. 8.J. Copyright, 1950, by Adam C. Ellis. Permission is hereby granted for quotations of reasonable length, provided due credit be given this review and the author. Subscription price: 2 dollars a year. Printed in U. S. A. Before wrltln9 to us, please cons,,It notice on Inside back cover. Diocesan or Pont:ific l? ¯Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. THE following pages constitute ~in effqrt to answer two practical canonical' questions: (1) should a diocesan congregation "Con-fine' itself to the diocese of origin? (2) should a' diocesa'n congregation become pontifical? These are very. important questions for many institutes. They are also questions to which angwers can. be given that are based solely on personal knowledge and espe'ciallT on personal preference. Such knowledge can be inadequate and the preference can be very subjective. Therefore, I l~ave tried to avoid mere.personal opinion and to base the answers primarily on the mind and 'v~ill of the Holy See and secondarily on the opinions that com-monly exist in the Church as found in approved authors. ~" I. DiSti~'~tion of Defi'nition between a Pontifical and a "" Diocesan Congregatiqn~ . . :,~., It is by no means unusual to encounter the mistaken opiniqfi.th, a~ a, diocesan religious institute is one that. is confined to a particul.ar. diocese and a pontifical institute one that has houses in seve.ral di0,- ceses. These false definitions are deafly excluded by canon 488, 3°: "'institute app~ou.ed bg the Hqlg See. (Religio iuris pontifical), ~every institute which has obtained from. the Apostolic S~e either ~p~r.o.-'.~ ba~ion'~o~'i.a.t, leas.t.the decree of commendation (decretur~,'l~udis)t;i Diocesan Institute, an institute erected by Ordinaries, which ~has ~not y~.t:.o."bthined this" decre~ ofcommendation.". Thu's the diStinCtiOn between a pontifical and a diocesan congregation has in itself nothing Whatever to do with territorial diffusion; it is based sblely on the p~es.ende or'absbnce of approval by the Holy See. We shall see tha~ a diocesan institute is also destined to spread to many dioceses, and d~ffu~ion~ to'. rrian~r diocese~ is only an ordinary, not ari absolfitel prerequisite for obtaifiing papal opproyal. In actual fact there are diocesan;. congregati6ns in the United 'States that haCce spread to several dioceses., It is equally true that some pontifical congregation~ in~thi~ c6dh~ry are confined to one diocese. ~All religious orders are pontifical institutes, since the approbation of 'an order is reserved to the Ho!y See. Ther?fore, institutes such as those of the Carmelite Nuns, Dominican Nuns, Poor Clares, Sacra-mentirie'Nuns, and Visithndines are pontifical. A religi0ds order is 57 JOSEPH F. GA'LLEN Review for Religious ¯ an institute whose particular law pr~scribes that at least some of the subjects at least should take solemn vows (can. 488, 2°). The hope of clarifying this o'ften misunderstood definitio'n is the justificat.for the tautology. It is not required that all of the members of the institute, but it is s~f~cient that only some of these, should either actually take solemn vows or be obliged to do so by the law of the institute. An institute can also be an order even if none of the mem-bers actually take solemn vows. It is sufficient that some should do so from the particular law of the institute.1 Solemn vows are not taken in mo~t of the monasteries of nuns in the United States, yet all of these institutes are orders since at least some of the members should take solemn vows in virtue of the particular law of the institute.2 A religious congregation is an institute in which all the members actually take simple vows, whether perpetual or temporary, and in which none of the members should take solemn vows in virtue of the law of the institute (canon 488, 2°). No religious institute can exist in the Church that has not been approved by legitimate ecclesi-astical authority. The foundation of a religious institute may certai.nly be approved by the Roman Pontiff, but in practice it is approved by the ordinary of the diocese of foundation. This approval of the local ordinary makes the congregation a diocesan institute. ~For example, article 37 of the Constitutions of the Ursuline Nuns of the Congre-gation of Paris, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. reads as follows: "By tight, these vows are solemn vows, as they were so approved by holy Church at the beginning: but, in fact, in this country, by disposition of the Holy See, they are only simple vows." Article 641 of the Constitutions of Dominican Nuns reads: "Those Nuns of our Order whose vows are, by constitution, solemn but who because of circumstances of time (cgn. 488, 70), by prescription of the Apostolic See, make only. simple VOWS . " -°In 1864 the Holy See declared the following monasteries of Visitation Nuns in the United States had solemn vows: Washington, (Georgetown), Baltimore (Roland Park), Mobile, St. Louis, and Kaskaskia. The last-mentioned later united with its daughter community in St. Louis. Mo. Since 1864 the monasteries that follow have received a rescript from the Holy See granting solemn vows. The year of the rescript is put in parentheses. Carmelite Nuns of the Ancient Observance: Allentown (1931): Discalced Carmelite Nuns: Philadelphia (1902, but solemn vows were first taken in 1925), Wheeling (1925), Bettendorf (1949), Louisville (1930), Morristown (1926), Loretto (1932), Rochester (1930), Mobile (1943), New Brunswick (1948): Dominican Nuns: Detroit (1929, Menlo Park (1929), West Springfield, Mass, (1928): Dominican Nuns of the Perpetual Rosary: Buffalo (1944), Camden (1947), Syracuse (1947): Poor Clare Nuns: Cleveland (1946); Franciscan Nuns of the Most Blessed Sacrament: Cleveland (1912), Canton (1925, but solemn vows were first taken in 1950): Nuns of Perpetual Adoration of the Blessed Sacrament (Spanish speaking) : E1 Paso (1930) : Visita-tion Nuns: Elfindale, Springfield, Mo. (1888). Solemn vows are taken in the Oriental Order of St. Basil the Great. Four other monasteries have applied for solemn vows¯ 58 March, 1950 DIOCESAN OR DONTIFICAL? After an initial period of growth the congregation usually peti-tidns the Holy See for papal approval. The attainment of papal approval makes the congregation a pontifical institute. It is sufficient that the Holy See approve either the institute or the constitutions. The present ordinary practice of the Holy See is to approve both. In answer to the first petition of the congregation for papal approval, the Holy See gives its first approval to the" institute by what is called a decree of praise or commendation. At the same time the Holy See gives a temporary and experimental approval to the.constitutions for a determined period of time, which now is usually seven years. At the end of this time the congregation sends another petition to Rome. The Holy See then gives a final approbation to the constitutions and, frequently at least, a definitive approbation to the institute.3 The practice of the Holy See can vary in many matters, and it has varied in the present case of the approval of religious congrega-tions. It is possible to find congregations that have long possessed papal approval and yet discern that the constitutions alone were approved by the Holy See. A doubt could and did arise as to the sufficiency of an approval of the constitutions alone, since the Code definition of a pontifical institute appears to be confined to a decree of~ praise or approbation of the institute. However, the presumption always is that a canon agrees with the pre-'Code law, and Leo XIII had originally defined pontifical institutes as those "in which in addi-tion the sentence of the Roman Pontiff has intervened, either by approval of their laws and statutes or also by the granting of praise or approbation.TM In this definition the approval of the constitu-tions is not only sufficient but apparently primary. All doubt was removed by a reply of the Sacred Congregation of Religious that the Sisters of Mercy, founded by Mother McAuley, were pontifical, whether it was a question of the independent communities or of the unions that had been established with the approval of the Holy See.5 3For the present practice of the Holy See, cf. P. Cosmas Sartori, O.F.M., duris-prudentiae Ecclesiasticae Elernenta (Romae: Pontif. Athenaeum Antonianum, 1946)~ p. 74. 4Leo XIII, Const. "'Conditae a Christo,'" 8 dec. 1900, Codicis luris Canonici Fontes III. p. 562. The same definition is repeated twice in the constitution. Cf., pp. 563, 564. nThis particular reply of Nov. 24, 1925, undoubtedly because of its general import, was published in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, XVIII (1926), 14. It can be found in English in Bouscaren, Canon Law Digest, I, pp. 269-270. Valuable commen-taries on the reply have been written by. Maroto, Cornrnentariurn Pro Religiosis, VII (1926), 83-92: and Vermeersch, Periodica, XV (1927), 52-53. To any-one unaware of this reply the distinctive constitutions of the independent com-munities can' cause difficulty as to their pontifical character. 59 .JOSEPH F. GALLEN Review foF Religious The constitutions alone of the Sisters of Mercy were approved by the Holy See in 1841. The same thing is apt to be true of any.congrer gation of religious women approved before 1850, because of the varying practice of the Holy See in approving religious congregations. Therefore, a congregation is made pontifical by any one or m6re of the following.four approvals: approval of the institute by either a decree of praise or of definitive approbation; approval of the con-stitutions either experimentally or finally. To all congregations that have received any one of these approvals are equally applied" the rights, laws, and obligations of pontifical institutes. II. Should a Diocesan Congregation Confine Itself to the Diocese of Origin? 1. The Code of Cation Lau;.--Canon 495, § 1 reads: "A dioce-san religious congregation cannot establish houses in another diocese without the consent of both Ordinaries, namely: the Ordinary of the place where the motherhouse is situated and the Ordinary of' the place where it is desired to make the new foundation, but the Ordi- .nary of the place of delSarture, shall not without a grave reason refuse his, consent." For the first house to be erected by a dlocesan.institt~te in anothe~ diocese, this canon requires the permission not only of the ordinary of~the new house but also of the ordinary of the mother-house. We can s.ee in this law of the Code an implicit affirmation of the closer guardianship, of the greater interest, supervision, and direc-tion that the ordinary of the diocese of origin is to exercise over a diocesan congregation in the early years of its existence. The same canon explicitly forbids the ordinary of the mother? house to refuse permission for the erection of a house in another diocese unless he has not merely a. reasonable or a just reason but a serious reason for the refusal. The .Code of Canon Law, therefore, implicitly states that it is the or~linary thing for a diocesan institute to spr,ead to other dioceses and that this diffusion can be prevented only by reason of a serious obstacle. It cannot be held that thi~ seri-ous obstacle is ordinarily tO be fouiad in diocesan institutes.' If this-were factually tr.ue, there would be little sense in the law of the Code that forbids the ordinary'of the motherhouse to refuse the permissi?n, and the law would rather read: "and the Ordinary of the mother~ house may grant this permission in extraordinary cases.',Y Therefore, the" law 'of the Code is that confinement to one" dioces~ sli'~.uld ble restricted to the early years of the existence-of.a, diocesan dongrega:- fi0n wl~en the institute is a.c.qujri, ng strength rand:.sta,,~:ilit.~.: .~T.h.!.s. 60 March, 1950" DIOCESAN OR PONTIFICAL? period should not be excessively prolonged. Diffusion to other dioceses is a usual prerequisite for obtaining papal approval, but the Holy See stated before the Code of Canon Law that ten or fifteen years from the time of the foun'dation of the first house of theinsti-tute could suffice for the presentation of a petition for papal approval.6 2. Documents of the Holy See.--The Holy See both before and after the Code of Canon Law has issued norms that are to guide the local ordinaries in the erection of new institutes. One of the most important of these norms is that the ordinary, rather than found a n~w congregation, is to invite and admit into his diocese a congrega-tion already approved that has the purpose desired by the ordinary. In speaking of these congregations already approved the Holy See makes no distinction between pontifical and diocesan congregations.) Therefore, the Holy See again positively implies that diocesan insti-tutes are not to be confined to the diocese of origin. 3. Doctrine of authors.--Two authors, Fogliassos and Muzza-relli, 9 have recently made detailed studies into the juridical nature of diocesan congregations. Fogliasso states: "Certainly a diocesan con-gregation, even though it consists of only one house, unlike a mon-astery of nuns, is an organism that bg its verst nature tends to uni-versality . The purpose of the disposition of canon 495, § 1 is to prevent the local ordinary of the motherhouse from impeding the ordered diffusion of a new congregation. This diffusion together with spiritual fruits is required for the granting of a decree of praise. Furthermore, recourse can always be made to the Holy See against the arbitrary opposition of this ordinary. Therefore, the norm of canon 495, § I, while it immediately, furthers the fundamental liberty of a new congregation, which is the attainment of its own increase, paves the way for the congregation to reach the prescribed condition by which, through means of a decree of praise, it may take its place 6Normae Secundum Quas 8. Congr. Episcoporum et Regulariura Procedere Sofet in Approbandis Novis lnstitutis Votorurn Simpliciurn, 28 iun. 1901, n. 9. ~Leo XII][, Const. "'Conditae a Christo,'" § 1, III, C. I. C. Fontes, III, p. 563; Pius X, Motu Propr. "Dei providentis,'" 15 iul. 1906, C. I. C. Fontes, III, p. 675; S. C. de Prop. Fide, Instr., "'De Congregationibus Religiosis lndigenis Condendis,'° 19 mart. 1937, n. 1, AAS XXIX (1937), 276. SAemilius Fogliasso, S.D.B., lntroductio in Vigentem Disciplinara de luridicis Re-lationibus inter Religiones et Ordinarium Loci (Augustae Taur[norum: Schola T}'pographica Salesiana, 1948). 9Fridericus MuzzareIli, S.S.P., Tractatus Canonicus de Congregationibus luris Di-oecesani (Romae: apud Piam Societatem a S. Pau[o Aposto[o, 1943). 61 JOSEPH F. GALLEN Review for Religious among pontifical institutes.''~° Muzzarelli expresses the same doctrine: "The nature of a diocesan congregation precisely as diocesan is universal only in potency and capacity . . . indeed the mind of "the Holy See with regard to these congregations is not that from their foundation they should be aSso-lutely confined within the boundaries of one diocese. They are rather considered as the first stage, the first phase of juridical et~olution. When this evolution is completed they become pontifical and uni-versal in fact and in law . Hence it generally happens that these congregations become multidiocesan in a short time and l~hus are uni-versal in fact . If the ordinary (of the motherhouse) should refuse his consent, recourse is always open to the Holy See.''11 Father Vidal, S.J., whose eminence as a canonist and years of service as a consultor of various Roman Congregations should qualify him to know the mind and prac.tice of the Holy See, affirms: ". the ordinary of the place of dephrture is forbidden to refuse his " consent except for a serious reason (canon 495, § 1) ; and recourse against an unreasonable refusal would always be open to the Sacred Congregation, which will usually lend a ready ear to such a recourse, unless there is question of an institute that is faring badly and is destined rather for extinction.''x~ The doctrine that a diocesan institute should at least ordinarily spread to other dioceses is held implicitly by many of the authors mentioned below, who teach that diocesan congregations should ¯ become pontifical, since diffusion to other dioceses is in the practice of the Holy See an ordinary prerequisite for obtaining papal approval. 4. Diffusion does not imply separation.--Diffusion to other dioceses is the second phase of the natural growth of a diocesan con-gregation to the juridical maturity of a pontifical congregation. Evidently diffusion does not impiy but excludes separation from the houses of the diocese of origin. Canon 495, § 1 is speaking of the spread of the same institute to other dioceses, not of the erection of. new institutes in other dioceses. The fear of separation, however, can exist. The diffusion of diocesan and even of pontifical congrega-tions to other dioceses of the United States in the last century very frequently was followed by a separation from the houses of the diocese of origin (and the same thing occurred in other countries). ~-0Fogliasso, op. cir., 160-161. The italics in this and subsequent citations are mine. XlMuzzarelli, op. cir., nn. 51, 123. xZWernz-Vidal, Ius Canonicum, III, "De Religiosis,'" n. 61. 62 March, 1950 DIOCESAN OR PONTIFICAL Fortunately, many of these separated congregations have ultimately at least prospered in vocations and in the extent and excellence of their lives and work. These happy consequences have not always been verified. Some of these congregations are still small in number of subjects, and they toil in vain for increase in the rocky territories of few Catholics and few vocations. It would obviously .have been much better if they had remained.united to houses located in dioceses that are more fertile in vocations and also financially. Furthermore, such separations were not of their nature conducive to a progressive improvement in the spiritual and intellectual formation of subjects. These separations may not be effected now without the permission of the Holy See, since the separation would involve at least the erec-tion of a new institute and also the passing of professed religious from one institute to another, both of which require recourse to the Holy See (canons 492, § 1; 632). III. Should a Diocesan Congregation become Pontifical? 1. The Code of Canon Latv.--To Father Arcadio Larra-ona, C.M.F., the present undersecretary of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, we are especially indebted for evolving the answer from the Code of Canon Law. Father Larraona calls attention to the definition in the Code of a diocesan congregation, which is not described as one that has been approved by a local ordinary or as one that does not possess or has not obtained a decree of commendation but as one, "that has not yet (nondum) obtained this decree of com-mendation (canon 488, 3°).'' Thus the very definition of a dioce-san congregation in the Code of Canon Law manifests that it is only in an initial and transitory state and in the first phase of a juridical evolution that is to terminate in the attainment of pontifical approval,la Larraona could have derived the same conclusion from canon 492, § 2. The argument is clearer in the translation of Woywood- Smith, although it can also be d~duced from the Vatican translation. This canon reads: "A diocesan congregation retains that character though it has in the course of time spread to several dioceses, and it remains completely under the jurisdiction of the bishops, until it has obtained from the Holy See approval or, at least, the decree of praise." The Vatican translation of this last and pertinent clause is: "as long as it is without pontifical approval or the decree of commendation." The Code here again does not consider a diocesan congregation to be laLarraona, Cornmentarium Pro Religiosis, II (192 I), 284. 63 JOSEPH F. GALLEN Review for Religious . in a definitive but only in an initial and temporary state. 2. The initiative of bishops.--The most°manifest testimony of the i.nspiration, encouragement, and support of bishops to diocesan congregations becoming pontifical is the vast number of congr.egations that ha~e been approved by the Holy See. This support of bishops wa~ evident at an early date in the era of pontifical approval of congregations of Sisters. The Provinci.al Council of Avignon, held in 1849, enacted the following norm for the bishops of the province: "That [Sisters] may conform their lives to that prescribed by the rule they have professed and observe their constitutions and praiseworthy customs, that the constitutions also may have a greater authority, the bishops are to take care as' soon as possible that these be approved by the Holy See,. if they have not already been approved.''14 The bishops of the Plenary Council of Latin America, celebrated in 1899, established a similar law: "Since in congregations that have spread into several dioceses and whose constitutions have not as yet been submitted to the examination, correction, and approbation of the Holy See, here and there things have been done in good faith that are contrary to the laws and mind of the Hoist See, we decree that, the prescriptions of law being observed, such congregations which, in the judgment of the bishops, increase and give good expectations to the Church shall submit their statutes to the judgment of and petition the approval of the Holy See.''1~ 3. The doctrine of authors. Especially in this important ques-tion authors are cited primarily to manifest the mind and the will of the Holy See and also to give the answer that is generally held in the Church. Greater attention should clearly be given to the canonists who are acknowledged specialists in the field of canon law for religious. LARRAONA: This author has been engaged since 1920 in writing an exhaustive explanation of the canons on religious in the Cormnentariurn Pro Religiosis. The greatest tribute to his authority is the frequency and respect with which he is generally cited by other authors. Writing of pontifical and diocesan congregations before the Code of Canon Law, he states that diocesan congregations were not considered "as something fixed and stable but as incomplete entities, tending by their nature to juridical perfection, which in the second 14Concilium Provinciae Avenionensis, Collectio Lacensi#, tom. IV, col. 351, n. 2. l~Acta et Decreta Con¢ilii Plenarii Americae Latinae (Roinae: Typis Vaticanis, 1902), n. 324. 64 March, 1950 DIOCESAN OR PONTIFICAL? category, that is, in pontifical congregations, alone appeared to be found.''10 This same doctrine, although not with the same urgency, he later applies to diocesan congregations after the Code of Canon Law.17 He likewise affirms: ".-. the constitution of a di6cesan congregation is not very conducive to the internal unity, strength and liberty of diffusion of the institute. The result is that diocesan con-gregations have scarcely begun to evolve and to be diffused when they are borne along almost by their own weight to become pontifical, which corresponds completely to the mind of the Holy See.''~s He styles the diocesan state of a congregation as the novitiate of the insti-tute and says of this novitiate: ". the Sacred Congregation has tended and now tends to surround this [diocesan state] with suffi-cient protection and to affirm it as transitory by representing this state to the eyes of both the bishops and the congregation as a period of probation, which should not be prolonged longer than is necessary to test the spirit and stability of the.congregation and for it to obtain some diffusion. When this test has been surpassed, it is undoubtedly the mind of the Hol~l See that a decree of commendation should be requested.''1° He continues: "Unless congregations become pontifical when they reach the above maturity, experience certainly proves that they can scarcely preserve their unity of spirit, of ministries, and of government. Consequently the.i.r internal force and solidity is almost necessarily exposed to positive dangers, or at least the congre-gation is uselessly hindered and its tendency for diffusion and expan-sion impeded.''u° In another work he reaffirms the same principle: "From the nature of the case a unity of government is scarcely pos-sible if the government itself is practically divided into as many parts as there are dioceses in which the institute has houses.''~ Other passages could be cited from this outstanding author to confirm the doctrine he states above that the diocesan state of a congregation is of its very nature transitory and the mind of the Holy See is that such congregations should seek papal approval after the initial period of probation and diffusion. 16Larraona, 17Larraona, lSLarraona, 10Larraona, 20Larraona, Commentariura Pro Religiosis, I (1920), 137. ibid., II (1921)', 284. ibid., II (1921), 284. ibid., V (1924), 146. ibid., V (1924), 146. ~aLarraona, Acta Congressus luridici Internationalis, IV, "'De Potestate Dorainativa Publica in lure Canon&o," p. 153, nota 17. JOSEPH F: GALLEN Reoieto [or Religious FOGLIASSO22 and. MUZZARELLIz~ accept and assert the doc-trine of Larraona, but the latter adds: ". especially when a con-gregation has spread to distant territories a practical necessity exists of asking for a decree of praise and approval of the con'stitutions from the Holy See, if one wishes to provide for the security, unity, and becoming expansion of the entire institute.''24 BASTIEN, who is a most eminent authority on the canon law for institutes of simple vows, states in the editions of his book pub-lished both before and after the Code of Canon Law: "The condi-tion of a diocesan congregation, as described in the preceding pages, is rather precarious; spread in different dioceses, they are dependent upon various bishops, without a sufficiently strong central authority. No wonder, then, that the. Holg See desires them to leave this initial stage, and exhorts them to present their constitutions [or its ap-proval."~ 5 BATTANDIER, who is of equal authority on institutes of simple vows, states in the same editions of his hook: "But the,dioce-san institute can naturally have the desire to attach itself more closely to the Apostolic See, which will give more authority to its govern-ment, more stability to its laws, and will permit it to be assured of the future.''~° Among the authors who have expressed their opinion less strongly are the following: CREUSEN-ELLIS: "When the new institute shall have devel-oped sufficiently and shall have shown by the test of time the value of its religious spirit and its unity, it may ask of the Holy See a posi-tive approbation.''27 "The Code does not provide for the erection of provinces in an institute which is purely diocesan. When it has arrived at this importance, it should ask for approbation from Rome, which will make its life and its government more autonomous.''2s 22Fogliasso, op. cir., 160-161. Z3Muzzarelli, op. cit., nn. 51, 102. ~4Muzzarelli, op. cir., n. 102. ~SDom Pierre Bastien, O.S.B., Directoire Canonique a l'usage des Congrdgations ~ Voeux Simples (lst edit., 1904, Abbaye de Maredsous), n. 22; (4th edit., 1933. Bruges: Ch. Beyaert), n. 70. The translation is that of D. I. Lanslots, O.S.B., Handbook of Canon Law (New York: Pustet, 1931), n. 19. Lanslot's d!gest is based on Bastien. ~OMgr. Albert Battandier, Guide Canonique Pour Les Constitutions des Instituts Voeux Simples (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre), 4th edit., 1908, n. 19; 6th edit., 1923, n. 20. :tTCreusen-Ellis, Religious Men and Women in the Code (Milwaukee: The .Bruce Publishing Company, 3rd English edition, 1940), n. 27. ~SCreusen-Ellis. ibid., n. 30. 66 March, 19 5 0 DIOCESAN OR PONTIFICAL? BOUSCAREN-ELLIS: "'It is the mind ot: the Church that after a diocesan congregation has developed its membership and spread to other dioceses, and has given satisfaction in its pursuit of good works, it may apply to the Holy See for pontifical approbation and thus become a po.ntifical institute.''2~ REGATILLO: "Diocesan congregations are not accustomed to be divided into provinces because when they are sufficiently diffused they become pontifical.''~° RAMSTEIN: "Since every religion of diocesan law normally entertains the hope of acquiring in time the status of a religion of papal approval . JOMBART: "A congregation spread into several dioceses and flourishing generally desires to become pontifical.''z2 "A multidioce-san and large congregation desires almost always to become pon-tifical, the better to safeguard its unity.''3~ Doctorate dissertations in canon law of the Catholic University of America have expressed similar opinions: ORTH: "The great difference that exists between episcopal and papal approbation is well known and, since the papal dxcels the epis-copal in extent, being wider and greater in effects and giving assur-ance of an unerring guidance, it is not in the least surprising that from the start, a new religious congregation will have this in view, to obtain a favorable decision'concerning itself from the Holy See. In its early stages a new community is still in an imperfect condition. Though entirely an autonomous society, yet it is subject to many restrictions on the part of the bishop. Besides formerly if it should chance to spread into other dioceses many things militated~ against unity which is a prime requisite in order that the institute preserve its original nature and purpose. In this respect nowadays it is welI pro-tected by the Code. The aim of the new society will be to have firmness and stability, to be enriched with all the privileges and favors of Mother Church, which aim will not be fully obtained unless it has received the seal of definite approbation from the Head of all christendom.''34 "The spread to other dioceses is considered ~t0Bouscaren-Ellis, Canon Law (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1946), p. 234. Z0Regatillo, lnstitutiones luris Canonici (Santander: Sal Terrae, 1946), I, n. 650. 81Ramstein, A Manual of Canon Law (Hoboken: Terminal Printing ~ Publishing Co., 1947), p. 299. a22ombart, Traitd de Droit Canonique (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1946) I, n. 810, 2. 33Jombarr, ibid. 8'~C. R. Orth, O.M.C., The Approbation of Religious Institutes (Washington: The Catholic University of America, 193.1), p. 131. 67 JOSEPH 1::. GALLEN the best reason for asking the approbation of the Holy See, because in that case there would be as many heads as there are bishops of the places where the community is established and this multiplied gov-ernment is not conducive to unity.''s5 FARRELL: "When a congregation has received pontifical appro-bation many phases of its subjection are withdrawn from the local Ordinaries in whose territory the congregation exists, and this juris-diction is supplanted by direct subjection to the Holy See. Thus, unfettered by the divergencies of the multiplicity of diocesan juris-dictions, the congregation achieves an extensive opportunity to exer-cise in a wider way the autonomy of moral personality, affording a unity of purpose through the various ramifications of its internal government to accomplish more effectively the work and purpose of its foundation.''s° IV. Conclusion The reader is now in a position to give his own answers to the questions of this article. These answers should be based primarily on the mind and will of the Holy See and on the common opinion in the Church. If the will of the Holy See is evident with regard to any action, arguments in favor of or contrary to that action are simply a matter of indifference. The intrinsic arguments for seeking papal approval emphasized by the authors cited above are: (1) the government and the constitu-tions of the institute receive a greater authority; (2-) the central and internal government becomes stronger; (3) the unity of govern-ment, spirit, and ministries of the institute is preserved;. (4) the in-stitute is endowed with a greater stability and is thus better able to preserve its original nature-and accomplish its original purpose: (5) the life and government of the institute become more autono-mous; (6) the institute has a greater liberty of diffusion and thus of increase. To these can be added (7) the more autonomous character of the institute naturally begets a greater internal initiative; (8) the immediate subjection to the Head of all Christendom and the wider diffusion of the institute are more apt to engender the universal view-point of the Holy See; (9) the constitutions approved by the Holy See and examined and corrected by specialists will very likely possess a greater excellence and utility. s~Orth, ibid., p. 145. SOB. F. Farrell, The Rights and Duties of the Local Ordinary Regarding Congrega-tions, o[ Women Religious o[ Pontifical Approval (Washington: The Catholic Uni-versity of America Press, 194~1), p. 56. 68 The Vir :ue of F:ait:h in :he Spiri :ual Life ~lohn Matthews, S.~I. BY ITS BAPTISMAL BIRTH man's soul receives divine life for the first time. It takes on a wholly, new and higher life. A second life comes into the soul and into its powers of mind and will. While sanctifying grace lifts the soul to a divine way of life, the virtues of faith, hope, and charity fill man's mind and will with the strength he needs to live his higher life. Thus grace thrbugh faith, hope, and charity makes us new men with new minds and wills. But what is faith? Life means power; faith is a God-given power of our grace-life. Life means lasting power; on this earth the holy person always possesses faith. This faith is a virtue, a power to take God at His word. By faith in action we believe God just because it is God who has spoken. In faith we bend our minds to the authority of God, of God's Son 3esus Christ and of God's Church. Man has a duty of bowing his whole self before God; through faith be subjects his mind to God. Thus faith is belief in God because He knows and tells the truth; those who enjoy such faith we call the faithful. In our Christian life this virtue is absolutely necessary. ~¢ usually comes through baptism and is lost only by mortal sins against faith such as heresy and apostasy. So the grown-up without faith lives in serious sin and has turned himself away from both God and heaven. "But without faith it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6)--in the way God wants to be pleased, honored, adored, loved and obeyed, i.e., in the supernatural way of life. Again, we need faith because it enters into every deed of our grace-life. In all these works faith is at least implicit. Lastly, as souls born of God, we must have faith. For, as the child must be able to take his parents at their word, so we must be able to believe our heavenly Father: and we do this by faith~ "For you are a11 the children of God by faith" (Gal, 3:26). This important virtue of which we speak is a supernatural gift. It forms part of the equipment by which holy souls live and grow in the divine life. With this faith we know truths man could never know of himself. All the genius of Aristotle, Shakespeare, and 69 JOHN MATTHEWS Review [orReligious Edison could never figure them out; all the power of all men's minds could, never guess them. For by faith we know divine truths in a divine way. We see with certainty what God has told men through Christ and the, Church;; we take a .deeper look into God's teachings; we view everything with a sight and understanding far beyond the human. Through faith, furthermore, we possess the mind of Christ. "But we have the mind of Christ" (1 Cot. 2 : 16). This is the new mind we receive along with the new life of grace. No longer do we think and plan in a merely human{ way but we think as Christ did, we plan as Christ planned, we value what Christ valued. We think holy thoughts; we know the truths Christ knew and chose to tell us; we accept His judgments and values on everything, e.g., on the world, on race and color, on the human soul. With the new mind of faith the supernatural man looks on all things in their relation to God and to his own salvation. This is faith at work--a living active fruitful faith: The virtue of faith, while itself interior, produces acts of faith both interior and exterior. Indeed, the faith of God's children must be a working faith. Such is the message of St. James in his Epistle. "For even as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead" (James 2:26). Possessing the mind of Christ, we must use that mind to live our divine life. For faith is the rock-foundation of our morals, our devotions, and our liturgy. Hence our holy deeds must be rooted in and must spring from faith in action. The "man of God must live by faith, and this he does when he bows his mind to divine truth on God's authority and when he guides his actions by that truth. Faith guides our actions by entering into there. It underlies and penetrates all our virtuous acts. The Catholic can hope for heaven only after faith tells him heaven exists. The faithful obey Christ's Church because faith assures them it is the true. church. Penitents by approaching the confessional bear witness to their faith that God's priest has power to forgive sins. In his belief that bap-tism is necessary for salvation, the Catholic father bears his child to the font of eternal life. Confirmed in faith, God's children adore the Eucharistic Christ, receive Holy Communion, and offer the Holy Sacrifice. As another instance of how faith penetrates.our life of holiness, let us consider charity. This latter virtue shows .itself in many diverse acts (1 Cot. 13:~r-8). There is the love of God above all 70 March, 1950 VIRTUE OF FAITH else, which we must practice in order to continue living the divine life. There are the works ofmercy, compassion' for one's fellow men, perfect contrition, almsgiying, the love of our neighbor in Christ, th~ expending of self for God's sake and for others. The reason why holy souls do these charitable deeds is the love of God in Himself and of men in God. But this infinite lovableness of God they know through.faith, which teaches them that God deserves to receive our purest love. Thus faith enters into our works of charity by supplying a supernatural reason for doing them. So too in all the circumstances of life does faith play its divinely assigned part. The truths we believe have power to overcome our human fear, weakness, and distrust of seIf. How often Our Savior spoke these words: "thy faith hath made thee whole" (Matt. 9:29; 15:28; Luke 8:48; 17:19). In the face of temptation, sickness, evil habits, poverty, andpersecution our faith gives us grounds for confidence that we can overcome all hardships in a Christlike man-ner. "This is the victory which overcometh the world, our faith" (1 dohn 5:4). In. order to see further the force and value of Catholic belief in the soul, let us view two men-~one with and the other without faith. On the death of a relative the latter can give only human sympathy, cannot help the deceased, can only send flowers and'can-not comfort the bereaved very'greatly. The real Catholic through his faith speaks words of divine sympathy. He helps both his dead relative and bereaved kinsfolk--by his comforting words, by his prayers and Masses and virtuous deeds. The soul without faith grieves as those "who have no hope" (I Thess. 4:13); the faithful soul sees in death God's will, entertains the hope of eternal happi-ness for his dear deceased, and offers his pain at bereavement to help his relative into heaven. Again the work of faith appears when these same men yisit a Catholic church. To the faithless person the church is a structure--perhaps, a thing of beauty; to the faithful, it is a home, a holy place, the house of God. For the former the stained-glass windows may be works of art; for the Catholic they serve to recall the mysteries of his religion and to hold his mind in prayer. In the opinion of the man without faith the baptismal font, confes-sional, and altar rail are the ordinary furnishings of a church; the child of God esteems them as sources of divine life in his soul. To his mind the tabernacle is no mere happening but the abode of Christ in the Eucharist; the altar is no chance property but the place of daily sacrifice, the bne thing withoutt which no building can be a church: 71 JOHN MATTHEWS the sactuary lamp is not just an adornment but a sign to the faithful that Jesus is at home, waiting for their visit. In the Catholic church the person who has not faitl-J is a stranger and sight-seer, the man of faith is at home with Jesus in His Father's house. So vast is the difference between the person without faith and the man whose actions are wholly penetrated by tiis Catholic faith! Let us sum up now the work of faith in the divine life of our soul. The virtue of faith gives us a new mind, enlightened with the new truths of Our Lord's Testament. A grown-up receiving the virtue of faith, may seem the same after his conversion as before-- ¯ but he is not. He has new thoughts; he knows God's new com-mands; all events in his life take on a divine meaning for eternity: his belief gives a heavenly purpose to his actions: he will soon show by his outward deeds of virtue the inward change within his mind. "For with the heart we believe unto justice: but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation" (Rum. 10:10). Moreover, to live the life of grace we must 1ire a life of faith. This virtue must influence' a11 our actions. Hence our every deed must be an act "of faith, must bear witness that we choose~ to be amongst God's faithful, must be a profession of our belief. Our religion, which is our .faith, must underlie all the circumstances of our lives and give them a Catholic tone and value. That is the work ¯ of faith. Thus by living a life of faith we actively live our grace-life. "The just man liveth by faith" (Rum. 1:17). Indeed, our faith and our divine life grow step by step together. For every holy deed we do God gives us this reward: our grace-life grows fuller and at the same time our virtue of faith is so deepened and enriched that it becomes stronger against temptation, that we are more Christ-minded, that we can make greater acts of faith. In this manner faith plays its important part in the growth of our divine life. OUR CONTRIBUTORS JOSEPH F. GALLEN and JOHN MATTHEW8 are members of the faculty at Woodstock College, Woodstock, Maryland. DOMINIC HUGHES is a member of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C. 72 On Controversy WE HAVE RECEIVED certain c,r, iticisms for publishing "Thd Three Ages o~f the Interior Life, by G.'Augustine Ellard, S.3". (Cf. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, VIII, 297-317.) One criti-cism is that the "theological erudition" of Father Ellard's article "takes advantage of readers who lack the technical preparation neces- Sary to measure its true weight." (Cf. IX, 42~-43.) Another criti-cism, not sent for publication, is that Father Ellard's article contains controversial matter, and that a magazine like ours should keep clear of controversy. It seems advisable to explain our position. Father Ellard's article was a book review; and the work he reviewed (The Three Ages of the Interior Life, by Father R. Garri-gou- Lagrange, OIP.) is decidedly theological. It is difficult to see how a v~ork of this kind could be reviewed without using theological erudition. Moreover, The Three Ages is intended, as least partly, for just such people as our readers; hence it seems that the theological erudition used in reviewing the work would no more take advantage of readers than would the work itself. It might be added here that one of the precise purposes for founding this REVIEW was tO present sound theology without the technical accompaniments that are usu-ally found in a strictly theological journal. As for controversy, we have always tried assiduously to avoid controversial topics or at least to avoid taking sides in any theologi-cal debate. Less than a year ago, when we published "Mystical Life--Mystical Prayer," by M. Raymond, O.C.S.O., we were care-ful to prefix to the article an editorial note indicating that Father Raymond's view was only one of three legitimately defended opin-ions on the normal development of the spiritual life. We expressed no preference for any of the opinions. (Cf. VIII, 121,) No one objected to our calling attention to the controversial nature of Father Raymond's article. Why, therefore, should anyone object to Father Ellard's pointing out that certain basic questions in The Three Ages are subjects of legitimate controversy? It would be naive to imply that, in publishing Father Ellard's .article, we did not expect contrary reactions. Since the author of The Three Ages has many admirers, it was quite likely that some of 73 ON CONTROVERSY Review for Religious them would come to his defense. It is clear, then, that in publishing the book review, we had to run the risk of controversy. The only ways oi~ avoiding it would be to refuse to review the work, or to publish an insincere review, or to print a sincere review without allowing a rebuttal. None of these procedures was or is desirable. Hence, we have some controversy, and perhaps it may continue for a time. We trust that our readers will find it both interesting and profitable. In this issue we present an article by Father Dominic Hughes, O.P., in rebuttal to Father Ellard, together with a brief reply by Father Ellard and a communication defending his position. Other'expres-sions of opinion on either side will be accepted. However, lest this subject .matter consume disproportionate space in the REVIEW, it seems necessary to limit further contributions to communications. Conditions for acceptance of these communications will be found on page 96. Now a word about Father Hughes's article. In some aspects it differs from our usual editorial policy; yet it seemed better, under the circumstances, to waive insistence on policy. What he says, however, about doctrinal authority in the Church, especially the authority of Doctors of the Church in general and of St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, calls for special editorial comment. For the most part this comment will simply agree with him and emphasize the truth of what he says; in one point it will at least qualify one of his views if not express a complete difference of opinion. Father Hughes rightly observes that the highest doctrinal author-ity in this world is the teaching Church. And this truth needs emphasizing in our times, even in the case of many devout laymen. This teaching Church is composed of the Pope himself, and of the bishops of the world united with tbe Pope, whether in a general council or ~in their respective dioceses. Theologians graphically and reverently style the~e successors to the Apostles theVioum Magisterium (the living teaching body) or simply the Ecclesia Docens (the teaching Church). It is a wonderful thing, this living teaching Church; it pos-sesses not only the great truths of revelation with which Christ and the Holy Spirit endowed the Apostles but also all the wisdom of the succeeding centuries which has been used in the exploration and explanation of the original endowment (the Deposit of Faith,. as it is. called), The Doctors and other theologians have authority only in so far as they express either the doctrine of this living .Church or 74 March, 1950 ON CONTROVERSY speculations which are in conformity with that doctrine. The revelation confided to the Church is a limitless treasure; and our knowledge of the doctrine and its implications is subject to con-stant growth. In this process 9f growth through the centuries there have always been questions that were not clear, that needed further exploration and illumination. Consequently, there have been and are divergent opinions, with abIe scholars defending contrasting views, without remonstrance and even with encouragement from the Church. The interesting question thus arises: how is the theologian of today to align himself in such controversies? Thd first duty of the true theologian is to judge the reasons of the respective sides in the light of already established principles and doctrines. Finding the reasons lacking sufficient cogency to win his preference, he might then inspect the authorities holding the different views. Suppose that in a debated question such as I have just outlined, a Doctor of the Church would be the principal defendant of one opinion. Should he, by the very fact that-he is a Doctor, win the theologian's intellectual preference? I get the impression from Father Hughes's article that he would answer this question in the affirma-tive. If this impression is correct, there is room here for a difference of opinion. The title of Doctor of the Church includes an official declaration of eminence in theological learning, but not necessarily pre-eminence over all uncanonized scholars. The eminence of some of these uncanonized theologians is attested by the constant use of their works in theological schools and even by the great, confidence placed in them by the Church while they were still living. Father Hughes suggests that in the canonized Doctor there is the added con-sideration of supernatural wisdom. But this wisdom is not limited to the canonized; it accompanies grace and virtue, not canonization. And history attests that many of the uncanonized scholars were men of lofty virtue. For example, speaking for Benedict-XV, Cardinal Gasparri styled Scotus a "most holy man,"; and speaking for himself Leo XIII referred to eminent Jesuit scholars (none of whom .were then Doctors of the Church) as men of "extraordinary virtue." So much for the authority of Doctors of the Church in general. As for St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, it is unquestionable that the Church's esteem for him is unique. Canon 1366, § 2, directs that professors of philosophy and theology should treat these subjects after the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor, and ¯ should hold these as sacred. An examination of the many documents 75 ON CONTROVERSY Review for Reliflious referred to in the sources of this' canon shows that it is but a capsule formulation of the insistent injunctions and directives of Leo XIII, Plus X, and Benedict XV. These Popes considered him not merely as an individual but also as the representative of all the great Scho-lastics of his time because in his works the best of their teaching is most perfectly embodied. Six years after the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law, Plus XI reaffirmed the praise and injunctions of his predecessors in an encyclical letter (Studiorum Ducem, June 29, 1923) which is rightly called a papal commentary on canon 1366, § 2. Finally; just a few months after he became Supreme Pontiff, Plus XII, in an address to clerical students in Rome, .recalled and approved all these directives (June 24, 1939). Obviously, therefore, the Church wants professors and students of philosophy and theology to follow St. Thomas. Ye~ it is not to be a slavish following which, in the words of Benedict XV, "would clip the wings of genius with consequent injury to the deeper study of theology," (Spoken in an audience granted to the Jesuit General and his Assistants, Feb. 17, 19.15.) 'This is not the place to try to indicate precisely the legitimate limitations to the following of St. Thomas; but it may be well to show, through the words of the Popes themselves, that the~e are some limits. Speaking of the "wisdom of Aquinas," Leo XIII insisted that he did not wish to propose to our age for imitation "anything which does not duly agree with the proved findings of a later age;" or any-thing "which does not hax~e its measure of probability." (Cf. the encyclical Aeterni Patrfs, in Fontes Codicis, III, p. 149.) Benedict XV declared in a letter to the Jesuit General (Mar. 19, 1917) that the Roman Pontiffs "have invariably held that St. Thomas must be regarded as the guide and master in the study of theology and phi-losophy,, although everyone retains full freedom to argue for either side of those questions which can be and are wont to be disputed." Pius XI, having enjoined the strict observance of canon 1366, § 2, added: "But let no one require of others more than is required of all by the Church herself who is the teacher and mother of all; for in those matters in which there is division of opinion among the best authors in Catholic schools, no one is forbidden to follow that opinion which seems to him to be nearer to the truth." (AAS, XV, 324.) Finally, in the address previously referred to, Pius XII said: "At the same time we make Our own the warnings of these same Predecessors, whereby they sought to protect genuine progress in sci- 76 ON CONTROVERSY ence and lawful liberty of research. We thoroughly approve and recommend that the ancient wisdom be brought into accord, if need be, with the new discoveries of scholarship; that there be free discus-sion of points on which reputable students of the Angelic Doctor commonly argue; that fresh resources be drawn from history for the better understanding of the text of St.Thomas." (AAS, XXX; 246-47.) Some people, hazily cognizant of historical disagreements on certain profound questions, seem to think that Dominicans and Jesuits are always on opposite sides of a theological debate and that Jesuits are not followers of St. Thomas. The impression is false. And it may be informative to add here that St. Ignatius enjoined the study of the "Scholastic doctrine of St. Thomas," and that this rather general prescription of our constitutions was made very definite by our Fifth General Congregation (1594), which legislated that Jesuits must consider St. Thomas as their own special doctor. The words of Leo XIII are witness to the fidelity of Jesuits in carrying out this command. Speaking of eminent Jesuit theologians, the Pope said that "being as they were, men of extraordinary virtue and talent, and applying themselves assiduously to the works of the Angelic Doctor, with certain arguments they expounded his tenets in a manner full and excellent,, they adorned his doctrine with the rich trappings of erudition, they made many keen and practical deduc-tions therefrom for the refutation of new errors, adding besides what-ever declarations or more exact decrees had since that time been made by the Church in this same field. The fruits of their industry no one in truth can spurn without loss to himself." (Apostolic Letter Gravissirne Nos to the Jesuit General, 1892.) --GERALD KELLY, S.J. SEARCHLIGHTING OURSELVES Many shrewd observations for retreats and tridua are found in Searchlighting Ourselues, the Retreat Notes of Father Timothy Brosnahan, S.J., edited by Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J. The book contains notes on the various meditations of The Spir-itual Exercises, several conferences on basic points of the spiritual life, and a number of special meditations, notably a series on the Beatitudes, for use during tridua. Jesuit Seminary and Mission Bureau, 51 East 83rd St., New York 28, N.Y. 77 Works of Made/v anit:es!: Dominic Hughes, O.P. CHARITY and solicitude for souls moved .Father Ellard (RE-VIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, November, 1949) to lay several stric-tures upon Father Garrigou-Lagrange's Three A~es of the Interior Life. That same charity now prompts a staying hand. Petulance or truculence cannot rise to defend either side in chari-table controversy. Neither party can reprove the sincere expression of an opinion any more than either can approve indefiniteness in doc-trine or ineptness in expression. Rather both must call upon charity's constant companion, wisdom, whose "abode is in the full assembly of the saints" (Ecclesiasticus 24: 16). However unqualified writers or readers may be in matters secu-larly or sacredly scientific, their judgment from wisdom will partake of that calm and certitude of those aware that "If anyone desires to do His will, he will know of the teaching whether it is from God" (,John 7:17). Even in these controversies about subsidiary doc-trines and their suitable expression something of the clarity and security of a truly wise appraisal is attainable, "for the spiritual man judges all" (I Corinthians 2 : 15). The judgment of the spiritual man is based on neither caprice nor allegiance, but solely upon wisdom. "It pertains to wisdom," --St. Thomas, the Common Doctor, expressed the common doc-trine--" to consider the highest causes through which it may judge of other things with the greatest certitude and according to which it should order other things" (Summa Tbeolo~qica, II-Ilae. q.45, a.1). Wisdom, then, has one main product and two by-products. The primary product of any habit of wisdom is a "consideration of the highest causes." In the different orders of reality and knowl-edge, various highest causes attract the attention of divers kinds of wise men. In any case, however, the object of wisdom's considera-tion is the ultimate, in words as in works. In works the absolute ultimate in no way ordered to anything further, and the measure of all, are the works of God made manifest in the works of Christ. Relatively ultimate, first and last in a particular line, and the measure of that group, are the works, for example, of a founder of a religious society, so that St. Ignatius would be the measure of the accomplish-ments as Jesuits of his followers, even of the glorious achievements 78 March, 1950 WORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST of St. Francis Xavier and St. Robert Bellarmine. In words, the absolute and unassailable ultimate is the voice of the Church and Sacred Scripture. Relative ultimates, too, are found in various writings: .those of St. Thomas for the whole of theology, those of St. Alphonsus Liguori for practice in moral problems, and those of St. 3ohn of the Cross inmatters mystical. Upon the basis of this "consideration of highest causes" wisdom has as one of its by-pr0ducts a judgment of things other than the highest cause itself "with the greatest certitude." The maximum of security in judgment is not invariable, but will change according as the highest cause is either absolutely or only relatively ultimate. In matters in which the Voice of God has not yet been heard---or may never be--the certitude attainable cannot be as unqualified as when the Church has spoken. Yet various other causes may be given a limited but appreciable certitude as they more or less cogently elimi-nate any worthy fear of contradiction. Moreover, some considera-tions within the scope of wisdom's judgment, metaphysics for example, need admit of no exceptions. Moral judgments, of which the mystical is a phase, however, can attain a certitude about human actions only "as they most often happen." "For it is the mark of the educated man to look for certitude in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits" (Aristotle, I Ethics, c. 3). In this spirit, St. Augustine, who was well aware that no case was finished until Rome had spoken, expressed a wise certitude: "I do not wish my reader to be bound down to me, so I do not wish my corrector to be bound down to himself. Let not the former love me more than the Catholic faith, let not the latter love himself more than the Catholic verity . Do not be willing to amend my writings by thine own opinion or disputation, but from the divine text or by unanswerable reasons." (On the Trinity, Bk. III, Preface.) The mere possibility of an unwarranted contradiction because his every word was not inspired or even uncontested--was not enough to unsettle the mind of St. Augustine, even about what he himself had written. Certainly others reading his words so often approved by the Church can reach the "greatest certitude." Like-wise, concerning a wide variety of matters, even without a decision of the Church or a consensus of theologians, certitude can be had upon the basis of either the arguments proposed or auth6rities cited. The citing of authorities is not a matter of number but of weight. The weight of one Doctor of the Church can overbalance toward 79 DOMINIC HUGHES Review [or Religious certitude any dispute, despite the contradictions of a multitude of theological scribes. Weighing such authority is the second by-product of wisdom. From a catalog of opinions or an enumeration of members of various schools a deep appreciation of human limita-tions may be derived, but scarcely a wise judgment. Wisdom, in addition to considering the highest causes and judging other things with the greatest certitude, orders other things .acgording to the highest cause, either in any particular grouping or according to the absolute ultimate itself. It does not gather a crowd but establishes a hierarchy. Not how many authors may be found who differ from one another, but how they are arranged relative to the primary master of the subject, e.g., ~lohn of the Cross~such is the judgment of wisdom. This wise ordering of authors, moreover, avoids two extremes. Spiritual atavism is inclined to bow so low and so often before the ancestral authority of a father, either of the Church or even of a particular spiritual family, that little opportunity is afforded for examining or explaining doctrinal implications or making practical applications. The other extreme to be shunned, more a tendency than a tenet, is a mollified "modernism." Those affected by it are disposed to judge the latest as the best, the more contemporary as the, more commendable. The foundation for avoiding both extremes, too much of the past, too much of the.present, and of formulating a truly wise judgment is an ordering, not according to.personal prefer-ences but according to principles. The principles of wise judgment are not personal but the peren-nial preferences and special approbation of the Church. When the Popes have praised and so often used particular authorities, e.g., St. Augustine or St. Thomas, as the highest, though not the exclusive causes for engendering certitude in the judgments of the faithful, there is little fear of worthy contradiction in following their example. In that case, other theological or spiritual writers, as they more or less approach and approximate the doctrines of these highest causes of the greatest possible certitude will take their place in the estimate and esteem of wisdom. The impressiveneses of such considerations as numbers, either of authors or copies of their works sold, avail-ability in English, or other such shavings of certitude is, for wisdom, negligible compared to the arguments or authority of but a single Doctor of the Church. These teachers of the "mind of Christ" offer principles at once profound and practical. The highest in heaven always seem the most down-to-earth. None realized more than they how each soul 80 March, 1950 WORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST must budget its talents, using a few well-coined principles through- Out its spiritual life to make both ends meet---in God. Prodigality in principles and in words, they were sure, would contribute to neither practicality nor profundity. With but little, and all of that Christ's, they sought and saw the deep things of God and the deep things of each soul on its way towards Him. The profundity and practicality of other spiritual writers can be wisely appraised only as it more or less approaches what is found in the Doctors both in their wisdom by infusion and their Wisdom by 'industry. Together in a single act these fountainheads of truth converged to give the saintly doctors their certitude. In others--so often what is united in superiors is divided in inferiors--an actual judgment is the result of either one or tlSe other, either of wisdom by infusion or of wisdom by industry. Wisdom by infusion, the science of the saints, as a Gift of the Holy Ghost judgeswith certainty and orderliness, not through metaphysical discourse, but by a loving accord with its object--"by tasting and seeing that the Lord is sweet." Wisdom by industry, the science of theology, on the other hand, secure though it is in the principles of faith, suffers the labors and infirmities of all human effort. Yet,. at times, wisdom by infusion must appeal to wisdom by industry to corroborate its expressions and to co-ordinate its findings; the mystics and spiritual writers must submit divine truth to the scribes in theology for a test in human terms. Wisdom's test, in human terms, concerning the charitable contro-versy over the divergent views of Father Garrigou-La~range and Father Ellard involves two major considerations: doctrine and method. The points of doctrinal divergence most worthy of mention con-cern the Gifts of the Holy Ghost: contemplation: its place and kinds; and the unity of the interior life. The methodological differences arise either positively from the stress or emphasis of one doctrine more than another, or negatively through the omission of detail by some considered as integral to any spiritual treatise. WISDOM IN WORDS: DOCTRINE The points controverted concerning the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are their necessity, nature, function, and number. " Concerning each of these points separately, and cumulatively, too, Father Ellard brings forth his hobgoblin--uncertainty. Upo'n how little might be said with certainty there can be found only the sole small voice of scholarly research, Father DeBlic, who 81 DOMINIC HUGHES Review [or R'eligious minimizes w.hat even Father De Guibert, S.J., thought .an irredu-cible denominator. Many Dominican theologians, are cited as recog-nizing a.controversy upon the matter, but the conclusions of each do not seem worthy of mention by Father Ellard. If thi~. process were pushed to its principle, it would imply that as soon as a point is questioned it immediately becomes questionable, and as soon as doubted, doubtful. Such can. scarcely be a moving principle to wis-dom which has ordered authorities according .to the highest among them and thus attained the "greatest certitude." To corroborate the general judgment of wisdom, however, each subordinate point which has come under scrutiny may well be examined. The necessity of the Gifts, as explained by St. Thomas, seems to have suffered the least from the minimizing tendencies of later and lesser theologians. None of the mystics, moreover, have found them a luxury. They are vital to the life of divine grace; "the just man," Leo XIII testified in his Encyclical Dioinum illud munus (May 9, 1897), "has need of these seven gifts." Because of the overwhelming testimony in tradition to the intimate association of the state of grace and presence of the Gifts, even the doughtiest opponent of Thomistic doctrine on the Gifts must treat the denial of this point as negligible. The nature of the Gifts, however, is quite another matter. "They make us docile to the Holy Ghost," according to a formula suffi-ciently broad to embrace all'variants, but not to preclude precisions. While all would agree that docility to the Holy Ghost is of the essence of the Gifts, as Father Ellard triumphantly pointed out to drive in the wedge of uncertainty, "not all" would ,concur with St. Thomas in finding them distinct habits in the soul. The words of Sacred Scripture itself give warrant for St. Thomas's doctrine, inasmuch as they imply a unique divine influx. This,doctrine of St. Thomas cannot lightly be set aside. His reason cannot be dis-proved, his authority no one can gainsay. Although obviously not of Faith, his doctrine has an approbation by the Church incompar-ably above any i~f those proposed by Father Ellard as competitors for our certain allegiance. Ordinary permission to teach or publish thisis only a faint resemblance to the abundant approval given to Doctors of the Church. In them, because of their sanctity and the special scrutiny of their works, the Church recognizes unique wit-nesses and guardians of her patrimony, the doctrine of Christ. Over and above the acclamations usually given to a Doctor, St. Thomas has received frequent and unique marks of esteem from the Church. Pope Pius V referred to him as "the most certain rule of Christian 82 March, 1950 X~rORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST doctrine," and Pope Clement VIII was sure that he could be "fol-lowed without any danger of error." These" and many other state-ments by successive Popes are not private hyperbole but public declarations, normative if not mandatory in Faith. Against this weight of certitude from St. Thomas, Father Ellard proposes (p. 305) a theologian described, in a citation from clerical students, as the."Subtle Doctor." Of the su.btlet~r of'Scotus there is no doubt; but of the tebm "Doctor" as applied to him there is con-siderable reason for hesitance. No more of a' Doctor of the Church than so many others who have taught in her schools throughout the centuries, Scotus has neithe~ the approval of his sanctity nor of his doctrine that is required of a Doctor. His opinion is, therefore, of an entirely other brder in certitude from that of St. Thomas. It is on a plane "with that of Suarez, who could not concur with St. Thomas in the matter of grace but could affirm against Scotus that he appreciated the importance of distinguishing between the virtues and the Gifts. The allegiance, moreover, of St. Francis de Sales to the doctrine of Scotus cannot be alleged'with certitude. The Gifts are, in the words cited by Father Ellard' (p. 306), "the virtues, properties and qualities of charity." (Cf. The Looe or: God, XI, 15.) "Speaking precisely," as St. Francis assured us he was doing, all these entities are distinct from the essence, although perhaps inseparable from it. In like manner, although the Gifts and charity are always together, they do not merge into one habit, otherwise the same might be said of St. Francis de Sales' doctrine of the relation of charity and the other infused virtues. Charity would not then be the "gift of gifts" (XI, 19), but the one gift, n6t the essence or bond of perfection, but the whole of the spiritual organism. There is nothing suffi-ciently explicit in the words of St. Francis de Sales to indicate an approval of the Scotistic opinion or the disapproval of the doctrine of St. Thomas. Even if a rivalry were established between these two Doctors of the Church, inasmuch as the matter is one of theological principles, the preponderance of authority would easily go to St. Thomas. To St. Thomas, then, and not to Father Garrigou-Lagrange, wisdom looks for its "highest cause" according to which it might order other opinions and thus attain the "greatest certitude" possible concerning the nature" of the Gifts. Obviously, Pohle-Preuss, Forget; Van der Meersch, and legions of other writers who subscribe to what is least as what is safest, are far from disturbing the certitude of 'a 83 DOMINIC HUGHES Reoiew for Religious soul in which wisdom dwells. The judgment of wisdom appre-ciates the authority and approves the arguments, the sublimity and certainty, of the doctrine on the Gifts proposed without equivoca-tion by St. Thomas. Allegedly based upon St. Thomas and employing his authority is the more recent confection of two different modes of the Gifts in life. The gesture with which Father Ellard includes Cardinal Billot among Thomists is so expansive that it would embrace all who, for one point or another, approximate the teaching of the Angelic Doc-tor, whose method, doctrine, and principles are to be held by all teachers as sacred according to the mandate of the Church (Code of Canon Law, canon 1366, § 2). Moreover, the contemporary pro-ponent of the theory qf two modes of the Gifts in this life, one ordi-nary, the other extraordinary, was immediately and unhesitatingly denounced as having mistaken and misquoted St. Thomas by Fathers R. Dalbiez (l~tudes Carm$litaines, April 1933, pp. 250ff.) and P. P~rinelle (Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques, No~ember 1932, p. 692), as well as by Father Garrigou-Lagrange (La Vie spirituelle, November 1932, suppl, pp. [ 77 ] if). Such total misinterpretation of St. Thomas cannot be a "form of modern Thomistic theory on the Gifts," as Father Ellard would have it (p. 310), but rather a warning against making St. Thomas a wit-ness to any elaboration prejudicial to his principles. Certain, partly because it is "seamless," Thomistic doctrine preserves its purity and integrity by faithful adherence to the "method, doctrine, and prin-ciples" in the text of St.' Thomas, particularly in the question of the nature of the Gifts. The number of the Gifts is likewise clearly and authoritatively determined in the text of St. Thomas. As always, he is in full accord with the texts of Sacred Scripture which the Church and the best exegetes c~ansider most reliable, as well as the sense of the Church in the hymn Veni, Sancte Spiritus, and the Catechism of the Coun-cil of Trent. St. Augustine is of the same mind (cf. On Christian Doctrine, II, 7), and St. Francis de Sales refers to the "seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost" (The Love of God, XI, 19) in a text otherwise considered probative by Father Ellard (p. 306). To introduce and perhaps induce a doubt in the traditional enumerhtion as taxative or "limitative," Father Ellard cites (p. 309) an author who would amplify the number as by "an infinite variety of shades." This plethora, seven is a "plenitude," the same author affirms is the intention of the sacred authors, "as we know." How we are to know, 84 March, 1950 WORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST however, is not indicated. Either a private revelation or some extremely adroit exegesis would be necessary to belie the authority of Doctors of the Church, who, so close to the primary author of Sacred Scripture--the Holy Ghost--have considered the Gifts as numeri-cally determined. Determination by the Doctors on one point may leave still another undetermined with exactly the same cogency and certitude. St. Thomas himself, having given, on the authority of another, a general schema of the functions of the various gifts, found it neces-sary to reconsider one of its aspects. "Who will assure us that the . last is perfect?" Father EIIard quotes (p. 309) a scholar who has studied the point. Who, on the other hand, will be temerarious enough to.insist that the last is imperfect or.less perfec~ than any other proposed? A distinction and argument which, after long thought, had clarity and cogency for St. Thomas has the added note of authority for those who wisely appraise both the change and the conclusion. In making his schema, St. Thomas realized he was establishing an appropriate parallel, an educative device, an argu-. ment of convenience. Neither he nor St. Augustine--nor Father Garrigou-Lagrange--attributes the same probative force to a schema as to a syllogism. Indeed, The Three Ages evidences an admirable conformity to the doctrine of St. Thomas, and his classical commen-tator, John of St. Thomas, in the substance and schema for the functioning of the various Gifts. The final point concerning what Father Ellard chooses rather ungraciously to call "the present-day Thomistic hypothesis" of the Gifts is their association with the doctrine that some graces are intrinsically efficacious. A larger issue is involved here than the .mat-ter of the Gifts and it should not be treated by innuendo. If at this juncture "many people pause," as Father Ellard expects (p. 310), because the common pre-Reformation doctrine on the efficacy of grace and the nature of the Gifts are "indissolubly bound" in doctrinal integrity, will it be to neglect an assured and consistent teaching for one that is hopelessly entangled in affirmations, denials, and com-promises? Those who demur at the doctrine of grace as expounded by St. Thomas cannot fail to deny his teaching on the Gifts. Only a compromise could enable Suarez to affirm the doctrine of St. Thomas on the nature of the Gifts and deny his doctrine on grace. Such compromises are always uncertain, as the doctrinally internecine con-flict among Molinists and Congruists amply testifies. Somewhat as a summary of his consideration of the .Gifts, 85 DOMINIC HUGHES Review [or Religious Father. Ellard implies (p. 311) that because leading Thomists are aware of controversies they themselves are subject to uncertainty. Nothing could be further from the truth, unless that Catholics by their cognizance of heresy diminish their faith. Moreover, because the teaching of The Three Ages is based upon what "the great majority of theologians hold with St.Thomas," a wise judgment would con-cede Father Ellard but poor pleasure in having ferreted out an admission that "'not all [italics his] theologians agree on this par-ticular fundamental point." Upon such minimal evidence and defensive techniques only an artificial uncertainty and imprudent reservation or suspension of judgment can be built. Father Ellard-emphasizes complexity ;ind confusion, Father Garrigou-Lagfange the "certitude of the great directive principles that illuminate all spirituality (cf. p. 311)." In the matter of the Gifts, their neces-sity, nature, number, and fufiction, .not St. Thomas' and Father Garrigou-Lagrange's unassailable doctrine, but Father Ellard's unre-solved doubts lead to "'disillusionment and discouragement" which all are so solicitous to avoid. Another complex question in need of "great directive principles" is that of contemplation. Concerning the exposition of contempla-tion in The Three Ages, Father Ellard seems to find two points of difficulty: the presence of acquired contemplation; the place of the infused. With regard to acquired contemplation, Father Ellard finds reason for criticism in the fact that Father Garrigou-.Lagrange gives it "hardly any place" in his s'ynthesis of the entire interior life,, while the Carmelite Father Gabriel of St. Mary Magdalen devoted "half his work, St. dohn of the Cross" to justifying its place in Carmelite theology. The same Carmelite, however, gives as his wise and orderly conclusion (pp. 199-200) that "the central thesis of the Thomistic spiritual synthesis is supported by the doctrine of actlx;e contemplation." Even if Father Ellard, in the Three Ages, would replace "hardly" with "half" to suit his preferences, the wise ordering of part to whole in both Carmelite and Dominican is obvious. Moreover, "St. Theresa never speaks of any other than infused contemplation.,"~ Father Gabriel states categorically (p. 111), while he and others can find only equivalents of the term in St. John of the Cross. Both the problem of terminology and the point of doc-trine concerning the "beginning of contemplation" (Dark Night, I, 9) and the "acquired prayer of recollection" receive ample and appropriate treatment in the chapter on "Contemplative Prayer" in The Three Ages. More would.make a part into a polemic. 86 March, 1950 WORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST If others disagree with Father Garrigou-Lagrange in this matter it should not be surprising. The harmony he has indicated between St. Thomas and St. John of the Cross is well-founded in the best Carmelite and Dominican authorities. If a dissident attitude arises from the outside and even seeps within, the foundations, of accord in the Theresian and Thomistic teachings are not tragically undermined. Without mentioning either the Common or the Mystical Doctor, Father Ellard has assembled a variety of authorities (p. 303) to indicate a confusion on the place of infused contemplation. The teachings of Msgr. Saudreau, Tanquerey, Crisogono, and Naval-- all but the last two differing from one another--are arrayed against that of The Three Ages. No mention is made, however, of which of all in the field more closely conforms to the doctrine of the Doctor of Contemplation, St. John of the Cross. Tanquerey, Crisogono, and Naval are not even close. Msgr. Saudreau confines contempla-tion to the unitive way. With "a great difference indeed" (p. 303) Father Garrigou-Lagrange conforms exactly to the doctrine of St. John by placing infused contemplation in both the unitive way and--to use St. John's own words--"the way of proficients, which is also called the illuminative way, or the way of infused contempla-tion" (Dark Night, I, 14). This explicit testimony of the "highest cause" in matters of contemplation and Father Garrigou-Lagrange's strict conformity to it, leaves but one judgment ~or wisdom-- "greatest certitude" for the doctrine on the place of infused con-templa. tion in The Three Ages. Moreover, when it is a question of the relationship between the Gifts and contemplation, Father Ellard's strictures are utterly con-fused. His use as an argument from omission of inappropriate texts from St. Francis de Sales and St. Alphonsus "who would have advocated for all a form of mental prayer that is full of inspirations from the Holy Spirit" is pitiably feeble. Fantastic, nothing less, is his assertion that "although in their process nothing has been said about infused contemplation," persons have been canonized, and hence "we can safely conclude" from no mention, let alone non-manifestation, to the non-existence of interior intellectual movements of the Holy Ghost in their souls. Father Garrigou-Lagrange clearly indicates (I, 81) saints and situations in which the activity of the intellectual Gifts are "diffuse." In them the practical Gifts of coun-sel, fortitude, or fear are more apparent, yet all the gifts will be "highly developed" and wisdom will [egulate all. Since the highest of mystical experiences is within the scope of a moral consideration, 87 DOMINIC HUGHES Ret~ieto for Religious judgments must be wisely formed" of them "as they most often hap-pen." Exceptions corroborate, not corrupt, certitude in morals, "for the man educated to expect them." Neither the fact that "various exceptions" are admitted to the doctrine of the predominance of infused contemplation, nor its "being so closely associated with a questionable theory of the gifts (p. 312)" is ground for asserting that the Theresian-Thomistic position in the Three Ages "suffers" a loss of certitude. Only those who are con-stantly looking for some "phenomenon in consciousness" which is "humanly noticeable" (p. 31'~) complain of dangers of disillusion-ment because the truth of mystical experience did not fit into their preconceived patterns. From the doctrines on the Gifts and contemplation flows the final point of difficulty: the normality of infused contemplation or the unity of the interior life. To Father Ellard's wonderment, The Three Ages "embodies no great new discovery nor corrects any old error" (p. 311). His observation is remarkably exact. The discovery is old, the error is new. Until the seventeenth century no one lost sight of the unity of the interior life and no arbitrary and artificial cleavage between ascetical and mystical theology was introduced. With the publica-tion of Scaramelli's Ascetical Directory an.d Mystical Director~l, how-ever the division and its tragic consequences were popularized. Since things ascetical were conceived as ordinary and the mystical, i.e., infused contemplation, as extraordinary, humility became the motive for the humdrum, and many souls apt for contemplation were forced to excruciating torments on the treadmill of discursive meditation. This new error bade fair to destroy an old discovery. To Father Garrigou-Lagtange is due sincere tribute as one of the vanguard leading souls to an appreciation of the traditional teaching on the unity of the interior life, its contemplative graces and gifts. Those only need fear disillusionment or discouragement in his leadership whose limited ideals or faint heart stultify their wisdom. WISDOM AT WORK: METHOD Wisdom governs not only the principles of the interior life but their presentation. In The Three Ages, Father EIlatd finds its doc-trinal stress and seeming omissions particularly distressing. Father Garrigou-Lagrange's stress upon the Gifts of the Holy Ghost is indeed a strain for Father Ellard. For him, "The whole vast construction presented in these two large volumes stands or fails with the special doctrine on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit which 88 March, 1950 WORKS OF GOD MADE MANIFEST forms as it were the supporting framework for it" (p. 305). Yet Father Ellard himself declared (p. 297) that "degrees of virtues, the functions of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, various purifications, arid the grades of prayer are assigned to each of the three ages." Perhaps the mere presence of the Gifts gives them too much prominence for Father Ellard. On~ of his authorities (p. 313), and a confrere, Father Poulain, apparently not a theologian, however proficient a psychologist, in his extensive work, The Graces of Interior Prayer, somehow manages to avoid any treatment of the Gifts. To anyone acquainted with their importance in traditional spiritual writers, the exposition of The Three Ages will seem the mere summary it was intended to be (I, 66). On the other hand, the omissi~)ns Father Ellard finds so lamen-table are more nominal than real. If the part;.cular examination deals with the predominant fault, a chapter on that subject should satisfy Father Ellard's justification of it as "one of the major tech-nique. s in modern Catholic asceticism." When "for the general examination no precise method is suggested," it need not be a strange omission.Once the "Sins to be Avoided" are mentioned, as Father Garrigou-Lagrange does in a chapter by that name (I, 299), the remainder is left to the individual conscience', even in the Spiritual Exercises, since of its five acts in this matter two are a preface, two an epilogue of prayers. Again in the case of mental prayer, concrete details appeal to Father Ellard as the source of certitude. As a mat-ter of fact, the opposite is true. The more particularized is the treat-ment, the more it is subject to doubt. The devious details of these devices for praying, whose security for some is largely in their famili-arity, are better consciously omitted by anyone who writes with the "certitude of the great directive principles of all spirituality" (cf. p. 311). The method of The Three Ages, moreover, cannot rather "stress theory than practice" (p. 302) if its principal excellence is "its inspiratio:lal value," and if "a reader feels his heart warmed and his enthusiasm enkindled" (p. 301). It can scarcely be labeled as more given to "metaphysics than psychology" (p. 302) when the author keeps reminding his readers of the grand dogmas of Christianity, their "infinite elevation," their implications for our "affective and practical lives" (p. 301). WORDS AT WORK FOR THE WISE For the wise, who are so either by industry in theology or by 89 DOMINIC HUGHES infusion .with God's love, a word of conclusion is sufficient. A wise word may not have rhetorical flair, but it cannot be faltering or fal-lacious. As an expression of the judgment of the "highest causes" with the "greatest certitude" and other things in an orderly manner, it is not an assembly of facts, but an appraisal of values. The relative values of both content and method between what Father Garrigou-Lagrange and Father Ellard offer for its appraisal leave wisdom no doubt whatever. In points of doctrine Father Ellard seems to be without the solid foundation of a man whos~ theological industry has made him wise. Despite his erudition-- sometimes amid the most trivial sources-~-his analysis lacks pro-fundity. Its practicality, too, since it fails in its calculated effect, is open to question. In the face" of an artificially imposed order, Father Ellard's thoughts ramble and lose themselves in details. When his conclusions are declarative, they waver over a "whatever" (p. 314) or a "whether or not" (p. 316), and when they are an interrogative they are most uncertain. His precision in labelling the doctrines of others he suddenly loses when he lets "Catholic" and "Church" slip into sentences containing ideas he favors (p. 302). All of this gives his article the appearance of a somewhat gauche polemic rather than of a sincere and solicitous appraisal. On the other hand, the mag-nificent proportions of The Three Ages are not often met with in contemporary spiritual writing. Because it presents so well the "great dogmas of Christianity" as well as "their implications for our affective and practical lives," each reader feels his "heart warmed and his enthusiasm enkindled for these great truths" (p. 301). Wisdom's final word concerning the providential purpose of this and other discordant notes in the harmony of the teachings in the Church on the interior life is after the Model of Wisdom Him-self. When the Apostles saw the man born blind, they balanced-- unknowingl~, perhaps--one rabbinical opinion against another: "this man or his parents?" They were forced to suspend judgment, because seeing only alternatives and not an order to a Highest Cause, they remained uncertain. When they appealed to Christ, He gave them an answer many rabbis would not have considered scientific or satisfying "in terms of human experience."" Yet it was sublime and secure. Wisdom Himself replied to the Apostles, and reassures all in the present instance: supernatural security and salvation are accom-plished through suffering and the triumph of wisdom--"because the works of God were to be made manifest . " (John 9:3). 90 March, 1950 FATHER ELLARD'S REPLY FATHER ELLARD'S REPLY In his inspiring introductory remarks on wisdom Father Hughes proposes a restricted, relative, and special sense of "certain." " If'we accept that, th~n really there hardly seems to be any necessity of my saying more. He' has virtually conceded the great cardinal point of my whole criticism, namely, that Father Garrigou-Lagrange's doc-trine on the gifts and the corresponding thesis on infused ~ontempla-tion insofar.as this depends on that doctrine, are not, in the plain and ordinary sense of the term, certain. Certaint~ , in this sense, espe-cially when predicated of a doctrine that is theological and specu-lative, is opposed not only to probability, bfit even to greater prob-ablity. Similarly, if the langu.age of The Three Ages is to be under-stood as expressing doctrine t~at is certain only in a limited and relative sense, I. was deceived, and my labor was in vain. Perhaps also some other readers will be misled too. It seems sufficient, therefore, to notice 'very briefly only what in Father Hughes's reply is most relevant to my four principal criti-cisms, and not to say more about certain matters in which he' has mistaken my meaning. Nor shall I advert further to several expres-. sions suggestive of what I would disclaim. Those four contentions were: "'The Three Ages is theoretical rather 'than practical; it is one-sided and narrow; an essential part of it, namely, its doctrine of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, is uncertain; and its main thesis is not after all really so significant" (p. 302). I shall follow the order in which Father Hughes deals with them. First, the gifts. As a simple and practical way of ending this ¯ particular argument, I will give to Father Hughes, if he wishes, a list of all the leading theologians of the twentieth century with their works and the appropriate references to what they teach on the giftsl Then he can see at once in black and white whether Catholic theo-logians agree in proposing as certain, in the usual sense, any such elaborate theory of them as that in The Three Ages. These theo-logians will embody, in varying degrees and ways of course, the present mind of the Church; they will be quite conversant with the altogether unique authority of St. Thomas, and they will be aware also of whatever else is pertinent. In [hem, considered adequately and properly, not merely arithmetically, will be found accumulated Catholic theological wisdom in its most mature and authoritative form. When the theologians, who are the most competent to judge in a question of this kind, are as greatly divided and as uncertain as 91 FATHER ELLARD'8 REPLY Review for Religious they actually are, on what evidence could particular persons come to certain knowledge in the matter? Possibly they can; but indeed it seems most unlikely. When the authorities disagree or "are not posi-tive, it would seem wise for individual persons to suspend judgment. If, as Father Hughes seems to agree, the two Thomistic doctrines on the efficacy of grace and the nature of the gifts stand or fall together, then most emphatically are theologians divided. As for the Doctors' of the. Church, the Augustinians claimed St. Augustine for their view on grace; and both Dominicans and Jesuits appealed to St. Augustine and St. Thomas. "Among the more modern Doctors, St. Alphonsus de' Liguori is cited for a modified version of the Augustinian theory; and St. Robert Bellarmine for the Jesuits. According to Von Pastor, St. Francis de Sales declared, in a memo-randum written for Pope Paul V, "that on the whole he shared the view of the Jesuits; and he added that he had made an exhaustive study of the subject, and that he saw considerable difficulties in either opinion, He did not think the time had come for deciding a question on which so many able scholars were unable to agree." (History oF the Popes, XXV, 240.) These facts concerning the controversy on grace are given, not with any intention of arguing such a matter in these pages, but simply to show that, if Father Garrigou-Lagrange's teaching on the gifts is logically involved in this highly disputed sub-ject, surely it cannot be called certain. Father Hughes writes: "Many Dominican theologians are cited as recognizing a controversy upon the matter [of the gifts], but the conclusions of each do not seem worthyof mention by Father Ellard" (p. 82). In the writings referred to I have not noticed any con-clusions contradictory either to the statements quoted from them or to the proposition in substantiation of which the citations were made. If Father Hughes should point out any such conclusion, I shall be glad to acknowledge it. Of course the same five theologians can be quoted in favor of the Thomistic theory of the gifts, and two of them for the certainty of it, for example, Gardeil in th~ Dictionnaire de Theolo~Tie, IV-2, 1776, 1777, and Garrigou-Lagrange himself, in PerFection Chretienne et Contemplation, II, [88-91]; neverthe-less, they witness the fact of disagreement among theologians and admit that others do not share their own view. Secondly, I said of The Three Aoes that it is one-sided and nar-row. Father Hughes replies that it is in accord, if not with lesser lights, at least with St. John of the Cross, the great and ultimate 92 March, 1950 FATHER ELLARD'S REPLY (relative) norm in this matter. But the same agreement is claimed by other authors also, among them tw6 Carmelite spokesmen. In other words, there is more than one interpretation of St. John among orthodox Catholics. ."But Father Garrigou-Lagrange has the right one." Perhaps he has; but we might be better, convinced if he would give us a chance to judge for ourselves. Could he not at least give us fair notice of dissenting opinions?. A fresh sample of div.ergenc~ is furnished by Father Gabriel of St. Mar.y Magdalen in his new book, St. Teresa o~: desus. Although he writes, "'For all that, it can be shown in fact that this teaching of the Teresian school is not irreconcilable with the modern Thomist synthesis of the spiritual life" (p. 44), yet repeatedly throughout - the book he contradicts Father Garrigou-Lagrange on the necessity of infused contemplation. The first point in my criticism reads: "'Tile Three Ages is theo-retical rather than practical." Of all, this was the least important, especially as instruction and inspiration are also in their own way most practical. Father Hughes objects: "The method of The Three Ages cannot rather 'stress theory than practice' if its principal excel-lence is 'its inspirational value,' and if 'a reader feels his heart warmed and his enthusiasm enkindled.' " Why not? In this respect the work resembles treatises on dogmatic theology which are preoccu-pied with doctrine rather than practice and which can at least be bigh.~y inspiring. Again my critic writes: The book "can scarcely be labeled as more given to 'metaphysics than psychology' when the author keeps reminding his readers of the grand" dogmas of Christianity, their 'infinite elevation,' their implications for our 'affective and practical lives.' " The answer is. simple. When a book contains dogmatic, metaphysical, and psychological elements, why cannot it accentuate them in just that order? As a matter of fact, The Three Ages does. I cannot imagine how Father Hughes can say: "In the case of mental prayer, concrete details appeal to Father Ellard as the source of certitude." My final contention was that the main thesis of The Three A~Tes, namely, that infused contemplation comes within the normal devel-opment of the interior life, is not after all very significant. It would be pregnant with meaning and significance if according to the mind of its author it were intended to im'ply that mystical contemplation in the full and obvious sense as described by St. Teresa in The 93 FATHER ELLARD'S REPLY Review/or Religious Interior Castle is normally to be expected. St. Teresa's terminology is used and one anticipates sbmething very wonderful. But then one finds out that only "what is essential" is promised us, and that seems much less indeed. Such language is surely apt to deceive the less wary. On this point, the climax of everything, Father Hughes has sur-prisingly little. I was careful not to deny the thesis of the nor-mality of mystical contemplation, or the unity of the interior life, or even to call them in question, except insofar as the thesis is pre-sented as a corollary from the theory of the gifts. Of course I am not suggesting that the tiniest bit of infused con-templation is not a most precious grace. It is, by all means. Rather, the question is whether the mysticism which Father Garrigou- Lagra~nge holds out in prospect for us is the same as the substantive sublime graces depicted in St. Teresa's Mansions and in St. 3ohn's Spiritual Canticle and The Living Flame. It seems highly fitting that I should add a word on two personal references that some readers will resent. I used a quotation in which Scotus was called '~the Subtle Doctor." There appears to be no reason for the depreciatory language which my critic uses. Scotus was one of the most influential of all Scholastic philosophers and theologians; for centuries innumerable times he has been referred to as "the Subtle Doctor" in more or less the same way that St. Thomas is termed "the Angelic Doctor." There was no suggestion at all that he is a Doctor of the Church; yet he is great enough to have been the theologian to whom above all others under the providence of God the Church owes the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Likewise it seems inexplicable that Poulain, the author of The Graces of Interior Prayer, A Treatise on Mystical Theology, should be referred to with these words: "apparently not a theologian, how-ever proficient a psychologist" (p. 89). True, Poulain was not a dogmatic theologian, and his design in writing on mystical the-ology was different from that of Father Garrigou-Lagrange, but his work is in certain respects, especially for an account of the facts of mysticism and for practical help in direction, of first-class worth and thus far unsurpassed. To conclude: if I am right in taking Father Hughes to mean that the doctrine of the gifts is to be considered certain only in a relative and limited sense, and not with the obvious and proper force of that term, then on the'chief point we are in agreement. If not, I would 94 March, 19 5 0 COMMUNICATIONS say to readers who have followed this criticism 'and countercriticism, especially if they have actually read The Three Ages, andpr.eferably against the background of Saints Teresa and 3ohn of the Cross: "I speak to men of reflection; judge for yourselves of what I say" (I Cor. 10:lS).--G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD, S.J. ommun{caldons Reverend Fathers: A few years ago in an issue of Emmanuel the reviewer of one of the books of Father Garrigou-Lagrange expressed his doubt of the truth of the characteristic doctrines of that eminent theologian, at the same time stating his hope that a more thorough criticism would be made in a lengthier review. That same doubt and hope have been felt by many who read Christian Perfection and Contemplation and The Three Ages of the Interior Life. In those works the views of the author on some points of dogmatic and of mystical theology were stated in such a way that the reader if not versed in these matters would conclude that these particular views are not seriously disputed by competent Catholic theologians. But they are disputed, and to bring out this fact, as Father Ellard has done in his review of The Three Ages of the Interior Life in your November, 1949, issue, is to render a real service to the reader of these valuable spiritual books. The truth that some of Father (3arrigou-Lagrange's theories are disputed, and are not part of Cath-olic doctrine nor the unanimous opinions of theologians will not hurt anyone. Veritas vos liberabit. In emphasizing the disputed character of .these opinions of the gifted.writer, it is not intended in any way, I am sure, to imply that he has deliberately misled his readers. But Father Garrigou-Lagrange has led the majo.r portion of his life in the midst of skilled theo-logians. He naturally and unconsciously keeps them in mind as he writes. Yet what he writes is being read by many who are n~;t versed in even the fundamentals of theology and who consequently may easily be misle.d by his statement, of his positions. For the general public a clearer statement of what is general Catholic doctrine and what. is not, is certainly desirable. May I add a personal note? After some experience in directing 95 SUMMER SESSIONS ReVietO [or Religi,,os souls who have undoubtedly received the gift of infused contempla-tion, I find it difficult.to believe that Father Garrigou-Lagrange has any real concept, of infused contemplation at all. Everything he writes leads me to believe that he is really thinking and speaking of that prayer which is variously called "acquired contemplation," "the prayer of ~implicity," etc. There is an essential distinction between this simplification of discursive prayer and infused contemplation; and that distinction, I believe, cannot be understood merely from ¯ reading the works of mystical writers or theologians. I thoroughly agree with the Benedictine' who said 'that "the conception that St. John of the Cross had of mysticism and contemplation entirely escaped" the gifted author of Tile Three Ages. No harm can come from giving testimony to the inexactitude of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's distinction between Catholic doctrine and the theories of certain theologians; nor to the incorrectness of his understanding of the fundamental nature of infused contempla-tion.-- A SECULAR PRIEST. [EDITORS' NOTE: Further communications concerning Father Ellard's appraisal.of The Three Ages will be acgepted. These communications should be kept as brief as the subject-matter permits. If at all possible, they should be neatly typed, double-spaced, with generous margin. The sender should sign his name; and the name will be printed unless the content is of a personal nature.] SUMMER SESSION The Plus X School of Liturgical Music, founded by the late Mother Georgia Stevens, will conduct its Thirty-Fourth Summer Session: June 29-Augtist 10. Registration is open to men and women, whether as students matriculated for the B.A. or B.Mus., degrees, or as non-matriculated students; resident and non-resident. Courses will be offered in Gregorian Chant, Gregorian Accompaniment, Con-ducting, Polyphony, Liturgical Singing, Vocal Production, History of Music, Keyboard Harmony,. Music Education, Counterpoint, .etc. Members of the Staff have been long trained in the traditions of Solesmes and have national and international pedagogical experience and recognition. Private lessons in organ, piano, and singing may be procured. Membership is held by the School in the National Association of Schools of Music and it enjoys the official approval of the most eminent music organizations. According to a long-established custom there will be lectures by prominent musicologists and the usual s, eries of weekly concerts. Students will be given the opportunity of~active particip.ation in the Liturgy by the congrega- 96 March, 1950 BOOK REVIEWS tional singing of Holy Mass, Vespers, Compline, and Benediction. The Very Reverend Monsignor Frederic Teller, D.D., Ph.D.,C.G.M. will teach some courses. The Ve.ry Reverend Monsignor Martin B. Hellriegel, of the Church of the Holy Cross, St. Louis, Mo., and the Reverend 3ohn 3. Dougherty, S.T.L.,S.S.D. of the Immaculate Con-ception Seminary, D~rlington, N. 3, will give daily lectures on the Liturgy throughout the Session. For further information write to: Mother Aileen Cohalan, Director, Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart, New York 27, New York. Book Reviews THE MOTHER OF THE SAVIOR AND OUR INTERIOR LIFE. By Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. Translated by Bernard J. Kelly, C.S.Sp. Pp. 338. B. Herder Book C;o., St. Lou~s, M~ssourL $4.00. The theological and d~votional literature about the Blessed Virgin is so extensive that .a new synthesis by a capable author is highly welcome: Father Garrigou-Eagrange published such a syn-thesis in 1941 (reprinted in 1948). The present translation from thd French makes his book available for the la.rge number of readers who have come to value his works in English versions. The book is divided into two parts. The first part, on "The Divine Maternity and the Plenitude of Grace," is doctrinal. It aims at imparting knowledge about Our Lady and her unique position, in subordination to her divine Son, at the very summit of creation and the supernatural order. The pre-eminence of the divine mater-nity, which dominates all Mariology as the source and end of all Mary's great gifts, is very clearly brought out. Here and there a line of reasoning is pursued that is not very convincing: but strictly theo-logical procedures are hardly to be expected in a work that is more devotional in spirit than scientific. The second part, on "Mary, Mother of all Men: Her Universal Mediation and our Interior Life," demonstrates Mary's activity in the plan of redemption and the important causality she exercises in our salvation and sanctification. In view of the character of the volume, the author has wisely refrained from entering into the contemporary debate among theo-logians on the precise meaning and function of Mary as co-redemp- 97 BOOK R~VlEWS Review [or Religious trix, contenting himself with general expressions that should prove acceptable to all parties in the controversy. The main source for the theological presentation is Merkelbach's well-known Mariologia. But the Fathers, the great Scholastics and their later successors, spiritual writers, orators, and Popes are called upon to yield up their treasures. Many gems have been contributed by Saints Ambrose, Sophronius, Andrew of Crete, Ephrem, and Peter Damien. Saints Bernard, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Alphonsus, Grignon de Montfort, and Francis de Sales have all offered their riches. Suarez, Terrien, Dublanchy, le Bachelet, and Hugon have generously thrown open their books. And these great names represent but a sampling of the numerous sources consulted and utilized. The encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, and Plus XI manifest the mind of the Church on recent Mariological doctrine. The Polish Dominican, Justin of Mi~chow, provides the inspiration for one of the finest chapters in the book, "Special Aspects of Mary's Queenship." The article on the Rosary sheds fresh light on that welt-loved devotion, and sug-gests a way of practicing it that will be profitable to all Catholics. The translator has done his part admirably. Comparison with the French edition shows how faithful Father Kelly has been to the orig!nal. If we did not know that the English edition is a transla-tion, we could hardly guess that fact from reading the book. And that is the supreme criterion of the translator's success. CYRIL VOLLERT, S.J. IGNATIAN METHODS OF PRAYER. By Alexandre Brou, S.J. Translated by William J. Young, S.J. Pp. xl ~ 203. The Bruce Publishing Com-pany, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1949. $3.00. The aim of this book is very clearly stated by the author when he tells us that he set out to discover "what exactly did St. Ignatius want to say, and what did he say" on the subject of prayer. The word "discover" is used purposely, for the many commentators on St. Ignatius have not always clarified his thought nor passed it on unadulterated to their readers. Father Brou observes: "Now it some-times happens that with'the best intentions in the World his thought has been misunderstood. Authors . . . have viewed the teachings of the Saint through a mist of commentary, and a commentator never fails to add something to his text" (p. vii). Father Brou gdes back to sdurces, the text of the Spiritual Exer-cises, and he interprets them in the light of Stl Ignatius' personal March, 1950 BOOK REVIEWS letters, supplementing his findings with. the writings of intimate con-temporaries of the Saint--St. Francis Xavier, Blessed Peter Faber, Father Nadal--to mention but three. The work is divided into four main divisions. In the first St. Ignatius' teaching on prayer and the interior life, the ,relation of prayer to the apostolate, seeking God in all things, the presence of God, and finally mystical prayer are treated. The second and third parts are devoted to the preparations for prayer and the so-called methods of prayer respectively, while the fourth part treats the coun-sels for the time during and after prayer, and tl~e rules for the dis-cernment of spirits. Two features of the teachin'g of.St. Ignatius as presented in this book are noteworthy. First is the continuity ot: practically every portion of the Ignatian teaching with a tradition of Catholic spirit-uality which he both inherited and developed into the forms found in the Exercises. The other is what we might call the compatibility of high prayer with the active life of the apostolate. Great mystic ¯ that he was, SI~. Ignatius was eminently a man of the active aposto-late, what we would call nowadays a man of affairs. He conceived the man of affairs as a man of prayer, and a life of prayer as not at all incompatible with a full daily schedule. "To St. Francis Borgia he asserts that it is more perfect to be able to find God everywhere and in all things than to have need of an oratory and long prayers to enter into union with Him" (p. 39). The book combines the excellent qualities of thoroughness and brevity. It can be r~ad and reread with profit.--T. L. McNAIR, S.J. LITTLE CATECHISM OF PRAYER. By Father Gabr;el of St. Mary Mag-dalen, O.C.D. Transla÷ed by ÷he Discalced Carmelite Nuns. Pp. 44. Monastery of Discalced Carmelites, Concord, New Hampshire, 1949. $.2S (paper). People in general who cultivate mental prayer and v.ery particu-larly all those who would like to practice it in the spirit and after the manner of the Carmelites, traditional leaders in matters of the contemplative life, will welcome this Little Catechism. In six chap-ters and eighty-nine questions it introduces one to "prayer in the contemplative life," "the methbd of mental prayer," "preparation and reading," "meditation and colloquy," "difficulties in prayer," and "the presence of God." There is nothing theoretical or learned or meticulously precise about it. Evidently it is meant, as its title suggests, to be a simple and practical primer. On the other hand 99 BOOK NOTICES Review for Religious there "are thoughts in it which would be helpful and inspiring, I should say, to almost anyone, even tb contemplatives far advanced in the ways of prayer and sanctity. For instance, from the very first page one might learn this distinction between the Christian life and the contemplative life: the good Christian "lives /:or God," whereas the contemplative soul "lives not only for God, but also with God." Likewise it is emphasized at the very beginning in a quotation from St. Teresa that to reach the higher degrees of prayer one must per-force add the practice of mortification, "because prayer and comfort do not go together."--G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD, S.,J. BOOK NOTICES BLESSED MARIA GORETTI: Martyr for Purity, by 3ohn Cart, C.SS.R., is an admirable life of the twentieth-century martyr whom the Holy Father intends to canonize in the course of the present holy year. Blessed Maria sets an ideal before modern youth who live in an atmosphere so perilous to purity. (Dublin: Clonmore ~ Reynolds, Ltd., 1949. Pp. 70. 3/6.) Father Louis I. Fanfani, O.P., an outstanding modern canonist, has published a third edition of DE IURE RELIGIOSORUM. While keeping all the good qualities of previous editions, the book has been brought up to date and considerably increased in volume. A separate chapter is devoted to the newly established Secular Institutes. Four important documents are added by way of appendices: I. The new Norrnae of 1921; II. Letter of the Sacred Congregation of. Religious of 1931 on the formation and training of religi6us for sacred orders; III. Instruction on the enclosure of nuns with solemn vows issued in 1924; and, IV. The Statutes for Extert~ Sisters of monasteries of nuns, approved by Pope Pius XI in 1929 an'd published by the Sacred Congregation of Religious two years later. These documents are given in the original Latin text. (Rovigo, Italy: .Istituto Padano di Arti Grafiche, 1949. Pp. xxxi + 810. L. 2000.) OUR ETERNAL VOCATION, written anonymously by a Carmelite nun in England, is intended for all, priests, religious, or laity, who are interested in attaining higher sanctity. Of its three main sections, the first treats of sanctity in gener.al, its meaning, its instruments, its fruits (pp. 9-135). The second is concerned with religious voca-tion in particular (pp. 135-177). The last tells about the sanctity and mission of St. Therese of Lisieux (pp. 177-207). The doctrine seems to be solid throughout and Jr'is presented palatably by a crisp style tinged With feeling and garnished with 100 March, 195 0 BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS striking illustrations. The book contains some shrewd psychology on the value of sincerity in attaining holiness, on methods of over-coming mental depression, on the natural requisites for a religious vocation. As might be expected, the author emphasizes the "Iittle way" of St. Therese, but she does not derogate from other methods of acquiring sanctity. (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1949. Pp. 207, $2.25.) BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS [These notices are purely descriptive, based on a cursory examination of the books listed. Some of the books will be reviewed or will be given longer notices later. The list is complete up to Feb. 10.] CARMELITE THIRD'ORDER PRESS, 6427 Woodlawn Avenue, Chi-. cago 37. Take This Scapulart. By Carmelite Fathers and Tertiaries. Pp. 270. $2.50. Unfolds the story of Our Lady's Scapular. FRANCISCAN HERALD PRESS, 1434 W. 51st Street, Chicago. Tertiar~ Office of the Parers. Pp. 103. $.50 (30% discount for orders of 25 or more). A vest-pocket booklet of aids in reciting the office prepared especially for members of the Third Order of St. Francis. Also contains the Seraphic Office, the Office of the Pas-sion, and the Franciscan Tertiary Office with reflections. M. H. GILL ~ SON, Ltd., 50 Upper O'Connell Street, Dublin. Fair as the Moon. By Father M. Oliver, O.Cist.R. Pp. xi -b 235. 12s. 6d. A portrait of Mary, the Mother of God and "Purest of Creatures." Catherine McAule~I: The First Sister of Mercy. Pp. x ÷ 434. 15/-. "This book, the fruit of considerable research, is based largely on hitherto unpublished document's, and throws fresh light on Cath-erine McAuley's life and work." [5. HERDER BOOK COMPANY, St. Louis 2, Missouri. Ps~/cbiatq/and Asceticism. By Felix D. Duffey, C.S.C. Pp. 132. $2.00. True Stories for First Communicants. Pp. 80. $1.25. First Communion Davis. Pp. 96. $1.25. Both by a Sister of Notre Dame. True stories which should help children in preparing for their first Communion and after. The books were first printed in 1919 and 1920 respectively. The Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Two volumes. By Maurice 101 BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS for Religiou* Meschler, S.J. Pp. xxii q-- 545 arid viii -b 551. $12.00 (set). Translated by Sister Mary Margaret, O.S.B. This is the fifth edi-tion of the author's well-known meditations on the life of Christ. LEMOYNE COLLEGE PRESS, LeMoyne Heights, Syracuse 3, New York. Inigo de Logola. By Pedro Leturia, S.J. Pp. xiii + 209. $4.50. The story of the early life of St. Ignatius up to and including his conversion. LIBRERIA FRANCESCO FERRARI, Via dei Cestari, 2, Kome, Italy. Manuale Tbeorico-Practicurn Tbeologiae Moralis ad Mentern D. Thomae. By Father Louis J. Fanfani, O.P. Pp. xix + 648. This is the first of a set of three volumes. It treats of man's last end, human acts, laws, conscience, the virtues, sins, and censures. It is planned to complete the set within the course of the year. LITURGICAL PRESS, St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minnesota. Life. and Miracles of St. Benedict. By Pope St. Gregory the Great. Translated by Odo J. Zimmermann, O.S.B., and Benedict R.Avery, O.S.B. Pp. xv q- 87. $2.00 (cloth); $.90 (paper). A translation of Book Two of the Dialogues of St. GregorY. MCLAUGHLIN ~ REILLY, 45 Franklin Street, Boston 10. When the People Sang. By Marie Pierik. Pp. 32. $.50 (paper). "A simple treatise on the Gregorian Chant, its history and use." NEWMAN PRESS, Westminster, Maryland. Treatise on Prager and Meditation. By St. Peter of Alcantara. Translated by Dominic Devas, O.F.M. Pp. xx ÷ 211. $2.50. Besides this classic treatise on prayer, the book contains an introdtic-tion and sketch of the saint's life and a complete English version of Pax Anirnae, a treatise formerly attributed to the saint. The Spiritual Life of the Priest. By M. Eugene Boylan, O.C.R. Pp. 161. $2.50. A reprint of a series of articles which first appeared in the pages of The Priest. The Holg Year of Jubilee. By Herbert Thurston, S.J. Pp. xxiv -[- 420. $4.25. An account of the history and ceremonial of the Roman jubilee. Contains many illustrations. First printed in 1900. The Wag of Divine Love. Pp. xxxvii q- 532. $4.25. A com-plete account of the revelations of the Sacred Heart as made to Sister Josefa Menendez, Coadjutrix Sister of the Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. There is also a short biography of the Sister and an analytical index. 102 March, 1950 BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS Purgatorg and the Means to AvoidIt. By Martin Jugie, A.A. Pp. 203. $3.25. A doctrinal and devotional treatment of a subject that is of interest to all. The book is translated from the seventh French edition by Malachy Gerard Carroll. The Life and Revelations of Saint Gertrude: Virgin and Abbess, of the Order of St. Benedict. Pp. xlv + 570. $4.00. A reprinting of an old favorite which first appeared some eighty years ago. Prager for All Times. By Pierre Charles, S.J. Translated by Maud Monahan. Foreword by C. C. Martindale, S.J. Pp. 328. $3,50. A book on prayer designed "to mak~ smooth the ways of the spirit and to unfold the eternal message of the nearness of God." Little Catechism of the Act of Oblation of St. Th~r~se of the Child Jesus. By the Carmelites of Lisieux. Translated by Rev. Mi-chael Collins, A.M. Pp. 22. $.25. PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH OF THE CAPUCHIN ORDER, 1740 Mt. EI-liott Avenue, Detroit, Michigan. Meditations: Volume I: Advent to Ash Wednesday. By Bernar-dine Goebel, O.F.M.Cap. Translated from the German by Berch- "mans Bittle, O.F.M.Cap. Pp. 537. $3.50 (paper). ST. CATHARINE JUNIOR COLLEGE LIBRARY, St. Catharine, Ken-tucky. The Catholic Booklist 1950. Edited by Sister SteIla Marls, O.P., for the Catholic Library Association. Pp. 74. $.65 (paper). "An annotated bibliography, for the most part Catholic in authorship or subject matter, chosen as a guide to the recreational and instructional reading of Catholics." UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS, Notre Dame, Indiana. The Christfan Vfrtues. By Charles E. Sheedy, C.S.C. Pp. xi q- 361. $3.00. A book on moral theology for college students and lay readers. God and the World of Man. By Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C. Pp. viii -}- 318. $3.00. A theological text for the layman. Treat-ises on faith, God, the Trinity, creation, the elevation and fall of .man, the end of the world and man. JOSEPH F. WAGNER, INC., 53 Park Place, New York 7. --Must It be Communism? By Augustine J. Osgniach, O.S.B. Pp. x -]- 486. A philosophical inquiry into the major issues of today. The last three chapters are by Jerome L. Toner, O.S.B. 103 .uestdons and Answers We have an application from a woman who has obtained a permanent separation from her husband and now wishes to try out the religious llfe. Creusen, ReBgious Men and H/omen ~n the Code, p. 135, states: "A wife abandoned by her husband., does not need his consent to enter, rell-gion. One may see in R.C.R., 1939, under what conditions her entry into religion may be obtained." Please tell us what R.C.R. stands for, and, if convenient, give us a summary of the conditions referred to. R.C.R. refers to a review for religious published in Belgium by Father Creusen and his associates under the title Reoue des Commun-autos Religieuses (53 rue Royale, Brussels, Belgium). Here is a sum-mary of what Father Creusen wrote in the answer referred to. (1) The aspirant must not have been in any way the gravely culpable cause of the separation. (2) There must be moral certitude that she cannot be forced legally to abandon the religious life in order to resume married life. A civil divorce is the best guarantee. (For this the bishop's permission should be obtained.) (3) If the appli-cant has children, their care and support will have to be guar~inteed. (4) The superior of an institute or monastery who is willing to accept her on trial must be convinced that she has an extraordinary vocation and that there are particular reasons to anticipate her perse-verance. If all these conditions are fulfilled, the person in question may appeal to the Holy See for the necessary dispensation. She should do so personally. To this personal appeal a letter of recommenda-tion from her bishop should be added. This recommendation should be given at least regarding the good character of the person, even though the bishop does not wish to support her application for the dispensation. Finally, a letter from the religious superior who is willing to accept the candidate, stating that she believes the applicant to have an extraordinary vocation and that the community is willing to receive her on trial, will complete the official documents required. A baptismal certificate of the applicant and a copy of the decree of civil divorce ~hould be sent along with the other documents. Father Creusen concludes his answer with the following para-graph: "It must be added that the Holy See shows itself very prudent and very reserved in granting this dispensation. The utmost good will in the beginning is far, it seems, from guaranteeing perseverance 104 QuEs-r~o~s ~no ANswrRs in vocations of this kind. It is useless to encourage the application without exceptional reasons." Canon law cjrants to superiors the rlgttf #o extend: (I) the posfulancy, but not beyond six months (canon 539, § 2); (2) the time of the novif~ofe, but not beyond six months {canon 571, § 2); (3~ the period of temporary vows, but