Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe centralization of local public finance is commonly justified in terms of equality. The welfare state regulates local government and allocates grants in a way that sacrifices efficiency to achieve equality. The political economy model suggests that democratically elected national politicians may pursue policies that diverge from this. This article outlines a version of the political economy model based on seat‐maximizing politicians in central and local government. Both parliamentary policy making and local government lobbying may generate disparities in grant allocation. On the basis of data on central grant distribution in Norway, we observe persistent disparities in local government revenues that cannot be accounted for by regional policy aims or egalitarian objectives. Extensive data on local governments, the lobbying activities of local council members and the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) allows us to test the political economy hypotheses. Disparities in the number of seats allocated to the national election districts, and differences in the local lobbying activities, influence the distribution of grants between municipalities and counties.

Abstract.  Public choice analysts argue that, while incentive mechanisms in competitive markets ensure consumer sovereignty, decisions in political processes conflict with voters' preferences. Voters are vulnerable because they are rationally apathetic. Yet, if this is so, how can high participation rates be explained? Evidence reveals that, in the absence of effective quid pro quo, behaviour differs systematically from that predicted of homo economicus. Here it is argued that, while participation cannot be explained in terms of an instrumental act (to affect outcome), it can be explained in terms of individuals' perceptions of the intrinsic value of the process itself. It follows that inherent mechanisms within representative democracy are capable of mitigating the more 'dismal' predictions of public choice analysis.

Abstract. In this article, we update and expand the measure of voter ideology we originally proposed in this journal in 1998. Our new measure combines party manifesto data most recently updated byBudge et al. (2001) with election return data. Assuming the comparability and relevance of left‐right ideology, we estimate the median voter position in 25 Western democracies throughout most of the postwar period. With this measure, we are able to make cross‐national comparisons of voter ideology among these countries, as well as cross‐time comparisons within individual countries.

Abstract.  According to numerous recent cross‐national studies of public support for democracy, citizens of both well‐established and newer democracies continue to share a strong commitment to the ideals and principles of representative democracy. Paradoxically, however, these same citizens are increasingly 'critical' of and 'dissatisfied' with the performance of their national democratic institutions. One response has been to call for the 're‐invention of government' through the use of referendums and ballot initiatives. This article explores what happens when the national referendum was introduced in Portugal in 1998 – a polity that only recently consolidated its transition to democracy. We examine in some depth the context under which the referendum was introduced and its results in terms of electoral behaviour. The main goals are to explain both abstention and vote choice in the 1998 Portuguese referendums, analysing the role of political parties, social structural factors and pressure groups on those phenomena.

Abstract.  Formally organized factions in dominant parties face an electoral dilemma – namely, they need to cooperate sufficiently to ensure party control of government while competing with each other for members. This article examines the efforts of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions to reconcile these conflicting interests during the period 1958–1990. In particular, we are interested in how institutional constraints imposed both by the electoral system and the party affected the ability of the various factions to increase membership. Following the literature, which identifies incumbency, the party endorsement and mainstream faction status as important determinants of electoral success, we investigate the relative ability of individual factions to increase membership by refocusing analysis on the party's non‐incumbent candidates. Consistent with earlier research, we confirm the importance of the party endorsement and mainstream faction status for the electoral success of these candidates. Contrary to current belief, however, we establish empirically that the electoral advantage enjoyed by the non‐incumbent candidates of mainstream factions is not due to a disproportionate number of party endorsements, but rather is heavily influenced by their disproportionate assignment to run in districts with attributes that enhance their electability.

Abstract.  The left‐right dimension and grid‐group theory differ in their empirical track records and the complexity of their conceptual structures. As regards the former, the left‐right dimension is the clear winner. With respect to the latter, grid‐group theory comes out ahead. The parsimony of the unidimensional left‐right dimension may result in a conflation of, or failure to account for, important political distinctions which grid‐group theory accounts for through its four political biases or orientations: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism. The degree to which grid‐group theory holds 'excess empirical content' compared to the left‐right dimension is tested by way of nine hypotheses. The analysis draws on a 1999 survey in the five Nordic countries (N=4,832) and demonstrates excess empirical content. Except in Norway, the left‐right dimension is found to be a surrogate for the conflict between egalitarianism's equality of outcome and individualism's equality of opportunity. Sweden and Denmark are prototypical cases. Conservatism conflates individualism and hierarchy, whereas radicalism conflates egalitarianism and fatalism. Confirmed excess empirical content is a necessary step. Theoretical complexity must also demonstrate enhanced causal power.

Abstract.  The conventional wisdom of domestic politics in the global economy holds that that the globalization of the market economy has spelled the imminent collapse of corporatist bargaining institutions and the corporatist goal of economic equality. This conventional wisdom, however, highlights an interesting puzzle: it was the process of internationalization and economic openness itself that generated corporatist institutions. This study examines whether corporatist institutions are still effective in ensuring the corporatist goal of equality in the 'global' economy. Income inequality from the early 1980s to the middle 1990s is used as a measure of institutional effectiveness. It is argued that corporatism, as a form of interest mediation, is a path‐dependent institution that generates increasing returns in terms of equality in the most internationalized economies. Results of a panel study of 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries indicate that corporatism reduces income inequality and, contrary to the conventional wisdom, income inequality is lowest in the most 'global' national economies.